High CourtSingle Judge2017-07-26Appeal allowed.

RAJIV DAWAR v. HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Case / Petition Number:Criminal Appeal No. 51 of 2007

Neutral Citation:[2017] 6 S.C.R. 411

Case Details & Bench

Court: High Court
Hon'ble Judges: KURIAN JOSEPH
R. BANUMATHI
Judgment Date: 2017-07-26
Court Decision / Holding: Appeal allowed. The Supreme Court set aside the conviction and the sentence under the Contempt of Courts Act and Article 215, holding that due process safeguards were not properly observed, and that the appellant had complied with a refund direction issued by the Bar Council. All pending applications were disposed of accordingly.
Final Disposition: Appeal allowed.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

RAJIV DAWAR

Respondents

HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

• K. V. Vishwanathan, Senior Advocate
• Ashok Mathur
• Ms. Nidhi Agrawal
• Sameer Dawar
• Dhananjay Ray

Counsels for Respondents

• C. K. Sucharita

Case Synopsis & Summary

Rajiv Dawar, a practicing advocate, challenges the Delhi High Court’s conviction for criminal contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and Article 215 of the Constitution, arising from a dispute with a client who had complained that Dawar charged exorbitant fees and withdrew from a criminal NDPS case. The High Court found him guilty and imposed a fine of Rs. 2,000 and a two-month suspension from practice. On appeal, the Supreme Court scrutinizes whether the conviction rested on admissible evidence and whether Dawar was afforded a fair opportunity to defend himself. The court notes that the proceedings largely relied on the de facto complainant’s unilateral statements, and that Dawar was not given an opportunity to adduce evidence or cross-examine during the reference to the High Court. The amicus before the High Court had urged compliance with procedural safeguards to enable Dawar to contest the allegations effectively. The Bar Council of Delhi’s order acknowledged disputes over withdrawal from engagement and partial refund of fees as a potential professional misconduct issue but did not compel broader penalties. The court emphasizes that contemnors must be afforded due process and a chance to establish innocence in contempt proceedings. In light of these factors and the disciplinary history, the Court sets aside the conviction and sentence and allows the appeal, disposing of any pending applications.

Provisions of Law Cited

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — Section 2(c)Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — Section 10Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — Section 15Article 215 of the Constitution of IndiaBar Council of India Rules, Clause 12

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant submits that the conviction rests on the complainant’s unilateral version, who was an accused in the NDPS case, and that he was not given a meaningful opportunity to adduce evidence or cross-examine during the reference to the High Court. He contends that due process was not satisfied and that, had he been allowed to participate in the enquiry, he could have contested the allegations. The amicus before the High Court urged full compliance with procedural safeguards to ensure a fair opportunity to defend the charges, including cross-examination or presenting evidence. Since the conviction largely rests on the complainant’s statements, and because the Bar Council order suggested refund of part of the fees as a disciplinary matter rather than criminal misconduct, the appellant argues that the High Court should not have sustained conviction without proper process.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents contend that the matter involved serious allegations of professional misconduct and that the proceedings demanded deference to the complainant’s account in a contempt context. They argue that due process principles were intended to be observed through the reference mechanism and that the Bar Council’s findings reflected ongoing concerns about withdrawal from engagement and refund obligations. They maintain that the contempt conviction was based on the record assembled through the High Court’s reference and that due procedure, including the opportunity for the contemnor to respond within the statutory framework, was essential to determine accountability for professional conduct.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

