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RAMCHANDER v. ANANTA

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 3483 of 2011
Neutral Citation:[2015] 2 S.C.R. 255

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • Vikramajit Sen
  • C. Nagappan
Judgment Date
2015-02-24
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal dismissed; High Court’s reversal of the trial court’s divorce decree stands; the divorce decree dated 14.7.2008 remains set aside; no costs.
Final Disposition
Appeal dismissed; High Court's order setting aside the divorce decree stands; no costs.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Ramchander (husband)

Respondents

  • Ananta (wife)

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • R. Chandrachud (for the Appellant)

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Bhakti Vardhan Singh
  • • R. C. Kohli (for the Respondent)

Case Synopsis & Summary

Ramchander v. Ananta concerns a husband seeking divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act on the grounds of mental cruelty and desertion. The marriage took place on 2 March 1994 and a son was born in 1996. The wife filed a 498A IPC complaint which was withdrawn. The couple reportedly changed residences several times; the wife left the matrimonial home in 1997 and again in March 2003, after which they did not live together. The Trial Court granted a decree of divorce under sections 13(1)(i-a) and 13(1)(i-b). The High Court, on appeal by the wife, set aside that decree, reversing the trial court’s decision. The appellant-husband challenged the High Court’s order in this Supreme Court appeal. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that cruelty under section 13(1)(i-a) is determined by the cumulative effect of conduct, which may be mental as well as physical, and that instances must be evaluated in context rather than in isolation. The Court found the conduct alleged by the husband not grave enough to constitute mental cruelty and held that the evidence did not establish desertion or an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. While relying on Samar Ghosh for the approach to mental cruelty and citing earlier precedents, the Court dismissed the appeal, thereby upholding the High Court’s reversal of the divorce decree. The final outcome leaves the marriage status unresolved in favor of the wife.

Provisions of Law Cited

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 ss.13(1)(i-a)Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 ss.13(1)(i-b)

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Cruelty under section 13(1)(i-a) is behaviour by one spouse towards the other that causes a reasonable apprehension that it is not safe to continue the matrimonial relationship; it can be physical or mental.
  • Cruelty must be assessed cumulatively from the facts and circumstances rather than in isolation.
  • Mental cruelty may be inferred from conduct (illustrative tests) as refined in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh; such illustrations are not exhaustive.
  • Wear and tear of married life is not necessarily cruelty; the act must be grave and weighty to constitute cruelty.
  • The ground of desertion requires cessation of cohabitation; evidence must establish abandonment beyond acceptable norms.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant argued that the High Court erred in misconstruing the cumulative instances of mental cruelty and failed to give proper weight to the child’s testimony; he contended that the marriage had irretrievably broken down and cited Parveen Mehta, A. Jayachandra, Samar Ghosh, and K. Srinivas Rao to support the test for cruelty and breakdown.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondent contended that the High Court correctly applied the Samar Ghosh framework, found no grave mental cruelty, and noted that the evidence did not establish desertion or irretrievable breakdown; she argued that the wife’s conduct did not warrant a decree for divorce.

Cited Precedents (5)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh2007 (4) SCR 428PositiveCourt relies on Samar Ghosh for the approach to infer mental cruelty and the cumulative assessment of conduct.
Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta2002 (5) SCC 706Mentioned OnlyCited by counsel; referenced in discussion but not adopted as controlling authority in this judgment.
A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur2005 (2) SCC 22Mentioned OnlyCited as background authority; not directly applied as binding precedent in the decision.
K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa2013 (5) SCC 226Mentioned OnlyCited for context; treatment not altered by the decision here.
:null2002 (2) SCC 106Mentioned OnlyCase name not available in text; cited in reference list as supportive authority.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

