Remanan v. State of Kerala and R. Usha

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ALEXANDER THOMAS** **THURSDAY, THE 17TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2020 / 26TH AGRAHAYANA, 1942** ## **Crl.MC.No.9335 OF 2019(F)** **CRIME NO.241/2019 OF ADOOR POLICE STATION, PATHANAMTHITTA** ## **PETITIONER/SOLE ACCUSED:** **REMANAN AGED 53 YEARS S/O. THANKAPPAN, THARAYIL VEEDU(AMBADI), PUTHUMALA P O, EZHAMKULAM MURI, ADOOR TALUK, PATHANMATHITTA DISTRICT-691554.** **BY ADVS. SRI.MANU RAMACHANDRAN SRI.M.KIRANLAL SRI.R.RAJESH (VARKALA) SRI.T.S.SARATH SMT.AKHILA B.** ## **- RESPONDENTS/STATE & DE FACTO COMPLAINANT:** - **1 THE STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM-682031.** - **2 THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, OFFICE OF DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, ADOOR SUB DIVISION, PATHANAMTHITTA DISTRICT-691523.** - **3 R.USHA,** **AGED 43 YEARS, W/O. MOHANAN, VALLIVILA VEEDU, PUTHUMALA P O, CHIRANIKKAL, PARACKODE NORTH, ADOOR TALUK, PATHANAMTHITTA DISTRICT-691554.** **R3 BY ADV. SHRI.VIJAYAN K.N R3 BY ADV. SRI.G.MANU (M-1316)** ## **SRI.SANTHOSH PETER, PUBLIC PROSECUTOR** **THIS CRIMINAL MISC. CASE HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 17.12.2020, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY PASSED THE FOLLOWING:** Crl.M.C No.9335 of 2019 2 ## **ALEXANDER THOMAS, J.** ## **=========================== Crl.M.C No.9335 of 2019** **===========================** Dated this the 17[th] day of December, 2020 ## **ORDER** The prayers in the aforecaptioned Crl.M.C filed under Sec.482 of the Cr.P.C is as follows : - _“1. To Quash Annexure-A1 FIR in Crime No.241/2019 of Adoor Police Station, Pathanamthitta district and the all the proceedings arising therefrom._ _2. Issue such other orders or directions which deems necessary for the ends of justice and in the circumstances of the case.”_ 2. The main contentions urged by the petitioner herein are as follows: - A. The attempt of the 3[rd] respondent/de-facto complainant herein while preferring the alleged complaint to District Police Chief, Pathanamthitta and in preferring private complaint is to set up a criminal case to defend the proceedings under S.138 of N.I Act from the part of petitioner/sole accused. The 3[rd] respondent/de-facto complainant herein preferred the alleged complaint to the District Police Chief, Pathanamthitta as a pre-emptive act to defend the possible actions from the part of the petitioner under 138 of N.I Act. - B. The offences alleged against the petitioner are not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. There is a gross delay in lodging the FIR or even the 1[st] alleged complaint which itself is an indication Crl.M.C No.9335 of 2019 3 of foisting a false case. It is in the light of these averments and contentions, the petitioner has filed the aforecaptioned Crl.M.C with the under Sec.482 of the Cr.P.C with the aforementioned prayers. 3. One of the contentions urged by the petitioner is that the abovesaid allegations raised by the 2[nd] respondent in the impugned criminal proceedings at Annexure-A1, are completely false and malicious and has been made only to extricate themselves from the liability on account of the dishonour of the cheque issued by them to the petitioner. That the 3[rd] respondent-de facto complainant has borrowed Rs.2 lakhs from the petitioner on 12.02.2018 and for repayment of the same, she had handed over post-dated cheque dated 27.11.2018 for an amount of Rs.2 lakhs to the petitioner. That by the first week of November, 2018, the petitioner had informed the 3[rd] respondent about his intention to present the cheque before the bank concerned without any further delay and the 3[rd] respondent should ensure that sufficient funds are available in her account for honouring the cheque. That, on 29.11.2018, the petitioner had presented the abovesaid cheque dated 27.11.2018 issued by the 3[rd] respondent, which was returned by the bank on 30.11.2018 with the Crl.M.C No.9335 of 2019 4 memo that the same is dishonoured for insufficiency of funds in the account of the 3[rd] respondent. That the petitioner had sent Annexure-A2 demand notice dated 03.12.2018 as contemplated in Sec.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act to the 3[rd] respondent. That Annexure-A2 demand notice was served on the 3[rd] respondent on 05.12.2018. That since the 3[rd] respondent knew very well that the cheque will be dishonoured, she has made the false allegations in the private criminal complaint at Annexure-A1, which was referred by the learned Magistrate to the police for investigation. That, Annexure-A1 private criminal complaint has been filed before the court concerned on 06.12.2018. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed Annexure-A3 complaint under Sec.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the 3[rd] respondent on 27.12.2018. That it is thereafter that Annexure-A1 FIR in the impugned crime has been registered by the police on 17.01.2019. 