High CourtDivision BenchAppeal dismissed; no order as to costs

RAJESH KUMAR @ RAJU v. YUDHVIR SINGH & ANR

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No.3538 of 2008
Neutral Citation:[2008] 8 S.C.R. 532

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • S.B. Sinha
  • Lokeshwar Singh Panta
Judgment Date
2008-05-13
Court Decision / Holding
We are of the opinion that it is not a case where we should interfere in the impugned judgment of the High Court as well as the Tribunal. The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
Final Disposition
Appeal dismissed; no order as to costs

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Rajesh Kumar @ Raju

Respondents

  • Yudhvir Singh
  • Anr.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Gaurav Goel
  • • Amit Sharma
  • • Mahesh Agarwal
  • • E.C. Agrawala

Counsels for Respondents

  • • S.S. Yadav
  • • S.L. Gupta
  • • Goodwill Indevar

Case Synopsis & Summary

The claimant, Rajesh Kumar (also referred to as Rajesh Kumar @ Raju), sustained injuries in a motor vehicle accident on 11 August 2001 while riding a scooter, and filed a petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 seeking approximately Rs. 10 lakh as compensation, asserting a 60% total disability based on a Civil Surgeon’s certificate (Ex. PW 2/2) issued on 11 November 2003. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal awarded Rs. 1,68,941, adopting a 30% disability and a monthly income of Rs. 3,000, with further sums for pain, suffering, and general damages. The High Court of Delhi enhanced the award to reflect a higher income and disability assessment, concluding the 60% disability certificate supported the case. On appeal, the appellant contends that the provisions of Section 163A of the Act should govern disability compensation and incorporate the Workmen’s Compensation Act (1923) principles, given the certificate’s genuineness; thus the high court erred by applying only 30% disability. The respondents counter that the petition was under Section 166, not 163A, and that Section 167 allows option to pursue Workmen’s Compensation; the certificate’s admissibility is doubtful since its author was not examined and it was issued after two years. The Supreme Court ultimately found no basis to interfere with the Tribunal/High Court findings, and dismissed the appeal.

Provisions of Law Cited

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 163A (including the explanation appended to Section 163A(1))Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 166Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 156Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 – Sections 2(e), 2(i)Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 – Section 4Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 – Section 32Workmen's Compensation Rules 1924Section 167 of Motor Vehicles Act

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant argues that for disability compensation under Section 163A the procedural and evidentiary framework of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 should apply, especially where there is no dispute about the genuineness of the disability certificate (Ex. PW 2/2) indicating 60% disability. He contends that the certificate, though issued two years after the accident, should be admissible, and that the proceedings are under Section 166, where the Workmen’s Act’s procedures ought to be applied if relevant. He asserts that the High Court erred in accepting a 30% disability figure, and that the 163A reference would have affected the computation of compensation. He also notes that the certificate’s author was not examined, questioning admissibility. Finally, he maintains that, given the severity of the alleged disability, the Court should have applied the more generous disability assessment and corresponding compensation.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents contend that the petition was filed under Section 166 of the Act, not Section 163A, and Section 167 allows the injured to seek relief under either Act. They argue that Section 163A’s reference to the Workmen’s Compensation Act pertains to claims under 163A only and not to 166 proceedings; thus the WCA procedure should not be imported into 166. They object to admitting the two-year-old certificate where its author was not examined, and contend that the Tribunal’s approach, which is based on the evidence on record, is correct. They further argue that the High Court/Tribunal’s findings were properly supported, and there is no basis for interference by this Court, especially given the lack of a proven link between the disability claimed and the award. The respondents thus support dismissal of the appeal and uphold the existing award.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

