Rajan v. Divisional Forest Officer, Chalakkudy Division & District Insurance Officer (MACA Nos. 2764/2012 (A) & 2765/2012)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.T.RAVIKUMAR & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE K.P.JYOTHINDRANATH TUESDAY, THE 26TH DAY OF JULY 2016/4TH SRAVANA, 1938 MACA.No. 2764 of 2012 (A) --------------------------------------AGAINST THE AWARD IN OPMV 657/2007 of MACT, IRINJALAKUDA, DATED 28.11.2012 APPELLANT/ PETITIONER : - ------------------------------------------ RAJAN, S/O. KUTTAN, KAROTTEL HOUSE, NERIYAMANGALOM DESOM VILLAGE AND P.O., ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, (FOREST WATCHER), PARIYARAM RANGE, CHIPPINKUZHI) BY ADVS.SRI.P.V.BABY SRI.A.N.SANTHOSH RESPONDENTS / RESPONDENTS : - ---------------------------------------------------- 1. THE DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER, CHALAKKUDY DIVISION, CHALAKKUDY.P.O., PIN-680307. ## 2. DISTRICT INSURANCE OFFICER, KERALA STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT, AYYANTHOLE, THRISSUR-680003. R1& 2 BY GOVERNMENT PLEADER SRI. K.K. SAIDALAVI THIS MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 26-07-2016, ALONG WITH MACA. 2765/2012, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: DMR/- ## **C.T. RAVIKUMAR** **& K.P. JYOTHINDRANATH, JJ.** ---------------------------------------------------- ## **M.A.C.A. No. 2764 of 2012 & M.A.C.A. No. 2765 of 2012** ---------------------------------------------------Dated this the 26[th] day of July, 2016 ## **J U D G M E N T** ## Ravikumar, J. These appeals arise from a common judgment in O.P. (MV) Nos.657 of 2007 and 658 of 2007 passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Irinjalakuda and they germinated from the same occurrence. The former appeal has been preferred against the judgment and award in O.P. (MV) No.657 of 2007 and the latter appeal has been preferred against O.P. (MV) No.658 of 2007. The former appeal has been preferred by the injured/claimant whose claim petition was dismissed as per the common award. The latter claim petition was filed by the legal heirs of one Paul who was a Forester attached to Forest Divisional Office, Chalakkudy, who met with an accident while driving the department vehicle involved in the accident and succumbed to the injuries sustained. The said claim petition was also dismissed. Essentially it is challenging the dismissal of the M.A.C.A. Nos.2764 & 2765/12 2 claim petitions as per the above said common award that those claim petitions had been preferred. A narration of the circumstances that led to the filing of the above mentioned claim petitions is necessary for the disposal of these cases. On 03.09.2006 at about 1.15 a.m, deceased Paul who was a Forester was driving the department Jeep bearing Registration No.KL-08-D-2431 through Athirappilly Chalakkudy Public road and when the said vehicle reached near Chakkrapani Bone Meals Factory a wild animal suddenly crossed the road and in order to rescue the animal the deceased Paul swerved the vehicle and consequently it hit against a tree. The injured/claimant in O.P. (MV) No.657/2007 who is a Forest Watcher was accompanying deceased Paul in the said vehicle. Both of them sustained injuries. The Forester Paul later succumbed to the injuries and in the said circumstances his legal heirs viz. his wife, children and mother filed O.P. (MV) No.658/2007. Seeking compensation for the injury sustained the Forest Watcher Sri. Rajan filed O.P. (MV) No.657/2007. Both the claim petitions were filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Respondents 1 and 2 in the appeals are respectively M.A.C.A. Nos.2764 & 2765/12 3 the owner and insurer of the vehicle. 2. Before the Tribunal, the first respondent filed a written statement taking up the contention that the vehicle in question was insured with the second respondent and therefore the second respondent is liable to indemnify the first respondent. It is also contended therein that the compensation sought for is highly excessive. But, at the same time, it is evident that in the written statement the first respondent virtually admitted the fact that deceased Paul was a Forester and due to an emergency situation he was forced to drive the Jeep when the permanent Jeep driver was made to drive a lorry in which the illicitly collected sand was being transported. It is also stated therein that an amount of Rs.2,20,000/- was given to the petitioners in O.P. (MV) No.658/2007 and the first appellant/the first claimant was given employment in the department. 3. The second respondent, the insurer of the vehicle, filed a separate written statement carrying the contentions that the vehicle in question though insured with the Kerala State Insurance Department going by the conditions of the M.A.C.A. Nos.2764 & 2765/12 4 policy it covers only third party risk. Passengers are not covered under the said policy. Further, it is stated therein that the compensation claimed is highly excessive. Evidently, based on the rival contentions the Tribunal conducted a joint enquiry into the claim petitions and the following issues were formulated for consideration. - “1. Whether the accident occurred due to the negligence of the respondents? 