R.C.R.No.305/2015

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.T.RAVIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE MARY JOSEPH FRIDAY, THE 15TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2017 / 24TH AGRAHAYANA, 1939 RCRev..No. 305 of 2015 AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN RCA 101/2006 of RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITYII/ II ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE, KOZHIKODE AGAINST THE ORDER IN RCP 169/1992 of RENT CONTROL COURT ADDL.MUNSIFF-I, KOZHIKODE REVISION PETITIONER(S)/SUPPL. APPELLANTS 2 TO 6 - 1 PUSHPA A., AGED 55, - W/O. LATE CHOIKUTTY @ RAJAN, ANAKKAYIL HOUSE, KOTTOOLI, CALICUT - 16. - 2 JISHA A, W/. SHOBITH K.M., AGED 38, PARAMBATH KOVIL HOUSE, NALLUR P.O., FOROKE, CALICUT - 673 631. - 3 JINITHA A., AGED 36, W/O. SUNIL KUMAR, PUTHUKUDI THAZHATH HOUSE, CIVIL STATION P.O., CALICUT - 673 020. - 4 SHIJI A, AGED 33, W/O. RAJESH M., VARIYAMVEEDUMATHAL, G.A COLLEGE P.O., PALAZHIPALA, CALICUT - 14. - 5 SHIBU A., AGED 28, S/O. LATE CHOYIKUTTY @ RAJAN A, ANAKKAYIL HOUSE, KOTTOOLI, CALICUT -16. BY ADVS.SRI.K.S.MADHUSOODANAN SRI.M.M.VINOD KUMAR SMT.K.M.RAMYA SRI.P.K.RAKESH KUMAR SRI.K.S.MIZVER RESPONDENT(S)/RESPONDENT NO.1/ PETITIONER: 1. SHAJI - S/O. SIDHARTHAN, ODUKKATHIL HOUSE, PANNIYANKARA AMSOM AND DESOM, KOZHIKODE TALUK. 2. MOOLAMPALLY SOUMINI, AGED 68, W/O. MOOLAMPALLY LOHITHAKSHAN, THATTARAKKAL, KALATHINKUNNU AMSOM AND DESOM, KOZHIKODE 3. M.SAJEENDRAN, AGED 40, S/O. MOOLAMPALLY LOHITHAKSHAN, DO. 4. M.SAJITHA, AGED 38, D/O. MOOLAMPALLY LOHITHAKSHAN, DO. 5. M.RAJKUMAR, AGED 37, S/O. MOOLAMPALLY LOHITHAKSHAN, DO. 6. M.SAJITHKUMAR, AGED 36, DO. DO. R1 BY ADV. SRI.R.RAMADAS THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 15-12-2017, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY PASSED THE FOLLOWING: 3 R.C.R. NO.305/2015 PETITIONERS' EXHIBITS: ANNEXURE I:PHOTOCOPY OF THE ENQUIRY REPORT IN R.C.3/91. - ANNEXURE II:PHOTOCOPY OF THE REPORT SUBMITTED BY ADV.COMMISSIONER DATED 19.9.01 IN R.C.3/91. - ANNEXURE III:PHOTOCOPY OF THE OBJECTION TO THE COMMISSION REPORT IN R.C.3/1991 DATED 5.11.2002. - ANNEXURE IV:PHOTOCOPY OF THE ORDER IN R.C.3/91 AND O.A.NO.302/90 DATED 16.11.2005. - ANNEXURE V:PHOTOCOPY OF THE ORDER IN R.C.R.322/12 DATED 29.5.2013 OF THE HIGH COURT. RESPONDENTS' EXHIBITS: NIL //TRUE COPY// P.A.TO JUDGE ## C.T. RAVIKUMAR & MARY JOSEPH, JJ. ========================== R.C.R.No.305 OF 2015 ========================== Dated this the 15[th] day of December, 2017 ## JUDGMENT Ravikumar, J. This is the third round of litigation arising from RCP No.169 of 1992 on the files of the Additional Rent Control Court, Kozhikode. The said petition was filed by the first respondent herein under sections 11(2)(b) and 11(4)(i) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (for short 'the Act') seeking eviction of the petitioners herein viz., the first and second respondents before the Rent Control Court. On his death, his wife and children were impleaded as supplemental respondents. The supplemental respondents preferred this revision petition challenging the judgment dated 4.9.2015 in RCA.No.101 of 2006 passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Kozhikode. The first respondent herein viz., the original petitioner claimed that he is the landlord of the petition schedule building and it was taken on lease by the first **RCR.305/2015** 2 respondent herein on 27.7.1987 on a monthly rent of `100/-. It was also alleged therein that he had paid the rent only up to and including May, 1988 and had also sublet the petition schedule building to the second respondent unauthorisedly and without his knowledge or consent. It was in the said circumstances that he filed the said petition seeking eviction of respondents 1 and 2 therein. The first respondent did not contest the matter and he died during the pendency of the petition and consequently, his legal heirs were impleaded as supplemental respondents 3 to 7. 2. The second respondent therein filed a counter statement denying the title of the petitioner over the petition schedule building. His contention was that the petition schedule building was let out to his mother by the original owner of the building namely K.Gopalan on 10.5.1972 and on his death, his mother and her legal heirs including himself started residing thereon. Subsequently, the other legal heirs left the house and he continued in its exclusive possession. Furthermore, he set up a case that he is the 'kudikidappukaran' in the building which is a hut. It is also contended that it was constructed two centuries back and the cost **RCR.305/2015** 3 of construction was only `150/-. He also stated therein that he had filed a separate application for purchase of 'kudikidappu' as O.A.No.302 of 1990 before the Land Tribunal. Since the plea of 'Kudikidappu' was raised by the second respondent, in terms of the provisions under section 125(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act (for short 'LR' Act), it was referred to the Land Tribunal, Kozhikode. Consequently, the reference was numbered as R.C.No.3 of 1991. The Land Tribunal conducted a joint trial in R.C.No.3 of 1991 and O.A.No.302 of 1990 filed by the first respondent therein. The Tribunal, subsequently, passed a common order in R.C.No.3 of 1991 and O.A.No.302 of 1990. The question referred was answered by the Tribunal to the effect that the second respondent was then in possession of 15 cents of land wherein he could erect a homestead. At the same time, the Tribunal had not considered the question whether the petition schedule building was a hut as defined under Explanation II of section 2(25) of the LR Act. Based on the answer to the reference, the Rent Control Court considered the petition. After considering the evidence on record and the rival contentions, an order of eviction was passed against the second **RCR.305/2015** 4 respondent under sections 11(2)(b) and 11(4)(i) of the Act. The second respondent therein took up the matter in appeal as RCA.No.101 of 2006 and respondents 3 to 7, who are the legal heirs of the first respondent, had also preferred an appeal as RCA.No.103 of 2006 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority. The District Court, Kozhikode, the Rent Control Appellate Authority, affirmed the order of the Rent Control Court and dismissed the appeal. It was also found therein that the second respondent was only a sub tenant and therefore, he could not raise the plea of 'kudikidappu'. Based on the said finding, the correctness or otherwise of the order of the Land Tribunal in R.C.No.3 of 1991 was not at all considered by the appellate authority. Feeling aggrieved by the same, the second respondent therein took up the matter in revision before this Court as RCR.No.103 of 2006. The said revision petition was disposed of as per order dated 19.12.2011. Evidently, this Court set aside the order of the Rent Control Appellate Authority only to the extent it held that the revision petitioner is not 'kudikidappukaran'. At the same time, the order of the Rent Control Court and the Rent **RCR.305/2015** 5 Control Appellate Authority for eviction of the first and second respondents under sections 11(2)(b) and 11(4)(i) of the Act were affirmed. Consequently, R.C.R.No.103/2007 was remanded to the Rent Control Appellate Authority with a direction to consider the issue whether the second respondent in the RCP viz., the revision petitioner therein is a 'kudikidappukaran' entitled to 'kudikidappu' right. The parties were also given liberty to adduce fresh evidence. Pursuant to the order of remand by this Court