Reji Mathew v. Ramachandran and State of Kerala

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.S.DIAS** **TUESDAY, THE 12[TH] DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2023 / 21ST BHADRA, 1945** **CRL.REV.PET NO. 636 OF 2011** **AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT CRA 242/2007 OF ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT (ADHOC)III, PATHANAMTHITTA** **CC 630/2002 OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS ,RANNI** ## **REVISION PETITIONER/S:** REJI MATHEW, S/OMATHEW VENKADASSERIL HOUSE, PAZHAVANGADI, RANNY,, PATHANAMTHITTA. BY ADV SRI.V.PHILIP MATHEW ## **RESPONDENT/S:** 1 RAMACHANDRAN , S/OGANAPATHY CHETTIYAR, SHANMUGHA SADANAM, ANGADYY, RANNY,, PATHANAMTHITTA687694. 2 STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA,, ERNAKULAM. BY ADVS. SRI.PRAVEEN THOMAS ABRAHAM SRI.SAJJU.S SRI. K.SHAJ ## **OTHER PRESENT:** PP SMT PUSHPALATHA THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 12.09.2023, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: CRL.REV.PET NO. 636 OF 2011 2 ## **ORDER** Questioning the legality and correctness of the judgment of the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge (ADHOC) Fast Track Court-III, Pathanamthitta (Appellate Court) in Criminal Appeal No.242/2007, which in turn had confirmed the judgment of the Court of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ranni (Trial Court) in C.C.No.630/2022, the present revision petition is filed. The courts below have concurrently found the revision petitioner guilty for having committed an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for brevity 'N.I.Act') and have convicted and sentenced him. The revision petitioner was the accused and the 1[st] respondent was the complainant before the Trial Court. 2. The kernel of the facts relevant for the determination of the revision petition is: (i) The revision petitioner had borrowed a sum of Rs.3/- lakh from the 1[st] respondent on CRL.REV.PET NO. 636 OF 2011 3 09.01.2002 and in discharge of the debt had issued Ext.P1 cheque. The cheque got dishonoured on presentation for collection as per Ext.P2 memo due to 'insufficiency of funds' and that the account was closed. The 1[st] respondent issued Ext.P5 lawyer notice to the revision petitioner. Due to an inadvertent omission on the part of the counsel for 1[st] respondent who failed to sign the lawyer notice, Ext.P8 lawyer notice was also issued on 02.08.2002. Both the notices were received by the revision petitioner, but he failed to pay the amount demanded in the lawyer notice. Hence, the revision petitioner committed the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I.Act. (ii) Consequently, the complaint was filed and the same was taken cognizance of by the learned Magistrate. The revision petitioner got himself enlarged on bail and the complaint was posted for trial. The 1[st] respondent and two witnesses CRL.REV.PET NO. 636 OF 2011 4 were examined as PWs 1 to 3 and Exts.P1 to P14 were marked on their side. The revision petitioner examined DW1 and marked Exts.D1 to D8 in evidence. The revision petitioner was questioned under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short, ‘Cr.P.C.’). - (iii) The Trial Court, after analysing the materials on record, convicted the revision petitioner under Section 138 of the N.I.Act and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months and ordered him to pay a compensation of Rs.3,50,000/- to the 1[st] respondent under Section 357(3) of the Cr.P.C. and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of three months. - (iv) Confronted with the said judgment, the revision petitioner filed Criminal Appeal No.242/2007 before the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court, after re-appreciating the materials on record, by the impugned judgment, confirmed the CRL.REV.PET NO. 636 OF 2011 5 conviction, but modified the sentence to imprisonment till the rising of the Court, but again maintained the compensation part. 3. Heard; Sri.V.Philip Mathews, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner, Sri.K.Shaj, the learned counsel appearing for the 1[st] respondent and Smt. Seetha S., the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the 2[nd] respondent. 4. Sri.V.Philip Mathews, vehemently argued that the courts below have gone wrong in not appreciating the materials on record in their proper perspective. He contented that the 1[st] respondent had issued two lawyer notices, demanding the amount due as per Ext.P1 cheque, which is against proviso (b) to Section 138 of the N.I.Act, thereby, rendering the complaint bad. He relied on the decision of this Court in **Sukumar Pillai v. Baburaj** [2020 (3) KLT 467] to fortify his contention that there is no requirement for the counsel to sign the lawyer notice. He also submitted that the courts below have failed to appreciate that Ext.P1 cheque was issued CRL.REV.PET NO. 636 OF 2011 6 only towards security. In fact, the revision petitioner had filed Ext.D3 suit before the civil court for a decree for return of Ext.P1 cheque. Furthermore, the courts below have not adverted or considered the answers given by the revision petitioner in the Section 313 statement. The courts below have erroneously drawn the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I.Act. The courts below ought to have dismissed the complaint. He prayed that the revision petition be allowed by setting aside the concurrent findings of the courts below. 