High Court of KeralaDivision BenchWrit appeal dismissed; no order as to costs.

Rajeev R. v. Oil Palm India Limited

Case / Petition Number:WA No.343 of 2019

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • K. Vinod Chandran
  • P. V. Kunhikrishnan
Judgment Date
2020-02-26
Court Decision / Holding
Writ appeal is rejected accordingly; the appellant’s challenge is dismissed and no order as to costs.
Final Disposition
Writ appeal dismissed; no order as to costs.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Rajeev R.

Respondents

  • Oil Palm India Limited
  • Senior Manager(HRD), Oil Palm India Limited
  • Manager Estate Senior Manager(HRD) Oil Palm India Limited

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • R. Sanjith
  • • K. Jasmin Baby
  • • C. S. Sindhu Krishnah
  • • Ashi Sukumaran
  • • B. R. Anees
  • • Charutha Bhaiju
  • • P. S. Anju
  • • Aneeta Thomas

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Standing Counsel (B/O)

Case Synopsis & Summary

The appellant, Rajeev R., a writ petitioner employed by Oil Palm India Limited, challenged the company's recruitment notification for several posts, arguing he should be considered as an in-service candidate. The 01 March 2018 notification prescribed eligibility based on five years of continuous service and a minimum 70% attendance in each of those years. The petitioner’s application was rejected for failing to satisfy 70% attendance in two out of the five-year window. The company later discovered a drafting error in transposing the rule to the vernacular notification and issued a corrigendum on 30 August 2018, clarifying that 70% attendance had to be assessed cumulatively for all five years, and that those meeting the Recruitment Rules could reapply. The appellant re-submitted his application under the second notification, but it was again rejected on the ground that his earlier rejection had already been finalized. The petitioner contended that the initial rejection was illegal and demanded fresh consideration; he asserted he had 71.53% attendance according to his calculation, though the company’s computation yielded 68.59% after excluding non wage-earning holidays. The learned Single Judge held the second rejection illegal and directed fresh consideration, but this court reversed, holding that attendance must be computed as on the date of the first notification and that the second corrigendum correctly rectified the error. The court ultimately upheld the company’s method and dismissed the writ appeal, holding the appellant failed to meet the 70% requirement.

Provisions of Law Cited

Recruitment Rules70% attendance criterion in five-year periodCorrigendum Notification dated 30.08.2018

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Mohinder Singh Gill & Another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Others [(1978) 1 SCC 405] - principle that an order rejecting a claim must be sustained on the reasons stated therein or must be set aside.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant contends that he was eligible for consideration as an in-service candidate under the notification and corrigendum, arguing that either the initial 70% requirement over five years or the corrected cumulative 70% standard should apply. He asserts his own computation shows substantial attendance and that the rejection in the first instance was illegal, warranting fresh consideration; he also argues the correct computation date should be that of the first notification, and that both notifications should be set aside to permit a fresh selection.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents maintain that the recruitment rules require 70% attendance cumulatively in the five-year period as per the Recruitment Rules; the second corrigendum merely clarified the earlier drafting error and backdated eligibility to those meeting the five-year cumulative requirement. They contend the petitioner fell short of the 70% threshold under the company’s computation (68.59%), and that allowing re-entry would undermine the rules and cause multiplicity of litigation.

Cited Precedents (1)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Mohinder Singh Gill & Another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Others[(1978) 1 SCC 405]PositiveCited as authority for the principle that the order rejecting a claim must be sustained on the reasons stated therein or has to be set aside.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