on 19.12.2011, the Rent Control Appellate Authority considered the matter afresh; needless to say that only on the question whether the revision petitioner therein was a 'kudikidappukaran' or not. After the remand, the revision petitioner therein took out a commission for the purpose of inspecting the petition schedule building and its lie and condition as also to assess the cost of construction. The Commissioner thereupon conducted an inspection and filed a report and plan on 6.2.2012. One Vasu was examined as RW3. Thereafter, the Rent Control Appellate Authority considered the evidence on record and the rival contentions and held that the second respondent is not a 'kudikidappukaran' and the petition **RCR.305/2015** 6 schedule building is not a hut. Based on such finding, an order of eviction was passed under sections 11(2)(b) and 11(4)(i) of the Act. The order of the Appellate Authority was then challenged before this Court by the appellant in RCA No.101/2006 as RCR No.322 of 2012. This Court found that the Appellate Authority had not entered into a clear finding as to whether the building in question is a hut as defined under Explanation II to section 2(25) of the LR Act. This Court also found that the Appellate Authority did not consider Ext.B1 report of the Revenue Inspector in its correct perspective. Evidently, this Court took note of the fact that being a report submitted by the Revenue Inspector in terms of the provisions under section 105A of the LR Act, the said document ought to have been considered by the Appellate Authority. It was also held that the Appellate Authority had not entered into a finding as to the rent which the building in question would have fetched at the time of construction. On such reasons, the matter was remanded to the Appellate Authority for the purpose of considering the question whether the building in question is a hut and the second respondent is a 'kudikidappukaran'. Pursuant to **RCR.305/2015** 7 the order in RCR No. 322 of 2012 dated 29.5.2013, the Appellate Authority considered the matter and passed the impugned order dated 4.9.2015. As per the impugned order, the Appellate Authority found that the petition schedule building is not a hut and the second respondent was not a 'kudikidappukaran' as defined under section 25 of the LR Act. Consequently, the appellate authority passed an order of eviction dismissing the appeal. As noticed hereinbefore, pending the proceedings, the first respondent in RCP died and it was thereafter that the supplemental respondents 2 to 6 who are respectively his wife and children were impleaded. They are the revision petitioners herein. 3. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel for the first respondent. Though notice was issued to other respondents, they have not chosen to enter appearance. It is to be noted that respondents 2 to 6 herein are the legal heirs of the first respondent in the RCP. Though they have taken up an appeal as RCA No.103 of 2006 against the order in the RCP, after its dismissal, they had not pursued the matter any further and even in this proceedings. The contention of the **RCR.305/2015** 8 revision petitioners is that despite the specific order in AnnexureV, viz., the order of this Court in RCR No.322 of 2012, the question whether the petition schedule building is a hut and whether the second respondent in the RCP was a 'kudikidappukaran' or not, were not properly considered by the Appellate Authority. It is the contention that though the appeal was remanded solely for the purpose of considering those questions specifically with reference to Ext.B1 report, the impugned order would reveal that Ext.B1 report of the Revenue Inspector in terms of the provisions under section 105A of the LR Act was not properly appreciated. In such circumstances, it is contended that the impugned order is liable to be set aside. It is the contention that as per Ext.B1 report, referred as such in Annexure-V, which is produced in this revision petition as Annexure-I, the Appellate Authority did not apply its mind properly on the question pointedly directed to be considered. It is also the contention that going by Ext.B1 report, the cost of construction of the petition schedule building was less than Rs.750/- and that going by the said report, at the time of construction, it would fetch only a rent of `3/-. The contention of **RCR.305/2015** 9 the revision petitioners is that the report carrying such clear findings ought not have been discarded by the Appellate Authority and at any rate, the Appellate Authority ought to have found that the commissioner report and also the subsequently obtained report dated 6.2.2012 would outweigh Ext.B1. In short, it is the contention of the revision petitioners that being a report in terms of section 105A of the LR Act, it should have been preferred to other commissioner reports. In other words, more credibility could have been and should have been given to Ext.B1 and based on the findings therein that the cost of construction of the petition schedule building was below `750/- at the time of the construction and it would have fetched only a rent of `3/-, the appellate authority ought to have found the building in question is a hut, it is contended. It is also held that the Appellate Authority ought to have found that the second respondent was a 'kudikidappukaran'. In short, according to them, in such circumstances, RCA.No.101 of 2006 ought to have been allowed and the RCP No.169 of 1992 ought to have been dismissed. It is the further contention of the learned counsel for the revision **RCR.305/2015** 10 petitioners that the appellate authority went wrong in placing more credence on the Advocate Commissioner's report viz., Annexure-II and the subsequent report dated 6.2.2012. It is also contended that as against Annexure-II report, though an objection was filed before the Land Tribunal, it was not considered. In support of the contention, the learned counsel for the revision petitioners relied on a Single Bench decision of this Court in Narayana Kamath v. Govinda Prabhu [1992 (1) KLT 630] and a Division Bench decision of this Court in Parameswaran Thampi v. Podiyan Thomas [1984 KLT 397] . In fact, these decisions were relied on by the revision petitioners to contend that the Land Tribunal was not competent to enter into the dispute of tenancy in a separate application filed by the tenant before the Land Tribunal when the civil court referred the same issue under section 125(3) of the LR Act for getting adjudicated the status of the very same person. The occasion to rely on such decisions arose in the peculiar facts obtained in this case. As noticed hereinbefore, the Rent Control Court referred the question whether the second respondent was having a 'kudikidappu' right or not under section 125(3) of the LR Act at a **RCR.305/2015** 11 time when an application for purchase of 'kudikidappu' filed by him under section 125(3) of the LR Act was pending before the Land Tribunal. Both the reference and the O.A were jointly considered by the Tribunal. As noticed hereinbefore, the finding of the Land Tribunal was to the effect that the second respondent in the RCP was not kudikidappukaran and the petition schedule building is not a hut. The second respondent had not chosen to challenge the said order in independent proceedings before the Appellate Authority under the LR Act. The O.A filed by him for purchase of Kudikidappu was jointly considered along with reference and in the reference, he was found not a 'kudikidappukaran'. According to the revision petitioners, in such circumstances, in the light of the decisions referred (supra), there was no need for the first respondent to challenge the order in O.A. 302 of 1990 separately before the Appellate Authority under the LR Act as it would be open to him to challenge the same before the Appellate Authority under the Rent Control Act. We will deal with the said issue a little later. 