High Court of KeralaSingle JudgeRegular Second Appeal disposed of; judgments an...

Puthiyadath Narayani Amma and Others v. Talipparamba Panchayat and Others

Case / Petition Number:RSA No. 270 of 2007 (F)

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • K. Harilal
Judgment Date
2016-12-01
Court Decision / Holding
Consequently, the judgments and decrees passed by the courts below are set aside and the matter is remanded back to the trial court for fresh consideration. The trial court shall dispose the case within four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The parties are at liberty to adduce further evidence, if they desire so. The parties shall appear before the trial court on 01/02/2017. All pending interlocutory applications will also stand closed. This Regular Second Appeal is disposed of accordingly.
Final Disposition
Regular Second Appeal disposed of; judgments and decrees set aside; remanded to trial court for fresh consideration; four-month deadline; liberty to adduce further evidence; interlocutory applications closed.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Puthiyadath Narayani Amma
  • Sreedevi Amma
  • Parvath Amma
  • Balachandran
  • Padmini
  • Seetha

Respondents

  • Talipparamba Panchayat represented by its Executive Officer (now Talipparamba Municipality)
  • The Special Officer, Talipparamba Municipality (now Secretary, Talipparamba Municipality)
  • Govinda Menon, S/O Kunhiraman Menon, Ayodhya, Talipparamba AMSOM Desom, Talipparamba Taluk, Kannur District

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Kaleeswaram Raj

Counsels for Respondents

  • • M. Sasindran

Case Synopsis & Summary

This Regular Second Appeal challenges concurrent judgments of the Sub Court, Payyannur, and the Addl. District Court (Adhoc)-II, Thalassery, in a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession over plaint schedule properties. The plaintiffs, namely Puthiyadath Narayani Amma, Sreedevi Amma, Parvath Amma, Balachandran, Padmini, and Seetha, claim title through a Kuzhikanam deed of 1649/1941 and a registered deed dated 27-8-1965, asserting jenmam rights and possession over the A schedule property, with the B schedule forming part of it. The defendants, Talipparamba Panchayat (now Taliparamba Municipality), the Special Officer (now Secretary, Talipparamba Municipality), and Govinda Menon, contend that the A schedule conveys only 66.5 cents; 10 cents were orally allotted for constructing an auditorium by the Panchayat, and 30 cents of the B schedule are held under tenancy rights. The trial court dismissed, and the appellate court confirmed dismissal. The pivotal issue is whether the suit is barred by constructive res judicata under Section 11 CPC due to a prior suit, O.S. 32/1986. The High Court held that withdrawal of the earlier suit under Order 23 CPC wiped out that judgment, so res judicata does not bar the current suit. The matter is remanded for fresh evidence appraisal under the proper standard, i.e., preponderance of probability, with a four-month deadline for disposal and liberty to adduce further evidence.

Provisions of Law Cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 11Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order 23Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Explanation IV to Section 11

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Res judicata (including constructive res judicata)
  • Withdrawal under Order 23 CPC wipes off proceedings
  • Preponderance of probability as standard of proof in civil suits
  • Burden of proof on the plaintiffs; consideration of evidence from both sides to determine better title

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellants contended that the suits are not barred by res judicata. They argued that the earlier suit, O.S. No. 32/1986, did not have title as a live issue and that the relief sought was possession, not title, so title could not have formed part of the prior cause of action. They asserted that the trial court’s finding of lack of title was not the sole issue, and that the presiding courts erred in treating the case as barred by res judicata merely because a prior suit was dismissed. They urged that, after withdrawal of the earlier suit under Order 23 CPC, no binding judgment or decree existed to foreclose their claim, and the standard of proof should be the preponderance of probability, with both sides’ evidence appraised. They requested fresh evidence and a fresh appraisal by the trial court, with disposal within four months and liberty to adduce additional evidence if necessary.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents argued that the suit was barred by res judicata, either because the matter could have been raised in defense in the earlier suit or because the decree and judgment in O.S. 32/1986 created a final adjudication on the issues raised. They contended that the plaintiff had to prove title beyond reasonable doubt, and that the lower courts correctly applied Section 11 CPC by treating the case as res judicata. They argued that even if title was not pleaded as a direct issue in the former suit, it could have been raised, and that the burden of proof lay on the plaintiffs to establish title and possession, with the court adopting a standard consistent with the need for a conclusive determination of title.”},