A B ## [2015] 2 S.C.R. 255 ## RAMCHANDER V. ANANTA (CivilAppeal No 3483 of2011) FEBRUARY 24, 2015 ## [VIKRAMAJIT SEN AND C. NAGAPPAN, JJ.] - _Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 ss.13(1 )(i-a) and 13(1 )(i-b)_ - - - _Petition for divorce By husband On the grounds of_ - _mental cruelty and desertion Decree of divorce granted by_ - - _trial court Decree set aside by High Court On appeal,_ C _held: The alleged conduct of the wife is not so grave and weighty amounting to mental cruelty, but can be said only_ a - _wear and tear of married life The ground of desertion also is not established in view of the evidence of three witnesses, who had seen the couple together as spouses even after the_ D - _alleged date of desertion The marriage also cannot be said_ - _to have irretrievably broken down Decree of divorce rightly set aside._ _Words and Phrases- 'Cruelty'_ - _Meaning of- Explained,_ E _in the context of s. 13(1 )(i-a) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955._ ## Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 The expression 'cruelty' has not been defined in the Hindu Marriage Act. Cruelty for the F purpose of Section 13(1 )(i-a) of the Act is to be taken as a behaviour by one spouse towards the other, which causes a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the latter that it is not safe for him or her to continue the matrimonial relationship with the other. Cruelty can be G physical or mental. In the present case, what is alleged is mental cruelty and it is necessarily a matter of H 255 (2015] 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 256 A inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of the case. It is settled law that the instances of cruelty are not to be taken in isolation but to take the cumulative effect of the facts and circumstances emerging from the evidence on record and then draw a fair inference B whether the plaintiff has been subjected to mental cruelty due to conduct of the other spouse. [Para 1 O] [260-D-G] _Samar Ghosh Vs. Jaya Ghosh_ 2007 (4) SCR 428 = (2007) 4 sec 511 - referred to. c D 1.2 In the present case, the conduct of the wife that had been complained of appears to be not so grave and weighty that it can be treated to be more serious than ordinary wear and tear of married life. [Para 15] [262-F-G] _Parveen Mehta Vs. lnderjit Mehta_ (2002) 5 SCC 706; A. _Jayachandra Vs. Aneel Kaur_ 2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 599 = (2005) 2 SCC 22; and _K.Srinivas Rao Vs. D.A. Deepa_ 2013 (2) SCR 126 = (2013) 5 SCC 226 - referred to. E 2. The ground of desertion alleged is also not established. The child was only 7 years old in 2003 and his testimony in this regard will not advance the case of the plaintiff. DWs 2 to 4 have testified that they had seen F the plaintiff and the defendant together as spouses even during 2005. There is no denial against such contention in cross examination. There is no reason for them to falsely depose against the plaintiff. The trial court has not indicated as to how their testimonies were not found G reliable and the High Court has concluded that it does not find their evidence unworthy of credence. [Para 16] [262-G-H; 263-A-C] 3. It also cannot be said that the marriage between the plaintiff and defendant has irretrievably broken down. H [Para 17] [263-D] 257 RAMCHANDER v. ANANTA ## **Case Law Reference** A |**(2002)s sec****_106_**|**referredto**|**para 7**|| |---|---|---|---| |**2004(6)Suppl.SCR599**|**referredto**|**para 7**|| |**2013(2)SCR126**|**referredto**|**para 7**|B| |**2007(4)SCR428**|**referredto**|**para10**|| CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3483 of 2011 c From the Judgment and Order dated 24.11.2008 of the High Court at Calcutta Circuit Bench at Port Blair in First Civil Appeal No. 3 of 2008 R. Chandrachud for the Appellant. D Bhakti Vardhan Singh, R. C. Kohli for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by **C. NAGAPPAN, J.** 1. The appellant-husband in this civil appeal has assailed the judgment dated 24.11.2008 passed E by the High Court of Calcutta Circuit Bench at Port Blair in F.A. No.003 of2008, wherein the Division Bench of the High Court set aside the decree of divorce dated 14.7.2008 granted by the District Judge, A & N Islands, to the appellant herein, in Matrimonial Suit No.27 of2005. F 2. Shorn of unnecessary details the facts in brief which give rise to the appeal herein are as follows: The appellanthusband is an engineer and the respondent-wife is a draftsman, both working in the office of Andaman Public Works G Department and their marriage took place on 2nct March 1994 and a son was born in the wedlock on 24.1.1996. It is an admitted fact that the respondent-wife had filed a complaint under Section 498-A IPC against the husband and it was subsequently withdrawn by her. It is also admitted fact that H 258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 2 S.C.R. ' A during their cohabitation the couple had changed their residence thrice. In 1997, the respondent-wife left the matrimonial home and started to live with her parents and upon legal notice sent by her husband she returned back to the matrimonial home. Then again in March 2003, the wife left the B matrimonial home to live with her parents and has not come back since. 