Rasiya v. S. Sujith

## **`IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM`** ## **`PRESENT`** ## **`THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K. NARENDRAN`** ``` & ``` ``` THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.G. AJITHKUMAR ``` ``` FRIDAY, THE 19[TH] DAY OF AUGUST 2022 / 28TH SRAVANA, 1944 R.C.REV.NO.145 OF 2022 ``` ``` AGAINST THE ORDER DTD. 14.07.2022 IN I.A.NO.1 OF 2020 AND R.C.A.NO.3 OF 2020 OF THE RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY (ADDL.DISTRICT COURT-IV), PALAKKAD ARISING OUT OF THE ORDER DATED 17.10.2019 IN R.C.P.NO.52 OF 2016 OF THE RENT CONTROL COURT (ADDI. MUNSIFF), PALAKKAD ``` ``` REVISION PETITIONER/S: ``` ``` RASIYA, AGED 49 YEARS W/O. K.HAMSA, AGED 49 YEARS, KIZHAKKETHIL HOUSE,RESIDING AT KEERTHANAM, BLOCK NO.38, SOORYANAGAR, CHANDRANAGAR P.O, PALAKKAD DISTRICT., PIN - 678007 ``` ``` BY ADVS.JACOB SEBASTIAN K.V.WINSTON ANU JACOB ``` ## **`RESPONDENT/S:`** ``` S.SUJITH, AGED 47 YEARS AGED 47 YEARS, S/O.SUKUMARAN, PALATHINKAL HOUSE, NOW RESIDING AT DOOR NO.3, DURGA HOMES, 90 BAJANAI KOIL STREET, KANAGAM TARAMANI P.O, CHENNAI., PIN - 600113 ``` ``` BY ADVS.K.S.MADHUSOODANAN(K/000271/1976) (CAVEATOR) M.M.VINOD KUMAR(K/1685/2000) P.K.RAKESH KUMAR(K/384/2008) K.S.MIZVER(K/333/2007) M.J.KIRANKUMAR(K/000201/2017) ``` ``` THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 19.08.2022, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ``` 2 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 ## **ORDER** Anil K. Narendran, J. The petitioner is the respondent-tenant in R.C.P.No.52 of 2016 on the file of the Rent Control Court (Additional Munsiff), Palakkad, a petition filed by the respondent herein-landlord under Sections 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, seeking eviction of the tenant from the petition schedule building. The tenant opposed the order of eviction by filing a counter. Before the Rent Control Court, the landlord was examined as PW1 and Exts.A2 to A6 were marked on his side. The tenant was examined as RW1 and Exts.B1 and B2 were marked on her side. After considering the pleadings and evidence on record, the Rent Control Court by the order dated 17.10.2019 ordered the eviction of the tenant under Sections 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Act and directed the tenant to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule building to the landlord, within a period of one month from the date of that order. The tenant was also held liable to pay the cost to the landlord. 2. Challenging the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court in R.C.P.No.52 of 2016, the tenant filed R.C.A.No.3 3 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 of 2020 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority (Additional District Judge-IV), Palakkad under Section 18(1)(b) of the Act. Along with that appeal, the tenant filed I.A.No.1 of 2020, an application to stay the execution proceedings before the Additional Munsiff Court. In I.A.No.1 of 2020 in R.C.A.No.3 of 2020 the Appellate Authority passed an order dated 08.04.2021, whereby the tenant was directed to pay arrears of rent to the landlord, within one month from the date of that order. It was further ordered that on failure, the tenant will be evicted from the petition schedule building, after the expiry of one month. The said order was followed by the order dated 12.08.2021 in R.C.A.No.3 of 2020, which reads thus: “Appellant and the respondent represented by counsel and submitted that the appellant deposited only Rs.55,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand thousand only). As per the order dated 08.04.2021 the appellant shall deposit arrears of rent Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees four lakh only) is pending. Appellant has not complied the order dated 08.04.2021. Hence appeal may be dismissed. The appellant shall deposit arrears of rent within 15 days.” 3. Aggrieved by the order dated 08.04.2021 in I.A.No.1 of 2020 in R.C.A.No.3 of 2020 and the order dated 12.08.2021 in 4 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 R.C.A.No.3 of 2020 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Palakkad the petitioner-tenant filed R.C.Rev.No.138 of 2021 before this Court under Section 20 of the Act. By the order dated 19.11.2021, this Court allowed R.C.Rev.No.138 of 2021, by setting aside the order dated 08.04.2021 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority in I.A.No.1 of 2020 in R.C.A.No.3 of 2020 and also the order dated 12.08.2021 in R.C.A.No.3 of 2020, by directing the Appellate Authority to reconsider I.A.No.1 of 2020 in R.C.A.No.3 of 2020, strictly in accordance with law and take an appropriate decision thereon, taking note of the statutory requirements under Section 12 of the Act and also the law laid down in the decisions referred to therein, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of three weeks from the date of appearance of the parties. Both parties were directed to appear before the Appellate Authority on 17.12.2021. In the said order, it was made clear that, till such orders are passed, no coercive steps shall be taken against the tenant in E.P.No.5 of 2020 in R.C.P.No.52 of 2016, pending before the Principal Munsiff Court, Palakkad. 4. After the order of this Court dated 19.11.2021 in R.C.Rev.No.138 of 2021, the Appellate Authority passed an order 5 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 dated 24.02.2022 in I.A.No.1 of 2021 in R.C.A.No.3 of 2020, whereby the tenant was directed to pay arrears of rent to the landlord within a period of four weeks from the date of that order. In paragraph 7 of that order the Appellate Authority noticed that the petitioner has admitted the rent at the rate of Rs.5,000/- per month. She had paid an amount of Rs.4,50,000/- to the landlord towards advance sale consideration and thereafter, she has not paid any amount to the landlord towards monthly rent. Despite the order dated 24.02.2022 of the Appellate Authority, the tenant failed to deposit the arrears of rent and she filed O.S.No.84 of 2018 before the Sub Court, Palakkad, a suit for specific performance, which was rejected on 10.07.2019 for non-remittance of balance court fee. 5. Challenging the order dated 24.02.2022, the tenant filed R.C.Rev.No.92 of 2022, which was dismissed as not maintainable, by the order dated 23.06.2022, since the said order of the Appellate Authority is one issued in exercise of the powers under Sections 12(1) and (2) of the Act, which is not revisable under Section 20. In continuation of the order dated 24.02.2022, the Appellate Authority passed an order dated 14.07.2022 in I.A.No.1 of 2020 6 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 and also in R.C.A.No.3 of 2020. Paragraphs 11 to 13 of that order read thus: “11. From the records, it is seen that my learned predecessor in office, has already passed an order under 12(2) of the Act directing the appellant to pay arrears of rent. It was passed on 24.02.2022. The appellant had not deposited or paid the arrears of rent till date. Similarly, he had not shown any sufficient cause regarding the nonpayment of the admitted arrears of rent and the rent subsequently accrued. The time granted by this Court has already been elapsed long back. This case was posted on different posting dates enabling the appellant to showing sufficient cause regarding the nonpayment of rent. But, the appellant had neither remitted the amount nor shown any cause regarding the non-payment. The appellant filed an affidavit stating that since he denied the landlord-tenant relationship the order which is passed by my learned predecessor in office under 12(2) is illegal and therefore no order of eviction under Section 12(3) could be passed. The above argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is unsustainable. The Rent Control Court found the landlord-tenant relationship between the appellant and respondent and passed an order of eviction. In order to prosecute this appeal the appellant ought to have deposited the arrears of rent as stipulated under Section 12(1) of the Act. Moreover, my learned predecessor in office already passed an order under Section 12(2) directing the appellant to pay the arrears of rent. Therefore, it is not possible for me, to suo moto review the order which was passed by my learned 7 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 predecessor in office. Hence, the contention of the appellant is unsustainable. 