# **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** # **PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.VINOD CHANDRAN** **&** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.V.KUNHIKRISHNAN** **WEDNESDAY, THE 26TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2020 / 7TH PHALGUNA, 1941** **WA.No.343 OF 2019** **AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN WP(C) 33340/2018(N) OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA** ## **APPELLANT/S:** **RAJEEV R., AGED 34 YEARS S/O.RAJENDRAN NAIR, OIL PALM QUARTERS, ROOM NO.12, VILAKKUPARA.P.O., KETTUPLACHY, KOLLAM-691312.** **BY ADVS. SRI.R.SANJITH SMT.K.JASMIN BABY SMT.C.S.SINDHU KRISHNAH SMT.ASHI SUKUMARAN SRI.B.R.ANEES SMT.CHARUTHA BHAIJU SMT.P.S.ANJU SMT.ANEETA THOMAS** ## **RESPONDENT/S:** **1 OIL PALM INDIA LIMITED KODIMATHA KODIMATHA, KOTTAYAM, KERALA-686013 REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR. 2 SENIOR MANAGER(HRD), OIL PALM INDIA LIMITED, KODIMATHA, KOTTAYAM, KERALA-686013. 3 MANAGER ESTATE SENIOR MANAGER(HRD) OIL PALM INDIA LIMITED KODIMATHA, KOTTAYAM, KERALA-686013. R1-3 BY ADV. STANDING COUNSEL(B/O)** ## **OTHER PRESENT:** **SRI.VIPIN NARAYAN** **THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 26.02.2020, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** WA No. 343 of 2019 ..2.. ## **JUDGMENT** Dated this the 26[th] day of February, 2020 ## K.Vinod Chandran, J. The appellant is the writ petitioner. The appellant's contention was that he was entitled to be considered for the selection carried out from in-service candidates. The notification issued by the respondents was for the post of Aaya, Hospital Attendant (Medical Orderly), Lab Attendant, Messenger, Sweeper and Watcher. The notification calling for applications for appointment was issued on 01.03.2018. As the notification provided; eligible candidates are persons who have five years continuous service immediately preceding the date of notification and also 70% attendance in each of the said five years. 2. The appellant applied under the said notification, but, however, his application was rejected for reason of he not having 70% attendance in two years coming within the WA No. 343 of 2019 ..3.. five-year period. Later, the respondent company realized a mistake in transposing the prescription in the rules to the notification, the latter of which was in the vernacular Malayalam. The Rules provided for only 70% attendance in the five-year period taken together. By that time, the written test, as per the first notification, was completed, but, the interview was not commenced. In such circumstances, realizing the mistake, the respondent company issued a corrigendum notification dated 30.08.2018. In that, it was specified that all persons, who had 70% attendance in all the five years together cumulatively, would be entitled to apply. It was also specified in the second notification that only those, who had attendance as per the Recruitment Rules, i.e., above 70% cumulatively in the five years, need apply afresh. The appellant again applied under the second notification. His application was rejected for WA No. 343 of 2019 **==> picture [31 x 8] intentionally omitted <==** the reason of the earlier application having been rejected. 3. The petitioner contended before the learned Single Judge that he had 70% attendance in the five years. It was also submitted that the rejection of the application for reason of it having been rejected earlier was not proper. The petitioner also submitted his own computation of the attendance and claimed that he had 71.53% attendance. The respondent, however, objected to the same, specifically pointing out that the petitioner had included Sundays, which were not wage-earning-days for the purpose of computation. 4. The learned Single Judge found that the rejection of the second application of the petitioner on the premise of the earlier application having been rejected is illegal. The learned Single Judge then considered the claim of 71.53% attendance and it was found that the computation has to be in the manner, in which the company suggested, excluding the non-wage earning WA No. 343 of 2019 **==> picture [31 x 8] intentionally omitted <==** holidays, and that in such computation, the petitioner would have only 68.59% attendance. The petitioner was then found ineligible even under the second notification. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted before us that having found the rejection itself to be illegal, the learned Single Judge ought to have directed fresh consideration by the company. It is also submitted that the computation has to be on the basis of the attendance as existed on the date of the second notification. It is argued that both the notifications should be set aside and a fresh selection ordered from eligible candidates as per law. The learned counsel for the respondent company, however, supports the judgment of the learned Single Judge. 6. The appellant obviously raises a claim on the basis of his computation of the percentage of attendance. We first deal with the issue; whether the learned Single Judge has committed any error in having found the rejection to be illegal and WA No. 343 of 2019 **==> picture [31 x 8] intentionally omitted <==** not permitting the appellant's participation in the examination or directing a re-consideration. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on **Mohinder Singh Gill & Another** v. **The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Others** [(1978) 1 SCC 405]. It is, no doubt, an established principle that the order rejecting a claim has to be sustained on the reasons stated therein or has to be set aside. Going by **Mohinder Singh Gill** 's case (supra), we have no doubt that the finding of the learned Single Judge that the order is illegal has to be sustained. In that context, was there any scope for reconsideration is the question posed before us. 7. The learned Single Judge, in the impugned order, has gone ahead and considered whether the claim of the appellant can be sustained, especially to avoid multiplicity of litigation. Having found that the computation has to be in the manner as suggested by the respondent company, the learned Single Judge could not have directed WA No. 343 of 2019 **==> picture [31 x 8] intentionally omitted <==** participation of the appellant since he was found ineligible; having fallen behind in the attendance percentage prescribed. In such circumstances, there was also no warrant for directing a fresh consideration by the company since then it would be a useless formality, the learned Single Judge having already upheld the method of computation of attendance percentage as offered by the company. 8. The next contention raised is as to whether the computation of attendance has to be as on the date of the first notification or the second notification. We perfectly agree with the learned Single Judge that the computation has to be as on the date of the first notification since the second notification was only a corrigendum rectifying the earlier notification. In this context, we have to notice that the requirement as per the first notification itself was of five years experience, which is in accordance with the Recruitment Rules. The second notification was WA No. 343 of 2019 **==> picture [31 x 8] intentionally omitted <==** necessitated only since an error had crept in insofar as the 70% in the attendance being prescribed for each among the five years. There could be instances, where the workers had attained the minimum five-year-period after the first notification. Such persons were not entitled to apply under the second notification and hence, the specific condition that those whose applications were rejected in the first instance, cannot apply again. Only persons who were entitled to apply as per the Recruitment Rules even at the time of first notification would be eligible for applying at the second instance. We perfectly agree with the learned Single Judge that company's measure to have allowed the second application to be related back to the date of first notification is correct. 9. The next contention is with respect to the claim raised of percentage of attendance, which the learned Single Judge has elaborately considered and rejected. The learned Single Judge has looked WA No. 343 of 2019 **==> picture [31 x 8] intentionally omitted <==** at the computation as arrived at by the petitioner and also by the respondent company. As per the petitioner's computation, the denominator being the total working days is 300 whereas as per the company's computation, the denominator is 313 working days. We agree that the company's computation has to be accepted and in such circumstances, the petitioner falls short of the 70% required attendance. We do not find any reason to interfere with the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The writ appeal is rejected accordingly. No order on costs. ## **Sd/-** ## **K.VINOD CHANDRAN** ## **JUDGE** **Sd/-** ## **P.V.KUNHIKRISHNAN** **JUDGE** Bka/27.02.2020 WA No. 343 of 2019 ..10.. ## **APPENDIX** **PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:** **ANNEXURE A1 TRUE COPY OF THE WAGE SLIPS OF MR.SONI C.S.**