Rajkapoor S/o Prithviraj Kapoor v. Laxman S/o Kishanlal Gavai

512 A B RAJKAPOOR S/O PRITHVIRAJ KAPOOR _v._ LAXMAN S/0 KISHANLAL GAVAI _December_ 14, 1979 (V. R. KRISHNA }YER AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.] _Ind;a11_ _Penal Code_ I 860 (45 _of_ 1860), _Ss._ 79 _and_ 292 _Cinematograph_ l, _Act_ 1952-S. _5A(lA)-Cinen1a_ _film granted censor certificate for public_ _e:chi' .._ _bitiou-Complaint_ _for_ _posecution_ _of_ _producer that_ _film_ _is_ _obscene, corrupts_ - -~ ~ _public n1orals-Such prosecution whether sustainable._ Word~ _and phrases-'Justified'-Meaning_ _of-Indian_ _Penal Code_ 1860, _S._ c 79. Section 79 I.P.C. provides that nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is justified by law in doing it, or, who by reason of a mistake of fact in good faith, believes himself to be· justified by law, in doing it. The respondent-complainant alleged that the film _Satyam Shivam Sundaram_ D was by il~ fa,~cinating title misleadingly foul and beguiled the guidele~~ into degeneracy and that obscenity, indecency and vice were writ large on the picture, constituting an offence under s. 292 I.P.C. The Magistrate after t:Xal11.lntng some 'vitnesses. took cognizance of the offence and issued notice to the appellant-producer of the film. Thereupon the appellant moved the l:ligh Court under section 482 Cr. P.C. on the score that the criminal proceeding was an abuse of the judicial process and that no prosecution could be legally sustained E as the film had been duly certified for public show by the Central Board of Film Censors. The High Court, however dismissed the petition. Jn the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant that once a certificate· sanctioning public exhibition of a film had been granted by the competent authority under the Cinematograph Act, 19 52, there was a justification for its display thereafter, and by virtue of the antidotal provisions in section F 79 J.P.C., the public exhibition, circulation or distribution of the film, even if it be obscene, lascivious or tending to deprave or corrupt public morals, could not be an offence, s. 292 I.P.C. notwithstanding. Allowing the appeal, ' ' G II HELD : 1. The prosecution is unsustainable because section 79 l.P.C. is exculpatory when read with section _5·A_ of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 and the certificate issued thereunder, and is therefore quashed. [517 G] 2. It j5 an antinomy to say that under section 5A(1A) of the Act, the Board certifies a film as suitable for public exhibition and for section 292 T.P.C. to punish such exhibition. unless the ground covered by the two laws be different. [516 HJ 3. The Penal Code is general, the Cinematograph Act is special. The scheme of the latter is deliberately drawn up to meet the explosively expanding cinema menace if it were not strictly policed. The cinema is a great instrument for public good if geared to social ends and can be a public curse if directed to RAJKAPOOR _v._ LAXMAN _(Krishna_ _Iyer,_ _J.)_ 513 anti-social objectives. So the Act sets up a Board of Censors of high calibre A and expertise, provides hearings, appeals and ultimate judicial review, the pre.ceni;orship and conditional exhibitions and other policing strategies to protect state and society. [516D; G-HJ B c _I_ ### .. 4. Neither the Penal Code nor the Cinematograph Ac.t can go beyond the n:strictions sanctioned tiy Part III of the Constitut"ion and cncc the special law polices the area it is _pro tanto_ out of bounds for the general law. Section 79 I.P.C. resolves the apparent contlict between secti0n 292 I.P.C. and part JI of th~ Act relating to certification of tilms. If the Board blunders, the Act provides remedies. [517 B-C) tent of the film. Sometimes the same film may produce contrary impacts H and what one regards as lecherous, another may consider elevating. Be that as it may a well published film _Satyam,_ _Sivam._ _Sundaram_ became ###### • _5._ Jurisprudentially viewed, an act may be an offence, definitionally speak~ ing; but a forbidden act may not spell inevitable guilt if the law itself declares that in certain special circumstances, it is 11ot to be regarded as an offence. The chapter on General Exceptions oper01tes in this province. Section 79 makes an offence, a non-offence, only when the offending act is actually justified by law or is _bona fide_ believed by mistake of fact to be so justified. [517 E] 6. Once the Board of Censors, acting within their jurisdiction and on an a-ppJication made and pursued in good faith, sanctions t_he public exhibition of a film, the producer and connected agencies enter the statutory harbour and are protected because s. 79 exonerates them in view of the _bona_ _fide_ belief that 'the D -eertificate is justificatory. [517 F] 7. Freedom of_ expression is fundamental. The Censor is not the moral 1ailor setting his own fashions but a statutory gendarme policing films under Article 19(2) front the angle of public order, decency or morality concepts themselves dynamic, and Vihich cannot be whittled down to strille expression nor Iioentiously enlarged to promote a riot of sexual display. [518 El E _K._ _A._ _Abbas_ v. _The Union_ _of_ _India_ & _Anr._ [1971] 2 SCR 446; referred _Jo._ CRIMINAL APPEUA'fE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 773 of 1979. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgmeut and Order dated 13-8-1979 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Criminal Case No. 279/79_ _Mrs._ _K._ _Hingorani_ for the Appellant. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by F G KRISHNA IYER, J.-Sublime titles of cinematograph films may enchant or entice and only after entry into the theatre the intrinsic worth of the picture dawns on the viewer. 111e experience may transfonn because ·the picture is great or the audience may lose lucre and culture in the bargain. Mere titles may not, therefore, attest the noxious or noble con 514 SUPREME COUR'~ REPORTS [19:\U) 2 S.C.R. A the subject matter of a prosecution presumably a _pro bona publico_ pro ceeding, by the respondent against the petitioner and others who are the producer, actor, photographer, exhibitor and distributor of that film. 'rne· complaint alleged that the fascinating title was misleadingly foul and beguiled the guileless into degeneracy .. If the gmvamen of this accusation were true, obscenity, indecency and vice are writ large on the picture, B constituting an offence under s. 292 I.P.C. The Magistrate, after examin ing some witnesses, took cognizance of the offence and issued notice to the accused. Thereupon, the producer, namely, the present petitioner, moved the High Court under s. 482 Cr. P.C. on the score that the crimi- ·~·­ nal proceeding was an abuse of the judicial process and engineered by c in ulterior considerations and that the circumstances of the case, no the prosecution could film having been duly certified for be legally sustained public show by the Board of Censors. The High Court, however, dismissed the petition, ignoring the contention that the film had been given 'A' certificate by the Central Board of Film Censors and finding in the· prosecution nothing frivolous or vexatious nor any material to quash· the .proceedings. The aggrieved film producer has arrived in this Court D hopefully, and pressed before us one principal objection founded on s. 79 I.P.C. to neutralises. 292 I.P.C. We do not find this contention: apparent in the High Court's judgment, but since the facts are admitted and the question of law is of some moment, we have chosen to hear the petitioner on the invalidatory plea that once a certificate sanctioning E public exhibition of a film has been granted by the competent authority under the Cinematograph Act, 19S2 (for short, the Act), there is a justification for its• display thereafter, and by virtue of the antidotal provisions in s. 79 of the Penal Code, the public exhibition, circulation or distribution or the production of the film, even if it be obscene, lascivious or tending to deprave or corrupt public morals, cannot be an F offence, s. 292 I.P.C. notwithstanding. The absolution is based upon the combined operation of s. SA of the Act and s. 79 of the Penal B c D Code. The issue is of some importance since the cinema is one of the major mass media wilh millions of viewers nnd many millions in: invest, _G_ men!. The respondent-complainant, despite notice having been served on him, did not enter appearance. We requested the Additional Solicitor General, Shri Banerjee, to help the court unravel the legal tangle and he responded promptly and eruditely rendered industrious assistance. We record our appreciation of the services of Shri Banerjee. • II The sole point for decision is the legal effect of the combined operation of s. SA of the, Act and s. 79 I.P.C. But we will assume for purposes of argument that the facts stated in the comp!aint _prima facie_ ,..::_ _**.r**_ . RAJKAPOOR _v._ LAXMAN _(Krishna Iyer, ].)