High CourtDivision BenchAppeals dismissed

Rangaswami, The Textile Commissioner & Ors. v. Sugar Textile Mills (P) Ltd. & Another

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 1182 of 1972; Civil Appeals Nos. 1545-1546 of 1972
Neutral Citation:1977 SCR 825

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • Y. V. Chandrachud
  • P. K. Goswami
  • P. N. Shinghal
Judgment Date
1977-01-27
Court Decision / Holding
The appeals are dismissed. The impugned notification, insofar as it prohibits printing of borders/heads on sarees for an indefinite period, is ultra vires Clause 20 of the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, 1948. The Court affirms the High Court on this point and leaves other issues undecided. The appellants will pay costs to the respondents.
Final Disposition
Appeals dismissed

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Rangaswami, the Textile Commissioner & Others

Respondents

  • Sugar Textile Mills (P) Ltd.
  • Another

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • V. P. Raman
  • • S. N. Prasad
  • • Girish Chandra

Counsels for Respondents

  • • V. M. Tarkunde
  • • V. N. Ganpule
  • • Miss M. Tarkunde
  • • P. C. Kapoor
  • • A. K. Srivastava
  • • Vineet Kumar

Case Synopsis & Summary

This case concerns the interpretation of clause 20 of the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, 1948, and its interplay with the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946. The Textile Commissioner, empowered to issue writing directions to manufacturers regarding cloth or yarn specifications and the maximum or minimum quantities during specified periods, directed an indefinite prohibition on printing borders or headings on sarees. The Gujarat High Court had held the notification to be ultra vires clause 20. The central issue was whether clause 20(1) obliges the Textile Commissioner to specify a period during which such directions remain operative, or whether the directive may operate indefinitely by virtue of the word “may.” The Supreme Court, relying on the principle that the word “may” can mean “must” or “shall” when coupled with an obligation, held that the power to issue directions is tied to a duty to specify the duration. Indefinite restrictions undermine predictability for producers and hinder timely review, making them unsustainable. The Court affirmed the High Court’s result on this narrow ground, expressing no opinion on other points raised. Accordingly, the appeals were dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

Provisions of Law Cited

Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, 1948, Clause 20(1) and 20(2)Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, Section 3

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • The word 'may' is capable of meaning 'must' or 'shall' in the light of the context when coupled with an obligation; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jogendra Singh (1964) 2 SCR 197 held that discretion juxtaposed with duty becomes a command.
  • Ultra vires doctrine: actions beyond statutory power are invalid.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant contended that Clause 20(1) empowers issuing directions but does not bind the Textile Commissioner to fix a period; discretion to issue directions may extend over varying time frames, and indefinite operation may be permissible under exigent circumstances. They urged that the language ‘may from time to time issue directions’ allows flexibility without a mandatory end date, and that review is feasible through future directions.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents argued that Clause 20 couples power with an obligation to specify the duration for which directions operate; indefinite prohibitions create uncertainty and undermine the statutory scheme, necessitating a determinate period and periodic review. The Gujarat High Court’s ultra vires finding on the indefinite period reflects this view.

Cited Precedents (1)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jogendra Singh[1964] 2 SCR 197PositiveThe court used the principle from Jogendra Singh to interpret 'may' as potentially meaning 'must' when coupled with an obligation, supporting the conclusion that duration must be specified.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

