Rameshkumar A v. Benny Joseph and State of Kerala

# **`IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM`** ## **`PRESENT`** ``` THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN ``` ``` TUESDAY, THE 29[TH] DAY OF NOVEMBER 2022 / 8TH AGRAHAYANA, 1944 ``` ``` CRL.REV.PET NO. 842 OF 2022 ``` ``` AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN CRA 182/2019 OF ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT & SESSIONS COURT - III, KASARAGOD / III ADDITIONAL MACT, ``` ## **`KASARAGODE`** ## **`REVISION PETITIONER/APPELLANT/ACCUSED:`** ``` RAMESHKUMAR A AGED 46 YEARS S/O. LATE RAGHAVAN NAIR RESIDING AT ANIKEEL HOUSE, PATTENA LAKSHAMVEEDU, P.O.PUTHARIYADUKKAM, PEROLE VILLAGE, NILESHWARAM VIA. HOSDURG TASLUK, KASARAGOD DISTRICT, PIN - 671314 BY ADVS. T.MADHU C.R.SARADAMANI SHAHID AZEEZ RENJISH S. MENON ``` ## **`RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS/COMPLAINANT & STATE:`** ``` 1P.BENNY JOSEPH AGED 54 YEARS S/O. JOSEPH, RESIDING AT PALAMATTATHIL HOUSE, MANJALAMKUNDU, KOLLAPARA P.O., NEELESHWARAM, KASARAGOD DISTRICT, PIN - 671314 2STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM, PIN - 682031 SRI.RENJIT GEORGE,SR.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ``` ## **`THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION`** ``` ON 29.11.2022, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ``` ``` CRL.REV.PET NO. 842 OF 2022 ``` ``` 2 ``` ## **O R D E R** Dated this the 29[th] day of November, 2022 This Revision Petition has been filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred as 'Cr.P.C.', for short), by the revision petitioner, who is the accused in C.C. No.260/2016 on the file of the Special Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Hosdurg, arraying the original complainant as the 1[st] respondent and State of Kerala as the 2[nd ] respondent. 2. The revision petitioner impugns judgment in C.C.No.260/2016 dated 22.08.2019 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II, Hosdurg and the judgment in Criminal Appeal No.182/2019 dated 27.08.2022 on the file of the Additional Sessions Court-III, Kasargod arising therefrom. ``` CRL.REV.PET NO. 842 OF 2022 ``` ## **`3`** 3. Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, learned counsel for the 1[st] respondent as well as the learned Public Prosecutor, on admission. 4. I shall refer the parties in this revision as 'complainant' and 'accused' for easy reference. 5. The brief facts of the case put up by the complainant before the trial court are as under: The complainant’s case before the trial court was that the accused had issued cheque dated 14.01.2016 to repay Rs.5,00,000/- due towards the complainant, which was allegedly borrowed by the accused from the complainant. On presentation of the cheque for collection, the same got dishourned with endorsement ‘payment is stopped by drawer’. Though demand notice was issued and accepted by the accused, he did not pay the amount. On the said premise, the complainant filed complaint under Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred ## **`CRL.REV.PET NO. 842 OF 2022`** ## **`4`** to as ‘the N.I.Act’) alleging that the accused committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. 6. The trial court secured the presence of the accused for trial and evidence was recorded. During trial, PW1 and PW2 were examined and Exts.P1 to P6(a) were marked on the side of the complainant. 7. On completion of prosecution evidence, the accused was questioned under Section 313(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. and provided opportunity to adduce defence evidence. Accordingly, DW 1 was examined and Ext.D1 marked on the side of the accused. 8. The trial court appraised the evidence and finally found that the accused committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and he was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment till raising of court and to pay fine of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees five lakh only). The fine was ordered to be given as compensation to the complainant under ## **`CRL.REV.PET NO. 842 OF 2022`** ## **`5`** Section 357(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. It was ordered further that in case of default in payment of fine, the accused would undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six month. 9. The judgment in C.C.No.260/2016 dated 22.08.2019 was challenged before the Additional Sessions Court-III, Kasargod. The learned Additional Sessions Judge also confirmed the said conviction and sentence as per judgment dated 27.08.2022 in Crl.Appeal No.182/2019. 10. The concurrent verdicts entered into by the trial court as well as by the appellate court are under challenge in this revision petition. 11. The trial court appraised the evidence and finally found that the complainant discharged the initial burden of transaction led to the execution of Ext.P1 cheque. The trial court given emphasis to Ext.P6, the copy of statement of accounts issued from Federal Bank, Nileshwar Branch to show that the complainant availed loan of Rs.10,35,000/- on ``` CRL.REV.PET NO. 842 OF 2022 ``` ## **`6`** 22.09.2015 and the money was given to the accused from the said amount. 12. In this case, the courts below relied on the evidence of PW1 and PW2 and Exts.P1 to P6(a) hold that the complainant herein discharged his initial burden in the matter of transaction led to execution of Ext.P1 cheque. 