12. On consideration of the facts of the case, I find that, the appellant/tenant has not complied the order passed by this court on 24.02.2022 by depositing the arrears of rent. In view of the above circumstances, I have to pass an order under Section 12(3) of the Act. Thus, the proceedings in this R.C.A. has to be stopped and there shall be an order directing the appellant/tenant to put the respondent/landlord in building. 13. Hence, following orders are passed: In the result, - a) Since the appellant has not paid the rent as per order dated 24.02.2022 the proceedings in this Rent Control Appeal (R.C.A.3/2020) is stopped under Section 12(3) of the Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act. - b) The appellant/tenant is directed to put the respondent/landlord in possession of the tenanted building within one month from today. - c) It is made clear that the stoppage of the proceedings in the R.C.A. shall have the effect of dismissal of the appeal.” 6. Challenging the common order dated 14.07.2022 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority in I.A.No.1 of 2020 and R.C.A.No.3 of 2020, the tenant is before this Court in this Rent Control Revision, invoking the provisions under Section 20 of the Act. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant and 8 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 also the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord. 8. The issue that arises for consideration in this Rent Control Revision is as to whether any interference is warranted on the common order dated 14.07.2022 of the Appellate Authority, invoking the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20 of the Act. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant would contend that the impugned order of the Appellate Authority is not in tune with the direction contained in the order dated 19.11.2021 of this Court in R.C.Rev.No.138 of 2021. After the order dated 24.02.2022 of the Appellate Authority, which is one issued under Sections 12(1) and (2) of the Act, the Appellate Authority ought to have arrived at a conclusion that the tenant has defaulted payment of admitted arrears of rent, before passing an order under Section 12(3) of the Act. The dispute raised by the tenant on 29.06.2022, denying the landlord-tenant relationship was not properly appreciated by the Appellate Authority, before passing the impugned order. 10. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondentlandlord would contend that the impugned order of the Appellate 9 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 Authority is the one issued in exercise of its powers under Section 12(3) of the Act, since the tenant defaulted payment of the admitted arrears of rent and failed to show sufficient cause for such default. Therefore, no interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20 of the Act is warranted. The learned counsel placed reliance on the provisions under Section 17(1A) of the Registration Act, 1908, Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and also the observations made by the Appellate Authority in paragraph 7 of the order dated 24.02.2022, in order to contend that the dispute raised by the petitioner-tenant denying landlord-tenant relationship has no relevance in deciding the question as to whether the order passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority under Section 12(3) of the Act can be sustained or not. 11. Section 12 of the Act deals with payment or deposit of rent during the pendency of proceedings for eviction. As per Section 12(1), no tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under Section 11, shall be entitled to contest the application before the Rent Control Court under that Section, or to prefer an appeal under Section 18 against any order made by 10 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 the Rent Control Court on the application, unless he has paid or pays to the landlord, or deposits with the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building up to the date of payment or deposit, and continues to pay or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be. As per Section 12(2), the deposit under sub-section (1) shall be made within such time as the court may fix and in such manner as may be prescribed and shall be accompanied by the fee prescribed for the service of notice referred to in sub-section (4). As per the proviso to Section 12(2), the time fixed by the court for the deposit of the arrears of rent shall not be less than four weeks from the date of the order and the time fixed for the deposit of rent which subsequently accrues due shall not be less than two weeks from the date on which the rent becomes due. As per Section 12(3) of the Act, if any tenant fails to pay or to deposit the rent as aforesaid, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all 11 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. As per Section 12(4), when any deposit is made under sub-section (1), the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall cause notice of the deposit to be served on the landlord in the prescribed manner, and the amount deposited may, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, be withdrawn by the landlord on application made by him to the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority in that behalf. 12. Section 12(1) of the Act enjoins a tenant, against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under Section 11, to pay to the landlord, or deposit with the Rent Control Court, all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building, up to the date of payment or deposit, and continue to pay or deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court, in order to contest that application for eviction before the Rent Control Court. Similarly, Section 12(1) of the Act enjoins a tenant, in order to prefer an appeal under Section 18 of the Act against any order made by the Rent Control 12 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 Court on an application made by a landlord under Section 11, to pay the landlord, or deposits with the Appellate Authority, all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building up to the date of payment or deposit, and continues to pay or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Appellate Authority. 13. The liability of a tenant under Section 12(1) of the Act, against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under Section 11, or who prefer an appeal under Section 18 of the Act, against any order made by the Rent Control Court on an application made by a landlord under Section 11, is limited to all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building, up to the date of payment or deposit, and he shall continue to pay or deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be. 14. The object of the provisions of Section 12(1) of the Act is to deny the defaulting tenant the right to contest the application 13 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 for eviction before the Rent Control Court, or to prefer an appeal under Section 18 of the Act against any order made by the Rent Control Court on an application made by a landlord under Section 11, unless he pays to the landlord, or deposits with the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent admitted by him to be due in respect of the building, up to the date of payment or deposit, and continues to pay or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be. 15. In **J. Ramkumar v. Ashok Jacob [2022 (1) KHC 495 : ILR 2021 (4) Kerala 876]** this Court held that, Section 12(2) of the Act enjoins a tenant to deposit the admitted rent under sub-section (1), within such time as the court may fix and in such manner as may be prescribed. The time fixed by the court for the deposit of the arrears of rent and the time fixed for the deposit of rent which subsequently accrues due shall not be less than that specified in the proviso to Section 12(2). As per the statutory mandate of Section 12(1), on an application filed by the landlord under Section 12, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, 14 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 as the case may be, has to order payment or deposit of arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the petition schedule building, up to the date of payment or deposit and the tenant shall also be directed to continue to pay or deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, regardless of the relief sought for in that application. As per Section 12(3) of the Act, if any tenant fails to pay or to deposit the rent as aforesaid, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. 