5. Sri.K.Shaj supported the judgments of the courts below and argued that the revision petitioner has failed to discharge the reverse onus of proof as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Kalmani Tex and other v. P. Balasubramaniam** [2021 (2) KHC 517]. The courts below have rightly appreciated the oral testimonies of PWs 1 and 3 and found that the 1[st] respondent has proved that Ext.P1 cheque was issued towards a legally enforceable debt. Even though the onus of proof had shifted to the revision petitioner, he CRL.REV.PET NO. 636 OF 2011 7 miserably failed to discharge the same. The revision petition is devoid of merits and is only to be dismissed. 6. Before I delve into the legality and correctness of the impugned judgments, this Court reminds itself of the nature of its revisional jurisdiction under Secs.397 to 401 of the Cr.P.C. 7. It is well settled in a host of judicial pronouncements that the revisional power of this Court is to be sparingly exercised and is in the nature of a supervisory jurisdiction to correct the miscarriage of justice, if any found. The revisional power cannot be equated with Appellate/Second Appellate power. Even if a different view is possible, the revisional Court shall not substitute the view taken by the Trial/Appellate Court, unless and until there is a patent illegality, which is shocking to the conscience of the Court. 8. In **Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan vs Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke & Anr** [(2015) 3 SCC 123], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has succinctly laid down the CRL.REV.PET NO. 636 OF 2011 8 ## scope and powers under Secs.397 to 401 of the Cr.P.C. It is apposite to extract the revisional declaration of law, which reads as follows: “14. In the case before us, the learned Magistrate went through the entire records of the case, not limiting to the report filed by the police and has passed a reasoned order holding that it is not a fit case to take cognizance for the purpose of issuing process to the appellant. Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is nonconsideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.” 9. Coming back to the facts of the instant case. 10. The cardinal grounds of attack before this Court is that the cheque was issued as security and the complaint is bad because two lawyer notices were issued by the 1[st] respondent demanding the amount due as per Ext.P1 cheque. CRL.REV.PET NO. 636 OF 2011 9 11. The 1[st] respondent was examined as PW1 and he proved and marked Exts.P1 to P14 documents in evidence. He also examined PW2 – the Bank Managerto prove the cheque and its dishonour. PW3 – the elder brother of the complainant - was also examined to substantiate the transaction that took place between the 1[st] respondent and the revision petitioner. PW3 specifically deposed that he had witnessed his brother handing over the amount of Rs.3,00,000/- to the revision petitioner, who in turn issued Ext.P1 cheque to the 1[st] respondent. 12. Admittedly, the revision petitioner did not send a reply notice or did he mount the box. Instead, he examined the landlord (DW1) of both the revision petitioner and the 1[st] respondent. The revision petitioner also marked Exts.D1 to D8 documents in evidence. 13. Ext.D1 is the rental was agreement that executed by DW1 in favour of the 1[st] respondent. Ext.D2 is the rental agreement that was executed CRL.REV.PET NO. 636 OF 2011 10 between revision petitioner and the 1[st] respondent. Ext.D3 is the suit that was filed by the revision petitioner against the 1[st] respondent for return of Ext.P1 cheque. Exts. D4 and D5 are the decree and judgment in the suit that was filed against the 1[st] respondent against forcible eviction. 14. The courts below after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record, particularly the oral testimonies of PWs1 and 3 arrived at a conclusion that Ext.P1 cheque was issued towards a legally enforceable debt. 15. A negotiable instrument, which includes a cheque, carries the presumption of consideration under Secs.118(a) and 139 of the N.I Act. It is profitable to extract the said relevant provisions: **“118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments** – Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made;- > (a) **of consideration** -that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration; **139. Presumption in favour of holder.** —It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a CRL.REV.PET NO. 636 OF 2011 11 cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in section 138, for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability”. ## 16. In **Kumar Exports vs Sharma Carpets** [2009 ## (1) KLT 197 (SC)], the Hon’ble Supreme Court analysed the above provisions and held thus: “9. In order to determine the question whether offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act is made out against the appellant, it will be necessary to examine the scope and ambit of presumptions to be raised as envisaged by the provisions of Sections 118 and 139 of the Act. In a suit to enforce a simple contract, the plaintiff has to aver in his pleading that it was made for good consideration and must substantiate it by evidence. But to this rule, the negotiable instruments are an exception. In a significant departure from the general rule applicable to contracts, Section 118 of the Act provides certain presumptions to be raised. This Section lays down some special rules of evidence relating to presumptions. The reason for these presumptions is that, negotiable instrument passes from hand to hand on endorsement and it would make trading very difficult and negotiability of the instrument impossible, unless certain presumptions are made. The presumption, therefore, is a matter of principle to facilitate negotiability as well as trade. Section 118 of the