Cited Precedents (1)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Sivaramaiah v. Rukmani AmmalAIR 2004 SC 508PositiveThe Apex Court decision is cited to support the proposition that withdrawal of a suit under Order 23 CPC wipes off the proceedings, thereby negating a claim of res judicata based on that prior suit.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.HARILAL THURSDAY, THE 1ST DAY OF DECEMBER 2016/10TH AGRAHAYANA, 1938 RSA.No. 270 of 2007 (F ) ------------------------ AGAINST THE JUDGMENT & DECREE DATED 13-10-2006 IN AS 149/2001 of ADDL. DISTRICT COURT (ADHOC)-II, THALASSERY AGAINST THE JUDGMENT & DECREE DATED 10-04-2001 IN OS 80/1990 of SUB COURT, PAYYANNUR APPELLANTS/APPELLANTS 1 TO 3 & 5 TO 7/PLAINTIFFS 2 TO 4 & 6 TO 8: --------------------------------------------- 1. PUTHIYADATH NARAYANI AMMA, - W/O KANNOTH KUNHIRAMAN MENON (DIED). 2. SREEDEVI AMMA, - D/O.KUNHIRAMAN MENON, AYODHYA, TALIPARAMBA AMSOM, DESOM, TALIPARAMBA TALUK, KANNUR DISTRICT. 3. PARVATHI AMMA, D/O.KUNHIRAMAN MENON, - AYODHYA, TALIPARAMBA AMSOM DESOM, TALIPARAMBA TALUK, KANNUR DIST. 4. BALACHANDRAN, S/O.KUNHIRAMAN MENON, - AYODHYA, TALIPARAMBA AMSOM DESOM, TALIPARAMBA TALUK, KANNUR DISTRICT. 5. PADMINI, D/O.KUNHIRAMAN MENON, - AYODHYA, TALIPARAMBA AMSOM DESOM, TALIPARAMBA TALUK, KANNUR DISTRICT. 6. SEETHA, D/O.KUNHIRAMAN MENON, - AYODHYA, TALIPARAMBA AMSOM DESOM, TALIPARAMBA TALUK, KANNUR DISTRICT. BY ADV. SRI.KALEESWARAM RAJ RESPONDENT(S)/RESPONDENTS & 4TH APPELLANT /DEFENDANTS & 5TH PLAINTIFF: ------------------------------------- 1. TALIPARAMBA PANCHAYAT REPRESENTED BY ITS EXECUTIVE OFFICER, TALIPARAMBA (NOW IT HAS BECOME TALIPARAMBA MUNICIPALITY). .....2 RSA.No. 270 of 2007 (F ) 2 2. THE SPECIAL OFFICER, - TALIPARAMBA MUNICIPALITY, TALIPARAMBA. (NOW SECRETARY, TALIPARAMBA MUNICIPALITY, TALIPARAMBA) 3. GOVINDA MENON, S/O.KUNHIRAMAN MENON, - AYODHYA, TALIPARAMBA AMSOM DESOM, TALIPARAMBA TALUK, KANNUR DISTRICT. R1 & 2 BY ADV. SRI.M.SASINDRAN THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 01-12-2016, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: OKB ## K.HARILAL, J. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ## R.S.A. No.270 of 2007 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ## Dated this the 1[st] day of December, 2016 ## JUDGMENT ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ The appellants are the plaintiffs in O.S.No.80/1990 on the files of the Sub Court, Payyannur. The suit was one for declaration of title and recovery of possession on the strength of title. According to the plaintiffs, the plaint schedule property originally belonged to Narikkottillam in jenmam and the same was in possession of one Madhavi Amma, who is the mother-in-law of the deceased 1[st] plaintiff, on the strength of Kuzhikanam deed of 1649/1941. While so, the 1[st] plaintiff obtained kuzhikanam right over the property by a registered document dated 27.8.1965 and on the strength of the said deed she was in possession of the property. Subsequently, she acquired jenmam right over the property as per the proceedings in O.A. No.4522/1976 of the Land Tribunal, Taliparamba. The plaint B schedule property is a part _RSA.270/07 -F_ **:2:** of plaint A schedule property. According to the plaintiffs, the plaint schedule property having a total extent of 94 cents belongs to the 1[st] plaintiff and she is in possession of the said property which lies within the boundaries specified in the plaint schedule and it was the actual extent of property conveyed by Ext.A1 and got reinforced by Ext.A2 purchase certificate. 2. The defendants in the written statement contended that the plaintiffs have neither right nor possession over the plaint B schedule property. According to the defendant, Ext.B1 is the prior title deed of Ext.A1 gift deed and it takes in more area than contained in Ext.A1. In Ext.B1, the plaint A schedule property is shown with 32 x 21 koles as measurement of the property. So, the actual extent of the property conveyed by the lease is 66.5 cents only. On the western side of A schedule property, 10 cents of property was orally obtained by the then Panchayat _RSA.270/07 -F_ **:3:** President Balakrishna Menon from the jenmi for constructing an auditorium and the Panchayat had already constructed basement for that. The Panchayat has been in possession of that property for the last 35 years. Similarly, the defendants have got right and possession over the northern 30 cents of property under tenancy right from the Juma-Ath. Thus, the defendants are in possession and enjoyment of a total extent of 39 cents, which lies on the western and northern sides of the property, which the plaintiffs got from Madhavi Amma. It is contended that even if the plaintiffs had title over the property, the same had been lost by adverse possession, for the last more than 35 years. 