4. The learned counsel for the first respondent herein viz., **RCR.305/2015** 12 the petitioner in the RCP submitted that virtually, the question whether the first respondent before the Rent Control Court was a kudikidappukaran or not ought not have been directed to be decided by the Rent Control Appellate Authority by this Court as per the order in RCR. 103/2007. The said contention is founded on the fact that there was concurrent findings of the Rent Control Court as also the Rent Control Appellate Authority to the effect that the first respondent therein was a tenant and the first respondent herein/the petitioner in the RCP, was entitled to get an order of eviction under sections 11(2)(b) and 11(4)(i) of the Act. It is submitted that a perusal of the order passed by this Court in RCR. 103/2007 would reveal that this Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority under sections 11(2)(b) and 11(4)(i) of the Act. It is submitted that in such circumstances, the first respondent who suffered an order of eviction under the provisions of the Rent Control Act ought not to have been permitted to take up the contention that he was a kudikidappukaran as no person can be a tenant and at the same time, a kudikidappukaran. To buttress the said contention, the **RCR.305/2015** 13 learned counsel relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Vittala D. Prabhu v. Nalini Shenoy [2012 (3) KLT 70] . The learned counsel also brought to our attention the specific provision under the LR Act incorporated on 1.7.1979 making the provisions under section 11 of the C.P.C applicable to the proceedings under the LR Act. It is further submitted that since the issue whether the first respondent is a tenant was decided by the Rent Control Court and it was affirmed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority and especially in the light of the adverse findings on his claim of kudikidappu by the Land Tribunal on a reference and furthermore the confirmance of the findings of the Rent Control Court by the Appellate Authority in RCR No.103/2007, the revision petitioners being the legal heirs of the first respondent therein are precluded from raising the said question in the light of the principle of res judicata under section 11 of C.P.C which was made applicable to the proceedings before the Land Tribunal by the incorporation of section 108(a) in the LR Act. It is also the contention that before the Rent Control Court, the question to be considered was whether the first respondent was a tenant. Since the first respondent raised **RCR.305/2015** 14 the question that he is a kudikidappukaran to decide the jural relationship between himself and the petitioner in the RCP that reference was made under section 125(3) by the Rent Control Court. After obtaining the order in the reference, the Rent Control Court entered into a specific finding that the second respondent was not a kudikidappukaran and he was only a tenant essentially relying on the binding order of the Land Tribunal on the issue as to whether the second respondent was a kudikidappukaran or not. The Appellate Authority affirmed the said order holding that the appellant is a tenant liable to be evicted under the provisions under sections 11(2)(b) and 11(4)(i) of the Act. It is the said finding that got confirmance by the order of this Court in RCR.103/2007. In such circumstances, it is submitted that the Rent Control Court, the Appellate Authority as also this Court entered into a clear finding that the second respondent was a tenant for the purpose of the Rent Control Act and the order of the eviction passed by the Rent Control Authority had become final by the confirmance of the order of the Appellate Authority. In such circumstances, after confirming the order of eviction passed by the **RCR.305/2015** 15 Rent Control Court which was affirmed by the Appellate Authority, the question whether he was a kudikidappukaran or not and the petition schedule building is a hut or not, ought not to have been directed to be considered. In short, the contention is that since the issue of jural status of the second respondent was considered by the civil court, it should act as res judicata by applying the principle of issue estoppel and more particularly under the provisions of section 108A of the LR Act. To drive home the said point, the learned counsel relied on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Govindan Gopalan v. Raman Gopalan [1978 KLT 315] . The learned counsel also relied on another Full Bench decision in Koran v. Kamala Shetty [1977 KLT 358] . The learned counsel for the first respondent further contended that there is absolutely no merit in the contention of the revision petitioners that pursuant to the estimation as per the judgment dated 29.5.2013, the Appellate Authority had not considered the effect of Ext.B1 report while passing the impugned order. It is submitted that a scanning of the impugned order would reveal that the effect of Ext.B1 report was considered by the Rent Control Appellate Authority and it is **RCR.305/2015** 16 considering the said report as also the second Advocate Commissioner report as also other evidence available on record that the Appellate Authority arrived at the conclusion that the petition schedule building is not a hut as it did not specify any of the two conditions which are disjunctive. In other words, it is submitted that after a proper evaluation of the evidence on record, including Ext.B1 report, the appellate authority had arrived at the conclusion that the cost of construction of the petition schedule building was more than `750/- and therefore, it would fall outside the purview of the definition of the hut under Explanation II of section 2(25) of the LR Act. The contention of the revision petitioners is that Ext.B1 report ought to have been given much credence. It is submitted that in the light of the Division Bench decision of this Court in Jayasree v. State of Kerala [1990 (2) KLT 294], the report of an authorised officer under section 105 A of the L.R Act is not entitled to get any greater sanctity than any other verification report. In the said decision, the Division Bench held that the findings and or opinions on the points of fact and law by such authorised officer are subject to scrutiny by the Land Board or **RCR.305/2015** 17 the Land Tribunal as the case may be and even in such circumstances, the Board or Tribunal is not bound to accept any of the verification report as final though the report could be admitted as evidence even without examining the officer concerned. It is submitted in the circumstances that it cannot be contended that the Appellate Authority had committed an error in not giving more credence to Ext.B1. According to the first respondent, the Tribunal was perfectly justified in relying on the commissioner report viz., Annexure-II as also the report dated 6.2.2012 which would reveal that the cost of construction of the petition schedule building was more than `750/- at the time of construction. It is further submitted that in such circumstances, the Appellate Authority could not have entered into a different finding and the irresistible conclusion which it could arrive at, was that building in question was not a hut and that exactly was the conclusion arrived at by the Appellate Authority as per the impugned judgment. In short, the revision petitioners have failed to make out a case for this Court to invoke the revisional jurisdiction. 