Act provides presumptions to be raised until the contrary is proved (i) as to consideration, (ii) as to date of instrument, (iii) as to time of acceptance, (iv) as to time of transfer, (v) as to order of endorsements,(vi) as to appropriate stamp and (vii) as to holder being a holder in due course. Section 139 of the Act provides that it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. Presumptions are devices by use of which the courts are enabled and entitled to pronounce on an issue notwithstanding that there is no evidence or insufficient evidence. Under the Indian Evidence Act all presumptions must come under one or the other class of the three classes mentioned in the Act, namely, (1) "may presume" (rebuttable), (2) "shall presume" (rebuttable) and (3) "conclusive CRL.REV.PET NO. 636 OF 2011 12 presumptions" (irrebuttable). The term `presumption' is used to designate an inference, affirmative or disaffirmative of the existence a fact, conveniently called the "presumed fact" drawn by a judicial tribunal, by a process of probable reasoning from some matter of fact, either judicially noticed or admitted or established by legal evidence to the satisfaction of the tribunal. Presumption literally means "taking as true without examination or proof". Section 4 of the Evidence Act inter-alia defines the words `may presume' and `shall presume as follows: - "(a) `may presume' - Whenever it is provided by this Act that the Court may presume a fact, it may either regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved or may call for proof of it. (b) `shall presume' - Whenever it is directed by this Act that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved." In the former case the Court has an option to raise the presumption or not, but in the latter case, the Court must necessarily raise the presumption. If in a case the Court has an option to raise the presumption and raises the presumption, the distinction between the two categories of presumptions ceases and the fact is presumed, unless and until it is disproved. 10. Section 118 of the Act inter alia directs that it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration. Section 139 of the Act stipulates that unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed, that the holder of the cheque received the cheque, for the discharge of, whole or part of any debt or liability. Applying the definition of the word `proved' in Section 3 of the Evidence Act to the provisions of Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, it becomes evident that in a trial under Section 138 of the Act a presumption will have to be made that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration and that it was executed for discharge of debt or liability once the execution of negotiable instrument is either proved or admitted. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument, say a note, was executed by the accused, the rules of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act help him shift the burden on the accused. The presumptions will live, exist and CRL.REV.PET NO. 636 OF 2011 13 survive and shall end only when the contrary is proved by the accused, that is, the cheque was not issued for consideration and in discharge of any debt or liability. A presumption is not in itself evidence, but only makes a prima facie case for a party for whose benefit it exists. 11. The use of the phrase "until the contrary is proved" in Section 118 of the Act and use of the words "unless the contrary is proved" in Section 139 of the Act read with definitions of "may presume" and "shall presume" as given in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, makes it at once clear that presumptions to be raised under both the provisions are rebuttable. When a presumption is rebuttable, it only points out that the party on whom lies the duty of going forward with evidence, on the fact presumed and when that party has produced evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the real fact is not as presumed, the purpose of the presumption is over. The accused in a trial under Section 138 of the Act has two options. He can either show that consideration and debt did not exist or that under the particular circumstances of the case the non-existence of consideration and debt is so probable that a prudent man ought to suppose that no consideration and debt existed. To rebut the statutory presumptions an accused is not expected to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt as is expected of the complainant in a criminal trial. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the note in question was not supported by consideration and that there was no debt or liability to be discharged by him. However, the court need not insist in every case that the accused should disprove the nonexistence of consideration and debt by leading direct evidence because the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated. At the same time, it is clear that bare denial of the passing of the consideration and existence of debt, apparently would not serve the purpose of the accused. Something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted to the complainant. To disprove the presumptions, the accused should bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of which, the court may either believe that the consideration and debt did not exist or their non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that they did not exist. Apart from adducing CRL.REV.PET NO. 636 OF 2011 14 direct evidence to prove that the note in question was not supported by consideration or that he had not incurred any debt or liability, the accused may also rely