16. In **Rakesh Menon v. Homex Trade Links (P) Ltd.,** **[2012 (4) KLT 18]** , a decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord, a Division Bench of this Court repelled the argument that the landlord has to file a petition under Section 12 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The Division Bench held that, if the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority notices that the arrears of rent admitted or the rent that 15 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 fell due subsequently is not paid or deposited within the period specified in Section 12, it is the duty of the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority to follow the procedure envisaged by that Section. ## 17. In **Mohammed Shammer v. Ashokan [2015 (1) KLT** **396]** it was contended before the Division Bench by the tenant that the expression “on the application” occurring in Section 12(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act also can be referable to an application under Section 12. The Division Bench did not accept this submission since Section 12(1) does not refer to an application under that Section, but refers to only an application under Section 11. The words “on the application” against which an appeal is preferred occurring in Section 12(1) can have reference only to the application under Section 11. It is true that an appeal under Section 18 lies not only against a final order under Section 11, but also against the order passed by the Rent Control Court dismissing an application to set aside the ex parte order under Section 11. Appeal under Section 18 lies against certain other orders passed by the Rent Control Court as well. The only plausible interpretation that could be made is that though an 16 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 appeal under Section 18 lies against a variety of orders passed by the Rent Control Court, the appeal which is referred to under Section 12(1) is an appeal against an order under Section 11. In other appeals, no order can be passed by the Appellate Authority under Section 12 of the Act. 18. In **Rasiya v. S. Sujith** [order dated 19.11.2021 in R.C.Rev.No.138 of 2021] this Court held that, viewed in the light of the law laid down in **Rakesh Menon [2012 (4) KLT 18]** and **Mohammed Shammer [2015 (1) KLT 396]** , conclusion is irresistible that, an application filed by the landlord under Section 12 of the Act is not required for the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority to invoke its powers under Section 12 of the Act to pass an order directing the tenant to pay admitted arrears of rent as on the date of the order and continue to pay arrears of rent for the subsequent period, within the time limit specified in Section 12(2) of the Act. Section 12(1) of the Act does not refer to an application under Section 12, but refers to only an application for eviction under Section 11 of the Act. Therefore, we find no merit in the contention of the petitioner-tenant that, in the absence of an application filed by the landlord under Section 12 of the Act, the 17 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 Appellate Authority cannot direct the tenant to deposit admitted arrears of rent during the pendency of R.C.A.No.3 of 2020. ## 19. In **Pochappan Narayanan v. Gopalan [1990 (2) KLT** **1]** a Division Bench of this Court noticed that, Section 12(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act deals with consequences flowing as a result of the failure on the part of the tenant to pay or deposit admitted rent. When the tenant fails to pay or deposit the admitted rent, as provided in Section 12(1) and (2), the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, will be required to ask the tenant to show cause why all further proceedings should not be stopped and an order be made directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession. When such an opportunity is afforded to the tenant, the tenant is entitled to show, if there is sufficient cause, for his failure to pay the amount or deposit the rent as provided in Section 12(1) and (2). If the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority is satisfied that there is sufficient cause for not making the payment or deposit of the rent within time, it will not make any order stopping further proceedings and directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession. If, however, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority is not 18 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 satisfied about the cause shown, an order has to be made stopping all further proceedings and directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession. 20. In **Pochappan Narayanan** the Division Bench held that, before the consequences contemplated by Section 12(3) of the Act can ensue, the conditions specified in Section 12(1) and (2) have to be satisfied. It is therefore clear that, before any steps can be taken under Section 12(3) for making an order against the tenant who has committed default in paying or making the deposit as contemplated by Section 12(1), the procedure prescribed by Section 12(2) has to be satisfied. A tenant who does not fulfill the obligations imposed on him by Section 12(1) cannot be visited with the penal consequences contemplated by Section 12(3), unless all the conditions specified by Section 12(2) are satisfactorily fulfilled. Even after the court acts in accordance with Section 12(2) and the tenant still commits default, the tenant has to be given one more opportunity of showing cause as to why penal consequences contemplated by Section 12(3) should not be imposed on him. It is only when the court is not satisfied with the cause shown that it 19 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 can pass an order stopping all further proceedings and directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. 21. In **Narayanan v. Vinod [2004 (3) KLT 955]** the order passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority under Section 12(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act was assailed before the Division Bench, on the ground that the petitioner-tenant was not granted time as stipulated in Section 12(2) to deposit the arrears of rent and that, he had not been issued with any notice under Section 12(3) to show sufficient cause for not depositing the rent and, therefore, the order directing eviction of the tenant is contrary to the provisions of Section 12. The Division Bench noticed that, the provisions of Section 12 of the Act are mandatory and no tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord is entitled to contest the same or to prefer an appeal under Section 18, against any order passed by the Rent Control Court, unless he had paid or pays to the landlord or deposits with the Rent Control Court or with the Appellate Authority, all arrears of rent admitted by him to be due in respect of the demised premises up to the date of payment and continues to pay or deposit the rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the 20 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 building until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority. Section 12(3) of the Act then mandates that if any tenant fails to pay or deposit the rent as aforesaid, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority shall ‘unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary’ stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the demised premises. In other words, if the admitted rent due is not deposited during the pendency of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, all further proceedings have to stop and the authority concerned is required to make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in vacant possession of the premises, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause for not depositing that rent. 22. In **Narayanan** , on the question as to whether the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, where