2. Whether the petitioner in O.P. 657/07 is entitled to the compensation?, if so what is the quantum and who is liable to pay the same? 3. Whether the petitioners in O.P. 658/07 are entitled to the compensation?, if so what is the quantum and who is liable to pay the same?” 4. Before the Tribunal, the wife of deceased Paul, who is the first petitioner in claim petition in O.P. (MV) No.658/07, was examined as PW1. The Divisional Forest Officer, Sri. George P. Mathachan who was the then Divisional Forest Officer and one Umadevi. P.K. were examined as PW2 and PW3. On the side of the respondents the certificate of insurance was got marked as Exhibit B1. On the side of the appellants/claimants before the Tribunal Exhibits A1 to A9 were got marked. After M.A.C.A. Nos.2764 & 2765/12 5 considering the evidence on record and the rival contentions, the Tribunal found that the appellants herein had failed to prove that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the respondents. Further, it was found that the policy in respect of the vehicle in question is only an Act policy and therefore the risk of the passengers are not covered by the policy and deceased Paul and the claimant in O.P. (MV) No.657/2007 were passengers in the said vehicle, they could not be treated as third parties and therefore the claimants are not entitled to get compensation. In that view of the matter, both the claim petitions were dismissed. It is in the said circumstances that the captioned appeals have been preferred. 5. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant in both the appeals and also the learned Government Pleader. Evidently, the accident in question was not in dispute. The entrustment of the vehicle in question involved in the accident with the Forester Paul is admitted by the first respondent in the counter affidavit. It is also specifically stated therein that he was forced to drive the vehicle in an emergent situation. The first respondent M.A.C.A. Nos.2764 & 2765/12 6 has also vividly explained the emergent situation in the written statement. It is stated therein that the permanent Jeep driver was directed to drive a lorry in which illicitly collected sand was being transported and it was in the said circumstances that deceased Paul who was holding a valid driving licence was forced to drive the Jeep. The fact that the claimant in O.P.(MV) No.657/2007 was then a Forest Watcher and he accompanied the said vehicle was also admitted. In short, from the pleadings in the written statement it is evident that the fact that the appellant in M.A.C.A. No. 2764 of 2012 and Forester Paul met with the accident while travelling in the said Jeep is clearly admitted in the written statement. From the pleadings taken up in the written statement it is evident that the respondents did not have a case that deceased Paul was unauthorizedly driving the Jeep in question. On the contrary, it is evident from the pleadings that he was then a Forester and was having a valid driving licence and further that he was rather compelled to drive the Jeep in an emergent situation. A perusal of the impugned judgment would reveal that the Tribunal found that the appellants herein had failed to M.A.C.A. Nos.2764 & 2765/12 7 establish that the accident occurred due to the negligence on the side of the respondents. Exhibit A1 and A2 would reveal the circumstances in which the accident occurred. In fact the circumstances were also spoken to by the first appellant in M.A.C.A. No. 2765/2012 while being examined as PW1. In the light of the oral evidence of PW1 and from the recital in Exhibit A1 and A2 it can be seen that the accident occurred when a wild animal suddenly crossed the road and when deceased Paul to save the wild animal swerved the vehicle. In said attempt, the vehicle lost the control and hit against a tree standing on the roadside. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the accident occurred due to the negligence from the part of the Driver of the vehicle. This evidence adduced by the appellants through PW1 with Exhibits A1 and A2 was not at all seriously challenged by the respondents. There is absolutely no case for the respondents that the deceased Paul and Rajan, the injured claimant were not among the personnel on duty at the relevant point of time when the lorry with illicitly collected sand was seized. In such circumstances, it is only appropriate to refer to the decision M.A.C.A. Nos.2764 & 2765/12 8 of the Honourable Apex Court in **National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Sinitha** reported in 2011 (4) KLT 821 (SC). We are not oblivious of the fact that the Honourable Apex Court was dealing with an appeal arising from a claim filed under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act in that case and position with respect to negligence in a claim under Section 166 is distinctly