High Court of KeralaSingle JudgeWrit petition disposed; Exts.P7 and P8 upheld a...

Raju Augustian v. Administrator, Maruthankara Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. & Others

Case / Petition Number:WP(C).No. 21201 of 2008-Y

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan
Judgment Date
2008-08-04
Court Decision / Holding
Writ petition disposed; Exts.P7 and P8 not impeached; the Administrator is directed to expediently proceed under Ext.P8 and to determine the period of suspension. The court acknowledged the exclusive arbitration jurisdiction under Section 69(2)(d) but allowed the writ petition to be considered in extraordinary circumstances.
Final Disposition
Writ petition disposed; Exts.P7 and P8 upheld against challenge; direction to expedite proceedings and fix period of suspension under Ext.P8.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • RAJU AUGUSTIAN

Respondents

  • Administrator, Maruthankara Service Co-operative Bank Ltd.
  • Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies (G), Vadakara
  • Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Kozhikode

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • K. Ramakumar (Sr.)
  • • K. N. Chandrababu

Counsels for Respondents

  • • P. Ravindran (Sr.)
  • • Anil Sivaraman
  • • P. K. Ravikrishnan

Case Synopsis & Summary

This writ petition by RAJU AUGUSTIAN, the Secretary of the Maruthankara Service Co-operative Bank Ltd., challenges Ext.P8, an order suspending him pending enquiry, and Ext.P7, the Administrator’s earlier decision to appoint an Internal Auditor to take charge in his place. The petitioner asserts that the challenged actions relate to earlier litigations and that suspensions should ordinarily be limited to serious charges; he argues he cannot be compelled to file counter affidavits that contradict his earlier statements in different cases and that Ext.P6 did not authorize any such directions. The respondent-bank contends that suspension disputes fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of arbitration under Section 69(2)(d) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, and that the petitioner has an alternate, efficacious remedy. It also contends that Exts.P7 and P8 arise from a refusal to obey Ext.P6, not from the requirement to file affidavits. The court, relying on earlier decisions of this Court (Prakasini v. Joint Registrar; Raveendran P.S. v. State of Kerala; F.A.C.T. Service Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Balakrishna Menon), reiterates that disputes between a society and its employee fall for arbitration under Section 69(2)(d). However, it allows the writ petition to proceed in part, noting extraordinary circumstances, and directs the Administrator to expedite proceedings under Ext.P8 and to determine the period of suspension. The petition is disposed accordingly.

Provisions of Law Cited

Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, Section 69(2)(d)Constitution of India Article 226Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, Section 2(i)

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Exclusive jurisdiction of Arbitrator under Section 69(2)(d) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969.
  • Disputes between a society and its employee fall for arbitration under Section 69(2)(d).
  • Suspension from service pending enquiry is a matter touching the employer-employee relationship.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The petitioner argued that Ext.P8 suspension is unwarranted as it targets past litigations and that suspension pending enquiry should be limited to serious charges. He contended that he cannot be compelled to file counter affidavits contradicting earlier statements and that Ext.P6 did not authorize such directives. He urged that the remedy under Section 69(2)(d) of the Act is not exhaustive and that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 should still be available in extraordinary circumstances.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents contended that suspension matters fall within arbitration under Section 69(2)(d) and that the petitioner has an alternate, efficacious remedy. They argued Exts.P7 and P8 arise from the petitioner’s non-compliance with Ext.P6 and that the decision was not about filing affidavits but about obedience to decisions. They relied on Prakasini v. Joint Registrar, Raveendran P.S. v. State of Kerala, and F.A.C.T. Service Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Balakrishna Menon to assert exclusive arbitration jurisdiction for such disputes.

