Raji V.O. v. State of Kerala and M/S Sree Gokulam Chit & Finance Co. (P) Ltd.

# **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN** **MONDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF NOVEMBER 2022 / 30TH KARTHIKA,** **1944** ## **CRL.REV.PET NO. 720 OF 2022** **AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN CRL.APPEAL NO.82/2020 OF ADDITIONAL SESSIONS COURT-IV, KOLLAM DATED 24.08.2021 S.T.NO.242/2016 OF THE JUDICIAL FIRST CLASS MAGISTRATE COURT, SASTHAMCOTTA DATED 27.08.2020** ## **REVISION PETITIONER/APPELLANT/ACCISED :** **RAJI V.O., AGED 49 YEARS, W/O.SIVARAJAN, USHALAYAM VILANTHARA P.O., VALIYAPADAM, WEST KALLADA VILLAGE, SASTHAMCOTTA, KOLLAM DISTRICT, PIN - 691502 BY ADVS. K.SIJU S.ABHILASH ANJANA KANNATH T.S.SREEKUTTY** ## **RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS/STATE & COMPLAINANT :** - **1 STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM - 682031** **2 M/S.SREE GOKULAM CHIT & FINANCE CO.(P) LTD., CORPORATE OFFICE AT SREE GOKULAM TOWERS, NO.66, ARCOT ROAD, CHENNAI-600024, THE COMPANY IS REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED OFFICER, MR.BHADRAN, AGED 55 YEARS, S/O RAGHAVAN, RESIDING AT THONDATHARAYIL HOUSE,** Crl.R.P.No.720 of 2022 -:2:- **KOZHIKKODU MEKKU, AYANIVELIKULANGARA VILLAGE, KARUNAGAPPALLY, KOLLAM -690573** **BY SRI.RENJIT GEORGE, SR.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR** **THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 15.11.2022, THE COURT ON 21.11.2022 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** Crl.R.P.No.720 of 2022 -:3:- ## **A.BADHARUDEEN, J.** **-------------------------------------------------------Crl.R.P.No.720 of 2022 -------------------------------------------------------Dated this the 21[st] day of November, 2022** ## **O R D E R** This is a revision petition filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter will be referred as Cr.P.C. for convenience) and the revision petitioner herein is the accused in S.T.No.242 of 2016 on the files Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Sasthamcotta. The respondents herein are the original complainant as well as the State of Kerala. 2. The revision petitioner impugns judgment in S.T.No.242 of 2016 dated 27.08.2020 and the judgment in Crl.Appeal No.82 of 2020 dated Crl.R.P.No.720 of 2022 -:4:- 24.08.2021 on the file of the Additional Sessions Court-IV, Kollam. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/the accused and the learned Public Prosecutor on admission. Notice to the second respondent/the original complainant stands dispensed with. 4. I shall refer the parties in this Revision Petition as ‘complainant’ and ‘accused’ for convenience. 5. Shown off unnecessary details, the case put up by the complainant/2nd respondent herein before the trial court is as under: It was alleged by the complainant that one P.Babuson joined to chitty No.G2E 3824/15 having a sala of Rs.1 lakh, run by the complainant commenced on 23.11.2013 and concluded on 23.06.2015. The Crl.R.P.No.720 of 2022 -:5:- above said P.Babuson received the chitty price amount of Rs.75,000/- as per cheque dated 28.03.2014 and the accused herein stood as surety towards the repayment of the said amount. Thereafter, the accused defaulted repayment of the amount as agreed and accordingly, the surety had issued Ext.P3 cheque dated 23.06.2016 drawn on Indian Bank, Sasthamcotta branch to repay the liability. The complainant launched prosecution alleging commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter will be referred as 'NI Act' for convenience), when the said cheque was dishonoured for want of funds and when the accused failed to repay the same even on notice of demand. 6. The trial court secured the presence of the accused for trial and during trial, PW1 and PW2 Crl.R.P.No.720 of 2022 -:6:- examined and Exts.P1 to P10 were marked on the side of the complainant. 7. After questioning the accused under Section 313(1)(b) of Cr.P.C, though opportunity was provided to the accused to adduce defence evidence, no defence evidence was adduced. 8. The trial court appraised the evidence and finally convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment till rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs.50,000/- and in default of payment of fine, simple imprisonment for one month more was ordered. 9. The learned Additional Sessions Judge dismissed the appeal arising therefrom, as per the judgment in Crl.Appeal No.82 of 2020 dated 24.08.2021, confirming the conviction as well as the Crl.R.P.No.720 of 2022 -:7:- sentence. 10. While attempting to upset the concurrent verdicts of conviction and sentence, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner failed to substantiate anything, so as to invoke the power of revision available to this Court in any manner. Accordingly, she prayed for granting five months time to pay the amount. 11. Going by the grounds raised in the grounds of appeal, in fact, the same are matters required to be addressed on re-appreciation of evidence. The power of this Court is not exhaustive to re-appreciate the evidence. 12. It is the settled law that power of revision available to this Court under Section 401 of Cr.P.C r/w Section 397 is not wide and exhaustive to Crl.R.P.No.720 of 2022 -:8:- re-appreciate the evidence to have a contra finding. In the decision reported in [(1999) 2 SCC 452 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], **State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri** , the Apex Court, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, laid down the following principles (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5): _“5. …... In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in_ Crl.R.P.No.720 of 2022 -:9:- _interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. ...”_ 13. In another decision reported in [(2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19], **Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke** , the Apex Court held that the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly - unreasonable or there is non consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. Following has been laid down in para.14 (SCC p.135) : _“14. …... Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of_ Crl.R.P.No.720 of 2022 -:10:- _criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 Cr.P.C is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaring unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”_ 14. The said ratio has been followed in a latest decision of the Supreme Court reported in [(2018) 8 SCC 165], **Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda** . Thus the law is clear on the point that the whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence and, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence had already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring Crl.R.P.No.720 of 2022 -:11:- feature is brought to the notice of the court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. To put it otherwise, if there is nonconsideration of any relevant materials, which would go to the root of the matter or any fundamental violation of the principle of law, then only the power of revision would be made available. 