High Court of KeralaSingle JudgeAppeal dismissed; lower court’s order maintained.

Regional Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation, Thrissur v. K.K. Unnikrishnan

Case / Petition Number:Ins.APP.No. 30 of 2005(A)
Neutral Citation:/

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • M.N.KRISHNAN
Judgment Date
2008-11-26
Court Decision / Holding
The appeal is dismissed; the lower court’s finding that the applicant cannot be a principal employer stands, and the contractor is at best an immediate employer under the ESI Act.
Final Disposition
Appeal dismissed; lower court’s order maintained.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • K.K.UNNIKRISHNAN, JOB CONTRACTOR, COCO R.O, PETROL PUMP, KANJIKODE, PALAKKAD

Respondents

  • REGIONAL DIRECTOR, EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION, THRISSUR

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Sri. T.V. Ajayakumar

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Sri. U.K. Ramakrishnan (Amicus Curiae)

Case Synopsis & Summary

This High Court of Kerala hears Insurance Appeal No. 30 of 2005 arising from I.C.No.68 of 2002 before the Employees’ Insurance Court, Palakkad. The job contractor of a petrol pump challenged the lower court’s conclusion that he could not be treated as a principal employer under the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948. The ESI Corporation argued that, by virtue of ownership, occupation, or managing agency, or under the terms of the contract appointing him as job contractor, he could acquire principal-employer status. The ESI Court initially held that the contractor cannot be a principal employer and set aside the proceedings. The Corporation appealed, urging that Ext. A3 (the appointment letter) shows the outlet operates under IOC’s control and the contractor acts in IOC’s name; thus, he cannot be merely a licensee with limited rights. The judge analyzes Section 2(17) of the ESI Act defining principal employer, noting that the status requires ownership or occupier rights. He contrasts the facts with precedents: a Division Bench decision (Thomas K.C. v. Regional Director, ESI Corporation) recognizes that a contractor can be an “immediate employer”; references to Anitha v. ESI Corporation (SC) are discussed to illustrate licensing scenarios where a licensee could be principal in different regimes, but those facts do not fit the petrol-pump contract. The court concludes the present applicant’s status is at most that of an immediate employer, not a principal employer, and dismisses the appeal, upholding the ESI Court’s finding.

Provisions of Law Cited

Section 2(17) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The respondent-applicant contends that he cannot be treated as a principal employer under Sec. 2(17) of the ESI Act. His appointment as a job contractor is on an ad hoc and temporary basis, restricted to operating the IOC outlet in IOC’s name, with control and entry rights reserved to IOC. He argues that he is not the owner, not the occupier with a legal right to possess, and not a managing agent; the subordinate right to operate under a license does not confer principal-employer status. The contract characterizes him as a licensee with no vested property rights in the premises, and the status is that of an immediate employer rather than a principal employer; reliance is placed on prior precedents distinguishing licensure and occupancy.

Contentions of Respondents

The ESIC contends that by virtue of ownership/control and the terms of the contract (Ext. A3), a principal-employer status could be attracted. It argues that the contractor functions under IOC’s supervision and enters premises as a licensee, with IOC retaining overall control, and that a decision such as Anitha v. ESI Corporation shows that a licensee can, in some licensing regimes, be treated as a principal employer; the definition of principal employer under Sec. 2(17) may encompass such arrangements if factually vested with ownership/occupancy aspects.