Cited Precedents (3)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Prakasini v. Joint Registrar2006 (1) KLT 199PositiveCited as authority that disputes between a society and its employee fall within exclusive arbitration under Section 69(2)(d).
Raveendran P.S. v. State of Kerala2007 (3) ILR Kerala 241PositiveCited for the principle of exclusive arbitration jurisdiction under Section 69(2)(d).
F.A.C.T.Service Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Balakrishna Menon2007 (3) ILR Kerala 483PositiveCited to support the view that disputes fall for arbitration under the Act.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** **PRESENT :** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN** **MONDAY, THE 4TH AUGUST 2008 / 13TH SRAVANA 1930** **WP(C).No. 21201 of 2008(Y)** **--------------------------------------** **PETITIONER:** **-----------------** **RAJU AUGUSTIAN, SECRETARY UNDER ORDERS OF SUSPENSION, MARUTHONKARA SERVICE CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD., NO.2461, MARUTHONKARA, KOZHIKODE.** **BY ADV. SRI.K.RAMAKUMAR (SR.) SRI.K.N.CHANDRABABU** **RESPONDENTS:** **----------------------** **1. THE ADMINISTRATOR, MARUTHANKARA SERVICE CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD., NO. 2461, UNIT INSPECTOR, ASSISTANT REGISTRAR OFFICE, VADAKARA, KOZHIKODE.** **2. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR OF CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES (G), VADAKARA, KOZHIKODE.** **3. THE JOINT REGISTRAR OF CO-OPERTIVE SOCIETIES, KOZHIKODE.** - **R2, R3 BY GOVERNMENT PLEADER SRI.P.K.RAVIKRISHNAN** - **R1 BY ADV. SRI.P.RAVINDRAN (SR.) R1 BY ADV. SRI.ANIL SIVARAMAN** **THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 31/07/2008, THE COURT ON 04/08/2008 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** **Rs/** ## THOTTATHIL B. RADHAKRISHNAN, J. = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = W.P.(C)No.21201 of 2008-Y = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = Dated this the 4[th] day of August, 2008. ## JUDGMENT 1.This writ petition was admitted and an interim order of stay of proceedings on the basis of Exts.P7 and P8 was granted on 14-7-2008. I.A.9589 of 2008 was filed by the first respondent on 23-7-2008 seeking that the said interim order be vacated. Along with that petition is Ext.R1(a). On 30-7-2008, the first respondent filed a counter affidavit to the writ petition. On 30-7-2008, the writ petitioner filed a reply affidavit dated 28-7-2008. On 31-7-2008, he filed another reply affidavit dated 31-7-2008. - 2.I have heard Adv.Sri.K.Ramakumar, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and Adv.Sri.P.Ravindran, the learned senior counsel appearing for the first respondent. WP(C)21201/2008 -: 2 :- - 3.The petitioner challenges Ext.P8 placing him under suspension, pending enquiry, from service of the co-operative bank of which the first respondent is the Administrator. Ext.P7 decision of the Administrator, deciding to keep the petitioner under suspension and to order that Sri.K.C.Pavithran, the Internal Auditor of the bank will take charge from the petitioner, is also under challenge. 4.The impugned decisions are impeached on the ground that the action taken against the petitioner relates to certain prior litigations and except in cases of serious charges, the order of suspension ought not to have been made. It is contended in the writ petition that the action taken is regarding certain affidavits or counter affidavits filed in the High Court and the petitioner cannot be compelled to file any affidavit or counter affidavit contradicting his earlier counter affidavits or affidavits filed in WP(C)21201/2008 -: 3 :- different cases before this Court. 5.In opposition to the writ petition, the stand of the first respondent is that a suspension order could be the subject matter of arbitration under Section 69(2)(d) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 and therefore, the petitioner has an alternate efficacious remedy and that the petitioner is trying to project a case which is just not there; in as much as neither Ext.P7 nor Ext.P8 proceeds on any allegation regarding filing of counter affidavits or affidavits and that the action taken is on the failure of the petitioner to act in terms of the decisions of the Administrator as are contained in Ext.P6. - 6.The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner argued that notwithstanding the sweep of Section 69(2)(d) of the Act, the scope of the definition of “dispute” in Section 2(i) may appear to show that a dispute relating to suspension could not be a dispute for the purpose WP(C)21201/2008 -: 4 :- of arbitration under Section 69. He also canvassed that when the petitioner is being compelled to file a counter affidavit contradicting his earlier stand before this Court, it is not merely a matter that should go for arbitration and there is no reason why this Court ought not to exercise its jurisdiction. It is further argued that having taken a particular stand in a previous case, he cannot be compelled to