5. Based on the aforesaid rival contentions, we will firstly **RCR.305/2015** 18 consider the question whether there is any substance in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the first respondent that by virtue of provisions under section 108A of the L.R Act as also under the principle of res judicata embedded under section 11 of the C.P.C., it could be held that the revision petitioners are disentitled to raise the claim of kudikidappukaran. True that before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, the second respondent raised a specific contention that he is a kudikidappukaran and that for the purchase of kudikidappu, he had earlier filed O.A 302 of 1990 before the Tribunal. It was the said specific contention taken that constrained the Rent Control Court to refer the matter in terms of the provisions under section 125(3) to the Land Tribunal. The Land Tribunal passed a joint order in the reference as also in the O.A. The reference was answered to the effect that the second respondent was not a kudikidappukaran and the petition schedule building is not a hut. Though the reference and O.A were jointly considered and disposed by the said common order and the finding therein was totally against the second respondent as regards his kudikidappu **RCR.305/2015** 19 right, he had not chosen to challenge the same before the Appellate Authority under the L.R act. As noticed hereinbefore, according to the learned counsel for the revision petitioners, there was absolutely no necessity for the first respondent to mount challenge against the said order before the Appellate Authority as the said findings was very much available to be challenged before the Appellate Authority under the Rent Control Act by virtue of the provisions under section 125(6) of the L.R Act. In the contextual situation, it is to be noted that in terms of the provisions under Section 125(5) of the L.R. Act the decision of the Land Tribunal on the question referred to it shall be accepted by the Civil Court and then proceed to decide the suit or other proceedings before it in terms of the said decision. In short, by virtue of the said provision, the decision of the Land Tribunal on the question referred to it is binding on the Civil Court which referred that question in the matter of decision of the suit or other proceedings before it. But, at the same time, a perusal of Section 125(6) of the L.R. Act would reveal that for the purpose of appeal the decision of the Land Tribunal should be deemed as part of the finding of the Civil **RCR.305/2015** 20 Court. Needless to say that when it forms part of the finding of the Civil Court the appellate authority is certainly having the jurisdiction to consider the correctness of the decision of the Land Tribunal also as it was deemed to be the part of the finding of the Civil Court. Going by Section 125(8) of the L.R. Act the word `Civil Court' would include the Rent Control Court. The Rent Control Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal preferred by the predecessor of the revision petitioners viz., the second respondent in R.C.P.No.169 of 1992 holding that the second respondent was liable to be evicted under Section 11(4)(i) and 11(2)(b) of the Act. In short, the appellate authority confirmed the order of eviction passed under those sections by the Rent Control Court. As noticed hereinbefore, the said orders passed by the Rent Control Court as also the appellate authority were confirmed by this Court in R.C.R.No.103 of 2007 and the order was interfered with only with respect to the finding thereunder regarding the status of the second respondent as kudikidappukaran. Needless to say that after setting it aside this Court remanded the matter to the Rent Control Appellate Authority solely for the purpose of considering **RCR.305/2015** 21 the question whether the second respondent was a kudikidappukaran or not and the plaint schedule building is a hut or not. The endeavour of the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent in this proceedings is that since the finding of the Rent Control Court as also the appellate authority that the second respondent was a tenant for the purpose of the provisions under the Rent Control Act and confirmed the order of eviction passed against him the second respondent or his legal heirs could not legally raise kudikidiappu right by virtue of the provisions under Section 108A of L.R. Act as also Section 11 of the C.P.C which were brought into the relevant status viz., Land Reforms Act by incorporating Section 108-A thereunder. Certainly, the said contention would appear to be attractive and acceptable. 6. In the contextual situation, it is relevant to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Dadu Dayalu Mahasabha, Jaipur (Trust) v. Mahant Ram Niwas & Anr. (AIR 2008 2187) . The ratio of the decision in Dadu Dayalu Mahasabha 's case is that when once it is found that the issues which arise in the subsequent suit were directly and substantially in issue in the earlier suit, **RCR.305/2015** 22 Section 11 of C.P.C. would apply, essentially, going by the principle of issue estoppel. The issue which was considered in the proceedings before the Rent Control Court was the jural relationship between the petitioner therein and the second respondent therein. True that, the Rent Control Court found that there was a sub-tenant. The finding by the Rent Control Court was that the first respondent therein was the tenant and he sublet the building in question to the second respondent. As found earlier, based on such findings, it was held that being a sub-tenant the second respondent was not entitled to claim kudikidappu right. The appellate authority considered the decision of the Land Tribunal also while considering the challenge against the order of the Rent Control Court. After such consideration evidently, the Rent Control Appellate Authority found that he is a tenant for the purpose of the Rent Control Act and consequently, passed an order of eviction against him under the relevant provisions referred hereinbefore. It is that order which got confirmed, according to the first respondent herein, by the order of this Court in R.C.R.No.103 of 2007. True that, a perusal of the order of this **RCR.305/2015** 23 Court in R.C.R.No.103 of 2007 would reveal that the order passed by the Rent Control Court which was upheld by the Rent Control Appellate Authority was confirmed by this Court. It is in view of the said factually indisputable position that the first respondent herein takes up the contention that by operation of the principle of issue estoppel and the provisions under Section 11 of the C.P.C. made applicable to the Land Recovery Proceedings by incorporation of Section 108-A thereunder, the said issue cannot be decided in any subsequent proceedings, even in a collateral proceedings. There can be little doubt with respect to the position that the consideration of the question whether the second respondent was a kudikidappukaran or not is also an issue viz., jural relationship between the petitioner in the R.C.P and the second respondent therein. In the Rent Control Proceedings which ultimately culminated and become final by the pronouncement of the order in R.C.R No.103 of 2007 it was held that his status is that of a tenant and he was ordered to be evicted under Section 11(4)(i) and 11(2)(b) of the Act. In