High CourtDivision BenchAppeal dismissed with costs

REGIONAL TRANSPORT OFFICER CHITTOOR ETC. v. ASSOCIATED TRANSPORT, MADRAS (P). LTD. & ORS.

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal Nos. 301-303 of 1970
Neutral Citation:1981 SCR 628

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • V. R. Krishna Iyer
  • A. D. Koshal
Judgment Date
1980-09-05
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal dismissed.
Final Disposition
Appeal dismissed with costs

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Regional Transport Officer, Chittoor

Respondents

  • Associated Transport, Madras (P) Ltd. & Ors.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • A. V. Nair

Counsels for Respondents

  • • K. Rajendra Chowdhary

Case Synopsis & Summary

Regional Transport Officer, Chittoor, challenged a tax rule crafted under the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers and Goods) Act, 1952/1954 framework, arguing it illegally imposed retrospective operation on tax liability for inter-state routes partly in Madras and partly in Andhra Pradesh. The matter traces to rules framed under Section 4(2) empowering the State Government to make necessary rules to effectuate the Act. In 1957, sub-rules (4) and (5) were added to Rule 1; these were later deleted in 1963 with retrospective effect from 1 April 1962, creating a dispute over retroactivity. The High Court held that Section 4(2) did not confer retrospective rule-making power on the delegate. The Supreme Court, in dismissing the special leave petition, agreed that while the Legislature can enact retrospective statutes, a delegate cannot exercise this power unless expressly conferred or implied by delegation. The Court emphasized that mere laying of rules before the Legislature does not grant retroactive validity, relying on established doctrine (cited Hukam Chand v. Union of India) that the delegation of rule-making power does not automatically include retrospective effect. The decision ultimately denies retroactive tax collection and dismisses the appeal with costs, reinforcing limits on delegated legislative power and the necessity for explicit delegation for retroactive rules.

Provisions of Law Cited

Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers and Goods) Act, 1954, Section 4(1)Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers and Goods) Act, 1954, Section 4(2)Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers and Goods) Act, 1952, Section 4(2)Section 40

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Delegated legislation requires express conferment or compelling implication for power to be exercised by the delegate.
  • A rule making power cannot be retrospective unless expressly conferred.
  • Laying a rule before the Legislature does not, by itself, confer validity if the rule is beyond the delegated power.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant contended that under Section 4(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Act, the State Government, as a delegate, could frame rules with retrospective effect, especially in light of rules (4) and (5) inserted in 1957 and their later deletion in 1963. It was urged that placing the rules on the table of the Legislature indicated implicit retrospection, and that the dissolution/approval process should not bar retrospective rule-making. The argument leaned on the belief that delegated power could encompass retrospective operation if implied by delegation or legislative procedure.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents argued that Section 4(2) does not vest the State Government with retrospective rule-making authority. The mere fact that rules could be placed before the Legislature or dissolved did not create retroactive validity. The delegation did not carry retrospective powers, and any retroactivity arising from deletions or substitutions in sub-rules was beyond the scope of the delegated power.

Cited Precedents (1)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Hukum Chand v. Union of India[1973] 1 S.C.R. 896, 902PositiveCited and followed to illustrate the principle that delegated rule-making power is not automatically retroactive; laid down the approach to reviewing delegated powers and retroactivity.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