13. The defence evidence put in by the accused before the courts below is that the accused lost two cheques including Ext.P1 cheque even prior to the date of alleged execution of this cheque and had intimated the said loss to the bank with stop payment intimation in respect of the cheque in question. 14. When the matter was taken in appeal, the appellate court also re-appreciated the evidence and finally concurred the finding. 15. While attempting to upset the concurrent verdicts of conviction and sentence, the learned counsel for the ``` CRL.REV.PET NO. 842 OF 2022 ``` ## **`7`** revision petitioner argued that the complainant failed to prove the transaction as well as the execution of Ext.P1 cheque and in this case, the cheque was lost from the custody of the accused and in consequence thereof, he had issued stop payment instruction to the bank and the said fact was established by examining DW1, the Bank Manager as well as by producing his Ext.D1 stop payment instruction. 16. The trial court relied on the decision of the Apex Court in ( **2012 (4) KHC 826) Laxmi Dyechem (M/s.) v. State of Gujarat and Others** hold that _the accused can show that the stop payment instructions were not issued because of insufficiency or paucity of funds, but stop payment instruction had been issued to the bank for other valid causes including the reason that there was no existing debt or liablity in view of bona fide dispute between the drawer and drawee of the cheque_ and ultimately, negatived the said contention. The appellate court also was not ``` 8 ``` ## **`CRL.REV.PET NO. 842 OF 2022`** inclined to accept this contention. 17. In this case, though the accused raised contention to the fact that the cheque lacks consideration and the transaction alleged by the complainant is not proved, the evidence available would show otherwise. To the contrary, the accused miserably failed to adduce evidence to hold the defence case as put forth. 18. In fact, the challenge is raised on the grounds of revision as well as one argued by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner are matters to be decided on the basis of re-appreciation of evidence. In this matter, this Court is exercising power of revision and the power of revision does not available to appreciate or re-appreciate to have a contrafinding. 19. It is the settled law that power of revision available to this Court under Section 401 of Cr.P.C r/w Section 397 is not wide and exhaustive to re-appreciate the evidence to ``` CRL.REV.PET NO. 842 OF 2022 ``` ``` 9 ``` have a contra finding. In the decision reported in [(1999) 2 SCC 452 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], _**State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri**_ , the Apex Court, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, laid down the following principles (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5): _“5. …... In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the_ ``` CRL.REV.PET NO. 842 OF 2022 ``` ``` 10 ``` _respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. ...”_ 20. In another decision reported in [(2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19], _**Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke**_ , the Apex Court held that the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse - or wholly unreasonable or there is non consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on . the ground that another view is possible Following has been laid down in para.14 (SCC p.135): _“14. …... Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or - there is non consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 Cr.P.C is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or_ ``` CRL.REV.PET NO. 842 OF 2022 ``` ``` 11 ``` _untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaring unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”_ 21. The said ratio has been followed in a latest decision of the Supreme Court reported in [(2018) 8 SCC 165], _**Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda**_ . Thus the law is clear on the point that the whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence and, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence had already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. To put it otherwise, if there is non-consideration of any relevant materials, which would go ``` CRL.REV.PET NO. 842 OF 2022 ``` ## **`12`** to the root of the matter or any fundamental violation of the principle of law, then only the power of revision would be made available. 22. In this matter, the trial court as well as the appellate court given benefit of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of NI Act in favour of complainant, on the finding that the evidence of PW1 and PW2 categorically established the initial burden caste upon him. 23. Regarding law on presumptions, I would like to refer a 3 Bench decision of the Apex Court in [2010 (2) KLT 682 (SC)], _**Rangappa v. Sri Mohan**_ . In the above decision, the Apex Court considered the presumption available to a complainant in a prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act and held as under: _“The presumption mandated by S.139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat [2008 (1) KLT 425 (SC)] may not be correct. This is of course in the nature of a rebuttable_ ``` CRL.REV.PET NO. 842 OF 2022 ``` ``` 13 ``` _presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant. S.139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While S.138 of the Act specified a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under S.139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by S.138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under S.139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of `preponderance of probabilities'. