High CourtDivision BenchAppeal allowed; High Court’s order set aside; M...

Rajpati v. Bachan

Case / Petition Number:Criminal Appeal No. 474 of 1980
Neutral Citation:[1981] 1 S.C.R. 93

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • Fazal Ali
  • A. P. Sen
Judgment Date
1980-07-28
Court Decision / Holding
The appeal is allowed. The High Court’s order is set aside and the Magistrate’s final order is upheld as valid.
Final Disposition
Appeal allowed; High Court’s order set aside; Magistrate’s order confirmed.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Rajpati

Respondents

  • Bachan
  • Anr.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Pramod Swarup

Counsels for Respondents

  • • R. D. Upadhyaya
  • • M. M. L. Srivastava

Case Synopsis & Summary

Rajpati v. Bachan is a Supreme Court decision interpreting the provisions of Section 145 Cr.P.C. in a land dispute arising from a police report that led to preliminarily finding a breach of the peace. The Magistrate issued a preliminary order on 29 July 1976 recording the reasons for believing a breach of the peace existed, and after a full inquiry under Section 145, he passed a final order on 17 July 1978 declaring Rajpati to be in possession of the disputed land. The Allahabad High Court quashed the final order under its revisional jurisdiction (Section 482 Cr.P.C.) on the ground that there was no explicit finding of breach of the peace in the final order, thereby rendering the order defective. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that a finding of breach of the peace need not be repeated in the final order. Once the preliminary order records such a finding, the High Court should not scrutinize the sufficiency of material again; the proceedings must be carried to their logical end under Section 145(6). The Court reiterated that the breach-of-peace finding in the preliminary order suffices and that absence of an explicit breach finding in the final order constitutes at most a curable irregularity, not a fatal defect, particularly where the parties had full opportunity to present evidence. The judgment cites earlier cases (Bhutani, Hari Ram, Ramarao) to support this approach.

Provisions of Law Cited

Section 145 Cr.P.C.Section 145(1) Cr.P.C.Section 145(4) Cr.P.C.Section 145(5) Cr.P.C.Section 145(6) Cr.P.C.Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Breach of the peace doctrine
  • Curable irregularity doctrine

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant contends that once the preliminary order recorded a finding of breach of the peace, the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. must proceed to completion and culminate in the final order without requiring a fresh or explicit finding of breach in the final order. The appellant asserts that the final order declaring possession is a valid outcome of the Section 145 inquiry and is not vitiated by the absence of a reiteration of breach in the final order. Because the preliminary finding was recorded, the Magistrate’s jurisdiction was properly invoked, the parties had full opportunity to adduce evidence, and no prejudice was shown. The High Court’s reliance on the lack of a final breach finding constitutes a curable irregularity rather than a fatal defect and misapplies the revisional standard under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents argued that the final order lacked an explicit finding that there was a breach of the peace, which should have been reflected in the final order. They submitted that this defect warranted intervention under the High Court’s revisional powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. They claimed that because the final order did not reiterate the breach finding, the essential procedural safeguard was missing, potentially prejudicing them, and the matter should be remanded for proper recording or scrutiny of the materials leading to such a finding.

Cited Precedents (3)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
R.H. Bhutani v. Miss Mani J. Desai & Ors.[1969] I.S.C.R. 50PositiveCited to support the proposition that once the Magistrate records a preliminary finding of breach of the peace, it is not necessary for the final order to reiterate that finding; the preliminary finding suffices.
Hari Ram & Ors. v. Banwari Lal & Ors.A.I.R. 1967 Punjab 378PositiveApproved as authority that continued inquiry after initial breach finding does not require continuing explicit breach findings in every stage.
Ramarao v. Shivram & Ors.A.L.R. 1954 Hyderabad 93PositiveApproved for the proposition that objection to a final order for lack of breach finding does not invalidate the order if breach was found earlier.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