15. The courts below relied on by the evidence of PW1 as well as PW2 and Exts.P1 to P10 to hold that the complainant succeeded in discharging his initial burden in the matter of transaction led to execution of Ext.P3 cheque. The appellate court also concurred the said finding. 16. As I have already pointed out, nothing argued to substantiate anything to be interfered by exercising power of revision. In the case in hand, the trial court as well as the appellate given benefit of Crl.R.P.No.720 of 2022 -:12:- presumption in favour of the complainant, on the finding that the complainant succeeded in discharging his initial burden. Law regarding presumption is also settled as well. 17. In this connection, I would like to refer a 3 Bench decision of the Apex Court in [2010 (2) KLT 682 (SC)], **Rangappa v. Sri.Mohan** . In the above decision, the Apex Court considered the presumption available to a complainant in a prosecution under Section 138 of the N.I Act and held as under: _“The presumption mandated by S.139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat [2008 (1) KLT 425 (SC)] may not be correct. This is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant. S.139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While S.138 of the_ Crl.R.P.No.720 of 2022 -:13:- _Act specified a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under S.139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by S.138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under S.139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of `preponderance of probabilities'. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. Accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own.”_ 18. In the decision reported in [2019 (1) KLT 598 (SC) : 2019 (1) KHC 774 : (2019) 4 SCC 197 : 2019 (1) KLD 420 : 2019 (2) KLJ 205 : AIR Crl.R.P.No.720 of 2022 -:14:- 2019 SC 2446 : 2019 CriLJ 3227], **Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar** , the Apex Court while dealing with a case where the accused has a contention that the cheque issued was a blank cheque, it was held as under: _“A meaningful reading of the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act including, in particular, Sections 20, 87 and 139, makes it amply clear that a person who signs a cheque and makes it over to the payee remains liable unless he adduces evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque had been issued for payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability. It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of S.138 would be attracted. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and other particulars. This in itself would not invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence.”_ 19. In a latest 3 Bench decision of the Apex Court reported in [2021 (2) KHC 517 : 2021 KHC Crl.R.P.No.720 of 2022 -:15:- OnLine 6063 : 2021 (1) KLD 527 : 2021 (2) SCALE 434 : ILR 2021 (1) Ker. 855 : 2021 (5) SCC 283 : 2021 (1) KLT OnLine 1132], **M/s.Kalamani Tex & anr. v. P.Balasubramanian** the Apex Court considered the amplitude of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I Act it was held as under: _“Adverting to the case in hand, we find on a plain reading of its judgment that the Trial Court completely overlooked the provisions and failed to appreciate the statutory presumption drawn under S.118 and S.139 of NIA. The Statute mandates that once the signature(s) of an accused on the cheque/negotiable instrument are established, then these `reverse onus' clauses become operative. In such a situation, the obligation shifts upon the accused to discharge the presumption imposed upon him. Once the 2[nd] Appellant had admitted his signatures on the cheque and the Deed, the Trial Court ought to have presumed that the cheque was issued as consideration for a legally enforceable debt. The Trial Court fell in error when it called upon the Complainant-Respondent to explain the circumstances under which the appellants were liable to pay._ _…................_ Crl.R.P.No.720 of 2022 -:16:- _18. Even if we take the arguments raised by the appellants at face value that only a blank cheque and signed blank stamp papers were given to the respondent, yet the statutory presumption cannot be obliterated. It is useful to cite Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar (2019 (1) KHC 774 : (2019) 4 SCC 197 : 2019 (1) KLD 420 : 2019 (1) KLT 598 : 2019 (2) KLJ 205 : AIR 2019 SC 2446 : 2019 CriLJ 3227], P.36., where this Court held that:_ _“Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption under S.139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt.”_ 20. In this matter, the specific case put up by the complainant before the trial court was that the accused, who stood as surety to the chitty transaction between the complainant and the accused, issued cheque for Rs.50,000/- to discharge in the loan liability and the same was dishonoured, when presented for collection. Crl.R.P.No.720 of 2022 -:17:- 21. Though it is argued by the learned counsel for the accused that the accused is only a surety, the same has nothing to be read in isolation, as the prosecution launched against the person who issued the cheque. 22. In view of the matter, the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court and confirmed by the appellate court do not require any interference. 23. However, the learned counsel for the accused sought for five months time to pay the amount. Considering the cheque amount would come to Rs.50,000/-, I am inclined to grant one month time from today to pay the compensation. 24. In the result, this revision petition fails and it is, accordingly, dismissed. 25. However, the revision petitioner/the accused is given one month time from today to pay Crl.R.P.No.720 of 2022 -:18:- the compensation or to undergo the default sentence. Therefore, the revision petitioner/the accused is directed to appear before the trial court on 20.12.2022 to pay the compensation or to undergo the default sentence. The execution of the sentence shall stand deferred till 19.12.2022. On failure to do so, the trial court is directed to execute the sentence without fail. Registry is directed to forward a copy of this order to the courts below concerned for information and compliance. Sd/- **A. BADHARUDEEN JUDGE** rkj