admitted rent has not been paid, is required to issue a separate notice to the tenant to enable him to show sufficient cause for the default in payment of admitted rent or is it for the tenant himself to file an application and bring to the notice of the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority the reasons which prevented him 21 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 from depositing the rent, the Division Bench held that, if the admitted arrears of rent are not deposited within the time fixed by the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority the tenant makes a default resulting in the penal consequences of his immediate eviction by stopping all further proceedings. This, however, will not happen if the tenant is able to show sufficient cause for making the default in not depositing the admitted rent. From the language of Section 12(3) of the Act and the legislative intent, it is not for the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority to issue any separate notice to the tenant to enable him to show sufficient cause for not depositing the admitted arrears of rent. When the time fixed for the deposit of arrears of rent runs out and the tenant has not deposited the same, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, is not expected to pass an order of ejectment of the tenant forthwith. 23. In **Narayanan** the Division Bench held that, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, while fixing the time within which the arrears of rent shall be deposited by the tenant should normally adjourn the hearing of the case to a date beyond the date fixed for depositing the rent, thereby allowing reasonable time to 22 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 the tenant to show sufficient cause for not depositing the rent, if he has committed default in payment. It will then be for the tenant to move an application before the concerned authority to show sufficient cause for the non-payment of rent. In other words, the interval between the date up to which the rent is to be deposited and the date on which the order under Section 12(3) is passed should be reasonable to enable the tenant to show sufficient cause for committing the default, if he so chooses. If the tenant moves such an application and points out the reasons which prevented him from depositing the arrears of admitted rent, the concerned authority will examine the issue on merits to find out whether sufficient cause has been shown or not. If sufficient cause has been shown, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority will not order immediate ejectment of the tenant. If no application is filed by the tenant or if the reasons shown by the tenant are insufficient, the penal consequences as contemplated in Section 12(3) of the Act shall follow. Section 12(3) of the Act is a mandate to the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority to order immediate ejectment of the tenant, if the tenant does not deposit the admitted arrears of rent, the only exception being, if he is able to show 23 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 sufficient cause for not doing so. In that view of the matter, the Division Bench concluded that, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, where admitted rent has not been deposited by the tenant, is not required to issue any separate notice to the tenant, to enable him to show sufficient cause for committing the default. 24. In **Shaji M. v. SNDP Sakhayogam No. 610, Alappuzha [2020 (2) KHC 574]** a Full Bench of this Court held that, in view of the principle evolved in **Narayanan [2004 (3) KLT** **955]** , from the language of Section 12(3) of the of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, and from the legislative intent, it is not for the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority to issue any separate notice to the tenant to enable him to show sufficient cause for not depositing the admitted arrears of rent. Instead, when the time fixed for deposit of the arrears of rent runs out and the tenant has not deposited the same, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, is not expected to pass an order ordering ejectment of the tenant forthwith. The Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, should normally adjourn the hearing of the case to a 24 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 date beyond the date fixed for deposit, thereby allowing reasonable time to the tenant to show sufficient cause for not depositing the rent, if he has committed default in payment of the arrears of rent. The interpretation made and the directions issued in **Narayanan** is more apt and appropriate to be held, as a view which can be legally sustained. The opportunity to be afforded to the tenant to show sufficient cause with respect to the failure to pay or deposit rent, as directed in Section 12(1) and (2), within the date stipulated, is not an empty formality. The principles of natural justice would mandate that the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, should afford the tenant with such an opportunity. 25. In **Shaji M.** , on the question as to whether the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority is required to issue any specific notice to the tenant to show cause, the Full Bench noticed that, the consequences provided under Section 12(3) of the Act follows when there occurred a default in complying with the direction for deposit or payment of the admitted arrears. Therefore, on the date stipulated for effecting such payment, by virtue of the order passed under Section 12(1) and (2), the tenant becomes fully aware that, unless sufficient cause has not been shown for the 25 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 default committed, the consequence of stoppage of the proceedings and direction to put the landlord in possession of the building, would follow automatically. Therefore, there is no necessity to alert the tenant by issuing any specific notice in this regard, calling upon him to show sufficient cause. On the other hand, providing of a further opportunity after the last date stipulated for effecting the payment or the deposit, is mandatory. If no sufficient cause is shown within such extended date to which the rent control petition is posted, it is absolutely within the authority and competence; and is the natural consequence that the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, should stop the proceedings and direct the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. Such a procedure, if followed, would be sufficient compliance for providing reasonable opportunity satisfying the statutory requirement contained in Section 12(3). Hence the Full Bench concluded that the decision in **Narayanan [2004 (3) KLT 955]** , even though passed without noticing the decision in **Pochappan Narayanan [1990 (2) KLT 1]** had laid the correct law. The Full Bench noticed that its view in this regard has got support from the decision of the Apex Court in **Sankaran Pillai v.** 26 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 **V.P. Venuguduswami [(1999) 6 SCC 396]** , the decisions of this Court in **C.V. Xavier v. Francis Leonard Pappali [1975 KLT 542]** and **Narayanan v. Muraleedhara Maran [1964 KLT 509]** . 26. In **Sankaran Pillai v. V.P. Venuguduswami [(1999)** **6 SCC 396]** the Apex Court held that, it is for the tenant to show sufficient cause and not for the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, to issue any show cause notice calling upon the tenant to show cause why an order of eviction shall not be passed. 27. In **C.V. Xavier v. Francis Leonard Pappali [1975 KLT 542]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, the reasonable opportunity contemplated under Section 12(3) of the Act must be a reasonable and real opportunity and is not an empty formality and that, if the tenant is not given such opportunity to show sufficient cause, an order passed under Section 12(3) would be unsustainable. 28. In **Narayanan v. Muraleedhara Maran [1964 KLT 509]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, when the court had passed an order directing a party before it to do a particular thing, in default of which certain consequence is to follow, if the party is 27 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 to be relieved of the consequences of any non-compliance of that order, he has to make a specific motion thereof showing sufficient - cause for his non compliance of the order and making appropriate prayer therein. Otherwise the order would work itself out and the default to comply with it will bring the appointed consequences on the tenant. 