Ram Nath and Others v. Dy. Director of Consolidation and Others

Case Details & Bench

Court: High Court
Hon'ble Judges: Sabyasachi Mukharji
G. L. Oza
Judgment Date: 1987-11-10
Court Decision / Holding: Appeal dismissed. The Supreme Court held there was no break in possession and that the respondents had continuous possession from May 1958, with the six-year period for eviction under Section 209 starting on July 1, 1958 and concluding before consolidation operations commenced. The appeal was found to have no merit on the merits, and the Court refused to challenge the Allahabad High Court’s conclusions.
Final Disposition: Appeals dismissed.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

Ram Nath
and others

Respondents

Deputy Director of Consolidation
and others

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

• P. K. Bajaj
• S. K. Bagga

Counsels for Respondents

• G. S. Chatterjee

Case Synopsis & Summary

Ram Nath and others v. Dy. Director of Consolidation concerns an eviction suit under section 209 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and issues relating to title by adverse possession. The Allahabad High Court had quashed the Deputy Director of Consolidation’s order, and the Supreme Court, on appeal, examined the period of possession and the starting point of the six-year limitation for eviction. The Court notes that the respondents were in possession in 1958 when the case began under section 145 CrPC, with their occupation not later than May 8, 1958. Consequently, the six-year limitation for eviction under section 209 would commence on July 1, 1958 and end on June 30, 1964, before consolidation operations began. The appellants argued there was a break in possession between May 8, 1958 and January 29, 1960; during this interval the land was under the custody of a Criminal Court, and they contended that the Court’s custody could not be treated as possession by the respondents. The respondents argued they had matured their title by adverse possession and should be regarded as rightful owners. The Court held that there was no break in possession, and even if the land was temporarily in the custody of the criminal court, it must be deemed to be in possession of the entitled party. Accordingly, the appeal failed and was dismissed. The Court also clarified that the earlier default dismissal should not prejudice the appellant and dismissed the appeal on merits.

Provisions of Law Cited

Section 209, Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms ActSection 145, Code of Criminal Procedure

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

Possession may be deemed continuous even when land is temporarily in custody of a court; custody of land by a court can be treated as possession on behalf of the entitled person.
Adverse possession matures title; continuous possession is essential to acquire rights to land.
No break in possession sustains the continuity necessary for a title by possession.
Continuity of possession is crucial for calculating the limitation period for eviction under Section 209.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellants contended that there was a break in possession from May 8, 1958 to January 29, 1960, during which the land was in the custody of the Criminal Court. They argued that such custody cannot be treated as possession by the respondents and that the running of the six-year limitation period for eviction under Section 209 should be delayed until after the break, i.e., after January 29, 1960. They further argued that the respondents did not establish rightful ownership through adverse possession to defeat the eviction action.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents argued that they matured their title by adverse possession and should be deemed rightful owners. They asserted there was no real break in possession, and even if the land was at times under the custody of the Criminal Court, possession should be attributed to the party ultimately found entitled to possession, preserving continuous occupation from 1958 onward.

Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

RAM NATH AND OTHERS _v._ DY. DIRECTOR OF CONSOLIDATION AND OTHERS NOVEMBER IO, 1987 [SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND G.L. OZA, JJ.) _Suit for eviction from land under section 209_ _of the Zamindari_ _Abolition and Land Reforms Act-Title to land by adverse possession._ A B The High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the order \ of the Deputy Director of consolidation. The appellants filed appeal in this Court against the order of the High Court. The appeal came up for C hearing on May 7, 1987, when it was dismissed for default of appearance, whereafter an application for restoration was filed on the ground that counsel for the appellants was busy in the High Court at the time of hearing of the appeal. This Court found no justification for recalling its order, dismissing the appeal, hut in view of the fact that the appellants D would suffer for no fault of theirs, decided to hear the matter, directing that this practice should not he permitted in this Court any further. ##### y Dismissing the appeal (on merits), the Court, HELD: There is no merit in the appeal. The High Court was right E in holding that the respondents (concerned) were in possession of the land in 1958 when the case started under section 145 of the Cr. P. C. and their date of occupation could not be later than 8.5.1958, so that the six years' period of limitation for a suit for their eviction under section 209 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act would start running from July 1, 1958 and expire on June 30, 1964 i.e. before the consolida- F tion operations commenced. The appellants contended that there was a break in the possession of the respondents concerned between 8.5.1958 and 29.1.60, but during that period the land was in the custody·ofthe Criminal Court which must be deemed to have been holding possession of the land on behalf of the person eventually found to be entitled to possession. The respondents had matured their title by adverse posses- G sion and there could he no warrant for denying them the status of rightful owners. There was no break in the possession of the respondents and they must he held to have been in continuous occupation at least from May, 1958. [877 A-Fl CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Miscellaneous H 875 ### r 1 ## . )----· .,._ # _'f_ ###### _y_ ## ..... ' ~( _r_ _**'r''**_ A B c D E F G H 876 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1988] 1 S.C.R. Petition No. 1483 of 19.87. (In Civil Appeal No. 573 of 1974). From the Judgment and Order dated 9 .4.1973 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 537 of 1970. P.K. Bajaj and S.K. Bagga for the Appellants. G.S. Chatterjee for the Respondents. The following Order of the Court was delivered: **ORDER** The appeal was listed on 7.5.1987 before a bench consisting of Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.L. Oza and Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.N. Singh. The order recited "Heard learned counsel for the respondent for sufficient time. No one appears for the appellants. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed in default." This C.M.P. was subsequently filed for recalling the order on the ground that the learned counsel was busy in the Delhi High Court on that date. It was further stated there "But when after arguing two cases viz. Company Petition No. 110 of 1983 _Ishwar Singh and Others_ v. _Dharam_ _Singh_ _and_ _others,_ (final hearing) and also other regular matter Suit No, 49 of 1976 A.C. _Tamra_ v. _Mercury_ _Production_ (part heard) in the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi he (meaning thereby the counsel for the appellant) came to this Hon'ble Court, he came to know that this appeal had reached for hearing and was dismissed for default". This petition is signed not by the appellant but by M/s. Bagga & Co., Advocates for the appellant. It is verified by an affidavit of one P.K. Bajaj who state that he had been instructed to appear and argue the appeal. W.e are not sure as to who is making this application and whether the appellant is at all aware of these events. We find no justification for recalling the order on the plea that the counsel was busy somewhere. We were not inclined to act upon this kind of plea but on the basis that otherwise the appellant would suffer loss for no fault of his, we have decided to hear the counsel. This practice should not be permitted in this Court any further. On perusal of the judgment of the High Court we find no merit in this appeal. By the impugned judgment of the High Court of Allahabad, writ petition was allowed and the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated the 25th October, 1967 was quashed. RAM NATH _v._ DY. DIRECTOR OF CONSOLIDATION 877 }' The learned Judge has recorded that the respondents herein A have been held to be in possession in 1958 when the case started under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and their date of occupation could not be later than 8.5.1958 with the result that the spc years' period of limitation for a suit for their eviction under Section 209 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act would start to B ~ run from 1st July, 1958 and would expire on 30th June, 1964 i.e. before the consolidation operations commenced. It was, however, contended on behalf of the appellants herein that there was a break in the possession of the respondents between 8.5.1958 and 29.1.1960, but it was obvious that though the land was in the custody of the criminal court during that period the court must be #### l 8.5.1958 and 29.1.1960, but it was obvious that though the land was in the custody of the criminal court during that period the court must be c deemed to have been holding possession on behalf of the person eventually found to be entitled to possession. We are of the opinion that the learned Judge was right in so holding. It was argued that there was no justification for treating the respondents to be entitled for possession of the land as they had occupied the land as mere trespasD sers but it was found that they had matured their title by adverse possession and there could be no warrant for denying them the status of rightful owners. The learned Judge did in the absence of any finding by a competent court negativing the respondents claim was of the ###### y opinion that they must be deemed to have been in persons entitled to possession of the disputed plots with the result that during the period opinion that they must be deemed to have been in persons entitled to possession of the disputed plots with the result that during the period E between 8.5.1958 and 29.1.1960 the criminal court must be held to have been in possession of the land. In that view of the melter there was no break in the possession of the respondents and they must be held to have been in continuous occupation at least from May, 1958. In that view of the matter the other contentions urged before the High Court need not be noticed. }~ F In that view of the matter the appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly. No one appears for the respondent. Therefore, there is no question of costs. We, however, direct the Registry to transmit a copy of this Order to the appellant directly at the costs of Advocate for the G appellant. ~ S.L. Appeals dismissed.