High Court of KeralaSingle JudgeDismissed

Ravindran @ Mani v. Radha and Others

Case / Petition Number:R.S.A No.74 of 2024

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • A. BADHARUDEEN
Judgment Date
2024-02-14
Court Decision / Holding
Regular second appeal stands dismissed, without being admitted. All interlocutory applications pending in this second appeal are dismissed. Registry to inform Trial Court and Appellate Court forthwith.
Final Disposition
Dismissed

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Ravindran @ Mani

Respondents

  • Radha
  • Biju
  • Bijosh
  • Bindu

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • R.K.PRASANTH
  • • K.G.BALASUBRAMANIAN
  • • AMBILY PREMKUMAR
  • • JIJO JOSEPH

Case Synopsis & Summary

This Regular Second Appeal (RSA No. 74 of 2024) is before the Kerala High Court, challenging the decree and judgment in O.S. No. 43 of 2012 of the Munsiff Court, Sulthan Bathery, confirmed by AS 30 of 2020 dated 30.06.2023. The dispute centers on a plaint schedule property originally assigned by document No. 352/1984 of the Sulthan Bathery SRO. The plaintiff, in possession, entered a sale agreement with the defendant, who then occupied the property and dispossessed the plaintiff, prompting earlier litigation. The plaintiff's suit OS 73/1999 (later OS 279/2011) was decreed in 2003; the defendants challenged it in Sub Court Sulthan Bathery (AS No. 25/2005) and RSA 1423/2013, with Roma remand and ex parte decrees following. After a long procedural history, delivery of possession and subsequent dispossession by the defendants led to the present second appeal. The principal legal issue is whether the suit is maintainable under Sec. 47 CPC given the existence of an earlier decree and its delivery. The appellants argued Sec. 47 bars the suit; the courts below rejected this. The High Court ultimately held that there is no substantial question of law to admit the second appeal, reiterating that the true test for a second appeal under Sec. 100 CPC is the existence of a substantial question of law, which must be formulated. The appeal is dismissed, and all interlocutory applications are also dismissed.

Provisions of Law Cited

Section 100 r/w Order XLII Rule 1 CPCSection 47 CPCOrder XLII Rule 2 CPCSection 55(6)(b) of Transfer of Property ActSection 53A of Transfer of Property Act

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Substantial question of law (doctrine for maintainability of second appeal)
  • Res-integra (no longer required as a blanket rule in this context)

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant/defendant contend that the remedy lies under Section 47 of the CPC because of the earlier decree and its delivery; hence the present suit is not maintainable. They challenge the plaintiff’s continued possession and rely on Section 55(6)(b) and Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act to contend that a vendee’s rights are limited to a charge and specific remedies, with time limitations applicable. They maintain that the trial and appellate courts correctly negatived the applicability of Sec. 47 to bar the suit. They argue that the execution and delivery of the earlier decree do not authorize a continued action outside the decree’s scope, and that possession asserted by the plaintiff remained under the earlier adjudication; the second appeal should be admitted only if a substantial question of law is framed.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents/plaintiff emphasize maintainability of the suit and that Sec. 47 CPC does not bar the action; they highlight that the decree’s effect and subsequent delivery do not foreclose rights claimed due to dispossession after initial delivery. They argue that the vendee’s rights under a sale agreement do not extinguish the plaintiff’s possession and the remedy seeks restoration of possession or related relief, not inconsistent with the earlier decree. They rely on the established standard that a second appeal under Sec. 100 CPC requires a substantial question of law, which the High Court must formulate, and contend that such a question exists given the concurrent verdicts and factual matrix. They contend that the lower courts rightly exercised their discretion and that the High Court should not disturb the findings where no substantial question of law is framed.

Cited Precedents (4)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala and OthersAIR 2020 SC 4321; 2020 KHC 6507; 2020 (10) SCALE 168PositiveCited to establish that entertaining/deciding a second appeal requires a substantial question of law and that the High Court must formulate such a question.
Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar(1999) 3 SCC 722PositiveCited as part of the precedent defining the 'substantial question of law' threshold for second appeals.
Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari(2001) 3 SCC 179PositiveCited to underscore the requirement that an appeal under Sec. 100 CPC poses a substantial question of law.
Government of Kerala v. Joseph2023 (5) KHC 264; 2023 (5) KLT 74 SCPositiveCited as reinforcing the approach to formulate substantial questions of law for second appeals.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