29. As per sub-section (4) of Section 12, when any deposit is made under sub-section (1), the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall cause notice of the deposit to be served on the landlord in the prescribed manner, and the amount deposited may, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, be withdrawn by the landlord on application made by him to the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority in that behalf. ## 30. In **J. Ramkumar [2022 (1) KHC 495]** , this Court held that, Section 12 of the Act imposes certain obligations on the tenant to pay or deposit admitted rent, during the pendency of the proceedings for eviction under Section 11, before the Rent Control Court, and also the proceedings in an appeal filed under Section 18, before the Appellate Authority, against such an order of ## 28 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 eviction. Section 12(3) of the Act also provides for the consequences, which were to follow, for committing default in fulfilling those obligations. Section 12(3) of the Act deals with the consequences flowing as a result of the failure of the part of the tenant to pay or deposit admitted rent. Before the consequences under Section 12(3) can ensue, the conditions specified in Section 12(1) and (2) have to be satisfied. Section 12(3) mandates that if any tenant fails to pay or deposit the admitted rent as provided under Section 12(1) and (2), the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. Therefore, if the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, is satisfied about the cause shown by the tenant, it will not make any order under Section 12(3) of the Act, stopping further proceedings and directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. 31. It is clear from the plain language and also the legislative intent of Section 12 of the Act that, it is not for the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, to 29 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 pass an order under Section 12(3), stopping further proceedings and directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, once the time limit fixed for payment or deposit of admitted rent runs out, and the tenant defaulted payment or deposit of rent in terms of the order passed under Section 12(1) and (2). Though it is not for the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, to issue any separate notice to the tenant to enable him to show sufficient cause for not paying or depositing the admitted arrears of rent, as held by the Division Bench in **Narayanan [2004 (3) KLT 955]** and approved by the Full Bench in **Shaji M. [2020 (2) KHC 574]** , the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority is not expected to pass an order forthwith, stopping further proceedings and directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, under Section 12(3). 32. Before passing an order under Section 12(3) of the Act, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, should normally adjourn the hearing of the case to a date beyond the date fixed for payment or deposit of admitted rent, thereby allowing reasonable time to the tenant to show sufficient cause for not paying or depositing the admitted rent, if he has 30 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 committed default in payment of the same, within the time limit stipulated in the order passed under Section 12(1) and (2). Such an opportunity to be afforded to the tenant to show sufficient cause is not an empty formality. The principles of natural justice would mandate that the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority should afford such an opportunity to the tenant before passing an order under Section 12(3). 33. In **J. Ramkumar [2022 (1) KHC 495]** , this Court held that, the consequences provided under Section 12(3) of the Act follow when there occurred a default by the tenant in complying with the direction in an order passed under Section 12(1) and (2), for deposit or payment of the admitted arrears of rent. On the date stipulated for effecting such payment, by virtue of that order, the tenant becomes fully aware that, unless sufficient cause has not been shown for the default committed, the consequence of stoppage of the proceedings and direction to put the landlord in possession of the building, under Section 12(3) would follow automatically. There is no necessity to alert the tenant by issuing any specific notice in this regard, calling upon him to show sufficient cause. On the other hand, providing of a further opportunity after 31 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 the last date stipulated for effecting payment or deposit of admitted rent, is mandatory. If no sufficient cause is shown within such extended date to which the rent control petition is posted, it is absolutely within the authority and competence, and is the natural consequence that, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, should stop the proceedings and direct the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. As held by the Full Bench in **Shaji M. [2020 (2) KHC 574]** , such a procedure, if followed, would be sufficient compliance for providing reasonable opportunity satisfying the statutory requirement contained in Section 12(3) of the Act. 34. In **Venugopalan v. Raphael [1974 KLT 640]** the Division Bench of this Court was dealing with a case in which the landlord filed Rent Control Petition under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act claiming eviction of the petition schedule building on the ground of arrears of rent. The Rent Control Court passed an order directing the tenant to pay admitted arrears of rent on or before the 20.09.1971. In the said order it was made clear that, on default of deposit within the specified period, an order for possession under Section 12(3) of the Act, will be passed. The order under Section 32 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 12(1) and (2) was not complied with, despite the fact that time for payment was extended. Therefore, the Rent Control Court passed an order for possession under Section 12(3) of the Act, which was dated 25.10.1971. Within thirty days of the said order, the tenant filed I.A. No. 4143 of 1971 to receive what was claimed to be the admitted arrears; and I.A. No. 4142 of 1971 to set aside the order for possession passed under Section 12(3) of the Act on 25.10.1971. The Rent Control Court dismissed I.A. No. 4142 of 1971 holding that an order under Section 12(3) cannot be set aside or vacated on the mere ground that the admitted arrears of rent had been deposited subsequent to the order. It declined to receive the arrears of rent tendered along with the I.A. No. 4143 of 1971, and accordingly dismissed the same. The appeals preferred by the tenant under Section 18(1)(b) of the Act against those orders were dismissed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority. On further revision, the revisional court, namely the District Court, Trichur, allowed the revision and set aside the orders of the Rent Control Court and of the Appellate Authority and remanded I.A. Nos. 4142 of 1971 and 4143 of 1971 back to the Rent Control Court for fresh disposal directing that the time for making deposit of the arrears of 33 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 rent, will be extended by the Rent Control Court. Feeling aggrieved landlord preferred revision petition before this Court. 35. In **Venugopalan** the Division Bench noticed that, under Section 11(2)(c) of the Act a tenant, against whom a decree for eviction has been passed by the Rent Control Court on the ground that rent had been kept in arrears, is allowed relief against the forfeiture of tenancy incurred by non-payment of rent, by depositing the arrears of rent decreed, within a certain period. In **Kurien v. Saramma Chacko [1964 KLT 1]** it was held that the power under Section 11(2)(c) can be exercised by the Appellate Authority and also by the Revisional Authority. Section 12 of the Act provides for a totally different contingency. The deposit of the admitted arrears enjoined by Section 12, is a condition precedent to the tenant entering on his defence and contesting the application for eviction, or an appeal filed therefrom. The scope and purpose of the deposit of arrears of rent enjoined by Section 12 is fundamentally different from the scope and the purpose of the deposit envisaged by Section 11(2)(c) of the Act. In **K.P.