3. On the aforesaid rival pleadings, both parties adduced evidence consisting of the oral testimony of P.W.1, D.W.1 and Exts.A1 to A10, B1 to B9 and C1 to C3. After considering the evidence on record, the trial court dismissed the suit and in appeal the appellate _RSA.270/07 -F_ **:4:** court dismissed the appeal confirming the findings of the trial court. The legality and correctness of the concurrent findings, whereby the courts below rejected the case of the appellants are challenged in this Regular Second Appeal, on the basis of the questions of law raised in this Appeal. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel for the respondents. 5. The learned counsel for the appellants mainly contended that the courts below went wrong in concurrently arriving at a finding that the present suit is barred by res judicata. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, the courts below failed to identify the matters in issue involved in the present suit and the former suit, O.S.No.32/1986. It is also contended that the question of title was not an issue in the earlier suit, O.S.No.32/1986, and the relief sought for was confined to claim of possession only. In other words, the question of title has not been _RSA.270/07 -F_ **:5:** directly or substantially an issue in the former suit and the cause of action of the present suit arose on the date on which the trial court dismissed O.S.No.32/1986. It is also contended that the courts below have not weighed evidence in view of preponderance of probability and the possibility of better title among the rival claimants. The courts below dismissed the suit merely on the finding that the plaintiffs have not proved title and possession beyond doubt and in such circumstance the case of the defendants need not be looked into. 6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents advanced arguments to justify the concurrent finding, whereby the courts below found that the suit is barred by res judicata. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, the question of title might or ought to have been raised as a ground of defence in former suit and thereby the present suit would fall under Explanation IV to _RSA.270/07 -F_ **:6:** Section 11 of the C.P.C. Even if the question of title has not been an issue in the former suit, the question of title might and ought to have been raised as a ground of defence in the former suit. According to the learned counsel, the burden of proof is on the plaintiffs alone and the plaintiffs have to prove the title beyond the shadow of doubts and the claim of the defendants and evidence adduced by the defendants thereon need not be looked into, for declaration of the title of the plaintiffs. 7. In view of the submissions made at the Bar, the main question of law to be considered is, whether the suit was barred by constructive res judicata caused by the decree and the judgment passed in O.S. No.32/1986. Going by the impugned judgments, it could be seen that the courts below concurrently found that the present suit is barred by res judicata caused by the decree and the judgment passed is O.S. No.32/1986. This Court is of the view that both courts _RSA.270/07 -F_ **:7:** below went wrong by relying on the judgment and decrees passed in O.S. No.32/1986 for arriving at such a conclusion. Exts.B6 to B9 are the judgments and decree passed in O.S. No.32/1986 and A.S. No.183/ 1989, which arose from O.S.No.32/1986. The courts below have lost sight of Ext.B9, a certified copy of the judgment in A.S.No.183/1989. It is seen that though O.S.No.32/1986 was dismissed, A.S. No.183/1989, the plaintiffs filed an application seeking permission to withdraw the said suit with a liberty to file a fresh suit and the court granted permission and thereby, the said Original Suit was withdrawn. Once a suit is permitted to be withdrawn under Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure, all proceedings taken therein, including the judgment and decree passed by the trial court will be wiped off. If that be so, after the withdrawal, there was no judgment or decree in O.S.No.32/1986. But, the courts below concurrently went wrong, by relying on the decree and the judgment _RSA.270/07 -F_ **:8:** passed in O.S.No.32/1986 which was not in existence, to arrive at a finding that the suit is barred by res judicata. The above view is supported by the decision of the Apex Court in Sivaramaiah v. Rukmani Ammal (AIR 2004 SC 508). Therefore, this Court finds that O.S.No.80/1990 is not barred by res judicata. 