_ 515 attract the offence under s. 292 LP .C. Supposing such film has been A . certified by the Central Board of Film Censors, acting within their jurisdiction under the Act, thereby sanctioning the public exhibition of _the_ film, does it furnish a justification in law in doing the act which, in the absence of such certification, may constitute an offence under s. 292 I.P.C.? Section 79 I.P.C. runs thus : Docs a certificate issued under s. SA(lA) of the Act amount to justification in law for public exhibition of the film, be it obscene or Mt. or, at any rate, does it generate a belief induced by a mistake of fact, namely, the issuance of the certificate and its effect that the certi ficate-holder is justified by law in exhibiting the film? F We arc thrown back upon a study of the anatomy of the Cinematogrnph Act and the cffcacy of a cerfficate under s. SA as a justification within the meaning of s. 79 of I.P.C. "Justified" according to Black's Legal Dictionary means : Done on adequate reasons sufficiently supported by G credible evidence. when weighed by unprejudiced mind, guided by common sense' and by correct rules of law. The Shorter Oxford Eng\;sh Dictionary assigns this meaning for **"justification".** 79. Nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is justified by law, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith, believes himself to be justified by law, in doing it. The argument is irresistible that if the performance of the act which constitutes the otiencc is _justified_ _by law,_ i.e. by some other provision. then s. 79 exonerates the doer because the act ceases to be an offence. Likewise, if the act were done by one "who by reason of a mistake of fact in good faith believes himself to be jusi;fied by law in doing it" then also, the exception operates and the _bona_ _fide_ belief, although mistaken, eliminates the culpability. The resolution of the problem raised in this case thus becomes simplified. If the offender can irrefutably estabfah that, he is actually _justified_ _by law_ in doing the act or. 2ltcrnativcly, that _he_ entertained a mistake of fact and in good faith believed that he was justified by law in committing the act, then, the weapon of s. 79 demolishes the prosecution. c D E The showing in conrt that one had sufficient reason for doing that which i.e. is called to answer; the ground for ;uch a plea. ##### • **0.'** ·A _B_ ·c F ·G 'H 516 SUPREME COU!lT REPORTS [1980] 2 S,C.lt. Lexically, the sense is clear. An act is justified by law if it is warranted, validated and _made blameless by law. Is a legal sanction permitting a thing a legal justification for doing it ? Maybe, there is a fine semantic shade between mere legal sanction, which is passive, and clear legal justification which is active. For the work-a-day world of meanings, between 'permissive' and 'justificative' 'thin partition do their bounds divide'. It is an antinomy to say that under s. 5A(IA) of the Act' the Board certifies a film as suitable for public exhibition and for s. 292 I.P .C. to punish such exhibition unless the ground covered by the two laws be different. Although it may be plausible to say that what is merely certified as suitable for show by a law may not go the length of holding that it is justified by Jaw. Such niceties need not deter us once we grasp the sweep of the Cinematograph Act. Indeed, the Penal Code is general, the Cinematograph Act is special. The scheme of the latter is deliberately drawn up to meet the explosively expanding cinema menace if it were not strictly policed. No doubt, the cinema is a great instrument for public good if geared to social ends and can be a public curse if directed to anti-soda! objectives. The freedom of expression, the r:ght to be equally treated and the guarantee of fair hearing before heavy investments in films are destroyed belong to Indian citizens under the Constitution. But all freedom is a promise, not a menace and, therefore, is subject to socially necessary restraints permitted by the Constitution. Having regard to the instant appeal of the motion picture, its versatility, realism, and its coordination of the visual and aural senses. what with the art of the cameraman with trick photography, vistavision and three dimensional representation, the celluloid art has greater capabilities of stirring up emotions and making powerful mental impact so much so the treatment of this form of art on a different footing with pre-censorship may well be regarded as a valid classification, as was held in _K. A. Abbas(_ _[1]_ _),_ Maybe, art cannot be imprisoned by the bureaucrat and aesthefos can be robbed of the glory and grace and free expression of the human spirit if governmental palate is to prescribe the permit for exh'bition of artistic production in any department, more so in cinema pictures. So it is that a special legislation viz. the Act of 1952, sets up a Board of Censors of high calibre and expertise, provides hearings, appeals and ultimate judicial review, pre-censorship and conditional exhibitions and wealth of other policing strategies. In short, a speeial machinery and proo::ssual justice and a host of wholesome restrictions to protect State and society are woven into the fabric of the Act. After (t) _K. A. Abbas'"_ _The_ _Union of India_ & _Anr._ [ 1971] _2_ S. C. R. 446 . _i_ ## • ##### • _I_ RAJKAPOOR _v._ LAXMAN _(Krishna Iyer,_ _!.)