[2008] 8 S.C.R. 532 B ## RAJESH KUMAR @ RAJU _V._ YUDHVIR SINGH & ANR. (Civil Appeal No.3538 of 2008) MAY 13, 2008 [S.B. SINHA AND LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, JJ.] _Motor Vehicles Act, 1988_ - s. _163A, explanation_ - _Referenc.e of Workman Compensation Act, 1923 in explanation_ c · _appended to s.163A(1)"""' Held: Is only for the purpose of said section, and is not meant to apply to cases falling under_ s. _156._ · s. _166_ - _Disability_ - _Claimant claiming compensation on the ground that he suffered 60% disability_ - _Certificate of civil surgeon stating 60% disability, put on record_ - _Courts below_ D _assessed total disability at 30%_ - _On appeal, held: The certificate not admissible in evidence_ as _the author of certificate was not examined_ - _Moreover, it_ was _issued after 2 years of accident and it was not proved whether author treated the claimant orwas competent to issue such certificate._ E The victim of motor accident, which took place in August, 2001, filed claim petition under s.166 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 claiming compensation on the ground that' he suffered 60% total disability. The claimant-appellant relied upon a certificate issued by the Civil Surgeon F oii Nbvember, 2003 stating that he had suffered 60% disability.· Tribunal awarded compensation upon taking 30% of his 'income. On appeal, High Court assessed total disability at 30% and accordingly awarded compensation. G In appeal to this Court, claimant-appellant contended that having regard to the provisions contained in s.163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, for the purpose of awarding compensation on disability, the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 would be attracted; )' ,, _>_ ' H 532 533 .... # RAJESH KUMAR @ RAJU _v._ YUDHVIR SINGH &ANR : -t and that in view of the fact that there was no dispute in A regard to the genuineness of the said disability certificate, the High Court committed a. serious error in assessing the total disability at 30% only. Dismissing the appeal, the Court B HELD: 1.1 The claim petition was filed· under s.166 of the Motor Vehicles Act and not under s.163A thereof. S.163A provides for filing of a claim petition where an accident took place by reason of use of the motor vehicle. It is not necessary to prove any fault on the part of the driver . c or the vehicle. The Tribunal in a proceeding arising under s.166 of the Act is required to hold a full fledged trial. It is required to collect datas on the basis whereof, the amount of compensation can be determined.· Under s.163A of the Act, however, the question of liability and 0 extent of proof thereof are not justiciable. The Tribunal can determine the amount on the basis of the basic datas provided therefor. [Para 7) [536-C,E,F] • 1.2. The reference to Workmen's Compensation Act by incorporation was only for the purpose of sub-section E (1) of s.163A. It was not meant to apply in a case falling under s.166 of the Act. Had the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act were applicable, the procedure laid down therein would also apply. For the purpose of the definition of total disablement as also person F who can grant a certificate therefor, namely, a qualified medical practitioner, ss.2(e) and 2(i) would be attracted. In terms of the 1923 Act, the amount of compensation is required to be determined as specified in s.4. The Rules made in terms of s.32 of the Act known as Workmen's G Compensation Rules 1924, would also be applicable. [Para 8] [536-H, 537-A,B] 2. The certificate in question was obtained after two years. It is not known as to whether the Civil Surgeon of the hospital treated the appellant. On what basis, such a H [2008) 8 S.C.R. 534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS A certificate was issued two years after the accident took place is not known. The author of the said certificate had not been examined. Unless the author of the certificate examined himself, it was not admissible in evidence. [Para 9] [537-C,D] B CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3538 of 2008 From the Judgment and Order dated 18/1/2007 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in MAC Appeal No. 886/2005 C Gaurav Goel, Amit Sharma, Mahesh Agarwal and E.C. Agrawala for the Appellant. S.S. Yadav, S.L. Gupta and Goodwill lndeevar for the Respondents. D The Judgment of the Court was delivered by )t- ., S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Claimant before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is the appellant before us. On 11.8.2001, he was driving a two E wheeler vehicle)~eing a scooter. It was hit by a bus bearing Registration No~Dl-1 P-A-0746. He was a motor mechanic. In July 2003, he filed a claim in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, 'the Act') claiming a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- along with interest at the rate of 18% per anF num. Allegedly, he suffered 60% total disability. His claim was based on the premise that he was earning a sum of Rs.4,500/per month. 3. Before the Tribunal, the appellant relied upon a certifiG cate purported lo have been issued by the Civil Surgeon, Faridabad on 11.11.2003 stating that he had suffered 60% disability. The learned Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.1,68,941 by way of compensation opining that his income was Rs.3,000/- per month and he was enH titled to compensation upon taking 30% of his income at the RAJESH KUMAR @ RAJU _v._ YUDHVIR SINGH & ANR [S.B. SINHA, J.] 535 rate of Rs.900/- per month being a total sum of Rs.20,000 be- . A sides the amount of compensation towards pain and sufferings and a sum of Rs.5,000/- as general damages including conveyance, special diet etc. An interest at the rate of 7% perannum was also awarded. 