short, in the eye of law, the status of the second respondent was held as that of a sub-tenant. Be it a **RCR.305/2015** 24 tenant or a sub-tenant, once it is so decided in a rent control proceedings, he could not claim the status of kudikidappukaran when he allowed the order of eviction suffered by the authorities under the Rent Control Act. This position was settled by this Court in Vittala D. Prabhu's case (supra). In the said decision, the Division Bench of this Court held that tenants having suffered an order of eviction are not entitled to turn around and contend that they are kudikidappukars under Section 2(25) of the L.R.Act and they are estopped from raising such contentions in terms of the provisions under Section 11 of C.P.C. But, in this case, it is to be noted that prior to the filing of the R.C.P, making him as the respondent the second respondent has filed an application under Section 80B of L.R. Act for purchase of kudikidappu before the Land Tribunal. Pursuant to the reference made by the Rent Control Court under Section 125(3) of L.R.Act the said Original Application was considered jointly with the reference. In the common order passed it was held held that the second respondent was not a kudikidappukaran. We are not oblivious of the fact that the question which was referred under Section 125(3) of the L.R.Act **RCR.305/2015** 25 and the scope of consideration of an application under Section 80B cannot be the same. In that context, it is only relevant to refer to Section 125(3) of the L.R.Act which is as follows:- “ 125(3) if in any suit or other proceedings any question regarding rights of a tenant or of a kudikidappukaran (including a question as to whether a person is a tenant or a kudikidappukaran) arises, the Civil Court shall stay the suit or other proceeding and refer such question to the Land Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the land or part thereof is situate together with the relevant records for the decision of that question only.” A perusal of the said provision would reveal that in any suit or other proceeding any question regarding the rights of a tenant or a kudikidappukaran arises for consideration, the Civil Court concerned shall stay the proceedings in the suit or other proceeding and shall refer the question to the Land Tribunal. In short, the question to be answered on such a reference is regarding the jural relationship between the persons concerned that is, the person concerned is a tenant or a kudikidappukaran. Section 80B deals with the procedure for purchase by kudikidappukaran. It pre-supposes a finding that the person applies for purchase is a kudikidappukaran. A joint reading of **RCR.305/2015** 26 Sections 80 and 80(1) would reveal that only the person whose name is included in the register of kudikidappukars, would be entitled to get purchased its kudikidappu. It is such a person who is having a right of kudikidappu could seek for purchase of the same by filing an application under Section 80B. We do not want to delve into the matter any further in detail. We refer to those provisions only to consider the question whether the first respondent in the R.C.P. was to challenge against the common order rather, the order in O.A.No.302 of 1990 before the appellate authority under the Land Reforms Act. As noticed hereinbefore, the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent is that by not preferring to make challenge against the order in O.A.No.302 of 1990 before the appellate authority under the Land Reforms Act and then suffering orders from the Rent Control Court as also the appellate authority and before this Court in the revision which decided the case based on the question of his relationship with the petitioner under the R.C.P could claim a different status after suffering such orders. The decision in Dadu Dayalu Mahasabha 's case (supra) and the provisions under Section **RCR.305/2015** 27 11 of C.P.C. and the principles thereunder which could be applied even in a case where Section 11 is not directly applicable and also by virtue of the provisions under Section 108-A of L.R. Act, it could be held that since the issue as to what exactly is the jural relationship between the petitioner in the R.C.P and the second respondent therein was decided by the Rent Control Court and it ultimately got confirmance by the order passed by this Court, it would not be open to the second respondent therein, needless to say his legal heirs, to claim for the adjudication of his status again qua the petitioner in the R.C.P., by virtue of the doctrine of the issue estoppel. In the light of the aforesaid provisions and the decisions referred supra, we would be compelled to hold that the revision petitioners are estopped from raising such a claim rather, the status of kudikidappukaran, that the first respondent was a kudikidappukaran but for the orders passed by this Court in R.C.R.No.103 of 2007 and subsequently, in R.C.R.No.322 of 2012. 7. As noticed hereinbefore, as per order in R.C.R.No.103 of 2007 even after confirming the order of eviction passed against the second respondent in the R.C.P under Sections 11(4)(i) and **RCR.305/2015** 28 11(2)(b) of the Act, this Court set aside the very same order to the extent it held the second respondent as not a kudikidappukaran. As per the order in R.C.R.No.103 of 2007 dated 19.12.2011, this Court disposed of the revision as hereunder: “The judgment of the appellate authority to the extent it confirms the finding of the rent control court that the revision petitioner is not a kudikidappukaran is set aside. The findings concurrently entered by the rent control court and the appellate authority that eviction grounds 11(4) (1) and Section 11(2)(b) are confirmed. Only the issue of kudikidappu is being remitted. The RCA is remanded to the rent control appellate authority. Transmit the entire lower court records including those of land tribunal which is before us to the rent control appellate authority. That authority can, if parties are desirous, permit them to adduce evidence in the context of kudikidappu right. The appellate authority will take a fresh decision on the issue whether the revision petitioner is a kudikidappukaran entitled to kudikidappu right on the evidence already adduced and further evidence that parties may adduce. Parties will enter appearance before the appellate authority on 03.01.2012. The learned appellate authority is directed to complete the enquiry and pass orders within four months thereafter. If the appellate authority finds that the petitioner is a kudikidappukaran, consequential orders can be passed with reference to the eviction order we have confirmed.” Being a Bench of co-equal strength we cannot and we will not **RCR.305/2015** 29 consider the correctness or otherwise of the said directions. In other words, after confirming the orders passed by the Rent Control Court and the Rent Control Appellate Authority regarding the order of eviction treating the second respondent as a tenant (sub tenant ?) the question whether he is a kudikidappukaran could have been ordered to be considered in the same proceedings by the appellate authority. Be that as it may, the fact is that as per the order in R.C.R.No.103 of 2007, this Court set aside the order in R.C.A.No.101 of 2006 passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority to the effect that the second respondent was not a kudikidappukaran and consequently directed the appellate authority to take a fresh decision on that issue. Furthermore, this Court held that subject to the finding on that issue the appellate authority could