_ 517 having elaborately enacted such a legislation can it be that a certificato granted under it by expert authority can be stultified by a simple prosecution or a shower of prosecutions for an offence under s. 292 1.P.C., driving the producer to satisfy a 'lay' magistrate that the certificate of the Board of Censors notwithstanding, the film was offensive ? The Board under s. 5B has to consider, before certification, all the pomts s. 292 I.P.C. prescribes. Indeed, neither the Penal Code nor the Cinematograph Act can go beyond the restrictions sanctioned by Part III of the Constitution and once the special law polices the area it is _pro tanto_ out of bounds for the general law. At least as a matter of interpretation, s. 79 I.P.C. resolves the apparent conflict betwee11 s. 292 I.P.C. and Part II of the Act relating to certification of films. H the Board blunders, the Act provides remedies. We are sure the public-spirited citizen may draw the attention of the 1gencies under the Act to protect public interest. A B c The general issues of art and the role of the State have already been referred to by us in an earlier appeal frpm the Delhi High Court relating to the same film. There s. 79 I.P.C. was not considered by D. us because the contention was not urged before 9s. The present deci,,ion will bind t!J.0 court that hears that case. # • The position tlrnt emerges is this. Jurisprudentially viewed, an act may be an offence, definitionally speaking but; a forbidden act may not spell inevitable guilt if the law itself declares that in certai>t special circumstances it is not to be rngarded as an offence. The chapter on General Exceptions operates in this province. Section 79 makes an offence a non-offence. When ? Only when the offending act is actually justified by law or is _bona_ _fide_ believed by mista"!ce of fact to be sc justified. If, as here, the Board of Censors, acting within their jurisdiction and on an application made and pursued in good faith, sanctions the public exhibition, the producer and connected agencies do enter the statutory harbour and are protected because s. 79 exonerates them at least in view of their _bona_ _fide_ belief that the certificate is justificatory. Thus the trial court when it hears the case may be appropriately apprised of the certificate under the Act nnd, in the light of our observations, it fills the bill under s. 79 it is right for the ce>urt to discharge the accused as the charge is groundless. In the present case, the prosecution is unsustainable because s. 79 is exculpatory when read with s. 5A of the Act and the certificate issued thereunder. We quash the prosecution. Two things deserve mention before we close. Prosecutions like this one may well be symptomatic of public dissatisfaction with the Board of Censors not screening vicious films. 1be ultimate censo E F G H A B c :E 518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 s.c.R. rious power over the censors bdongs to the people and by indifference, laxity or abetment, pictures which pollute public morals are liberally certificated, the legislation, meant by Parliament to protect people's good morals, may be sabotaged by statutory enemies within. Corruption at that level must be stamped ont. And the Board, alive to its public duty, shall not play to the gallery; nor shall it restrain aesthetic expression and progressive art through obsolete norms and grandma inhibitions when the world is wheeling forward to glimpse the beauty of Creation in its myriad manifestations and liberal horizons. A happy balance is to " .... consider, on the one hand, the number of readers they believe would tend to be depraved and corrupted by the book, the strength of the tendency to deprave and corrupt, and the nature of the depravity or corruption; on the other hand, they should assess the strength of the literary, sociological and ethical merit which they consider the book to possess. They should then weigh up all these factors and decide whether on balance the publication is proved kl be justified as being.for the public good."(!) Going to the basics, freedom of expression is fundamental. The censor is not the moral tailor setting his own fashions but a statutory gendarme policing filIDB under Art. 19(2) from the angle . of public order, decency or morality. These concepts are themselves dynamic and cannot be whittled down to stifle expression nor licentiously enlarged to promote a riot of sensual display. Anyway, the appeal must succeed and we extinguish the prosecution by the order. F N.V.K. _Appeal_ _allowed._ #### ---- (!) calder and Boy:.rs Ltd., [1969] I OB 151et172.