4. Yet another contention urged by the petitioner is that even otherwise, there are no allegations in the impugned complaint, which is treated as the First Information Statement in the impugned FIR that the alleged utterances of caste name made by the petitioner in any place within the public view, as contemplated in Sec.3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Crl.M.C No.9335 of 2019 5 Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 as amended and that therefore, apart from the fact that the abovesaid allegations of utterance of caste name has been made falsely by the 3[rd] respondent, the said allegations will not fulfil the essential and vital ingredients of the offence as per Sec.3(1)(s) of the abovesaid Act. Further, it is pointed out that the only allegations on the basis of which the offence as per Sec.294(b) of the IPC has been included in the FIR is that the petitioner has allegedly used vulgar and abusive language to the 3[rd] respondent. That it is well settled by a series of rulings of this Court that mere use of vulgar and filthy language, will not constitute the vital ingredients of the offence of the utterance of obscene words, as envisaged in Sec.294(b) of the IPC, unless the prosecution has a definite case that the alleged words uttered out are those which are capable of arousing impure sexual thoughts in the minds of the hearers and those words should be lascivious in nature and further that the words will have been uttered in a public place, that the said ingredients to disclose the offence as per Sec.294(b) of the IPC are also completely lacking in this case, etc. 5. Earlier it is pointed out on behalf of the 3[rd] respondent that Crl.M.C No.9335 of 2019 6 as a matter of fact, she had earlier filed a complaint/petition dated 08.11.2018 before the Superintendent of Police, Pathanamthitta, for which she would also issue receipt No.2645 from the office of the Superintendent of Police, which are cited as document Nos.1 & 2 in the list of documents appended to Annexure-A1 private criminal complaint dated 06.12.2018. Further that, Annexure-A1 private criminal complaint has been filed before the competent court on 06.12.2018 and that the learned Magistrate had passed orders on 05.01.2019 directing the police to register a crime and conduct investigation in terms of Sec.156 (3) of the Cr.P.C and it is only thereafter, the police have registered the impugned Annexure-A1 FIR on 17.01.2019. That the incident in question has happened on 04.11.2018 at about 11 a.m. in the morning and that since the police authorities was not taking steps to register the crime, the 3[rd] respondent was constrained to submit complaint /petition in writing on 08.11.2018 before the Superintendent of Police, Pathanamthitta, which was duly received by the said office by giving receipt No.2645/2015, as can be seen from item Nos.1 & 2 of the list of documents appended to Annexure-A1 private criminal complaint. Further that, even going by the case of the petitioner, the cheque dated 27.11.2018 was presented only on 28.11.2018 and that the petitioner Crl.M.C No.9335 of 2019 7 cannot contend that the 3[rd] respondent has raised false allegations, in respect of the incident which happened on 04.11.2018, since at the first available opportunity, the 3[rd] respondent has filed a petition in writing before the Superintendent of Police on 08.11.2018, immediately after the incident on 04.11.2018. Therefore, it cannot be said that it is only as a counterblast to the steps taken by the petitioner for presentation of the cheque that the 3[rd] respondent has raised these allegations, etc. Further, it is submitted that the case is only at the crime stage and that the prayer for quashment may not be acceded to by this Court, etc. 6. The learned Public Prosecutor was requested to get specific instructions on the factual plea of the 3[rd] respondent, as to whether she had in fact filed petition/complaint dated 08.11.2018 before the Superintendent of Police, as stated in item Nos.1 & 2 of the list of documents appended to Annexure-A1 private criminal complaint. So also, the learned Public Prosecutor was requested to get instructions, as to the steps taken in the investigation process and as to whether the petitioner as well as the witnesses cited by the 3[rd] respondent in her complaint has been questioned and examined by the Investigating Crl.M.C No.9335 of 2019 8 Officer, etc. Today when the matter has been taken up for consideration, Sri.Santhosh Peter, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the official respondents would submit on the basis of instructions that the 3[rd] respondent has filed complaint/petition dated 08.11.2018 before the Superintendent of Police, Pathanamthitta, for which a receipt was also issued and these aspects are mentioned by the 3[rd] respondent in item Nos.1 & 2 of the list of documents appended to Annexure-A1 private criminal complaint. Further it is pointed out by the learned Public Prosecutor on the basis of instructions of the Investigating Officer that the Investigating Officer has already interrogated the petitioner and 10 other witnesses. The said 10 witnesses are the 3[rd] respondent-lady de facto complainant, her husband, two daughters and her father & mother (thus 6 persons belonging to the family of the de facto complainant including herself) and 4 witnesses cited by the 3[rd] respondent in her complaint, who are the immediate neighbours in the vicinity. That all the abovesaid six witnesses including the 3[rd] respondent, who are family relatives has supported the case of the complainant, whereas all the four independent witnesses have not supported the case of the de facto complainant, etc. Crl.M.C No.9335 of 2019 9 7. After hearing both sides and on examination of the materials on record at Annexure-A1, etc., it can be seen that the specific allegation raised by the 3[rd] respondent in Annexure-A1 in the impugned criminal proceedings at Annexure-A1 is that the petitioner has allegedly uttered her caste name in the veranda of her residence. 