pass orders with reference to the eviction order despite the fact that the said order was confirmed by this Court in revision. Though the learned counsel for the first respondent herein contended that after the confirmation of the order of the Rent Control Court as also the appellate authority which got confirmance in the order in R.C.R.No.103 of 2007 dated **RCR.305/2015** 30 19.12.2011, the second respondent was not legally entitled to claim the right of kudikikdappu based on the principle of issue estoppel, we are of the considered view that the Tribunal could not be find fault with in considering that issue in the light of the order in R.C.R.No.103 of 2007 as none of the parties took up the matter further challenging the said order. The appellate authority in such circumstances, was bound to pass orders in the light of the order in R.C.R.No.103 of 2007 and it could not have considered whether the question of Kudikidappukaran was available for consideration based on the confirmation of its order in R.C.R.No.103 of 2007. In this context, it is also to be noted that the first respondent who maintain such a stand in this proceedings could have then challenged the direction in R.C.R.No.103 of 2007 taking up such contentions. However, he has also not chosen to challenge the same. In such circumstances, we are of the considered view that the scope of consideration of this revision is only confined to the question whether the Rent Control Appellate Authority had considered the issue to be considered by the remand order in accordance with law and in accordance with the said remand order. **RCR.305/2015** 31 We have already taken note of the fact that as per the order in R.C.R.No.322 of 2012 this Court directed the Rent Control Appellate Authority to consider the effect of Ext.B1 report and take a fresh decision in R.C.A.101 of 2006. Therefore, essentially, the question is pursuant to another final order in R.C.R.No.322 of 2012 whether the Rent Control Appellate Authority had considered the said issue in terms of the directions thereunder and also in accordance with law. 8. Ext.B1 is a report filed by the Revenue Inspector before the Land Tribunal. It is essentially a report under Section 105A of the Land Reforms Act. Though the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners contended that it should have been given more credence than the Commissioner's reports, we are of the considered view that there is absolute absence of any merit in the said contention. As noticed hereinbefore, a Division Bench of this Court in Jayasree's case (supra) considered the scope of such a report. Going by the said decision, though the report could be admitted in evidence even without examining the officer concerned, the said report is not entitled to get any sanctity than **RCR.305/2015** 32 any other verification report. The findings or opinions on points of fact and law made thereunder are subject to scrutiny by the Land Board or the Land Tribunal, as the case may be and even in such a case, the Taluk Land Board/Land Tribunal is not bound to accept any of the verification reports as final. In other words, going by the said decision, the Tribunal or the Board is not bound to accept it. In short, though it is a relevant document, it is up to the Tribunal to consider whether the report as such is to be accepted or not and should be acted upon. Virtually, the said position is nothing but a re-statement of the said position made earlier by this Court in Paily Thommen v. Thommen Thommen reported in 1984 KLT (SN) 19 . Therefore, in the light of the decisions referred supra, we are of the view that the contention of the revision petitioners that more sanctity could have been given to Ext.B1 could not have been accepted as held by this Court in Jayasree's case (supra). It is also nothing but a verification report and therefore, by applying mind the appellate authority has to consider the evidentiary value of Ext.B1 report in the light of the other evidence available on record including the Advocate **RCR.305/2015** 33 Commissioner's report, Ext.P5, Ext.P6 etc. 9. We will now consider whether the contention of the petitioner that the Rent Control Appellate Authority had not properly considered Ext.B1 report despite the specific direction in the order of this Court in CRP No.322/2012 is having any substance? Ext.B1 is a report of the Revenue Inspector. Evidently, it is a report of the authorised officer under Section 105 A(2) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. In the report, which is marked in the revision petition as Annexure 1 (Ext.B1 report), it is stated that on enquiry he came to understand that the building in question is about 60 years old and that it might have been constructed in the year 1940. It is also stated therein that on enquiry he came to know that the revision petitioner has been residing there for the past 37 years along with his family. It is further stated therein that owing to the failure to repair it in time, it became a shambles. The cost of construction of the plaint schedule building was given therein as `472.05/- It is to be noted that in the said report itself the said officer had stated that the cost of the materials as also the labour charge during the period in question was not available and **RCR.305/2015** 34 therefore, he fixed the aforesaid amount as the probable cost of the construction based only on the information gathered on enquiry. Further, he has stated that access to the building in question is very difficult and therefore, it would have fetched only `3/- as rent. Admittedly, the other piece of evidence available in this regard consists of two Advocate Commissioners' report; one filed before the Tribunal itself and other filed before the Rent Control Appellate Authority. It is to be noted that the report dated 06.02.2012 filed by the Advocate Commissioner before the Rent Control Appellate Authority was at the instance of the revision petitioner herein. Annexure-II is the report which was filed before the Land Tribunal by the Advocate Commissioner. The said commission was taken out by the landlord, the first respondent herein. In the said report, what is stated is that the plaint schedule building is a pukka house constructed on laterite stone basement. The plaint schedule building consists of two bed rooms, one corridor, verandah and a kitchen besides Kola (ക��ല). The outer and inner walls are built with laterite stones. The doors and windows made of wood were found to be in good condition. The **RCR.305/2015** 35 floors in the front verandah was plastered with cement, while floors of the other rooms were plastered with cow dung. Going by the said report, out of the three rooms, two are on the southern side and are being used as bed rooms. The third room situates on the northern side and it is being used as kitchen. It is also stated that those three rooms have wooden doors and windows. Apart from the verandah, corridor and three rooms, there is another room, viz., a side room located on the southern side of the house, evidently mentioned in Anx.1 (Ext.B1) as 'Kola'. The walls of the rooms are plastered with lime mortar. It is also stated that the main structure of the house including basement and walls are built with red laterite stone. The reapers, rafters and tiles of the rooms, as per the report, are old. It is further stated that the Advocate Commission made a local enquiry with the neighbours to know the oldness of the said building and it was reported that its oldness is about 40 years. The Advocate Commission further stated that from the appearance and the details of the house, it could be safely and reasonably said that the house is having an approximate oldness of 40 years. Based on the said information gathered and **RCR.305/2015** 36 on his own estimation, it is stated that the house must have been constructed in the year 1960. The Advocate Commissioner calculated the cost of construction as `984.40/- A valuation statement was also appended with Annexure-II. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner has submitted that Choyikutty @ Raja, the petitioner in RC No.3/1991 and the second respondent in the RCP filed objection to Annexure-II report. This document is marked as Annexure-III in this proceedings. The grievance of the revision petitioners is that the objection filed to Annexure-II was not at all considered by the Land Tribunal. Annexure-IV is the common order passed by the Land Tribunal in RC No.3/1991 and OA No.302/1990. We have already noted that as per the said orders the Tribunal answered the issues framed against the petitioner, i.e., Choyikutty. The said order which is binding on the Rent Control Court was virtually acted upon and it is based on the report and the other evidences adduced before it that the Rent Control Court ultimately found that the second respondent therein was liable to be evicted and consequently passed order of eviction under Section 11(4) and 11 (2)(b) of the **RCR.305/2015** 37 Kerala Land Reforms Act. Before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, evidently, at the instance of the second respondent, a commission was taken out. The Advocate Commissioner submitted a report on 06.02.2012. Going by the said report, the second respondent viz., Choyikutty @ Rajan along with his family is residing there. 10. Going by the above, it is noted that the House number and ward number is affixed on the wall of the said building. Its house number is 136 and the ward number is 46. The old board hanging there would reveal that the House number was 483 and ward number was 29. The Advocate Commissioner has given vivid description of all the rooms in the said building. In fact, the size of the building and also the size of the materials used for constructing the said building were explained there. After giving a detailed description, the Commissioner assessed the oldness of the building. Going by Annexure—III report, the building in question must have been constructed about 45 years ago at a cost of `1,500/- The number of the rooms mentioned in the said report would tally with the number of rooms mentioned in the other **RCR.305/2015** 38 reports. Thus it can be seen that Ext.B1 report is filed by the Revenue Inspector in terms of the provisions under Section 105 A of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. The cost of the plaint schedule building was only `472.52/- and at the same time, going by Annexure-II report as also the report of the Advocate Commissioner dated 06.02.2012 filed before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, the cost of construction is above `750/- To be precise, going by Annexure-II the cost of construction was `984.40/- and going by the report dated 06.02.2012 it was `1,500/- The other aspects which is to be looked into is that going by Annexure-I (Ext.B1) report the oldness of the plaint schedule building is 60 years. Going by the said report, the building in question must have been constructed in the year 1940. At the same time, going by Annexure-II report, it must have been constructed in the year 1960. In the report dated 06.02.2012, what is stated regarding the age is that it must have been constructed about 45 years ago. The inspection was conducted in the year 2012. 11. Now, we will consider the question whether any **RCR.305/2015** 39 corroborative material either to support Ext.B1 or Annexure-I, Annexure-II and the other report dated 06.02.2012 are available on record. The learned counsel appearing for the first respondent submitted that in that regard Exts.A5 and A9 assume relevance. Ext.A9 is a deed by which the settler obtained the property in question wherein the plaint schedule building situates. It is a registered partition deed, dated 15.09.1961. It would reveal that the settler of the first respondent viz., K.T. Prasad obtained item No.28 therein on partition. The contention of the first respondent is that item No.28 in Ext.A9 would reveal that the land in question was a vacant land. In other words, it would reveal that there was no building in the said property. In the light of the said fact borne out from Ext.A9, it is submitted that in the year 1961 when the partition was effected in item No.28, the building in question was not there. To fortify the said contention, the learned counsel further drew our attention to Ext.A5 settlement deed dated 30.12.1982. It was executed by K.T. Prasad in favour of the first respondent, who is none other than his nephew. The learned counsel submits that conspicuously there is a mention about a **RCR.305/2015** 40 building in Ext.A5. In that context, another document also assumes relevance. It is a release deed No.3043/1987 dated 20.07.1987, which is marked as Ext.A6 in the present proceedings. It was, in fact, executed by the first respondent in the RCP in favour of the petitioner in the RCP. Ext.A6 refers to a mortgage created by the settler of the first respondent, viz., K.T. Prasad in favour of the first respondent by document No.891/1972. Taking into account the evidence revealed from the said document as also the report dated 06.02.2012, evidently, the Rent Control Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that the plaint schedule building must have been constructed between the year 1961 and 1972. In other words, it is submitted that in the property shown as item No.28 in Ext.A9 there was no building in the year 1961. When the said property was settled in favour of the first respondent, there is a mention about a building and therefore, it could be deemed that the building must have been constructed between 1961 and 1972. A perusal of the impugned order passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority would reveal that this contention was virtually upheld by the Appellate Authority. Consequently, it is found that **RCR.305/2015** 41 the fact that the building in question must have been constructed in the year 1940 could not be said to be correct. It is further held therein that, in such circumstances, the cost of construction and the rent assessed by the Revenue Inspector in Ext.B1 also could not be accepted. The cost of construction mentioned in Annexure-II, viz., the report of the Advocate Commissioner submitted before the Land Tribunal as also the report submitted by the Advocate Commissioner dated 06.02.2012 reveal that the cost of construction of the plaint schedule building is more than `750/Based on an overall appreciation of the evidence available before it, as mentioned hereinbefore, the Rent Control Appellate Authority found that the cost of the construction assessed by the Advocate Commissioners appear to be more probable and discarded assessment of cost of construction and the rent made by the Revenue Inspector in Ext.B1. It is, in the said circumstances, that the Rent Control Appellate Authority ultimately came to the conclusion that the plaint schedule building is not a 'hut' as defined in Explanation II of Section 2(25). 