# **`IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM`** ## **`PRESENT`** ``` THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN ``` ``` WEDNESDAY, THE 14[TH] DAY OF FEBRUARY 2024 / 25TH MAGHA, 1945 RSA NO. 74 OF 2024 ``` ## **`AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT OS 43/2012 OF MUNSIFF MAGISTRATE,`** ## **`SULTHAN BATHERI`** ## **`AS 30/2020 OF ASSISTANT SESSIONS COURT/SUB COURT / COMMERCIAL`** ## **`COURT (KALPETTA), SULTHANBATHERY`** ## **`APPELLANT/S:`** ``` RAVINDRAN @ MANI AGED 62 YEARS S/O. GOPALAN, KOONAMAKKAL HOUSE, KOZHUVANA, TAZHATHOOR POST, NENMENI AMSOM, SULTHANBATHERY TALUK, WAYANAD DISTRICT, PIN - 673595 BY ADVS. R.K.PRASANTH K.G.BALASUBRAMANIAN AMBILY PREMKUMAR JIJO JOSEPH ``` ## **`RESPONDENT/S:`** ``` 1RADHA AGED 70 YEARS W/O. LATE VISWANATHAN NAIR, PADIPARAMBIL HOUSE, KOZHUVANA, CHEERAL VILLAGE AND POST, NENMENI AMSOM, SULTHANBATHERY TALUK, WAYANAD DISTRICT, PIN - 673595 2BIJU AGED 47 YEARS S/O LATE VISWANATHAN NAIR, PADIPARAMBIL HOUSE, KOZHUVANA, CHEERAL VILLAGE AND POST, NENMENI AMSOM, SULTHANBATHERY TALUK, WAYANAD DISTRICT, PIN - 673595 3BIJOSH AGED 45 YEARS S/O LATE VISWANATHAN NAIR, PADIPARAMBIL HOUSE, KOZHUVANA, CHEERAL VILLAGE AND POST. NENMENI AMSOM, SULTHANBATHERY TALUK, WAYANAD DISTRICT, PIN - 673595 4BINDU AGED 50 YEARS D/O.LATE VISWANATHAN NAIR, KOUSTHOOBAM HOUSE, CHELAPRAM, MAKKADA, KAKKODI POST, KOZHIKODE DISTRICT, PIN - 673611 ``` ``` THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 14.02.2024, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ``` ``` R.S.A No.74 of 2024 ``` ``` - 2 - ``` ## **`J U D G M E N T`** ``` The defendants in O.S.No.43/2012 on the files of Munsiff Court Sulthan Bathery has filed this second appeal under Section 100 r/w Order XLII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as 'CPC' for short), challenging decree and judgment in the above case which were confirmed by the decree and judgment in AS 30/2020 dated 30.06.2023. ``` ``` 2.Heard the learned counsel for the appellant/ defendant on admission. Perused the verdicts under challenge. ``` ``` 3.In this matter, though it is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant/defendant that, in view of the earlier decree and delivery thereof, the remedy of the plaintiff is under Sec.47 of CPC and therefore the present suit is not maintainable, the Trial Court as well as the appellate Court negatived the contention. ``` ``` 4.In this matter, the plaint schedule property got assigned in favour of the plaintiff by virtue of document NO. 352/1984 of Sulthan Bathery SRO. While ``` ``` R.S.A No.74 of 2024 ``` ``` - 3 - ``` ``` the plaintiff had been in the possession and enjoyment of the same, an agreement of sale had been executed in between plaintiff and defendant. Thus, the defendant occupied the plaint Schedule Property and continued possession. At this juncture, the plaintiff filed OS 73/1999 before the Munsiff Court, Kalpetta which was later transferred to Munsiff Court Sulthan Bhathery and re-numbered as OS 279/2011 and the suit was decreed on 30.03.2003. Thereafter the defendants approached Sub Court Sulthan Bathery and filed As No. 25/2005 along with delay petition of 631 days. When the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal, the matter was taken before this Court in RSA 1423/2013. As per the judgment in RSA, this Court set aside the judgment of the Trial Court and remanded the matter to the Trial Court for fresh disposal. The defendant again was set exparte and an exparte decree was passed. IA 1436/2006 was filed to set aside the exparte decree also Was dismissed. By long process, finally the decree was put in execution and as per A9, the delivery report of Amin in EP3/2005, delivery was affected and ``` ``` R.S.A No.74 of 2024 ``` ``` - 4 - ``` ``` possession of the property was put back to the hands of plaintiff. The suit was necessitated since the defendants again trespassed into the property and dispossessed the plaintiff. ``` ``` 5.In this matter, it is an admitted fact that, there was a sale agreement in between the plaintiff and defendant. But the sale agreement in no way would confer any right upon the vendee and as per Section 55(6)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act the vendee would get a charge on the immovable property agreed to be sold, so as to realise the advance consideration, if any, paid. Further Section 53A of the T.P Act has also no application in the present case. So, the vendee in a contract of sale can enforce the contract seeking the reliefs of specific performance of contract or return of advance of money and sometimes damages. Apart from the said remedies, vendee has no other right available and protected by law. By the time, all the remedies in view of the sale agreement is hopelessly barred by limitation. ``` ``` R.S.A No.74 of 2024 ``` ``` - 5 - ``` ``` 6.In this matter, it is discernible from the judgment of the lower Court that, the defendants raised a contention that there was no physical execution of the decree and the report of the Amin noted as Ext. A9 is incorrect. The defendants also raised a contention that his possession is protected under Sec.53A of the TP Act. In fact, even after execution of the decree in OS No. 279/2001, now also the defendant has been possessing and enjoying the same, after trespassing upon the property and now his status is that of a trespasser, since his possession earlier on the strength of the contract of sale was given a go by Ext.A9 delivery report, effecting delivery in favour of the plaintiff. ``` 7. `It is true that Section 47 of CPC would