Cited Precedents (3)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Thomas K.C. v. Regional Director, ESI Corporation1998(2) LLJ 166PositiveDivision Bench held that a contractor would come within the term 'immediate employer'; supported the view that a contractor need not be the principal employer.
Anitha v. ESI Corporation2003(3) KLT 813(SC)DistinguishedCited regarding licensee's possibility of being a principal employer in a licensing regime; present facts involve a job contractor, not licensee, so the decision is distinguished.
Anitha v. ESI Corporation2003 10 SCC 303Mentioned OnlySupreme Court citation referenced as background; not directly applied to the present facts.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** **PRESENT :** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE M.N.KRISHNAN** **WEDNESDAY, THE 26TH NOVEMBER 2008 / 5TH AGRAHAYANA 1930** **Ins.APP.No. 30 of 2005(A)** **-------------------------** **IC.68/2002 of ESI COURT, PALAKKAD** **....................** **APPELLANT/OPPOSITE PARTY:** **---------------------------------------------** **REGIONAL DIRECTOR, EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION, THRISSUR.** **BY ADV. SRI.T.V.AJAYAKUMAR** **RESPONDENT(S): APPLICANT:** **----------------------------------------------** **K.K.UNNIKRISHNAN, JOB CONTRACTOR, COCO R.O, PETROL PUMP, KANJIKODE, PALAKKAD.** **ADV. SRI.U.K.RAMAKRISHNAN (AMICUS CURIE)** **THIS INSURANCE APPEALS HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 26/11/2008, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** _Kss_ ## **M.N.KRISHNAN, J** ## **===================== INAP No.30 OF 2005** ## **=====================** **Dated this the 26th day of November 2008** ## **JUDGMENT** This appeal arises out of the order of the Employees' Insurance Court, Palakkad in I.C.No.68 of 2002. It was an application filed by the job contractor of the petrol pump contending that he cannot be considered as a principal employer for the purpose of E.S.I.Act and therefore he is not liable to comply with the provisions of the said Act. The ESI Corporation objected to the same on the ground that he will become the principal employer by virtue of the fact that he is either the owner, occupier or the managing agent of the owner or occupier by virtue of which he will acquire status of a principal employer. After considering the entire materials the E.I.Court came to the conclusion that he cannot be considered as a principal employer and therefore set aside the proceedings. It is against that decision, the Corporation has come up in appeal. The following substantial questions of law are raised in this appeal, which reads as follows: “(i)Whether the finding of the learned E.I.Court that the Indian Oil Corporation the principal employer in relation to the retail outlet concerned in this case and the respondent cannot be treated as a principal employer INAP 30/2005 -:2:- under any of the categories mentioned in Sec.2(17) of the E.S.IAct are not unsustainable in law. (ii) Whether the licencee who has been granted licencee to conduct the retail outlet would not come within the definition of principal employer under Section 2(17) of the E.S.I Act especially in view of the ruling of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2003 10 SCC 303”. 2. The points that arise for determination in the appeal are whether a job contractor, who is functioning or conducting a petrol pump under specific terms of the agreement can be classified as a principal employer for the purpose of the E.S.I.Act. It is profitable to refer to the definition of principal employer as defined in Section 2(17) of the Employees State Insurance Act. For our purpose, it is sufficient to understand that a principal employer means “in a factory, the owner or occupier of the factory and includes the managing agent of such owner or occupier, the legal representative of a deceased owner or occupier and where a person has been named as the manager of the factory under the Factories Act, the person so named”. If the applicant before the court below comes within the 4 corners of any of these certainly he can be called as a principal employer for the purpose of this Act. It is also to be stated that a reference is necessary to the document executed by the Indian Oil Corporation appointing this man as the job contractor. The caption itself would show that the operation of COCO INAP 30/2005 -:3:- Retail Outlet at Kanjikode, Palakkad District is on job contract basis. The terms of the said letter would reveal that the appointment as a job contractor is on a temporary basis and he shall operate the outlet of the Indian Oil Corporation only in the name of the Corporation and shall not operate the same under the name and style of him or under any other name. It is also specifically stated that the arrangement of the appointment is only as a job contractor on adhoc and temporary basis. It is also stipulated in paragraph 6 that only mere leave and permission to enter upon the site for the purpose of conducting retail outlet business is granted and it shall be deemed to be in the possession of the Corporation, one or more representatives of the Corporation shall always have the right to be in the outlet premises. It is further classified that the status of the person