8. It is by now well settled by a series of rulings of the Apex Court in cases as in _**Swaran Singh & Ors. v. State through Standing Counsel & Ors.**_ [(2008) 8 SCC 435] that there is a distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”, etc. These aspects of the matter has been given the detailed consideration in a recent judgment rendered by the Apex Court on 05.11.2020 in Crl.Appeal No.707/2020 in the case _**Hitesh Verma v. The State of Uttarakhand & anr.**_ [(2020) SCC OnLine SC 907], wherein it has been held in paragraph Nos.14 to 15 thereof after placing reliance on _**Swaran Singh’s case**_ (supra) [(2008) 8 SCC 435] that there is a vital distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view” and that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the Crl.M.C No.9335 of 2019 10 contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends), then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view. 9. It will be profitable to refer to paragraph Nos.14 & 15 of the judgment dated 05.11.2020 rendered by the Apex Court in Crl.A.No.707/2020 (arising out of SLP (Criminal) No.3585/2020), in the case _**Hitesh Verma v. The State of Uttarakhand & anr.**_ , [(2020) SCC OnLine SC 907] which read as follows : _“14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as_ _**Swaran Singh & Ors.** v._ _**State through Standing Counsel & Ors.5** . The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view. The Court held as under:_ _“28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or_ Crl.M.C No.9335 of 2019 11 _friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.”_ _15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the informant were within the four walls of her building. It is not the case of the informant that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic ingredient that the words were uttered “in any place within public view” is not made out. In the list of witnesses appended to the charge-sheet, certain witnesses are named but it could not be said that those were the persons present within the four walls of the building. The offence is alleged to have taken place within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view of the judgment of this Court in_ _**Swaran Singh** , it cannot be said to be a place within public view as none was said to be present within the four walls of the building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet.”_ 10. Sec.3(1)(s) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act as amended reads as follows : _**“Sec.3. Punishments for offences atrocities** ._ _**—** (1) Whoever, not_ _**—** being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,_ XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX ( _s_ ) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view;” Since the specific allegations of the 3[rd] respondent in the impugned criminal proceedings at Annexure-A1 are to the effect that the petitioner has allegedly uttered out the caste name in a derogative Crl.M.C No.9335 of 2019 12 manner in the veranda of her house, etc., it cannot be said that the vital ingredients of Sec.3(1)(s) of the abovesaid Act are fulfilled, inasmuch as the specific requirement thereof is that such utterances should have been made in any place within the public view and that in view of the abovesaid legal position, the vital ingredients thereof are not satisfied in this case. Hence, the matter would require interdiction to that extent. One of the other allegations is that the petitioner has allegedly used filthy and abusive language to the 3[rd] respondent at the time of the incident. 11. It is by now well settled by a series of rulings of this Court as in _**Latheef v. State of Kerala**_ [2014 (2) KLT 987], _**Sangeetha Lakshmana v. State of Kerala**_ [2008 (2) KLT 745] and _**P.T.Chacko v. Nainan Chacko**_ [1967 KLT 799], that mere use of filthy and abusive language will not satisfy the vital ingredients of the offence of utterance of obscene words, as envisaged in Sec.294(b) of the IPC and that for attracting the offence as per Sec.294(b) of the IPC, the prosecution has a definite case that the alleged words used by the accused are lascivious in nature would arose lustful thoughts in the minds of the hearers and further that, such alleged obscene words must have been uttered by the accused in a public place. It will be profitable Crl.M.C No.9335 of 2019 13 ## to refer to paragraph Nos.5 of decision of this Court _**Latheef v. State**_ _**of Kerala**_ [2014 (2) KLT 987], which reads as follows: “5. Abusive words or humiliating words or defamatory words will not as such amount