different. The accident there had occurred when the rider of a Jeep struck against a large laterite stone lying on the tar road. It is evident from the said judgment of the Honourable Apex Court that the granting of the compensation in favour of the legal heirs of the driver of the vehicle who succumbed to the injuries, in such circumstances was not interfered with by the Honourable Apex Court though the contention appears to be that it is a self invited one. We referred to the above said decision only to emphasize the fact that in the facts and circumstances of this case when it is evident that the accident occurred when a wild animal crossed the road and when the driver of the vehicle attempted to save the wild animal and in that bid he swerved the vehicle which culminated in the casualty. There is no question of M.A.C.A. Nos.2764 & 2765/12 9 attributing negligence on the driver and also to hold it is a self-invited accident. The point is that in the absence of serious challenge against the cause of the accident as deposed to by PW1, by no such of imagination it can be said that the accident occurred due to the negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle viz. Sri.Paul on whose death O.P. (MV) No.658/2007 was filed and then, it can be said that the accident occurred is one arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. In the contextual situation it is only appropriate to refer to Section 165 of the M.V. Act and the explanation thereunder. They read thus:- “165. **Claims Tribunals** - (1) A State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (hereafter in this Chapter referred to as Claims Tribunal) for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both. **Explanation** - For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the expression “claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the M.A.C.A. Nos.2764 & 2765/12 10 use of motor vehicles” includes claims for compensation under Section 140 [and Section 163A]. (2) A Claims Tribunal shall consist of such number of members as the State Government may think fit to appoint and where it consists of two or more members, one of them shall be appointed as the Chairman thereof. - (3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a member of a Claims Tribunal unless he - - (a) is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court, or - (b) is, or has been a District Judge, or - (c) is qualified for appointment as a High Court Judge [or as a District Judge.] - (4) Where two or more Claims Tribunals are constituted for any area, the State Government, may be general or special order, regulate the distribution of business among them.” ## 6. It is obvious from a conjoint reading of Section 166 of the M.V. Act and the above extracted provisions that what makes an injured or the legal heirs of a deceased eligible to apply for compensation is that the accident in question must have been one arising out of the use of motor vehicles. Merely because the plural form 'motor vehicles' is used it cannot be said that such entitlement would enure only if the accident is one involving more than M.A.C.A. Nos.2764 & 2765/12 11 one vehicle. If such a strict interpretation is given how can a passenger in a transport vehicle could claim compensation if he got injured in a motor vehicle accident or by the legal heirs of a passenger who succumbed to the injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. This is one case for exemplifying such situations. In the decision in **Shivaji v. Vatshala** reported in AIR 1991 SC 1769 the Hon'ble Apex Court considered the scope and meaning of the expression 'arising out of the use of motor vehicles'. Paragraphs 34 and 35 which are relevant reads thus:- “34. In the same case, Windeyar, J. has observed as under: “The words 'injury caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle' postulate a casual relationship between the use of the vehicle and the injury. 'Caused by' connotes a 'direct' or 'proximate' relationship of cause and effect. 'Arising out of' extends this to a result that is less immediate; but it still carries a sense of consequence.” 35. This would show that as compared to the expression “caused by”, the expression “arising out of” has a wider connotation. The expression “caused by” was used in Sections. 95(1)(b)(i) and (ii) and 96 (2)(b)(ii) of the Act. In S.92-A, Parliament, however, chose to use the expression “arising out of” which indicates that for the purpose of awarding M.A.C.A. Nos.2764 & 2765/12 12 compensation u/S. 92-A, the casual relationship between the use of the motor vehicle and the accident resulting in death or permanent disablement is not required to be direct and proximate and it can be less immediate. This would imply that accident should be connected with the use of the motor vehicle but the said connection need not be direct and immediate. This construction of the expression “arising out of the use of a motor vehicle” in S.92-A enlarges the field of protection made available to the victims of an accident and is in consonance with the beneficial object underlying the enactment.” 