3. The appellant-husband filed a suit for divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion under Section 13(1 )(i-a) and c 13(1 )(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. He has alleged that immediately after marriage the relationship between the spouses was not cordial and the wife did not want to live with husband's family and wanted to live separately. She insulted and abused the husband calling him 'dhobi' and the minor child o as 'dhobi's son' and because of her rude behaviour with landlord and neighbours they had to change the residence thrice. The wife refused to perform any household work and did not take proper care of their minor child and the husband had to bring food from outside and ultimately in the month of E March 2003, she left the matrimonial home and did not return, leading to the filing of the divorce petition by the husband. 4. The respondent-wife contested the suit by filing her written statement alleging that since her father was working F as 'chowkidar', her husband's family was ill-disposed towards her and they used to taunt her for not bringing enough dowry. She has specifically denied the allegations in the plaint and asserted that she had never behaved improperly and she took good care of her child. She also leveled an allegation of extra G marital affair against her husband with a woman who was working under him. According to her whenever she confronted him in this respect the husband would shout and abuse her. 5. The appellant-husband besides examining himself as PW1, examined the minor child as PW2 and the servant as H PW3 on his side. The respondent-wife examined herself and RAMCHANDER v. ANANTA 259 # [C. NAGAPPAN, J.) her mother as DW1 and DW5 respectively and further A examined three persons working in municipal council as DWs 2 to 4 on her side. > 6. The trial court on a consideration of oral and documentary evidence held that the plaintiff-husband proved 8 the ground of cruelty and desertion and granted the decree of divorce as prayed for. Challenging the same the defendantwife preferred the appeal and the High Court on an elaborate consideration held that the trial court was not justified in decreeing the suit by dissolving the marriage between the c spouses and allowed the appeal. Aggrieved by the same the husband has preferred the present appeal. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant-husband submitted that the High Court failed to consider and appreciate the cumulative instances of mental cruelty as pleaded and D proved but considered every instance separately and held that each by itself would not entitle the husband to a decree for divorce and said approach is erroneous and contrary to law. It is his further submission that the High Court erred in not placing E reliance on the child's testimony and fell into a grave error in reversing the well considered judgment of the trial court. It is also submitted that mental cruelty was clearly established and in any event the marriage has broken down irretrievably and on that score alone the decree for divorce should have been F passed. In support of the submissions the learned counsel relied on the following decisions : (1) **Parveen Mehta** Vs. **lnderjit Mehta** (2002) 5 SCC 706; (2) **A. Jayachandra** Vs. **Aneel Kaur** (2005) 2 SCC 22); (3) **Samar Ghosh** Vs. **Jaya Ghosh** (2007) 4 SCC 511; and (4) **K.Srinivas Rao** Vs. **D.A.** G **Deepa** (2013) 5 SCC 226). 8. The learned counsel for the respondent-wife contended that the High Court examined the instances of mental cruelty pleaded in this case on the parameters laid down by this Court in the decision in **Samar Ghosh** case (Supra), and concluded H 260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 2 S.C.R. - A that the ground of mental cruelty has not been established by the plaintiff-husband. It is further submitted that the wife was compelled to live separately on account of the conduct of the husband. The further submission was that the impugned judgment does not suffer from any legal infirmity warranting - B interference. 9. The appellant-husband and the respondent-wife are educated and working in the office of the Andaman Public Works Department. They got married on 2.3.1994 and son c was born to them on 24.1.1996. The appellant-husband filed the suit on 18. 7 .2005 seeking for divorce on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. 10. The expression 'cruelty' has not been defined in the Hindu Marriage Act. Cruelty for the purpose of Section 13(1)(i0 a) is to be taken as a behaviour by one spouse towards the other, which causes a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the latter that it is not safe for him or her to continue the matrimonial relationship with the other. Cruelty can be physical or mental. In the present case there is no allegation of physical E cruelty alleged by the plaintiff. What is alleged is mental cruelty and it is necessarily a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of the case. It is settled law that the instances of cruelty are not to be taken in isolation but to take F the cumulative effect of the facts and circumstances emerging from the evidence on record and then draw a fair inference whether the plaintiff has been subjected to mental cruelty due to conduct of the other spouse. In the decision in **Samar Ghosh** case (supra), this Court set out illustrative cases where G inference of 'mental cruelty' can be drawn and they are only illustrative and not exhaustive. 