Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Station House Officer, Mannanthala Police Station

# **`IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM`** ## **`PRESENT`** ``` THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.S.DIAS ``` ``` MONDAY, THE 19[TH] DAY OF FEBRUARY 2024 / 30TH MAGHA, 1945 BAIL APPL. NO. 1104 OF 2024 ``` ## **`CRIME NO.34/2024 OF MANNANTHALA POLICE STATION,`** ## **`THIRUVANANTHAPURAM`** ``` AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT CMP 81/2024 OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS -V, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM(SPECIAL COURT-MARKLIST CASES) ``` ## **`PETITIONER/4TH ACCUSED:`** ``` RAMACHANDRAN AGED 56 YEARS S/O SUBBAYYAN, AKSHAYA HOUSE, CHANTHAVILA, KARIPPOORU.P.O., NEDUMANGAD, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695541 ``` ``` BY ADV A.S.SHAMMY RAJ ``` ## **`RESPONDENTS:`** ``` 1STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM, PIN - 682031 ``` ``` 2STATION HOUSE OFFICER MANNANTHALA POLICE STATION, MANNANTHALA.P.O., THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695015 ``` ## **`OTHER PRESENT:`** ``` SR PP SMT SEETHA S ``` ``` THIS BAIL APPLICATION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 19.02.2024, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ``` B. A No.1104 of 2024 2 **Dated this the 19[th] day of February, 2024** ## **O R D E R** The application is filed under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, by the fourth accused in Crime No.34/2024 of Mannanthala Police Station, Thiruvananthapuram registered against the accused (four in number) for allegedly committing the offences punishable under Sections 409, 420, 120 (b) and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner was arrested on 17.01.2024. 2. The essence of the prosecution case is that: on 04.11.2023 at 12 p.m. the 1[st] accused who was the former Branch Manager of the Catholic Syrian Bank, Nalanchira Brach took 1727.77 grams of gold ornaments having a value of Rs.96,23,678/- from the strong room of the bank and handed over the same to the 2[nd] accused who in turn gave it to the 3[rd] accused. Thereafter, the 4[th] B. A No.1104 of 2024 3 accused replaced the stones and pearls of the said ornaments and melted the gold ornaments in his house. Subsequently, the gold was taken for testing its purity. Thereafter, the gold was sold to the Kerala Jewelery, East Fort and the accused shared the profit between them. Thus, the accused have committed the above offences. 3. Heard; Sri.Shammy Raj A.S., learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Smt. Seetha S., the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondents. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is totally innocent of the accusations leveled against him. The petitioner has not committed any offence. Going by the prosecution case, Sections 409 and 420 of the IPC will not stand attracted against the petitioner, because he is only a goldsmith. He had only obeyed the directions of his employer- third accused. The learned counsel placed reliance on the B. A No.1104 of 2024 4 decisions of this Court in **Jose P.T. V. State of Kerala** [2023 (2) KHC 526] and **Shinoj and Others v. State of Kerala** [2019 KHC 862], to fortify his contention that the offence under Sections 120 (b) read with Section 34 of IPC also can be attributed against the petitioner. He further contended that the petitioner has been in judicial custody since 17.01.2024, which is more than 32 days. The investigation in the case is complete and recovery has been effected. Therefore, the petitioner may be released on bail. 5. The learned Public Prosecutor seriously opposed the application. She contended that the investigation in the case is in progress. The accused have committed a grave economic offence. This Court has already dismissed the bail applications filed by the other accused as per the orders in B.A. Nos.809/2024 and 1044/2024. If the petitioner is released on bail, he would tamper with evidence and there is every likelihood B. A No.1104 of 2024 5 of him intimidating the witnesses. Hence, the application may be dismissed. 6. The gist of the prosecution case is that, the accused 1 to 4 hatched a conspiracy and the first accused, who was the former Manager of the Catholic Syrian Bank, took 1727.77 grams of gold ornaments having a value of Rs.96,23, 678/- from the strong room of the bank and handed them to the second accused, who in turn gave it to the 3[rd] accused, and who gave to the 4[th] accused. The 4[th] accused melted the gold ornaments and sold the same to the Kerala Jewelery, East Fort. 7. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the offences under Sections 409 and 420 of IPC are not attracted against the petitioner. The contention is quite premature, especially when Section 120 (b) r/w Section 34 of the IPC have been incorporated. ## 8. In **State of Madhya Pradesh v. Sheetla Sahai** B. A No.1104 of 2024 6 **and Others** [(2009) 8 SCC 617], the Honourable Supreme Court has clearly held that conspiracies are often hatched in secrecy and for proving the said offence, substantial direct evidence may not be possible to be obtained. An offence of criminal conspiracy can only be proved by circumstantial evidence. 9. When the bail applications of the other accused came up for consideration, this Court dismissed the applications referred to above, for the reason that the investigation in the case was in progress, that the recovery was to be effected and that there was a likelihood of the accused tampering with the evidence. The petitioner is the 4[th] accused , who is at par with the accused 1 to 3. 10. In **Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee and Another** [(2010) 14 SCC 496], in paragraph 9, the Honourable Supreme Court has observed as follows: B. A No.1104 of 2024 7 “9. …...... It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation: (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” ## 11. Again, the Honourable Supreme Court in **Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav and another** [AIR 2004 SC 1866] has held thus: “11. The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very well settled. The Court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Though at the stage of granting bail a detailed B. A No.1104 of 2024 8 examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not be undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where the accused is charged of having committed a serious offence. Any order devoid of such reasons would suffer from non application of mind. It is also necessary for the Court granting bail to consider among other circumstances, the following factors also before granting bail; they are, (a) The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence; (b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant; (c) Prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge. See Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh and others (2002(3) SCC 598) and Puran v. Rambilas and another (2001 (6) SCC 338)” 12. On an anxious consideration of the facts, the materials placed on record, the rival submissions made across the Bar, especially on comprehending the seriousness, gravity and nature of the economic offence alleged against the petitioner, that the investigation in the case is still in progress, that the recovery is to be effected, and that this Court has already dismissed the bail applications of the other accused, I am of the B. A No.1104 of 2024 9 definite view that the petitioner is not entitled to be released on bail at this stage because there is a danger of justice being thwarted. Therefore, I hold that the application is only liable to be rejected. Resultantly, the application is dismissed. SD/- **C.S.DIAS, JUDGE** rmm/19/2/2024