7. It is thus evident that the _sine qua non_ is that the injury must one 'arising out of the use of motor vehicle/vehicles'. In the light of the explanation it will not be inappropriate to refer to S.163 A, solely for the purpose of considering the position regarding causation to make a claim for compensation. Evidently, the accident concerned must be one 'arising out of motor vehicles or vehicle'. Under Section 163A(1) the expression used is 'accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle' and under sub-section (2) therein words 'owner of vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person' are used. As found earlier there is distinction between the expression 'arising out of' and M.A.C.A. Nos.2764 & 2765/12 13 'caused by' used respectively by Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and 1939 and the former expression has wider connotation. This was considered in the decision in **United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Amir Basha** reported in 2003 (1) KLT SN 55 (DB). The Court expressed the view that restrictive interpretation should not be given for the word 'use' and that it has to be given a wider meaning. Further, it is held that 'use of motor vehicle' necessarily be so intimate and closely direct as to make it 'a motor accident' in the sense in which that expression is used in common parlance. When the competent officer of the Department gave consent to the deceased Paul and, in fact, directed him to drive the departmental vehicle in an emergent situation and when the contention is that Ext.B1 policy reveals payment of additional premium for the driver and the policy put forth carries only one condition that the person who drives the vehicle should posses a valid driving licence how can the Tribunal decline to consider the liability of the insurer and even in case of absence of liability of the insurer the liability or otherwise of the owner as also the State, in accordance with law. Whether in such circumstances the M.A.C.A. Nos.2764 & 2765/12 14 appellants in M.A.C.A. No.2765 of 2012 are entitled to get compensation? Whether in the circumstances the appellant in M.A.C.A. No.2764 of 2012 will fall under the term 'any person' appearing in Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the M.V. Act? These points in view of the positions of law settled and provisions of law as mentioned hereinbefore, were not all properly considered by the Tribunal. 8. In the case on hand it is not the case of the respondents that the death of Paul and injury to Rajan had arisen not out of the use of the departmental vehicle. In fact in explicit terms the first respondent admitted the fact the deceased Paul was asked to drive the departmental vehicle in the emergent situation vividly explained in the written statement. It is pertinent to note that there is absolutely no case for the respondents that the forest Watcher Rajan accompanied the said Paul without consent or unauthorizedly against any direction. As noticed herein before, the respondents did not have a case that Rajan was not among the party which took custody of the lorry. A scanning of the contentions of the respondents would reveal that to disclaim the respondents took up the contention that M.A.C.A. Nos.2764 & 2765/12 15 the policy in respect of the vehicle in question would not cover the risk of passenger and it covers only the risk of third parties. 9. Certain other aspects have to be considered in the contextual situation. It is worthwhile to refer to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in **National Insurance Company Ltd v. Nimmy** reported in 2002 (1) KLJ 811. Going by the decision an employee driving the vehicle as part of his duty will come within the first proviso to Section 147(1) and is entitled to get compensation. In **Rikhi Ram v. Sukhrania** reported in AIR 2003 SC 1446 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that once a vehicle is insured, besides owner other persons can also use that vehicle with the consent of the owner. It was rendered under Section 94 of the old Act corresponding to Section 146 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. It was held that Section 94 did not require that any person who would use the vehicle should insure the vehicle in respect of his separate use. In the cases on hand, it cannot be said that the first respondent was incompetent to give consent to drive the departmental vehicle by a person having appropriate driving licence to M.A.C.A. Nos.2764 & 2765/12 16 drive the class of vehicle to which it belongs in case of an emergent situation. When the first respondent himself admitted the factum of asking the deceased Paul to drive the departmental vehicle in an emergent situation and when there is no case that the injured claimant Rajan who was a Forest Watcher accompanied the vehicle in derogation of any direction and, in troth, authorizedly how can the tortuous liability be denied by the respondents. In such circumstances, how can there be an exoneration from 'strict liability' even if there is no fault liability? 