11. The plaintiff-husband alleged that after their marriage the defendant-wife did not like to live in the joint family and that led to shifting to separate residence and even there due to H quarrels, the wife had with the respective landlords and 261 RAMCHANDER v. ANANTA [C. NAGAPPAN, J.] neighbours, there was frequent shifting of residence. According A to the defendant-wife the shifting was necessitated once because the husband desired so and on two other occasions due to increase in rent demanded by the landlord and absence of sufficient quantity of water to the rented premises. Neither the family members of the plaintiff nor the landlords and B neighbours of the tenanted premises were examined, and as rightly held by the courts below, there is no evidence adduced by the plaintiff to substantiate this allegation. B 12. The next instance alleged by the plaintiff-husband is c that the defendant-wife used to abuse him as 'Dhobi' ar:id the son as 'Dhobi's son' and such utterances had adverse effect on them. PW1, plaintiff and PW2, the son have stated so in their testimonies. Of course the defendantcwife has specifically denied the said allegation. PW2, the child, when examined in o September, 2007 in the court was 11 years old and was studying in 6th class. On the date of alleged desertion in 2003 he was only about 7 years old. Prior to 2003 he was an infant and it is unlikely he would remember in detail his early life. Even if the version of the child that the mother used to call him E Dhobi's son is accepted, such scolding is the common reaction to discipline him and it denotes lack of culture on the part of the mother. 13. It is further alleged that the defendant-wife was reluctant F to do any household work and was not cooking food for the plaintiff and the child which necessitated the bringing of food from outside, amounting to mental cruelty. Being working mother, she could not spare enough time to be with the child resulting in the feeling of not being cared for. In this context it is G relevant to point out that the child was residing with his father since alleged separation in 2003. The expression of the child is due to attitudinal problem and it can be addressed to. The trial court placed much reliance on the testimony of the child and the High Court termed it as misplaced. The learned H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 2 S.C.R. 262 A counsel for the appellant found fault with the High Court in not placing reliance on the child testimony. We are not able to appreciate this contention. In the facts of the case we are of the considered view that the High Court has rightly done so. 8 14. The next instance is the allegation made by the wife in the case filed by her under Section 498-A of IPC against the husband. Admittedly the case was withdrawn by the wife and she continued to live with the husband. In fact the High Court has observed in the impugned judgment that though the date c of filing of the criminal complaint is not frtenfioned in the plaint, from the sequence of narration of events therein it appears to have been filed prior to the birth of the child. The aberration on the part of the wife has been condoned by the husband by resuming cohabitation and they continued to live together till o the date of alleged separation in 2003. 15. The last instance of cruelty alleged by the husband is the allegation made by the wife that he has been involved in an extra marital affair with the daily rated mazdoor lady working under him. It is true that the defendant-wife has named the said E lady with whom her husband allegedly was having an affair. The plaintiff-husband though admitted that the said lady was working under him, has specifically denied the said allegation. The courts below have concurrently found that the wife has not F substantiated the said allegation. Mere failure to prove such allegation would not entitle the husband to a decree of divorce as rightly held by the High Court. The conduct of the wife that had been complained of appears to be not so grave and weighty that it can be treated to be more serious than ordinary G wear and tear of married life. 16. What remains to be considered is the ground of desertion alleged by the plaintiff-husband, it is averred that the defendant-wife left the company of the plaintiff in March, 2003 and date is not mentioned. The child was only 7 years H old in 2003 and his testimony in this regard will not advance RAMCHANDER v. ANANTA 263 [C. NAGAPPAN, J.] the case of the plaintiff. DWs 2 to 4 have testified that they had A seen the plaintiff and the defendant together as spouses even during 2005. It is pointed out that there is no denial against such contention in cross examination. It is relevant to point out that DW2 is working in Marine Department and DW3 and DW4 are working in the Municipal Council and there is no reason B for them to falsely depose against the plaintiff. The trial court has not indicated with any clarity in its judgment as to how the testimonies of the above witnesses were not found reliable by it. The High Court on going through their testimonies has concluded that it does not find their evidence unworthy of C credence. We are in agreement with the said view expressed by the High Court. Resultantly the ground of desertion alleged is also not established. 17. We also find no merit in the contention of the learned o counsel for the appellant that the marriage between the plaintiff and defendant has irretrievably broken down. 18. In the result there is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed. No costs E Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal dismissed