** **Mohammed v. Madhavi Amma [1963 KLT 688]** the Division Bench held that, Section 11 and Section 12 of the Act are not 34 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 dependent on each other. They provide for different contingencies though the consequence of the non compliance of the mandates of either Section is eviction. An order of eviction passed under Section 12(3) of the Act is not amenable to correction under Section 11(2)(c), which relates to orders of eviction passed under Section 11(2)(b) only. In **T.B. Mohanan v. Kanakaraja Pillai [1970 KLT** **1024]** a learned Judge of this Court held that an order passed under Section 12 of the Act, cannot be reopened or vacated by tendering the rent subsequent to the passing of the said order. In **Venugopalan** , the Division Bench held that, even assuming that for purpose of execution an order under Section 12(3) of the Act can be equated with and treated as the same, as one under Section 11 of the Act, the consequence enjoined by an order under Section 12(3) for failure to deposit the admitted arrears in time cannot be vacated or obliterated by payment at any subsequent stages or periods. 36. In **Venugopalan** it was argued before the Division Bench that Section 12(3) of the Act is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Division Bench observed that, the scope and the purpose of Section 11(2)(c) and 35 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 Section 12 are fundamentally different. The one is meant to relieve against forfeiture, and the other, as a condition precedent to be performed by the tenant before entering on his defence. The law itself does not encourage or put a premium on dishonesty, although those inclined to be dishonest may make use of its provisions to suit their purpose. Therefore, the Division Bench repelled the contention of the tenant that Section 12(3) of the Act is discriminatory. 37. In **Chinnamma v. Gopalan [(1995) 6 SCC 491]** the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which the landlord filed R.C.P.(OP)No.141 of 1977 before the Rent Control Court seeking eviction of the tenant under Sections 11(2) and 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The plea of bona fide need under Section 11(3) for own occupation of the landlord was found against. However, the Rent Control Court ordered eviction under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act on the ground of default in payment of rent from 01.06.1975, at the rate of Rs.20/- per month, as demanded in the notice on 22.06.1977. The Rent Control Court ordered that, in case the tenant deposits a sum of Rs.820/- as arrears as on 01.11.1978 within one month from the date of the 36 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 order, i.e., 30.11.1978, the tenant could move an application for vacating the order of eviction. The tenant filed R.C.A.No.8 of 1979 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority, by the order dated 26.07.1979, set aside the order passed by the Rent Control Court and remanded the matter, directing the Rent Control Court to consider the maintainability of the petition. After the remand, the Rent Control Court passed an order on 22.02.1980, directing the tenant to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule building under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act, within 30 days from the date of order. In that order it was made clear that, in case the tenant deposits the sum of Rs.540/-, which is the arrears of rent due as on 01.02.1980, she will be entitled to apply for getting the order of eviction vacated under section 11(2)(c) of Act. The tenant was directed to pay costs of the landlord including Advocate's fee, which was fixed as Rs.25/-, and interest at 6% per annum on the arrears of Rs.540/- from the date of order. R.C.A.No.40 of 1980, filed by the tenant before the Appellate Authority was dismissed on 21.07.1981. Thereafter, the tenant moved the Revisional Authority, the District Court, Palakkad, in R.C.R.P.No. 53 of 1981. The Revisional Authority passed an order 37 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 dated 24.03.1982 to the effect that the tenant shall be free to get the order vacated by making necessary deposit and application as contemplated in Section 11(2)(c) of Act before the Rent Control Court on or before 24.05.1982. The landlord filed O.P.No.10288 of 1988 before this Court and assailed the said order passed by the Revisional Authority. A learned single Judge of this Court, after referring to the prior history of the case and the earlier orders passed in the various proceedings, posed the question thus:Whether the revisional court was right in holding that the tenant was not required to pay or deposit more than the amount which was quantified by the Rent Control Court, the same being confirmed by the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority or whether the tenant should have deposited the entire arrears of rent that fell due by 06.04.1982, instead of Rs.750/- in terms of the directions of the revisional court in R.C.R.P.No.53 of 1991. After referring to Section 11(2)(b) and (c) and Section 12(1) and (2) of the Act, the learned Single Judge held that the expression "arrears of rent" in Section 11(2) (c) of the Act will be the "entire arrears of rent due" as on the date of deposit under that sub clause, in the context of section 12 of the Act. In taking the said view the learned Single 38 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 Judge followed a Bench decision in **Chellamma Varghese v. Cicey [1994 (2) KLT 106]** and held that it is not the arrears specified in the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller dated 22.02.1980 but the deposit of all arrears of rent that accrued even subsequent thereto till the date of filing of the application under Section 11(2)(c) of the Act, that should be made. The learned Single Judge set aside the order passed by the revisional court in R.C.R.P.No.6 of 1985 dated 31.07.1986. 38. In **Chinnamma** the Apex Court noticed that, it is nobody's case that either the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority or the revisional court passed any order under Section 12 of the Act regarding the payment of subsequent arrears (or future rent till the termination of proceedings) admitted by the tenant, when the proceedings were pending for eviction and before the order was passed under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act. Before expiry of the time fixed in the aforesaid order of the revisional court, the tenant filed I.A.No.764 of 1982 before the Rent Control Court on 06.04.1982, along with a remittance of a sum of Rs.750/- and prayed for setting aside the order of eviction dated 22.02.1980. The Apex Court held that, a mere look at Sections 11 and 12 of the 39 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 Act would show that they operate in different situations. Under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act the court passes a final order of eviction, directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, if there is default as provided therein. The execution of such final order is statutorily suspended for a period of one month. Within that time or such further time as the court may allow, the tenant is given an opportunity to deposit the arrears of rent with interest and cost of the proceedings and, if so done, the court is bound to vacate the order passed under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act. On the other hand, the provisions of Section 12 are applicable during the pendency of the proceedings for eviction. It permits the tenant against whom an application has been made by the landlord under Section 11 to contest the application or to prefer an appeal only if the tenant has paid or pays to the landlord or deposits in the court all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building upto the date of payment of deposit and also continues to pay or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building till the termination of the proceedings before the court. Section 12 is a special provision applicable during the pendency of the proceedings 40 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 and the provisions thereof point out that an order has to be made by the court fixing a time and the manner for payment or deposit of the amount. If the tenant fails to pay or deposit the rent so specified, unless sufficient cause is shown to the contrary, the Rent Control Court shall stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. In other words, Section 12 provides a summary procedure whereby during the pendency of the proceedings the court can direct the tenant to pay the current rent as admitted by the tenant and if it is not so done, the main eviction proceedings itself will come to an end and the court is enabled to pass an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. 