10. Now we will have to take into account another aspect as well. Admittedly, the deceased Paul was a Forester attached to the Divisional Forest Office, Chalakkudy. When being directed by the first respondent to drive the departmental vehicle in an emergent situation, being a subordinate having the appropriate driving licence, he could not have disobeyed such a direction. Being a forest official it was his bounden duty to see that every attempt to save the life of a wild animal when it comes in the way during the course of the vehicle through the forest track, be it a pathway or not. It is to be noted that Section M.A.C.A. Nos.2764 & 2765/12 17 132 of the M.V. Act enjoins a duty on the driver of a motor vehicle to cause the vehicle to stop when required to do so by any person in charge of an animal if such person apprehends that the animal is or being alarmed by the vehicle will become unmanageable. When that be so, an officer recruited in to a department destined to protect wild life if swerved the vehicle to save the life of a wild animal during its course it can only be said to be dutiful act. Certainly, none can attribute negligence or allege that he was inviting self accident in such circumstances even if he got entangled in a motor vehicle accident. A dutiful and sincere officer who attempted to save the life of a wild animal when forced to drive the vehicle because of an emergent situation, unfortunately met with an accident and lost his life, in the case on hand. We are at a lost to understand how in such circumstances the respondents could take up a contention solely to riggle out of the tortuous liability. There can be little doubt that for Social Welfare Legislation of a State wedded to socialism and the Constitutional focus is on social justice not only in its preamble but also in directive principles being enforced by M.A.C.A. Nos.2764 & 2765/12 18 passing legislation like Motor Vehicles Act and similar Social Welfare Statutes the approach should be humanistic, liberal, non-technical and equitable. Can it be denied to a person who acted in obedience of lawful directions of authorities simply he being a government employee. Every person must have a right to claim compensation for the injury as that is the only way of remedying the injury caused to him in a modern urbanized, industrialized and automobile ridden life. It is a pity that despite several decision by courts the State functionaries, public-sector undertakings, insurers and other institutions are not restraining or refraining themselves to contest such cases with a view to disclaim instead of being benevolent in approach. Essentially, the Tribunal arrived at a finding that the injured Rajan, the appellant in M.A.C.A. No.2764 of 2012 and deceased Paul were passengers in the departmental vehicle involved in the accident and it was covered only a policy in respect of the risk of third parties. We are of the considered view that such a technical objection cannot be appreciated when it comes from the Government functionaries in such circumstances expatiated above. M.A.C.A. Nos.2764 & 2765/12 19 11. As noticed herein before, the Tribunal arrived at the finding that the injured Rajan and the deceased Paul were passengers in the said vehicle and therefore they could not be considered as third parties. The question is in respect of a contract of insurance how the term 'third party' should be understood. In respect of a contract of insurance only the insurer and the insured owner of the vehicle concerned alone are the parties to the contract and anyone who is not a party to the contract can only be treated as a third party. True that in certain circumstances a person who drives the vehicle may also step into the shoes of the owner of the vehicle. The question is whether in this case such a theory can be imported to deprive the claimants their claim for compensation? If both of them were having only the status of passengers who was its driver at the time of the accident? In this context it is to be noted that additional premium was also paid for a driver. The department was fully astute to the fact that deceased Paul was not driving the vehicle unauthorizedly and since he was a Forester attached to the department and was holding a valid driving licence he drove the vehicle in an emergent M.A.C.A. Nos.2764 & 2765/12 20 situation on being directed by the superior officers. When the said fact was not at all disputed, the fact that he drove the vehicle cannot be a reason to hold that he had stepped in to the shoes of the owner and therefore he could not be treated as a third party. It is to be noted that the claim petitions mentioned above were filed under Section 166 of the M.V. Act. We have already arrived at a conclusion based on the evidence on record consisting of the oral testimony of PW1 and the documentary evidence in Exhibits A1 and A2 and also taking note of the factum of absence of serious challenge regarding the cause of the