file a different affidavit or counter affidavit in a later case or cases touching the affairs of the bank. 7.The learned senior counsel appearing for the first respondent, on the other hand, argued that the decisions of this Court in Prakasini v. Joint Registrar [2006 (1) KLT 199], Raveendran P.S. v. State of Kerala [2007 (3) ILR Kerala 241] and F.A.C.T.Service Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Balakrishna Menon [2007 (3) ILR Kerala 483] clearly lay down the law that there is an exclusive jurisdiction before the Arbitrator for WP(C)21201/2008 -: 5 :- consideration of such cases. It is argued that it would be too far-fetched to contend that suspension is not an issue on which a dispute could arise between the employer and the employee. He further pointed out that Exts.P7 and P8 would, by themselves, clearly show that those actions did not follow on any refusal to file any affidavit or counter affidavit and it emanated only out of the refusal of the petitioner to obey the first respondent and to carry out the decisions contained in Ext.P6. 8.With the precedents laid down by this Court, as noticed above, all disputes between a society and its employee fall for arbitration under Section 69(2)(d). Suspension from service pending enquiry is a matter touching the employer-employee relationship. The power to suspend is one that is available with the employer to keep the employee out of office temporarily. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the question of suspension cannot be raised before an arbitrator WP(C)21201/2008 -: 6 :- in terms of Section 69(2)(d) of the Act is unsustainable. 9.However, to some extent, the petitioner may be justified in requesting this Court to exercise the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, notwithstanding the existence of Section 69(2)(d) of the Act since, according to the petitioner, the situation in hand is of an extra-ordinary nature and is, according to him, linked with some of the proceedings which were decided by this Court or were pending before this Court as on the date of issuance of the impugned Exts.P7 and P8. So much so, notwithstanding the availability of the remedy by way of arbitration under Section 69(2)(d) of the Act, as already found, I deem it appropriate to decide on the plea of the petitioner, in challenge of Exts.P7 and P8. 10.Ext.P7 is a decision of the first respondent on the basis of which Ext.P8, the impugned order of WP(C)21201/2008 -: 7 :- suspension is issued. Ext.P7 decision is taken on the ground that the decision in Ext.P6 was not carried out by the petitioner. Ext.P6 proceedings of the first respondent shows that as the Administrator, in lieu of the elected committee, the first respondent decided to engage a particular advocate and also for paying him due fee in accordance with law. Ext.P6 does not contain any decision to file or not to file any affidavit or counter affidavit. Ext.R1(a) produced along with I.A.9589/2008 is issued by the petitioner to the first respondent on 5-72008 stating that he has difficulty in carrying out the first respondent's decision dated 5-72008 (Ext.P6) since the replies given in cases which were existing against the bank were true and it will be illegal to state anything contrary to that in WP(C).Nos.18764/2008 and 18116/2008 to which Ext.P6 relates. The issuance of Ext.R1(a) is not disputed by the petitioner. A perusal of Ext.P6 will show that the petitioner was not called upon to file any particular statement or WP(C)21201/2008 -: 8 :- affidavit or counter affidavit in the cases referred to therein. He was not even required to express his views in that regard. Therefore, the first respondent is right in contending that Exts.P7 and P8 are impeached on an assumption that Ext.P6 contains directions to file affidavit/counter affidavit; which is baseless since there is nothing of that nature in Ext.P6. 11.The second ground on which Ext.P8 is issued is that the petitioner, as the Secretary of the bank filed counter affidavits in certain matters, contradicting the stand taken by the Administrator. That fact is not denied by the petitioner. I desist from expressing anything on the propriety or otherwise of the stand of the petitioner because, Ext.P8 is only an order of suspension pending enquiry and such issue has to be left open. 12.With the aforesaid, it can easily be seen that Exts.P7 and P8 cannot be impeached as groundless. WP(C)21201/2008 -: 9 :- The challenge to Exts.P7 and P8 has, necessarily, to fail in that regard. 13.However, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner further pointed out that Ext.P8 order of suspension has been issued without prescribing any time limit and that even in terms of the statute, there cannot be any indefinite suspension. Hence, repelling all other contentions of the petitioner, the first respondent is directed to expedite proceedings, if any, following Ext.P8 and also to issue orders determining the period of suspension. The writ petition is ordered accordingly. THOTTATHIL B. RADHAKRISHNAN, JUDGE. Sha/310708