12. As noticed hereinbefore, the main grievance of the **RCR.305/2015** 42 learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner is that the objection filed by him to Annexure-II report was not considered by the Rent Control Appellate Authority. In this context, it is to be noted that the impugned judgment was rendered by the Rent Control Appellate Authority pursuant to the order of this court in RCR No.322/2012. Evidently, the direction thereunder was to consider Ext.B1 report. Necessarily, the tenor of the order therein would reveal that the direction was for a consideration of Ext.B1 as also the other evidence on record for arriving at a conclusion as to whether the plaint schedule building is a hut or not. It is relevant to note that despite the fact that there was a direction to consider Ext.B1 report, the petitioner thought it fit to file another application for issuance of commission, which was acted upon by the Rent Control Appellate Authority. As noticed hereinbefore, it was at the instance of the revision petitioner despite the availability of Ext.B1 that a commission was appointed which led to the filing of the report dated 06.02.2012. It is also relevant to note that the revision petitioner herein had not filed any objection to the Advocate Commissioner's report dated 06.02.2012. The learned **RCR.305/2015** 43 counsel appearing for the revision petitioner submitted that the revision petitioner had not filed any objection to it as there is a mention in the said report itself that the accurate value of the building could be assessed with the assistance of an expert engineer. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner further contended that the Rent Control Appellate Authority ought not to have placed reliance on Exts.A5, A6 and A9. In short, it is the contention that being a report filed by the authorised officer under Section 105(A)(2) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, the Appellate Authority ought to have given much credence to that document rather than the aforesaid document. In the light of the decision in Jayasree's case (supra) and Thommen Thommen's case (supra) as also on perusing the relevant provision under Section 105(A) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, we are of the considered view that the said contention cannot be upheld. It is the further contention that the mere fact that there was no mention about any building in item No.28 of Ext.A9 could not have been a reason to hold that at the time of its execution, there was no building in the property in question. The learned counsel **RCR.305/2015** 44 submitted that none of the items was mentioned in Ext.A9. It is relevant to note that there is no mention regarding existence of a building in those properties. It is submitted that in such circumstances, it might have been an omission to make such mention about the existence of a building in those properties. The said document is a registered partition deed. When there is no mention about existence of any building that too, in a partition deed, there is no reason for presuming that a building must have been there but the executants must have omitted or forgotten to make a mention about it. In the light of Exts.A5 and A6 the said contention raised on behalf of the revision petitioner cannot be upheld. Going by Ext.A6, which was executed in the year 1972, it is the building in question which was constructed in item No.28 of Ext.A9, that was mortgaged. Ext.A6 is the release deed executed by the first respondent in the RCP in favour of the petitioner in the RCP. It is dated 20.07.1987. It is to be noted that in Exts.A5 and A6, there is a mention about the building in the property which was mentioned as item No.28 in Ext.A9. It was based on the said aspects together with the recitals in the report of the Advocate **RCR.305/2015** 45 Commissioner submitted before the Land Tribunal and subsequently by the Advocate Commissioner before the Rent Control Appellate Authority dated 06.02.2012 that the Rent Control Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that the plaint schedule building must have been constructed between the year 1961 and 1972. We do not find any reason to hold that the Appellate Authority had committed a mistake in taking note of the non-mentioning of the existence of any building in Ext.A9 which was executed in the year 1961 and also in taking note of the fact that the very item which was partitioned in favour of the settler of the first respondent in the year 1961, settlement deed executed in the year 1982 and also a release deed executed in the year 1987, contained a reference with respect to the existence of a building in the very same property. It is such aspects which led the Rent Control Appellate Authority to come to a conclusion that the building in question was constructed in between the years 1961 and 1972. When that be the evidence available on record, we do not find any reason to hold that the Rent Control Appellate Authority had gone wrong in not accepting Ext.B1 report regarding **RCR.305/2015** 46 the course of construction as also to the rent which it would have fetched. The Rent Control Appellate Authority in such circumstances, was justified in coming to the conclusion that the building in question must have been constructed with a cost more than `750/- at the time of its construction. In this context, it is to be noted that a perusal of the provisions under Explanation II of Section 2 (25) would reveal that the conditions to be satisfied thereunder with respect to the cost of construction and the probable rent which it would have fetched are distinct and not conjoint. In such circumstances, when once it is found that the plaint schedule building was constructed with a cost of more than `750/- at the time of its construction the consequential finding to the effect that it was not a hut falling within the purview of Explanation II of Section 2(25) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act cannot be said to be a faulty finding. In fact, it is a rightful conclusion which could be arrived at in the light of the evidence on record and taking into account the relevant provision. 13. There could be little doubt with respect to the scope of revisional power. This court cannot act as a court of first appeal. It **RCR.305/2015** 47 is the correctness, propriety and legality which could be gone into in exercise of the revisional power. When once it is found that the Appellate Authority had taken a plausible view based on the evidence on record, this court cannot upturn the said finding in exercise of the revisional power. The long and short of the discussions, is that there is absolutely no reason for interfering with the order passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority in RCA No.105/2006 and this revision petition is liable to fail. While we are about to part with the judgment, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner submitted that since the revision petitioners are residing in the building in question they must be granted some time for surrendering its vacant possession. We have heard the learned counsel for the first respondent as well. After considering the rival submissions, we are of the view that these petitioners can be permitted to continue to occupy this building in question for a period of one year, provided they file an affidavit before the Rent Control Court to the effect that they would vacate the plaint schedule building within the said period. This shall be done within a period of two weeks. He shall continue to **RCR.305/2015** 48 pay the rent at the admitted rate during the said period. Subject to the above, this Revision Petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Sd/- C.T. RAVIKUMAR, JUDGE Sd/MARY JOSEPH, JUDGE spc/TKS/SKK/221217/121218 # **RCR.305/2015** 49