will be that of a licencee and he shall have no right or interest over the retail outlet premises. It is specifically reiterated in clause 9 that the term of appointment is only as a job contractor. In order to become a principal employer one must be either owner or occupier of the factory. There cannot be any dispute that he is not the owner of the premises. Then the question is whether he will become an occupier. Occupier in the widest connotation means a person who occupies. But the word 'occupier' has got relevance because his occupation must be on a legal right to occupy. An occupier means a person who has got control INAP 30/2005 -:4:- over the premises and possession over the premises. Here is a case where the permission, that is granted to the person is only to have entry into the premises for the limited purpose of conducting the petrol outlet business. It is also to be stated that a reading of the entire conditions imposed upon by the Indian Oil Corporation would indicate that they are in control of the entire area with possessory right and the mere right to use the premises for a particular purpose is seen granted to this person. Such a person in an ordinary parlance cannot be called as an occupier for the legal purpose of arriving at a finding on the question of principal employer. Similarly now the next question will be whether he is a managing agent. A managing agent must be a person who must be employed as an agent. Admittedly the applicant before the court below is not employed as an agent or a managing agent. His status is only that of a mere licencee. 3.It has to be stated that a licencee's right is a limited right and it is only permissive occupation without any legal right attached to the same. On the contrary, when one is a lessee, even as per the definition, there is a transfer of interest in the property which creates a right in the person to occupy on the basis of the right conferred on him as a lessee, but whereas a licencee is a person who is merely in permissive occupation or possession at the whims and fancies of the person granting the license. So there is an INAP 30/2005 -:5:- ocean of difference between the right attached to a lessee and a licencee. A Division Bench of this Court in the decision reported in Thomas K.C. v. Regional Director, ESI Corporation(1998(2) LLJ 166) had the opportunity to deal with the question of a principal employer and immediate employer. It was held in that case that “it observed that the principal employer continued to be the occupier of the factory despite the fact that persons were employed through an immediate employer. A 'contractor' would come within the term “immediate employer”. But in the case of a lease, as in the present case the position was different. The right to run the factory was transferred to the lessee who therefore got a proprietory right in the property, viz., factory, and he would be the occupier of the factory”. According to the Division Bench, a contractor would not come within the ambit of a principal employer but would be only an immediate employer as contemplated under the Act. 4.Learned counsel for the Corporation had invited my attention to a decision of the Apex Court reported in Anitha v. ESI Corporation(2003(3) KLT 813(SC). It was a case relating to a toddy shop and there while analysing the question of license, the Apex Court arrived at a decision holding that the rules and regulations of the Abkari Act deals with a situation where the Government under the Rules and Regulations have got INAP 30/2005 -:6:- only a power of the regulatory nature whereas the person who bids in auction will have all the right and there cannot be any interference even by the Government in the conduct of the business. In such a situation, it was held that the licencee therein can be considered as a principal employer. But on going through the strict terms and conditions incorporated in Ext.A3 which is the letter issued by the Indian Oil Corporation to the applicant it is very clear that his appointment is merely as a job contractor with limited right of entering the premises for the purpose of conducting the outlet business and even therein the Corporation has reserved the right of its employees to enter the premises for the purpose of control and supervision. In the case on hand, it has to be held that the nature of employment as specifically seen from Ext.A3 itself, is that of a job contractor. Or in other words, as held by the Division Bench it can be only the status of an immediate employer and nothing else. Learned counsel for the Corporation would contend that the court has entered into a finding that the Indian Oil Corporation is the principal employer. It can be only taken as an incidental reference for the reason that without hearing the Corporation, one cannot attribute a particular status on them. But, for the limited purpose of understanding the terms of employment and implications I hold that the status of the present applicant can be at the most be that of an immediate INAP 30/2005 -:7:- employer and not a principal employer. So from these discussions, I find that the finding arrived at by the court below does not call for any interference. Therefore the appeal lacks merit and the same is dismissed. ## **M.N.KRISHNAN, JUDGE** ## **Cdp/-**