825 RANGASWAMI, THE TEXTILE COMMISSIONER & ORS. v. SUGAR TEXTILE MILLS (P) LID. & ANOTHER _January_ 27, 1977 [Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, P. K. GOSWAMI AND P. N. SHINGHAL, JJ.] _Coton Textiles_ _(Control)_ _Order_ 1948, _clause_ _20(1)-Whether_ _the_ _provisions_ _make_ _it_ _obligatory_ _upon_ _the_ _Textile_ _Commissioner_ _to specify_ _the_ _period_ _of_ _operation_ _of_ _his_ _direction's-Meaning_ _of_ _thi!_ _word_ _"may",_ A ( ~lause 20 of the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, 1948 empoweni the Textile Commissioner, having regard to the capacity of the producer to produce cloth and yarn of different description or specification and to the needs of the general public, to issue from time to time such directions in writin.11 to any manu- C facturer or manufacturers generally regarding the class or specifications of cloth or yarn and the maximum or the minimum quantities thereof which they shall or shall not produce during such periods as may be specified in the directions. The respondents' challenge to the vires of the notification issued by the appellant which prohibited the printing of any border or heading on sarees etc. for an indefinite period was accepted by the Gujarat High Court. Dismissing the appeals by special leave, the Court, HELD : ( 1) The impugned notification in so far as it prohibits the printin& D of any border and heading on sarees etc., for an indefinite period ie _ultra vire.r_ clause 20 of the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order 194g since the aforesaid clause casts an obligation or a duty upon the Textile Commissioner to speciy the period during which the prohibition shall remain in force. [827 B·C] (2) It is well settled that the word "may" is capable of meaning ~must" or "shall" in the light of the context and that where a discretion is conferred upon a public authority coupled with an obligation the word "may" which denotes E discretion should be construed to mean a command. Considering the purpose of the relevant empowerment and its impact on those who are likely to be affected by the exercise of the power, it is clear that the power conferred on the Textile Commissioner in the Cotton Textile (Control) Order 1948 to issue directiom is coupled with a duty to specify the particular period for which the directiomi ,shall be operative" [826 F-G] _State_ _of_ _Uttar Pradesh_ v. _Jogendra Singh_ [1964] 2 SCR 197 @J 202, princi- F pies reiterated. CIVJL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1182 of 1972. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 4-8-71 of the Gujarat High Court in S.C.A. No. 1346/69 and G CNIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1545-1546 of 1972. Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 4-8-1971 of the Gujarat High Court in S.C.A. Nos. 972 and 1527 of 1970 respectively. H A B ## c D E F 826 SUPREME C:OURT REPORTS [1977] 2 S.C.R. _V._ _P._ _Raman,_ Addi. Sol. Gen., _S. N. Prasad_ and _Girish Chandra_ for the Appellant in CA 1182/72 and CAS.1545-46/72. ~ _V._ _M._ _Tarkunde,_ _V._ _N. Ganpule, (Miss) M Tarkunde and_ P. C_ _Kapoor_ for Respondents in C.A. 1182/72. _V._ _N. Ganpule,_ _A._ _K. Srivastava_ and _Vineet Kumar_ for RR. No. 1 in C.As. 1545-46/72. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD, J. Under the power conferred by Section 3 of the Essential Suppiies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, the Central Government issued an Order called "The Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, 1948". Clause 20 of that Order, as amended, reads thus : "20( 1) The Textile Commisisoner may from time to time issue directions in writing to any manufacturer or class of manufacturers or the manufacturers generally regarding the classes or specifications of cloth or yarn, and the maximum or the minimum quantities thereof, which they shall or sha,11 not produce during such periods as n:iay be specified in the directions, and they shall comply with such directions. 20(2) In the exercise of the powers conferred upon him by sub-clause (1) the Textile Commissioner shall have regard to the capacity of the producer to produce cloth and yarn of different descriptions or specifications and to the. needs of the general public." ... The question for our determination in these appeals is whether, if the Textile Commissioner decides to issue appropriate directions to any manufacturer or class of manufacturers, it is obligatory upon him to specify therein the period for which the directions will remain in operation. ### .. ) \ G H As hold by this Court in _State_ _of_ _Uttt!r Pradesh_ v. _}ogendra_ _-..Singh,(1)_ it is well settled that the" word "may" is capable of meaning "must" or "shall" in the light of the context and that where a discretion is conferred upon a public authority coupled with an obligation, the word "may" which denotes discretion should be construed to mean ··a command. Considering the purpose of the relev_ant empowerment and its impact on those who are likely to be affected by the exercise of the power, we are clear that the power conferred on the Textile Commissioner to issue directions is coupled w:th the duty to specify the particular period for which the directions shall be operative. Directions of the kind envisaged by clause 20 are influenced and justified oy exigencies which render it imperative that the directions be revie\\-. d from time to time. That becomes feasible only if the directions as . mlted expressly to a determinate period of (1) [1964] 2 S.C.R. 197 at 202. ### • ### • RANGASWAMY, TEXT. COMMR. _v._ SUGAR TEXTILE MILL!! 827 _(Chandrachud._ /.) time at the end of which a fresh review of facts and circumstances A becomes obligatory. There is a fear that a direction not limited in point of time may continue to operate even after it has outlived its utility for the reason merely that the need to review it is not clearly perceived. Besides, the manufacturers must know, in order that they may organize their business in their own interest as well as in . the interest of the community at large, as to how long any particular embargo is going to be operative. B Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the High Court though on the ground only that the impugned Notification in so far as it prohibits the printing of any border or heading on sarees etc. for an indefinite period is _ultra vires_ clause 20 of the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, 1948, ~ince the aforesaid clause casts an obligation ### or a. duty upon the Textile Commissioner to specify the period f! during which the prohibition shall remain in force. We express no opinidn on the other points, including Point No. 6 urged before the High Court for its consideration. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. The appellants will pay one set of costs of these appeals to the respondents. D S.R. _Appeals_ disnii~sed. _I_ 5-206501/77