to obscenity as defined under the law. Of course there is no doubt that the words alleged to have been used by the revision petitioner are in fact abusive and humiliating. But to make it obscene, punishable under Section 294(b) IPC, it must satisfy the definition of obscenity. Section 294 IPC does not define obscenity. Being a continuation of the subject dealt with under Section 292 IPC the definition of obscenity under 292(1) IPC can be applied in a prosecution under Section 294 IPC also. To make punishable, the alleged words must be in a sense lascivious, or it must appeal to the prurient interest, or will deprave and corrupt persons. In P.T Chacko V. Nainan Chacko reported in (1967 KLT 799) this Court held that, “ the test of obscenity is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences.” In Sangeetha Lakshmana V. State of Kerala reported in (2008(2) KLT 745) this Court held thus, “in order to satisfy the test of obscenity, the words alleged to have been uttered must be capable of arousing sexually impure thoughts in the minds of its hearers.” Thus it is quite clear that, to make obscene the alleged words must involve some lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts or feelings or the words must have the effect of depraving persons, and defiling morals by sex appeal or lustful desires. I find that the words alleged to have been used by the revision petitioner in this case are really abusive and humiliating, but those words cannot be said to be obscene. As already stated, every abusive word or every humiliating word cannot, by itself, be said to be obscene as defined under the Indian Penal Code. I find that the conviction against the revision petitioner under Section 294 (b)IPC in this case, on the basis of the above words alleged to have been used by him, is liable to be set aside, and the revision petitioner is entitled to be acquitted.” 12. In the instant case, the allegations projected for roping in the offence as per Sec.294(b) of the IPC in the impugned criminal Crl.M.C No.9335 of 2019 14 proceedings is to the effect that the petitioner has allegedly used obscene and filthy language to the 3[rd] respondent and further that, the said words were uttered out by him in the veranda of the house of the 3[rd] respondent. In the instant case, the prosecution does not have any case that the alleged words uttered out by the petitioner are lascivious in nature and would have arose impure sexual thoughts and lustful desires in the minds of the hearers. So also, the prosecution does not have any case that the such words have been uttered out by the petitioner in a public place, inasmuch as, the admitted case of the prosecution is that the words were uttered out by the petitioner in the veranda of the residential premises of the 3[rd] respondent. Hence, for these reasons, this Court is of the considered view that the vital ingredients of the offences as per Sec.3(1) (s) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 as amended and that of Sec.294(b) of the IPC are conspicuously absent in this case. Hence, the initiation and continuance of the impugned criminal proceedings at Annexure-A1 to the limited extent it alleges offences as per Sec.3(1)(s) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 as amended and Sec.294(b) of the IPC, are liable for interdiction at the hands of this Court. Crl.M.C No.9335 of 2019 15 13. The other offences alleged against the petitioner are those under Secs.354, 323, 448 & 506 of the IPC and as per Sec.3(1)(w) (ii) and Sec.3(2)(vi) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Sec. 3(1)(w) (ii) of the abovesaid Act provides as follows: _**“Sec.3. Punishments for offences atrocities** ._ _**—** (1) Whoever, not_ _**—** being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,_ ||XXX|XXX|XXX| |---|---|---|---| ||XXX|XXX|XXX| |(_w_) (i)|XXX|XXX|XXX| ( _ii_ ) uses words, acts or gestures of a sexual naturetowards a woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, knowing that she belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe.” 14. Sec. 3(2)(vi) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, reads as follows: ## _**“Sec.3. Punishments for offences atrocities** ._ _**—**_ |XXX|XXX|XXX| |---|---|---| |XXX|XXX|XXX| |being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Sc||| |XXX|XXX|XXX| |XXX|XXX|XXX| ( _2_ ) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, **—** Crl.M.C No.9335 of 2019 16 _(vi) knowingly or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed under this Chapter, causes any evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment, or with that intention gives any information respecting the offence which he knows or believes to be false, shall be punishable with the punishment provided for that offence;”_ 15. After hearing both sides and after giving anxious consideration to the rival pleas, this Court is of the considered view that at this stage, it may not be proper for this Court to hold that the ingredients of the abovesaid other offences are not disclosed in this case, as the matter is still at the investigation stage and as of now, the petitioner does not have any case that the investigation is being conducted wrongfully or that it is not being