92 # _I_ A **B** **RAJPATI** _v._ BACHAN & ANR. _July_ 28, **1980** [S. MURTAZA FAZAL Au AND A. **P.** SEN, **JJ.]** _Criminal Procedure Code, Section_ _145-Recording_ _in the final order that it_ _was breach_ _of_ _peace is_ _not_ _necessary, once such a recording has been made in_ **C** _the preliminary_ _order-Omission_ _to do_ _so_ _is_ _an error_ _of_ _procedure falling with·_ _in the domain_ _of_ _a curable irregularity._ Allowing the appeal by special leave, the Court, **D** **E** **F** G **H** HELD: (1) A finding of existence of breach of the peace is not necessary at the time when a final order is passed nor is there any provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure requiring such a finding in· the final order. Once a preliminary order drawn up by the Magistrate sets out the reaso:is for holding that a breach of the peace exists, it is not necessary that the breach of pea~e should continue at every stage of the proceeding unless there is clear evidence to show that the dispute has ceased tci exist so a:; to bring the case within the ambit of sub-section (5) of s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Unless such a contingency arises the proceedings have to be .carried to their logical end cnlminating in the final order under sub-s. (6) of s. 145. Further, it is well settled that under s. 145 it is for the Magistrate to be satisfied regarding the existence of a breach of the peace and once he records his satisfaction in the preliminary order, the High Court in revision cannot go into the su!1lciency or otherwise of the materials on the basis of which the satisfaction of the Magistrate is based. [94C-F] _/_ _R._ _H._ _Bhutani_ v. _Miss Mani_ J. _Desai_ _&_ _Ors.,_ [1969] I S.C.R. SO, followed. _Hari_ _Ram_ & _Ors._ v. _Banwari_ _Lal_ & _Ors.,_ A.J..R. 1967 Punjab 378; _Ramarao_ v. _Shivram_ & _Ors.,_ A.LR. 1954 Hyderabad p. 93, approved. (2) Mere absence of a finding of the existence of breach of the peace by· the Magistrate in the final order in the circumstances of the case cannot be such a manifest defect so as to attract the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 194B] (3) At the worst the omission on the part of the Magistrate to mention· in his final order that there was breach of the peace could be said to be an error of procedure clearly falling within the .domain of a curable irregularity which is not sufficient to vitiate the order passed by the Magistrate, particularly when there is nothing to show, in the instant case, ithat any prejudice was caused to any of the parties who had the full opportunity to produce their evidence before the Court. [95B-C] CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 474 of 1980. RAJPATI _v._ BACHAN _(Fazal Ali,_ _J.)_ 93 Appeal by Specia~ Leave from the Judgment and Order A· dated 26-9-1979 of the Allahabad High Court in Cr!. Misc. Case No. 356/79. _f_ _Pramod Swarup_ for the Appellant. _R._ _D._ _Upadhyaya_ and _M. M._ _L._ _Srivastava_ for the Respondent No. 1. B The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL Au, J.-This appeal by special leave involves a short point . of law. Proceedings unde.r s. 145 was started by the Magistrate against the respondents on the basis of a police report. After passing a preliminary order on the 29th July, 1976 (wherein the Magistrate had - recorded reasons for his being satisfied that a breach of the peace existed), the Magistrate called upon the parties to file their written statements and then after a full enquiry as provided by s. 145 the Magistrate passed the final order on 17th July, 1978 declaring the appellant to be in possession of the land in dispute. Against this order, the respondents moved the High Court under s. 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the order of the Magistrate. The High Court found that as there was no clear finding by the Magistrate in the final order that there was an apprehension of breach of the peace, therefore,' the final order was bad and the High Court accordingly allowed the petition and remitted the case to the Magistrate. ##### c D ###### .E F G ...... ## ... \ We have heard counsel for the parties and in our opinion the High Court erred in holding that the final order of the Magistrate was vitiated in absence of a finding that breach of the peace existed at the time the order was passed. It is not disputed that in the preliminary order there was a clear finding by the Magistrate that apprehension of breach of the peace did exist which was sufficient to give jurisdiction to the Magistrate to initiate the proceedings. When the parties filed their .written statements, they did not state that no dispute between the parties existed but whereas one party said that there was no apprehension of breach from their side, the 'other side took the stand that,there was an apprehension pf breach of the peace. Thus, the stand taken by the two parties was contradictory; hence it must be taken for granted that the apprehension of breach of peace -continued to exist and it was not a case where it could be said that no dispute existed, as contemplated under s. 145(5) Cr.P.C. After considering the record and evidence produced by the parties, the Magistrate passed the final order in favour of the appellant. H The High Court thought that it was absolutely essential for the Magistrate to give a finding that a breach of peace existed e_ven in A B ### c D E F G H 94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R. the final order. It may have been proper if the Magistrate had given a finding on this aspect of the matter also but in the circumstances, it can be safely presumed that apprehension of breach of peace existed and such a finding was implidt in the final order passed by the Magistrate so it was not necessary for the Magistrate to repeat what he had said in the preliminary order in the final order also. Moreover, mere absence of