High CourtDivision BenchAppeal allowed; High Court sentence quashed; Tr...

Ravindra Tukaram Hiwale v. State of Maharashtra

Case / Petition Number:Criminal Appeal Nos. 1419-1420 of 2010
Neutral Citation:[2010] 9 S.C.R. 454

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • Harjit Singh Bedi
  • Chandramauli Kr. Prasad
Judgment Date
2010-08-02
Court Decision / Holding
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashed the High Court’s enhancement of the sentence under Section 306 IPC from four to six years, and confirmed the Trial Court’s judgment under Section 306 and 498-A; the appellant is to be released forthwith if not required in connection with any other case.
Final Disposition
Appeal allowed; High Court sentence quashed; Trial Court judgment confirmed; release of appellant forthwith if not required in connection with any other case.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Ravindra Tukaram Hiwale

Respondents

  • State of Maharashtra

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • B. Sridhar

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Shankar Chillargee
  • • Asha G. Nair
  • • Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure

Case Synopsis & Summary

This Supreme Court judgment concerns a criminal appeal by Ravindra Tukaram Hiwale challenging his conviction for offences under sections 498-A and 306 IPC in connection with the death of his wife, Alka, by self-immolation in February 1990. The Trial Court convicted the appellant for 498-A (cruelty) and 306 IPC, sentencing him to four years and one year RI respectively. The High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench, on appeal by the State, enhanced the 306 IPC sentence from four to six years, relying on the appellant’s alleged quarrelsome and aggressive nature, and on two letters reflecting his conduct. The prosecution case stated that the deceased had made a dying declaration to a police officer on 9 February 1990, asserting she had quarrelled with her husband over household chores and feeding the children, poured kerosene on herself, and burnt herself. The Supreme Court noted that the dying declaration expressed that the quarrel occurred in the morning, a commonplace circumstance among young married couples, and that this should weigh against heavy reliance on prior letters. It emphasized that appellate intervention in quantum of sentence should be rare and only in exceptional cases, and that section 306 IPC carries a maximum of 10 years, with the trial court having the prerogative to award up to that limit. The Court held that the High Court’s enhancement was unwarranted, reversed it, and restored the Trial Court’s judgment, directing release of the appellant if not needed in other cases.

Provisions of Law Cited

Section 498-A IPCSection 306 IPC

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant contends that the High Court erred in relying on his alleged quarrelsome and aggressive nature, evidenced by two letters, to enhance the sentence; the dying declaration indicates a morning quarrel and a spontaneous self-immolation; the trial court rightly held no prior misbehavior; appellate interference with quantum of sentence should be rare and only in exceptional cases; the maximum under Section 306 IPC is 10 years, and the trial court had the prerogative to award up to that limit.

Contentions of Respondents

The State argued for a higher sentence based on the appellant’s quarrelsome conduct and the letters indicating aggressive behavior; the High Court’s enhancement to six years was warranted given the circumstances; the appeal is sought to sustain or further increase the sentence as a deterrent for cruelty and recidivist conduct.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

# [2010) 9 S.C.R. 454 A # RAVINDRA TUKARAM HIWALE _V._ # STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (Criminal Appeal Nos. 1419-1420 of 2010) 8 AUGUST 2, 2010 # **[HARJIT SINGH BEDI AND CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, JJ.]** _Penal Code, 1860:_ c _ss. 306 and 498-A_ - _A married woman causing her death by burning herself_ - _Husband convicted ulss 306 and 498-A and sentenced to four years and one year's RI respectively_ - _High Court enhancing sentence u/s 306 to six years_ - _HELD:_ 0 _[In ][the light ][of ][the dying declaration made ][by ][the deceased ] that she had quarrelled with her husband that very morning, i.e. the date of occurrence, (which is a common place happening amongst young married couples}, High Court was not 1ustified in holding that the accused was liable to an enhancement in the sentence on account of his quarrelsome_ E _nature_ - _It must also be emphasized that the interference of the appellate court on the quantum of sentence should be rare and only in exceptional cases_ - _Section 306 provides for a sentence which may extend to 10 years and it was the prerogative of trial court to award a sentence up to 10 years_ - F _Trial court gave a positive finding that there was no misbehaviour on the part of the accused over a period of time and the incident was a spontaneous one arising out of a family quarrel in the morning_ - _The finding of High Court based on two letters written about a year before the incident would,_ G _therefore, have little value in the light of the dying declaration_ - _The incident happened in February, 1990 and the accused has undergone about four years of the sentence_ - _The sentence awarded by High Court is quashed and the judgment of trial court confirmed_ - _Criminal Law_ - _Interference with_ H 454 # RAVINDRA TUKARAM HIWALE _v._ STATE OF 455 MAHARASHTRA _quantum of sentence by appellate court_ - _Propriety of_ - A _Sentence._ CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. : 1419-1420 of 2010. From the Judgment & Order dated 02.08.2006 of the High B Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench at Nagpur in Criminal Appeal Nos. 53 & 199 of 1991. B. Sridhar for the Appellant. Shankar Chillargee, Asha G. Nair, Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure for the Respondent. C The following order of the Court was delivered ## **ORDER** D Leave granted. The appellant was married with the deceased Alka after the death of his first wife. As per the prosecution story at about 7.00 a.m. on 6th February, 1990 the deceased suffered serious burn injuries in the kitchen of the house and ultimately died of those injuries. It is the prosecution case that at about 8.30 a.m. on the 9th February 1990 she made a dying declaration to PW.10 - a Police Head Constable, in which she stated that she had a quarrel with her husband over the house-hold chores and over the feeding of the children and she had thereafter poured kerosene on herself and then burnt herself. E F The Trial Court on a consideration of the evidence convicted the appellant for offences punishable under Section 498-A and to a sentence of one year and under Section 306 to a sentence of four years. The appellant thereafter filed an appeal in the High Court of Bombay whereas the State of Maharashtra also filed an appeal pleading for a higher sentence. The appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed. The appeal filed by the State was allowed and the sentence awarded by the Trial Court under Section 306 IPC was G H 456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 9 S.C.R. A enhanced from four to six years. It is in this situation that the matter is before us. The learned counsel for the appellant has made only one argument before us. He has submitted that the High Court had 8[observed that the appellant appeared ][to ][be ][of a quarrelsome ] and aggressive nature and as evidence of his behaviour had placed reliance on two letters which required that a heavy sentence should be imposed. We see, however, that in the light of the dying declaration made by the deceased that she had quarreled with her husband that very morning (which is a C common place happening amongst young married couples), the High Court was not justified in holding that the appellant was liable to an enhancement in the sentence on account of his quarrelsome nature. We must also emphasize that the interference of the appellate court on the quantum of sentence D should be rare and only in exceptional cases. Section 306 of the !PC provides for a sentence which may extend to 10 years. It was therefore the prerogative of the Trial Court to award a sentence up to 10 years. As already mentioned above the trial court had given a positive finding that there was no E misbehaviour on the part of the appellant over a period of time and the incident was a spontaneous one arising out of a family quarrel in the morning. The finding of the High Court based on two letters written about a year before the incident would therefore have little value in the light of the dying declaration of F the deceased. We also notice that the incident happened in February, 1990 and we are told by the learned amicus curiae that the appellant has undergone about four years of the sentence. We accordingly allow the appeal, quash the sentence G awarded by the High Court and confirm the judgment ()f the Trial Court. In the meantime, we also direct that the appellant who is in custody, shall be released forthwith if not required in connection with any other case. H R.P. Appeal allowed.