4. He preferred an appeal thereagainst. The High Court awarded a further sum of Rs.84,800/-, opining : · B "Minimum wages notified on 1.1.1980 for skilled workers was Rs.320/- per month. It rose to Rs.1043/- as on 1.1.1990. It rose to Rs.3,016/- as on 1.1.2001: The trend c shows that minimum wages double every 10 years. Considering the age of the deceased being 34 years, it would be safe to assume that by the time he would turn 60, his income would have doubled. I accordingly treat the average monthly income of the deceased at Rs.4,500/-. Aplying the disability certificate, Ex.PW 2/2, being 30% disability, loss on account of disability comes to Rs.1350/per month. Since multiplier adopted by the tribunal is 12 and the Respondents have raised no objection thereto, loss· of future income comes to Rs. 1350/- x 12 x 12 = 1,94,400/-." D E It was further observed : "Damages on account of compensation for loss of amenities of life, hardship and discomfort including frustration and stress under general damages awarded in . F sum of Rs.5,000/- is inadequate. I increase the same to Rs.25,000/-." 5. Mr. Gaurav Goel, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, would submit that having regard to the provisions contained in Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, for G the purpose of awarding compensation on disability, the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 would be attracted. According to him, in view of the fact that there is no dispute in regard to the genuineness of the said disability certificate, the High Court committed a serious error in assessing H 536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R. 0 A the total qisability at 30% only. It was pointed out that the appellant was an indoor patient in the Lady Harding Hospital for a month. The injury suffered by him was considered to be a grievous one and allegedly one-third of his lower limb had been amputated. In view of the fact that no evidence, contrary thereto, B has been produced by the respondents, it was urged that the learned Tribunal as also the High Court committed a serious illegality in arriving at the aforementioned finding. 6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondentinsurance company, however, supported the impugned judgment. c E F G 7. The claim petition was filed under Section 166 of the Act and not under Section 163A thereof. It was contended by the claimant-appellant that the driver of the bus in question was rash and negligent as a result whereof, the accident took place. By reason of Section 167 of the Act, an injured person had the option either to file a claim under the Motor Vehicles Act or the Workmen's Compensation Act, if both the Acts apply. It is, tlierefore, a case where the claimant could have filed at his option an application under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Section 163A provides for filing of a claim petition where an accident took place by reason of use of the motor vehicle. It is not necessary to prove any fault on the part of the driver or the vehicle. The Tribunal in a proceeding arising under Section 166 of the Act is required to hold a full fledged trial. It is required to collect datas on the basis whereof, the amount of compensation can be determined. Under Section 163A of the Act, however, the question of liability and extent of proof thereof are not justiciable. The Tribunal can determine the amount on the basis of the basic datas provided therefor. Explanation appended to Section 163A of the Act, reads, thus : ... ,.._ _Explanation.-For_ the purposes of this sub-section, 'permanent disability' shall have the same meaning and extent as in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923." 8. The reference to Workmen's Compensation Act by in- H RAJESH KUMAR @ RAJU _v._ YUDHVIR SINGH 537 & ANR. [S.B. SINHA, J.] corporation was only for the purpose of sub-section (1) of SecA tion 163A. It was not meant to apply in a case falling under Section 166 of the Act. Had the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act were applicable, the procedure laid down therein would also apply. For the purpose of the definition of total disablement as also person who can grant a certificate therefor, B namely, a qualified medical practitioner, Section 2(e) and 2(i) would be attracted. In terms of the 1923Act, the amount of compensation is required to be determined as specified in Section 4. The Rules made in terms of Section 32 of the Act known as Workmen's Compensation Rules 1924, would also be applicable. c 9. The certificate in question in this case was obtained after two years. It is not known as to whether the Civil Surgeon of the hospital treated the appellant. On what basis, such a certificate was issued two years after the accident took place is not known. The author of the said certificate had not been D examined. Unless the author of the certificate examined himself, it was not admissible in evidence. Whether the disability at 60% was calculated on the basis of the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act or otherwise is not known. It is also not known as to whether he was competent to issue such a E certificate. It even does not appear that the contentions raised before us had either been raised before the Tribunal or the High Court. The Tribunal as also the High Court, therefore, proceeded on the materials brought on record by the parties. In absence of any contention having been raised in regard to the applicaF bility of the Workmen's Compensation Act which, in our opinion, ex facie has no application, the same, in our opinion, cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time. 10. We are of the opinion, that it is not a case where we should interfere in the impugned judgment of the High Court as also the award of the Tribunal. The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs. G D.G. Appeal dismissed H