carried out in the right and proper lines. Therefore, it is for the investigating agency to ensure that the investigation of the abovesaid crime to the extent it involves the other offences if carried out, in accordance with law and untrammelled and uninfluenced in any manner by the observations and findings made by this Court hereinabove. It is now apprised to this Court that the petitioner has already been interrogated and questioned by the Investigating Officer in this case and further that, altogether 10 witnesses have been examined, out of which six including the 3[rd] respondent are her immediate family relatives and four others are Crl.M.C No.9335 of 2019 17 neighbours. That the said six witnesses have supported the case of the 3[rd] respondent and four others were neighbours in the vicinity, have not supported the case of the 3[rd] respondent, etc. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner would point out that since the Investigating Officer has already interrogated the petitioner, the petitioner would surrender before the jurisdictional court concerned and move bail application or before the Investigating Officer, so that thereafter, his bail application would be considered on the same day by the competent court below concerned on his production, etc. 17. The learned Public Prosecutor would point out that it is not known whether the interrogation of the petitioner has been completed in its entirety and that if any further interrogation is required, it will be it make better in the fitness of things that the petitioner is directed to surrender before the Investigating Officer, so as to complete the interrogation process, etc. 18. Taking note of the said submissions, it is ordered in the interest of justice that the petitioner may without any further delay surrender before the Investigating Officer for interrogation purposes by 9 a.m. on any day on or before 31/01/2021, upon which the Investigating Crl.M.C No.9335 of 2019 18 Officer will interrogate the petitioner and thereafter, will immediately produce the petitioner before the competent Sessions Court notified to deal with SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, upon which the said court will consider the bail application of the petitioner filed under Sec.437 of the Cr.P.C and after affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to the petitioner, prosecution agency and the 3[rd] respondent-de facto complainant, may pass orders thereon on the same day of production of the petitioner/accused, taking note of the abovesaid aspects mentioned by the Investigating Officer regarding the questioning of 10 witnesses, including the four independent witnesses, who are neighbours, etc. At that stage, the said court will take into account the fact that the statutory bar in terms of Sec.18/18A of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 would not apply at the stage of consideration of the regular bail application filed by an accused in terms of Sec.437 of the Cr.P.C. 19. To ensure co-ordinated action in that regard, the petitioner will ensure that advance notice shall be given to the Investigating Officer as well as the learned Prosecutor in charge of this case before the competent court, at least three days prior to the proposed surrender notifying them about the exact day that he would surrender. Immediately thereafter, the Investigating Officer will ensure that notice is served on the 3[rd] respondent-lady de facto complainant about the aforesaid bail application that will be moved before Crl.M.C No.9335 of 2019 19 the competent court and its details. It is for the said party thereafter, to appear before the said court at the time of consideration of the bail application. No other separate notice to be issued to the 3[rd] respondent, as otherwise it may almost impossible for the sessions court concerned to adhere to the abovesaid direction to pass orders on the bail application on the same day of the production as well as to ensure the process of completion of service of notice on the 3[rd] respondent. 20. The petitioner and the Investigating Officer/learned Prosecutor concerned will ensure that copy of this order is made available to the competent court below concerned, which is to consider the bail application under Sec.437 of the Cr.P.C, for perusal. It is made clear that the court below concerned will independently consider the bail application on merits, after hearing both sides and in accordance with law. With these observations and directions, the above Crl.M.C will stand finally disposed of. **Sd/-** **ALEXANDER THOMAS JUDGE** vgd Crl.M.C No.9335 of 2019 20 ## **APPENDIX** **PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS: ANNEXURE A1 THE TRUE COPY OF THE FIR IN CRIME NO.241/2019 OF ADOOR POLICE STATION, PATHANAMTHITTA DISTRICT.** **ANNEXURE A2 THE TRUE COPY OF THE DEMAND NOTICE DATED 3.12.2018 ISSUED BY THE PETITIONERS ADVOCATE TO 3RD RESPONDENT/DE-FACTO COMPLAINANT HEREIN ALONG WITH RETURNED ACKNOWLEDGMENT CARD. ANNEXURE A3 THE TRUE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT U/S. 138 OF N.I. ACT FILED BY THE PETITIONER AGAINST 3RD RESPONDENT/DE-FACTO COMPLAINANT HEREIN AND NOW PENDING AS S.T. NO.977/2019 ON THE FILES OF JFMC, ADOOR.**