~627 REGIONAL TRANSPORT OFFICER CHITTOOR ETC. _v._ ASSOCIATED TRANSPORT, MADRAS (P) LTD. & ORS. _September 5,_ 1980 [V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND A. **D.** KosHAL, JJ.] _Andhra Pradesh Motor VehiCles (Taxation_ _of_ _Passengers and Goods) Act,_ 1954, _·Section 4(1}--Power to make rules under Section_ 4(1)-A _delegate cannot_ _exercise the same power_ _of_ _the delegator unless there_ _is_ _svecial conferment_ _thereof._ _Retrospectivity_ _in_ _the rule-making_ _power-Mere_ _fact that the rules framed_ _by the State Government (delegate) had to_ _be_ _,placed on the ·table_ _of_ _the_ _Legislature does not automatically empower the former to make retrospective_ _rules._ I I Dismissing the special leave petition, the Court HELD : '(1) The legislature ha~ no doubt bienary power in the matter of enactment of statutes and can itself make retrospective laws subject, of course, to the constitutional limitations. But it is trite Jaw that a delegate cannot exercise the same power unless there is special conferment thereof to be spelled out from the express words of the delegation or by compelling implication. In the present case the power under Section 4(2) docs not i".ldicate either alternative. Therefore the authority of the State Government under the delegation does not empower it to make retmopective rules. [629 A-B; 630B] (2) The mere fact that the rules framed had to be placed on the table of the legislature. was not enough, in the absence of a wider power in the Section, fo enable the State Government to make retrospective rules. The whole purpose of laying on the table of the legislature the rules framed by the State Government is different. [629 EJ _Hukum Chand_ v. _Union_ _of_ _India,_ [1973] 1 S.C.R. 896 (902), followed. _Observation:_ The State Government should have been more careful in giving effect to the resolution passed by the legislature and should not have relied upon its delegated powers which did not carry with it the powers to make retrospective rules. [629 CJ CrvrL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 301-303 of 1970. From the Judgment and Order dated 17-11-1967 cf the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition Nos. 138/63, 1256/63 ·and 1460/ 63. _A. V. V. Nair_ for the Appellant. _K._ _Rajendra Chowdhary_ for the Respondent. **B** ## **c** **D** F ### **ll** 628 SUPREME COUltT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R. A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J.-We are in complete agreement with the rea· soning and conclusions of the High Court and a brief statement of the short point that arises for decision and of the grounds for dismis· sing the appeal is all that is needed. The Motor Vehicles (Taxation of B Passengers and Goods) Act passed by the Madras legislature in the composite Madras State was made applicable to Andhra Pradesh when that State was carved out. · There were certain difficulties in the matter of levy of taxation on vehicles plying on inter-state routes and the State of Andhra Pradesh thought it fit to enact its own legislation, which it did in the form of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Taxation ,C of Passengers and Goods) Act, 1952, Section 4(2) whereof empowered the State Govemm,ent to make necessary rules to effectuate the enact. ment. Pursuant to this power, certain rules were framed, of which ·rule 1 consisted of three sub-rul.es. On 19-6-1957 sub-rules (4) and (5) were added to that rule and sub-rule (5) ran thus : D "The proviso to sub-rule l of Rule 1 shall cease to ·be opera· tive on and from 1st October, 1955 and the composition fee calculated with r.eference to clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-rule (1) in respect of vehicle plying on inter State routes lying partly in Madras State and partly in the Andhra State shall. with effect from that date be paid in the State where the vehicles are registered E and normally kept." F G H This sub-rule enabled operators of Motor Vehicles on inter-state routes lying partly in the Madras State and partly in the State of - Andhra Pradesh to pay the tax duly to either of these two Sitates. It was, however, deleted along with sub-rules (3) and (4) on 29th March, 1963 with effect from 1st April, 1962 and it is the retrospectivity of the deletion that is challenged before us because the Andhra Pradesh State sought to collect tax for the period commencing 1st April, 1962 from the respondent under the Act above referred to, although he had already paid the same to the State of Madras. The ground of invalidity was stated to be that S. 4(1) did not confer on the State Government power to make rules with retrospective effect. Thus, the only question which engages our attention is as to whether S. 4(2) does confer on the delegate, namely, the State Government, the power to make retrospective rules. The High Court, after an elaborate discussion on the jurisprudence of subordinate legislation, came to the conclusion that no such power was conferred on the State Government and that consequently the deletion which resulted in retrospective operation of the Iiabi.Jity to payment of tax was bad in law. ' R. T. o. ClllTTOOR _v._ ASSOCIATED TRANSPORT _(Krishna_ _Iyer,_ _**J.)**_ **629** The legislaure has no doubt a plenary power in the matter of ·enactment of statutes and can itself make retrospective laws subject, ·Of course, to the Constitutional limitations. But it is trite law that a · ·delegate cannot exercise the same power unless there is special confer ment thereof to be spelled out from the express words of the delegation or by compelling implication. In the present case the. power under - _s._ 4(2) does not indicate either alternative. The position has been - -considered by the High Court at length and there is no need for us to go throug? the exercise over· again. Indeed, considerable reliance was placed by learned counsel for the appellant on two circumstances. He argued that the impugned rule was framed in pursuance of a desolution passed by the legislature. The fact does not have any bearing ·on the question under consideration' except for us to make the ()bser-. vation that the State Government should have been more careful in giving effect to the resolution and should not have relied upon its dele· gated power which did not carry with it the power to make retrospective - rules. The second ground pressed before us by learned counsel for the appellant is that the rules had to be placed on the table of and . approved by the legislature. This was sufficient indication, . in his submission. for us to infer that retrospectively in the rule-making power was implicit. We cannot agree. The mere fact that the rules fr::imed had to be placed on the table of the legislature was not enough, in the· _:_ absence of a wider power in the Section, to enable the State Govern. ment to make retrospective ruies. The whole purpose of laying on the table of the legislatu!'e the rules framed by the State Government is different and the effect of any one of the three alternative modes - of so placing the rules has been explained by this Court in _Hukam_ - _Chand_ v. _Union of lndia,(_ _[1]_ _)_ Mr. Justice Khanna speaking for the Bench observed: **...** **A** **B** # **c** **D** **E** **F** **G** **H** "The fact that the rules framed under the Act have to be laid before each House of Parliament would not confer validity on a rule if it is made not in conformity with Section 40 of the Act. It would appear from the observations OJ) pages 304 to 306 of the Sixth Edition of Craies on Statutes Law that there are three kinds of laying _:_ (i) Laying without further procedure : (ii) Laying subject to negative resolution : \_ (iii) Laying subject to affirmative resolution. The laying referred to in sub-section (3) of Section 40 is of the second category because the above sub-section contemplates that the rules would have effect unless modified or annulled by (I) [19731 1 S.C.R. 896, 902. ## 630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] r S.C:R. ·\A the House of Parliament. The act of the Central Government in· laying the rules before each House of Parliament would not, however, prevent the courts from scrutinising the validity of the rules and holding them to be ultra vires if on such scrutiny the rules,A are found to be beyond the rule making power of the Central Government." B It is, therefore, plain that the authority of the State Government under the delegation does not empower it to make retrospective rules . . With this position clarified there is no surviving submission for appel lant's counsel. The appeal must be dismissed and we do so with costs· (one set). S.R. _Appeal dismissed!._ ;. _:._