accident that deceased Paul could not have been said to have committed any of the faults namely 'wrongful act', 'neglect', or 'default' to cause the accident. In such circumstances, at least the strict liability principle has to be applied. When that be the position, we have no hesitation to hold that the respondents in that matter the State also will not be justified in their attempt to riggle out of the liability. We are of the considered view that the Tribunal should have considered all the aforesaid aspects in their true perspective instead of simply accepting the contention M.A.C.A. Nos.2764 & 2765/12 21 of the respondents that deceased Paul was a passenger in the vehicle therefore, they are not entitled to get compensation. Coming to the question whether the Tribunal was justified in dismissing the claim petition filed by the claimant in O.P. (MV) No.657/2007 obviously the respondents resisted the claim of the appellant contending that he was also a passenger in the vehicle and that the policy in respect to the vehicle is an Act policy. As stated herein before, the appellant was a Forest Watcher at the relevant point of time attached to Divisional Forest Office, Chalakkudy. He was one among the officers who were present at the place when they seized a lorry in which illicitly collected sand was attended to be transported. At any rate, the respondent authorities do not have any such case. He cannot be said to be a gratuitous passenger. In fact, it was the consistent claim of the appellant that he was directed to accompany deceased Paul in the department Jeep. Being a Forest Watcher, he could have only acceded to the commands from the higher officers. There is absolutely no evidence to establish that he had mounted the Jeep ignoring the specific directions from any of the M.A.C.A. Nos.2764 & 2765/12 22 officers, rather, the evidence led him to the effect that he was also asked to accompany Paul in the said vehicle. At any rate, no such of disobedience is put forth by the respondents against him. We have already narrated the circumstances in which the accident occurred. When an employee was accompanying an officer in a vehicle, how can his presence in the vehicle be said to be unauthorized? Therefore, the question is whether the injured claimant was an employee accompanying the driver, in the vehicle in obedience of the orders of superiors or whether he will be fall under the term 'any person' under Section 147(1)(b)(i) of the M.V. Act. The fact that in the accident he had sustained injuries is not in dispute. Certainly there is absolute absence of any contention to the effect that he had contributed to the accident whereas as noticed hereinbefore the accident occurred only when the driver of the Jeep swerved it in a bid to avoid hitting on the body of a wild animal that crossed the road. In such circumstances, how can it be held that he was a passenger in the vehicle and therefore the first respondent or the insurer and in that matter the State was not having a liability to compensate M.A.C.A. Nos.2764 & 2765/12 23 him, his application for compensation could have been dismissed. In view of the discussions as above though we are not holding that the second respondent is liable to indemnify the first respondent, we are of the view that a fresh consideration after taking into account all the aforesaid aspects, enunciation of law and provisions of law is required, in respect of both the claim petitions. In other words, entitlement of the claimants and the liability aspects are all, have to be decided afresh by the Tribunal. In such circumstances, the common judgment whereby O.P (MV) Nos.657/2007 and 658/2007 were dismissed is liable to be interfered with. Consequently, to enable the Tribunal to have such a fresh consideration, the common judgment in O.P. (MV) Nos.657/2007 and 658/2007 is set aside. O.P. (MV) Nos.657/2007 and 658/2007 are restored in to the files of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Irinjalakkuda. The Tribunal shall consider the question whether the second respondent is liable to indemnify the first respondent or the first respondent alone should be fastened with the liability to pay the compensation subject to its decision on the question of entitlement of the claimants to get 24 M.A.C.A. Nos.2764 & 2765/12 compensation in view of the observations made herein before. The Tribunal shall also consider the just compensation payable in both the claim petitions, in such eventuality. Both parties are at liberty to adduce evidence, if they so desire. Taking into account the fact that the claim petitions are of the year 2007, the Tribunal shall make an earnest endeavour to dispose of the claim petitions as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. On receipt of the copy of the judgment, the Tribunal shall cause notices to the parties with a view to dispose of the matter within the above stipulated period. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs in both the appeals. ## **C.T. RAVIKUMAR** ## ## **K.P. JYOTHINDRANATH JUDGE** DMR/-