apply in relation to all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. But in the facts of the case, the Trial Court and the Appellate Court concurrently negatived this contention and` ``` R.S.A No.74 of 2024 ``` ``` - 6 - ``` ``` therefore the said finding does not require interference. Therefore, the Trial Court rightly granted decree and directed the defendants to surrender the vacant possession of the plaint schedule property to the supplemental plaintiffs, within a period of one month from the date of the decree. The Appellate Court also confirmed the same. On perusal of the concurrent verdicts, the same found to be absolutely correct and it could not be held that, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the present suit would not lie, by the interdiction of Sec.47 of CPC. Thus, no substantial questions of law arise to admit and maintain this second appeal. Thus, the concurrent verdicts of the trial court and Appellate Court do not require any interference at the hands of this Court. ``` ``` 8.In view of the above discussion, no substantial question of law emerges in this matter to be formulated to maintain and admit this regular second appeal.Order XLII Rule 2 of CPC provides thus: ``` ``` “2. Power of Court to direct that the appeal be heard on the question formulated by it.-At the time ``` ``` R.S.A No.74 of 2024 ``` ``` - 7 - ``` ``` of making an order under rule 11 of Order XLI for the hearing of a second appeal, the Court shall formulate the substantial question of law as required by section 100, and in doing so, the Court may direct that the second appeal be heard on the question so formulated and it shall not be open to the appellant to urge any other ground in the appeal without the leave of the Court, given in accordance with the provision of section 100.” ``` ``` 9.Section 100 of CPC provides that,(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) An Appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be ``` ``` R.S.A No.74 of 2024 ``` ``` - 8 - ``` ``` heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question. Proviso stipulates that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question. ``` ``` 10.In the decision reported in[2020 KHC 6507 : AIR 2020 SC 4321 : 2020 (10) SCALE 168] Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala and Others, the Apex Court held that: ``` ``` The condition precedent for entertaining and deciding a second appeal being the existence of a substantial question of law, whenever a question is framed by the High Court, the High Court will have to show that the question is one of law and not just a question of facts, it also has to show that the question is a substantial question of law. In Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, [(1999) 3 SCC 722]. ``` ``` 11.In a latest decision of the Apex Court in Government of Kerala v. Joseph, reported in [2023 ``` ``` R.S.A No.74 of 2024 ``` ``` - 9 - ``` ``` (5) KHC 264 : 2023 (5) KLT 74 SC],it was held, after referringSantosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, [2001 (3) SCC 179](three – Judge Bench), as under: ``` ``` For an appeal to be maintainable under Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure ('CPC', for brevity) it must fulfill certain well – established requirements. The primary and most important of them all is that the appeal should pose a substantial question of law. The sort of question that qualifies this criterion has been time and again reiterated by this Court. ``` ``` 12.The legal position is no more res-integra on the point that in order to admit and maintain a second appeal under Section 100 of CPC, the Court shall formulate substantial question/s of law, and the said procedure is mandatory. Although the phrase 'substantial question of law' is not defined in the Code, 'substantial question of law' means; of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with – technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen ``` ``` R.S.A No.74 of 2024 ``` ``` - 10 - ``` ``` not to qualify the scope of “substantial question of law” by suffixing the words “of general importance” as has been done in many other provisions such as S.109 of the Code or Art.133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. As such, second appeal cannot be decided on equitable grounds and the conditions mentioned in Section 100 read with Order XLII Rule 2 of CPC must be complied to admit and maintain a second appeal. ``` ``` 13.In the instant case, it appears that the concurrent verdicts entered into by the trail court as well as by the Appellate Court, based on the facts and evidence, are found to be in order. Therefore, the same does not require any interference at the hands of this Court. ``` ``` 14.In this matter, no substantial question of law arises for consideration so as to admit this second appeal. It is the well settled law that a second appeal involving no substantial question of ``` ``` R.S.A No.74 of 2024 ``` **==> picture [40 x 8] intentionally omitted <==** ``` law cannot be admitted. Therefore, the decree and judgment under challenge do not require any interference and no substantial question of law to be formulated to adjudicate in this regular second appeal. ``` ``` Accordingly, this regular second appeal stands dismissed, without being admitted, as indicated above. ``` ``` All interlocutory applications pending in this second appeal, stand dismissed. ``` ``` Registry shall inform this matter to the Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court, forthwith. ``` Sd/- ``` A. BADHARUDEEN JUDGE ``` ``` SM ```