39. In **Chinnamma** the Apex Court held that, for the applicability of Section 12 of the Act the proceedings for eviction should be pending, and the court should, by an order, direct the tenant to pay or deposit all arrears of rent that have been admitted by the tenant to be due and the tenant shall continue to pay the admitted rent that may subsequently become due till the termination of the proceedings and if it is not so done, that itself is treated as an independent default which will enable the court to 41 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 stop further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. Section 12 will not apply to a proceeding which is already over under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act. To invoke Section 12 of the Act, an independent order, passed during the pendency of the proceedings under Section 11 is required. With regard to the proceedings which have ended in an order passed by the Rent Control Court under Section 11(2)(b), it is only the provisions of Section 11(2)(c) that are applicable. The view of the learned Single Judge that provisions of Section 11(2)(b) should be read along with Section 12 of the Act, relying on an earlier Bench decision in **Chellamma Varghese [1994 (2) KLT** **106]** , is not justified in law. The Apex Court held that Section 12 of the Act has no application to a case wherein the proceedings for eviction are not pending, but on the other hand an order of eviction has been passed by the court under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act. In a case where an order of eviction has been passed under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act, Section 11(2)(c) alone is attracted and Section 12 of the Act is inapplicable. 40. In **Davy v. Indu [1999 (3) KLT 434]** a Division Bench of this Court reiterated that Section 11 and Section 12 of the Act 42 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 operate in different fields and circumstances. The compliance of these mandatory provisions will lead to eviction of the tenant. But an order of eviction once passed under Section 12(3) cannot be undone by resorting to Section 11(2)(c) of the Act. Section 11(2)(c) of the Act relates to orders of eviction passed under Section 11(2) only. Therefore, Section 11 and 12 of the Act are not dependent on each other. ## 41. In **Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal [(2003) 2 SCC** **577]** the question as to the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in the matter of default in deposit of rent as also interpretation of the word ‘shall’ occurring in Section 13(4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, came up for consideration before a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex. Section 13(1)(a) of the Act enables a landlord to sue for a decree of eviction in the event a tenant has neither paid nor tendered the amount of rent due from him for six months. In terms of Section 13(3), which was substituted by Section 8(i) of Rajasthan Act 14 of 1976, it is obligatory on the court to provisionally determine the amount of rent wherefor no application is required to be filed. As per Section 13(4) of the Act, the tenant shall deposit in court or 43 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 pay to the landlord the amount determined by the court under Section 13(3) within fifteen days from the date of such determination, or within such further time, not exceeding three months, as may be extended by the court. The tenant shall also continue to deposit in court or pay to the landlord, month by month, the monthly rent subsequent to the period up to which determination has been made, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month or within such further time not exceeding fifteen days, as may be extended by the court, at the monthly rate at which the rent was determined by the court under Section 13(3). Under Section 13(5), if a tenant fails to deposit or pay any amount referred to in Section 13 (4), on the date or within the time specified therein, the court shall order the defence against eviction to be struck out and shall proceed with the hearing of the suit. 42. In **Nasiruddin** the Apex Court held that, a bare perusal of the aforementioned provisions would show that in terms of Section 13(4), a tenant is required to deposit the amount of rent determined by the court under Section 13(3) within fifteen days of the date of determination or within such further time not exceeding 44 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 three months, as may be extended by the court. By reason of the 1976 Amendment, the following was specifically inserted: “within such further time, not exceeding three months as may be extended by the court” or the words “or within such further time, not exceeding fifteen days, as may be extended by the court, at the monthly rate at which the rent was determined by the court under sub-section (3)” The word “shall”, which is ordinarily imperative in nature, has been used in Section 13(4). The power of the court has also been limited to the extent that it can extend time for such deposit not exceeding three months and so far as the deposit of monthly rent is concerned, by fifteen days. The court's power, therefore, is restricted. In case the tenant deposits the provisional rent as determined by the court within the stipulated period the tenant is relieved by the eviction decree. 43. In **Nasiruddin** the Apex Court noticed that, Section 13(1) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 dealt with in the decision in **Shyamcharan Sharma v. Dharamdas [(1980) 2** **SCC 151],** the court has been conferred power to extend the time for deposit of rent to any such further time, as it may, on an application made to it, allow in this behalf. The power of the court under the M.P. Act is not restricted. However, discretion available 45 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 to the court under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act is limited. Furthermore, in Section 13(6) of the M.P. Act, the word “may” has been used which is directory; in contradistinction with the word “shall” employed in the Rajasthan Act. The M.P. Act provides for the power of the court to extend the time in the event sufficient cause therefor is shown which is absent in the Rajasthan Act. Furthermore, in terms thereof once the rent has been determined, the same has to be deposited within the prescribed period wherefor there exists no provision for filing an application. Wherever the special Act provides for extension of time or condonation of default, the court possesses the power therefor, but where the statute does not provide either for extension of time or to condone the default in depositing the rent within the stipulated period, the court does not have the power to do so. In that view of the matter it must be held that in the absence of such provisions in the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, the court did not have the power to either extend the period to deposit the rent or to condone the default in depositing the rent. 44. In **Nasiruddin** the Apex Court observed that, it is true that the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act does 46 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 not expressly exclude the application of the Limitation Act, 1963. But Section 5 of the Limitation Act