upon circumstantial evidence and if the circumstances so relied upon are compelling, the burden may likewise shift again on to the complainant. The accused may also rely upon presumptions of fact, for instance, those mentioned in Section 114 of the Evidence Act to rebut the presumptions arising under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act. The accused has also an option to prove the non-existence of consideration and debt or liability either by letting in evidence or in some clear and exceptional cases, from the case set out by the complainant, that is, the averments in the complaint, the case set out in the statutory notice and evidence adduced by the complainant during the trial. Once such rebuttal evidence is adduced and accepted by the court, having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the preponderance of probabilities, the evidential burden shifts back to the complainant and, thereafter, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act will not again come to the complainant's rescue. 17. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in **Rangappa vs. Sri.Mohan** [2010 KHC 4325], while dealing with Sec.139 of the N.I Act has conceptualised the doctrine of ‘reverse onus’, by holding thus: “ 18. In light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the respondent - claimant that the presumption mandated by S.139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) may not be correct. However, this does not in any way cast doubt on the correctness of the decision in that case since it was based on the specific facts and circumstances therein. As noted in the citations, this is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability CRL.REV.PET NO. 636 OF 2011 15 can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant. S.139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While S.138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under S.139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by S.138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused / defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under S.139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of 'preponderance of probabilities'. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. As clarified in the citations, the accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his / her own. 15. Coming back to the facts in the present case, we are in agreement with the High Court's view that the accused did not raise a probable defence. As noted earlier, the defence of the loss of a blank cheque was taken up belatedly and the accused had mentioned a different date in the 'stop payment' instructions to his bank. Furthermore, the instructions to 'stop payment' had not even mentioned that the cheque had been lost. A perusal of the trial record also shows that the accused appeared to be aware of the fact that the cheque was with the complainant. Furthermore, the very fact that the accused had failed to reply to the statutory notice under S.138 of the Act leads to the inference that there was merit in the complainant's version. Apart from not raising a probable defence, the appellant - accused was not able to contest the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. The fact that the accused had made regular payments to the complainant in relation to the construction of his house does not preclude the possibility of the complainant having spent his own money for the same purpose. As per the record of the case, there was a slight discrepancy in the complainant's CRL.REV.PET NO. 636 OF 2011 16 version, in so far as it was not clear whether the accused had asked for a hand loan to meet the construction - related expenses or whether the complainant had incurred the said expenditure over a period of time. Either way, the complaint discloses the prima facie existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability since the complainant has maintained that his money was used for the construction - expenses. Since the accused did admit that the signature on the cheque was his, the statutory presumption comes into play and the same has not been rebutted even with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant”. ## 18. Recently, a three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in **Kalamani Tex and Anr vs. P. Balasubramanian** [2021 (2) KHC 517] has reiterated the legal position and doctrine of the reverse onus. It is apposite to extract the relevant paragraphs, which declare the law on the point in the following legal terms: “14. Adverting to the case in hand, we find on a plain reading of its judgment that the trial Court completely overlooked the provisions and failed to appreciate the statutory presumption drawn under Section 118 and Section 139 of NIA. The Statute mandates that once the signature (s) of an accused on the cheque/negotiable instrument are established, then these ‘reverse onus’ clauses become operative. In such a situation, the obligation shifts upon the accused to discharge the presumption imposed upon him. This point of law has been crystalized by this Court in **Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat** (2019 (2) KHC 243).” ## 19. Similarly, in **M/s.Shree Daneshwari Traders** CRL.REV.PET NO. 636 OF 2011 17 ## **vs Sanjay Jain** [2019 (4) KHC 495], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows: “16. Under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, once the cheque is issued by the drawer, a presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in favour of the holder would be attracted. Section 139 creates a statutory presumption that a cheque received in the nature referred to under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is for the discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability. The initial burden lies upon the complainant to prove the circumstances under which the cheque was issued in his favour and that the same was issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt. 17. It is for the accused to adduce evidence of such facts and circumstances to rebut the presumption that such debt does not exist or that the cheques are not supported by consideration. Considering the scope of the presumption to be raised under Section 139 of the Act and the nature of evidence to be adduced by the accused to rebut the presumption.” 