8. Further, it is seen that after finding that the suit is barred by res judicata, the courts below have ventured to determine the issues also, by an erroneous yardstick, as to the standard of proof required in the suit. The suit was one for declaration of title and recovery of possession on the strength of title. The plaintiffs have sought for declaration of title over A schedule property on the strength of Exts.A1 gift deed, A2 Purchase Certificate and A3 to A3(d) tax receipts of various periods. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the plaintiffs have got title and possession over the A schedule property having an extent of 94 cents and B schedule property forms a _RSA.270/07 -F_ **:9:** part of A schedule property. Exts.A1 to A3(d) stand in conformity with the said claim of 94 cents. 9. On the other hand, the defendants contended that out of the total extent of the A schedule property, the defendants are in possession of B schedule property. According to the defendants, on the western side of the A schedule property, 10 cents of property was orally obtained by the then President of the Panchayat Sri. Balakrishna Menon from the 'jenmi' for constructing an auditorium and the Panchayat had already constructed the basement for the same. Thus, the Panchayat has been in possession of that property for the last 35 years. Similarly, the defendants have got right and possession over the northern 30 cents of property under tenancy right from the Juma-Ath. Now they are in possession of the aforesaid extent of properties, out of the plaint schedule properties. Thus, the defendants have set up a rival claim of title and possession over the _RSA.270/07 -F_ **:10:** aforesaid extent of properties (B schedule) and the defendants have produced Exts.B1 to B5 to substantiate the aforesaid contention raising title and possession over the B schedule property. In short, rival claims of title and possession, with respect to B schedule property, have come up before the trial court for determination. 10. What is the scope and extent of enquiry in the trial in view of the aforesaid pleadings of both parties? It is true that in a suit for declaration of title, the plaintiffs have to prove their title and possession. But, it doesn't mean that a complete go-bye can be given to the pleadings and evidence adduced by the defendants, who had set up a rival claim of title, or the evidence adduced by the defendants, could be skipped, without appraisal. There is no specific standard for declaring title and possession. The standard of proof is preponderance of probability only. Where both parties set up rival _RSA.270/07 -F_ **:11:** claims of title and possession, it is incumbent upon the trial court to appreciate the pleadings and evidence adduced by both plaintiffs and the defendants with the yardstick of preponderance of probability. In other words, the party having better title is to be determined with the yardstick of preponderance of probability and give the declaration in favour of that party who have better title. In view of Exts.A1 to A3(d), which stand in conformity with claim of 94 cents, the burden is on the defendants to prove how they got title and possession over B schedule property. In this enquiry, the evidence, adduced by the defendants, also has to be looked into and appreciated so as to find out better title among the rival claimants. 11. But, going by the impugned judgments, it could be seen that the courts below have appreciated the evidence of the plaintiffs alone with the yardstick of proof beyond doubt and arrived at a _RSA.270/07 -F_ **:12:** finding that the plaintiffs have not succeeded in proving their title beyond doubt. It is to be remembered that proof beyond doubt is not the standard of proof in civil suits and the status of the defendants is not as that of the accused in a criminal case. In other words, the courts below ought to have determined the party who have better title with the yardstick of preponderance of probability, in view of the evidence adduced by both parties. Thus, this Court is not satisfied with the way or the manner in which the courts below appreciated the evidence adduced by both parties and the judgments and decrees passed by the courts below require interference of this Court. The evidence requires fresh consideration in the light of the above observation. 12. Consequently, the judgments and decrees passed by the courts below are set aside and the matter is remanded back to the trial court for fresh _RSA.270/07 -F_ **:13:** consideration. The trial court shall dispose the case within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The parties are at liberty to adduce further evidence, if they desire so. The parties shall appear before the trial court on 01/02/2017. This Regular Second Appeal is disposed of accordingly. All pending interlocutory applications will also stand closed. Sd/- K.HARILAL, Judge. okb/Nan