## [2017] 6 S.C.R. 411 ## _RAJNDAWAR_ A v. ## HIGH COURT OF DELHI (CriminalAppealNo. 51 of2007) JULY 26, 2017 B **[KURIAN JOSEPH AND R. BANUMATHI, JJ.]** _Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:_ _ss. 2(c), JO and I 5 rlw. Art. 215 of Constitution of India_ ~ _Complaint before subordinate Court_ - _By an accused undergoing trial in criminal case under NDPS Act_ - _Against his advocate_ - _Alleging that the advocate had charged exorbitant fees and had also withdrawn from the case_ - _The complainant prayed for refund of part of his fees_ - _Reference to High Court_ - _High Court held him guilty of criminal contempt_ - _On appeal held: In view of the facts that contemnor was completely absolved of the allegations by disciplinary authority; that procedural safeguards were not followed; and that the contemnor ·had complied with the direction to refund the fee, conviction and sentence imposed on the contemnor, set aside_ - _Appeal allowed._ CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 51 of 2007 .. C D E From the Judgment and Order dated 02.01.2007 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Cr!. C. Ref. No. 2 of2005. K. V. Vishwanathan, Sr. Adv., Ashok Mathur, Ms. Nidhi Agrawal, Sameer Dawar, Dhananjay Ray, Advs. for the Appellant. F C. K. Sucharita, Adv. for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by **KURIAN, J.** I. The appellant is before this Court aggrieved by the conviction and sentence under section 2( c) read with Section I 0 & 15 of Contempt of Courts Act and under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. Under the Contempt of Courts Act a fine of Rs.2,000/- was imposed and under Article 215 of the Constitution oflndia the appellant was suspended from practice for a period of two months. G **H** 411 412 [2017] 6 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS , A B .c D E . F G H 2. The main contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant is that the whole conviction is based on the unilateral version of the complainant before the Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi. Either before the Additional Sessions Judge at the time of reference to the High Court or at the stage of the proceedings in the High Court, the appellant was not given an opportunity to adduce evidence, or at least cross examine the de facto complainant. We find that the learned amicus before the High Court had also requested the High Court to comply with the procedural formalities giving full opportunity to the appellant to disabuse the allegations against him. In contempt proceedings, the contemnor has to be given an opportunity to establish his innocence. From the proceedings it is seen that the appellant was not granted such an opportunity except the opportunity of filing an affidavit. On the facts of this case, unless the allegations made by the de facto complainant who was an accused in a criminal' case under the N.D.P.S. Act; had actually been established or proved in accordance with law, there could not have been a conviction based solely on tlfe allegations. The situation could have been different had at least at the time of reference by the Additional Sessions Judge, the appellant had been given an opportunity to participate in the enquiry and cross examine the complainant. On facts, we do not find that any such exercise had been undertaken even by the Additional Sessions Judge while making a reference to the High Court. 3. lt is a case where the de facto complainant made an allegation that the appellant had charged exorbitant fees to the tune of Rs. 7 .05 Lacs, without any active assistance to the accused and also withdrawn from the case and, therefore, he prayed for a direction to the Additional Sessions Judge for refund of at least Rs.6 Lacs. However, it was the case of the appellant that for professional services rendered to the de facto complainant appropriate fees had been charged and it was not as if the amount received was for any other purpose as alleged by the complainant. · 4. lt is seen that the Bar Council of Delhi ha:d also looked into this complaint and in the order dated 30.09.2006, at paragraph 12, it has been held as follows:- "12. An advocate should not ordinarily withdraw from engagements, once accepted, without sufficient cause and unless reasonable and sufficient notices is given to the client. Upon his RAJIV DAWAR v. HIGH COURT OF DELHI [KURIAN JOSEPH, J.] 413 withdrawal from a case, he shall refund such part of the fee as A has not been earned. It is substantially a matter of withdrawal by Respondent from the case and not one of misconduct involving any misrepresentation, deliberate receipt of money by falsification or false assurances. The complainant is also not seeking any disciplinary action. His B prayer is confined to the refund ofRs.6 lacs and we feel that to the extent ofRs.4 lacs, the prayer of the complainant is justified, which would be covered under clause 12 of Bar Council oflndia Rules. The present matter according to us is, therefore, one of c withdrawal from the case and for the deficiency of professional services, the ends of justice would be met, it we order refund of part of payments made to the Respondent. No prejudice will be caused to the complainant. For the reasons stated above, issue No. I and 2 are decided against the complainant insofar as the D misconduct is concerned. In view of the observations and findings, however, the refund ofRs.4.00 lakhs would be justified. There is neither a claim for interest nor would be justified, as such no interest will be payable." 5. The Disciplinary Authority having completely absolved the appellant and in view of the procedural safeguards having not been followed in this case and also having regard to the fact that the appellant has complied with the direction to refund the money, the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant is set aside. E 6. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. F 7. Pending application(s), ifany, shall stand disposed of. Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal allowed.