finding by the Magistrate in the final order in,{he circumstances as mentioned above cannot be such a manifest defect so as to attract the extraordinary jurisdiction of,the High Court under s. 482 of Cr.P.C. It is, therefore, manifest that a finding of existence of breach of the peace is not necessary at 'the time when a final order is passed nor fa there any provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure requiring· such 'a finding· in the final order. Once a preliminary order drawn up by the Magistrate sets out the reasons for holding that a breach of the peace exists, it is not necessary that the breach of peace should continue at every stage of the proceedings unless there is clear evidence to show that the dispute has ceased to exist so as to bring the case within the ambit of sub-section (5) of s. 145 of the Code of Criminal :procedure. Unless su.ch a contingency ari1ses the proceedings have· to be carried to their logical end culminating in the final order under sub-s. (6) of s. 145. As already indicated the cbntradictory stands taken by the parties clearly show that there was no question of the dispute having ended so as to lead to cancellation of the order under sub-section (5) of s. 145 nor was such a ·case set up by any party before the Magistrate or before the High Comit. Further,, it is well' settled that under s. 145 it is for the Magistrate to be satisfied regarding the existence of a : breach of the peac1~ and once he records his satisfaction in the preliminary order, the High Court in revision cannot go into the sufficiency ol' otherwise of the materials on the basis ct which the satisfaction of the Magistrate is based. In _R._ _H. Bhutani_ v. _Miss Mani_ _J._ _Desai_ _&_ _Ors.(_ _[1]_ _),_ this Court pointed out as follows: "The section requires that the Magistrate must be satisfied before initiating proceedings,that a dispute regarding an immovable property exists and that such dispute is likely to cause breach of peace. _But once he is. satisfied_ _on_ _these two conditions, the_ _section requires him to pass a preliminary order under sub-s._ (l} _and thereafter to make an enquiry under sub-s.,_ (4) _and pass a_ _final_ _order under sub-s._ (6). _It is not necessary that at the time of_ _passing the_ _final_ _order the apprehension_ _of breach_ _IOf_ _peace should_ _continue or exist._ The enquiry under s. 145 is limited to the (1) [19691 1 S.C.R. 80. _·'!-·_ RAJPATI _v._ BACHAN _(Fazal Ali,_ J.) 95 question to who was in actual possession on ·the date of the preliminary order irrespective of the rights of the parties... The High Court, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, would not go into the question of sufficiency of material which has - satisfied the Magistrate." (Emphasisours) In _H ari_ _Ram_ _&_ _Ors._ v. _Banwari 'Lal_ _&_ _Ors.(_ _[1]_ _)_ it was held that once a Magistrate finds· that there is a breach of peace it is not necessary that the dispute should continue to exist at other stages of the proceedings also. In ·this connection, the High Court observed as follows: "Of course, Magistrate· can under sub-section (1) of s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, assume jurisdiction only if he is satisfied that at the time of passing the preliminary order a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land etc. Once ·that is done the Magistrate is thereafter expected to call upon the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his court in person or by pleader and put in written statements of their respective claims as respects ·the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. The enquiry, therefore, after the initial satisfaction of the Magistrate and after the assumption ct jurisdiction by him, has to bd directed only as respects the fact of actual possession. _At that \time he has not to record a finding_ #### again about the existence of h dispute likely to cause a breach _of_ _the peace."_ I (Emphasisours) I To the same effect is a decisio~ of the Hyderabad High Cour·t in _Ramarao_ v. _Shivram &_ Ors.( [2] ) wh~re Srinivasachari J. observed as follows:- 1 1 "As regards this contention I am of· opinion that once the Magistrate has given a finding to the effect that there is apprehension of breach of peate and than he has jurisdiction to take proceedings under s. 14S, Cr.P.C., he can continue the proceedings. _It_ is _not necessafy that_ _at_ _each stage he should be_ _satisfied that there exists an imminent apprehension_ _of_ _breach_ _of_ "As regards this contentio A B ### c D E F G _peace."_ I (Emphasisours) ff (1) A.I.R. 1967 Punj. 378. (2) A.l.R. 1954 Hyderabad 93. 96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] I S.C.R. A We find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made by the Punjab and Hyderabad High Courts, extracted above, which lay down the correct law on the s.ubject. _A,_ B ## c D Assuming, however, that there was an omission on the part of the ~agistrate to mention in his final order that,there was breach of the peace, that being an error of procedure would clearly fall within ### the domain of a curable irregularity which is not sufficient tc vitiate ~ the order passed by the Magistrate, particularly when there is nothing to show in the instant case that any prejudice was caused to any of _ the parties who had the full opportunity to produce their evidence' before the Court. It was therefore not correct on the part of the High Court to have interfered with the order of the Magistrate on ::i., a purely technical ground when the aggrieved party had a clear remedy in the civil court. For these reasons therefore, we are satisfied that the order passed - I . by the High court is legally erroneous and cannot be allowed to stand. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The order of the High Court _is_ set aside and the order of the Magistrate is confirmed. V. D. K. _Appeal allowed._