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. Accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is_ ``` CRL.REV.PET NO. 842 OF 2022 ``` ``` 14 ``` _conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own.”_ 24. In the decision reported in [2019 (1) KLT 598 (SC) : 2019 (1) KHC 774 : (2019) 4 SCC 197 : 2019 (1) KLD 420 : 2019 (2) KLJ 205 : AIR 2019 SC 2446 : 2019 CriLJ 3227], _**Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar**_ , the Apex Court while dealing with a case where the accused has a contention that the cheque issued was a blank cheque, it was held as under: _“A meaningful reading of the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act including, in particular, Sections 20, 87 and 139, makes it amply clear that a person who signs a cheque and makes it over to the payee remains liable unless he adduces evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque had been issued for payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability. It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of S.138 would be attracted. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and other particulars. This in itself would not invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence.”_ ``` CRL.REV.PET NO. 842 OF 2022 ``` ## **`15`** 25. In a latest 3 Bench decision of the Apex Court reported in [2021 (2) KHC 517 : 2021 KHC OnLine 6063 : 2021 (1) KLD 527 : 2021 (2) SCALE 434 : ILR 2021 (1) Ker. 855 : 2021 (5) SCC 283 : 2021 (1) KLT OnLine 1132], _**Kalamani Tex (M/s.) & anr. v. P.Balasubramanian**_ the Apex Court considered the amplitude of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act it was held as under: _“Adverting to the case in hand, we find on a plain reading of its judgment that the Trial Court completely overlooked the provisions and failed to appreciate the statutory presumption drawn under S.118 and S.139 of NIA. The Statute mandates that once the signature(s) of an accused on the cheque/negotiable instrument are established, then these `reverse onus' clauses become operative. In such a situation, the obligation shifts upon the accused to discharge the presumption imposed upon him. Once the 2[nd] Appellant had admitted his signatures on the cheque and the Deed, the Trial Court ought to have presumed that the cheque was issued as consideration for a legally enforceable debt. The Trial Court fell in error when it called upon the Complainant-Respondent to explain the circumstances under which the appellants were liable to pay._ _…................_ ``` CRL.REV.PET NO. 842 OF 2022 ``` ``` 16 ``` _18. Even if we take the arguments raised by the appellants at face value that only a blank cheque and signed blank stamp papers were given to the respondent, yet the statutory presumption cannot be obliterated. It is useful to cite Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar (2019 (1) KHC 774 : (2019) 4 SCC 197 : 2019 (1) KLD 420 : 2019 (1) KLT 598 : 2019 (2) KLJ 205 : AIR 2019 SC 2446 : 2019 CriLJ 3227], P.36., where this Court held that:_ _“Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption under S.139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt.”_ 26. Thus the law is clear on the point that when the complainant discharges the initial burden to prove the transaction led to execution of the cheque, the presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act would come into play. No doubt, these presumptions are rebuttable and it is the duty of the accused to rebut the presumptions and the standard of proof of rebuttal is nothing but preponderance of probabilities. ## **`CRL.REV.PET NO. 842 OF 2022`** ## **`17`** 27. In this matter, the trial court as well as the appellate court correctly appreciated the evidence and came to the conclusion that the evidence available established commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of NI Act by the accused and, accordingly, the accused was convicted. In fact, there is no reason to revisit the concurrent verdicts of conviction. Since the sentence is the minimum possible, there is no reason to reduce the sentence also. 28. Faced with the situation, the learned counsel for the accused sought for six months’ time to pay the amount. Considering the fine amount would come to Rs.5 lakh and in consideration of the fact that the transaction was in the year 2015, I am inclined to grant three months’ time from today to pay the compensation. In the result, this revision petition fails and it is, accordingly, dismissed. ``` 18 ``` ## **`CRL.REV.PET NO. 842 OF 2022`** However, the revision petitioner/the accused is given three months’ time from today to pay the compensation and to undergo the sentence. Therefore, the revision petitioner/the accused is directed to appear before the trial court on 28.02.2023 to pay the compensation and to undergo the sentence. The execution of the sentence shall stand deferred till 27.02.2023. If the accused fails to surrender as directed, the trial court is directed to execute the sentence without fail. Registry is directed to forward a copy of this order to the courts below concerned for information and compliance. **Sd/A. BADHARUDEEN,** **JUDGE** nkr