in its terms is not applicable to wherever there is a default in depositing the rent by the tenant. The provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be construed having regard to Section 3 thereof. For filing an application after the expiry of the period prescribed under the Limitation Act or any other special statute, a cause of action must arise. Compliance with an order passed by a court of law in terms of a statutory provision does not give rise to a cause of action. On failure to comply with an order passed by a court of law, instant consequences are provided for under the statute. The court can condone the default only when the statute confers such a power on the court and not otherwise. In that view of the matter the Apex Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application in the case on hand. 45. In **J. Ramkumar [2022 (1) KHC 495]** , this Court concluded that, the consequences provided under Section 12(3) of the Act follow when there occurred a default by the tenant in complying with the direction in an order passed under Section 12(1) and (2), for deposit or payment of the admitted arrears of 47 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 rent. On the date stipulated for effecting such payment, by virtue of that order, the tenant becomes fully aware that, unless sufficient cause has not been shown for the default committed, the consequence of stoppage of the proceedings and direction to put the landlord in possession of the building, under Section 12(3) would follow automatically. As held by a Division Bench in **Venugopalan [1974 KLT 640]** and reiterated in **Davy [1999 (3)** **KLT 434]** even assuming that for purpose of execution an order under Section 12(3) of the Act can be equated with and treated as the same, as one under Section 11 of the Act, the consequence enjoined by an order under Section 12(3) for failure to deposit the admitted arrears in time can not be vacated or obliterated by payment at any subsequent stages or periods. The law laid down by a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in **Nasiruddin [(2003)** **2 SCC 577]** is to the effect that, where the statute does not provide either for extension of time or to condone the default in depositing the rent within the stipulated period, the court does not have the power to do so. 46. In the instant case, the order of eviction is one passed under Sections 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Act. The order of eviction 48 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 passed by the Rent Control Court in R.C.P.No.52 of 2016, under Sections 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Act, was under challenge in R.C.A.No.3 of 2020 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, filed under Section 18(1)(b) of the Act. In that appeal filed by the tenant, the provisions under Section 12 of the Act has application. The Appellate Authority has ample power to invoke the provisions under Section 12 of the Act, during the pendency of R.C.A.No.3 of 2020. In view of the law laid down by this Court in **Rasiya v. S. Sujith** [Annexure A1 order dated 19.11.2021 in R.C.Rev.No.138 of 2021], an application filed by the landlord under Section 12 of the Act is not required for the Appellate Authority to invoke its powers under Section 12 of the Act to pass an order directing the tenant to pay admitted arrears of rent. The fact that, despite the order of the Appellate Authority dated 24.02.2002, which is one issued in exercise of the powers under Section 12(1) and (2) of the Act, whereby the tenant was directed to pay admitted arrears of rent, he has not chosen to make any payment towards arrears of rent. The tenant has also not shown sufficient cause for not making such payment, within the time limit. Thereafter, the Appellate Authority passed an order dated 14.07.2022, invoking its powers under 49 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 Section 12(3) of the Act, whereby the proceedings in R.C.A.No.3 of 2020 stands stopped and the tenant is directed to put the landlord in possession of the tenanted premises. The rate of monthly rent of the petition schedule shop room is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that after the payment made towards advance sale consideration, the tenant failed to deposit arrears of rent. O.S.No.84 of 2018 filed by the tenant before the Sub Court, Palakkad, a suit for specific performance, which was rejected due to non-payment of balance court fee on 10.07.2009, as stated in the counter filed by the respondent. The tenant filed application seeking extension of time to pay the balance court fee, along with an application for condonation of delay. Both applications were dismissed by a common order dated 23.11.2020. The tenant challenged that order by filing C.R.P.No.17 of 2001, that ended in dismissal by Annexure R1(c) order dated 07.04.2001. 47. Much after the order dated 24.02.2022 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority under Section 12(1) and (2) of the Act, the tenant filed Annexure R1(d) affidavit dated 29.06.2022 in R.C.A.No.3 of 2020, denying landlord-tenant relationship and the liability to pay the rent. In the order dated 14.07.2022, the 50 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 Appellate Authority found those contentions unsustainable in view of the order of eviction passed under Sections 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Act in R.C.P.No.52 of 2016. 48. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord, in order to attract the provisions under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, first and for the most, the transferee must, in part performance of the contract, have taken possession of the property or any part thereof. Secondly, the transferee must have performed or willing to perform his part of the agreement. It is only if these two important conditions, among others, are satisfied that the provisions of Section 53A of the said Act can be said to be attracted on the facts of a given case. See: **Seshasayee Steels Pvt. Ltd. v. Assistant** **Commissioner of Income Tax, Company Circle VI(2),** **Chennai [(2020) 14 SCC 774]** . In the instant case, the tenant has no case of taking possession of the property as part performance of the sale agreement. The tenant admittedly failed to perform her part of sale agreement and found herself unable to remit even the balance court fee, resulting rejection of the plaint. Further, in order to get benefit under Section 53A of the said Act, 51 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 the sale agreement ought to have been registered. The said point is covered against the tenant by the judgment of the Apex Court in ## **Commissioner of Income Tax v. Balbir Singh Maini [(2018) 12 SCC 354]** . 49. The reasoning of the Appellate Authority in the impugned order dated 14.07.2022, while stopping the proceedings in R.C.A.No.3 of 2020 under Section 12(3) of the Act and by directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the tenanted premises, is neither perverse nor patently illegal and it cannot also be said that while arriving at such a conclusion, the Appellate Authority has committed any manifest error, warranting interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20 of the Act. In the result, this Rent Control Revision fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. ## Sd/- ## **ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE** Sd/- ## **P.G. AJITHKUMAR, JUDGE** bkn/- 52 RCREV. NO. 145 OF 2022 ## **`APPENDIX OF RCREV. 145/2022`** ## **`PETITIONER ANNEXURES`** |**`Annexure-A1`**|**`A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED`**| |---|---| ||**`19.11.2021 IN R.C.REV. NO.138/2021 OF`**| ||**`THIS HON'BLE COURT.`**| |**`Annexure-A2`**|**`A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED`**| ||**`23.06.2022 IN R.C.REV. NO.92/2022 OF`**| ||**`THIS HON'BLE COURT.`**| |**`RESPONDENT ANNEXURES`**|| |**`Annexure R1(a)`**|**`Photocopy of Rent Deed dated 3-5-2014`**| |**`Annexure R1(b)`**|**`Photocopy of sale agreement dated 7-7-`**| ||**`2015`**| |**`Annexure R1(c)`**|**`Photocopy of the order in`**| ||**`R.P.No.195/2021 dated 7-4-2021`**| |**`Annexure R1(d)`**|**`Photocopy of the affidavit filed by the`**| ||**`tenant dated 29.06.2022`**| |**`Annexure R1(e)`**|**`Photocopy of the order in RCA No.`**| ||**`3/2020 dated 24-02-2022`**|