20. In the instant case, indisputably, the revision petitioner has admitted the issuance of Ext.P1 cheque or rather he has not denied the same either through a reply notice or by mounting the box. The only material that he relies on is Ext.D3 plaint that was instituted before the Civil Court to establish that Ext.P1 cheque was issued as security. 21. A reading of the oral testimony of DW1 would prove that he had no direct knowledge. His testimony is CRL.REV.PET NO. 636 OF 2011 18 based on hearsay evidence. Likewise, a reading of the Section 313 statement also reveals that the revision petitioner had not taken a defence that the cheque was issued only as a security. 22. It is based on the above clinching materials that the courts below arrived at a conclusion that Ext.P1 cheque was issued towards the legally enforcible debt and not as security. Hence, the revision petitioner committed the offence under Section 138 of the N.I.Act. 23. The next contention is regarding the sustainability of the complaint in view of the issuance of Exts.P5 and P8 lawyer notices in respect of the same cause of action. 24. The specific contention of the 1[st] respondent in the complaint is that although he had issued a notice on 01.08.2002 to the revision petitioner, due to an inadvertent omission on the part of his counsel to sign the notice, the counsel issued a second notice on the following day i.e., 02.08.2002. 25. On a perusal of Exts.P5 and P8 notices, it is CRL.REV.PET NO. 636 OF 2011 19 seen that the 1[st] respondent had issued four lawyer notices to the revision petitioner, both in his residential address and his business address, demanding to repay an amount of Rs.3,00,000/- in discharge of Ext.P1 cheque bearing No.152700 dated 09.07.2002. 26. Ext.P10 series acknowledgment cards substantiate that the four lawyer notices were received by the revision petitioner on 03.08.2002. 27. Admittedly, the revision petitioner has not replied to any of the notices or paid the amount claimed. The complaint was filed on 06.09.2002, well within the statutory time period contemplated under Section 142(1)(b) of the Act. 28. Even assuming that only one notice is contemplated under the Act, absolutely no prejudice has been caused to the revision petitioner by the issuance of the second notice because the 1[st] respondent has filed the complaint based on the cause of action that arose on the strength of the first notice dated 31.07.2002. There would have been some force in the contention of the CRL.REV.PET NO. 636 OF 2011 20 revision petitioner, if the complaint was filed after the statutory time period prescribed under the Act or if different amounts were demanded in the notices. Not only that, the revision petitioner has not cared to reply to any of the notices. Thus, I hold the issuance of second notice on the very next day is inconsequential and does not cause any prejudice to the revision petitioner as urged before this Court. The said contention is a hypertechnical one urged for the purpose of carving out a ground to sustain the revision petitioner. 29. On a comprehensive analysis of the materials on record and the findings of the court below, I do not find any impropriety, illegality or irregularity in the courts below finding that the revision petitioner guilty of an offence under Section 138 of the N.I.Act. The Appellate Court has rightly imposed only a reasonable sentence by sentencing the revision petitioner to imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to pay the compensation of Rs.3,50,000/-, which does not warrant any interference. CRL.REV.PET NO. 636 OF 2011 21 30. At the said point of time, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner submitted that the revision petitioner has already remitted an amount of Rs.1,50,000/- based on the interim order passed by this Court. Hence, the revision petitioner is only liable to pay the balance amount. He prayed for a reasonable time period to pay the balance amount. In the result: - (i) The revision petition is dismissed; - (ii) The conviction of the courts below and the sentence of the Appellate Court are confirmed; - (iii) Considering the request of the revision petitioner, two months time from today is granted to deposit the fine amount. - (iv) Needless to mention, if the revision petitioner has already deposited any amount towards the fine amount only the balance amount need be deposited; - (v) The revision petitioner is directed to appear before the Trial Court on or before **13.11.2023** to CRL.REV.PET NO. 636 OF 2011 22 undergo the sentence and to pay the fine amount. (vi) In case of failure of the revision petitioner to appear before the Trial Court and pay the fine amount, the Trial Court is directed to execute the sentence without fail, in accordance with law. - (vii) The execution of the sentence shall stand deferred till 13.11.2023. (viii) The Registry is directed to forthwith forward a copy of this judgment to the Trial Court for compliance. ## **Sd/-** **C.S.DIAS JUDGE** rkc/12.09.23