PREMAJA C K v. C.K. SATHEESHAN & C.K. SUMAJA

## **`IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM`** ## **`PRESENT`** ## **`THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN`** ``` THURSDAY, THE 16[TH] DAY OF NOVEMBER 2023 / 25TH KARTHIKA, 1945 RSA NO. 679 OF 2023 ``` ``` AGAINST THE DECREE AND JUDGMENT DATED 02.08.2023 IN A.S.NO.15/2019 ON THE FILES OF THE COURT OF THE SUBORDINATE JUDGE, KANNUR ARISING FROM THE DECREE AND JUDGMENT DATED 21.12.2018 IN O.S.NO.182/2016 ON THE FILES OF THE ADDITIONAL MUNSIFF COURT, KANNUR ``` ## **`APPELLANT/APPELLANT/DEFENDANT NO.1:`** ``` PREMAJA C K, AGED 52 YEARS, D/O. GOPALAN, MUNDACHALI HOUSE, P.O. CHOVVA, ELAYAVOORAMSOM, DESOM, KANNUR, PIN - 670006 ``` ``` BY ADVS. V.PREMCHAND HALIYA T.P. MAHADEV M.J. ``` ## **`RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS/PLAINTIFF & DEFENDANT NO.2:`** - **`1 C.K. SATHEESHAN, AGED 57 YEARS S/O GOVINGAN, MUNDACHALIL HOUSE, P.O. CHOVVA, ELAYAVOORAMSOM, CHOVVADESOM, KANNUR, PIN - 670006`** - **`2 C.K. SUMAJA, D/O. GOVINDAN, RESIDING AT MUNDACHALIL HOUSE, P.O. CHOVVA, KANNUR,, PIN - 670006`** ``` BY ADV K RAJESH SUKUMARAN (CAVEATOR) - R1 ``` ``` THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON ``` ``` 16.11.2023, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ``` ``` R.S.A. No. 679 of 2023 ``` ``` 2 ``` ## **JUDGMENT** ## **Dated this the 16[th] day of November, 2023** This regular second appeal has been filed under order XLII Rule 1 read with Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“CPC” hereinafter) challenging the decree and judgment in A.S. No.15 of 2019 with cross-objection dated 02.08.2023 on the files of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Kannur arose from decree and judgment in O.S. No.182 of 2016 dated 21.12.2018 on the files of the Munsiff Court, Kannur. The appellant herein is the 1[st] defendant and the respondents are the plaintiff and supplemental defendant in O.S. No. 182 of 2016. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned counsel appearing for the respondents who filed Caveat O.P. No.937 of 2023, on admission. 3. Parties in this appeal shall be referred as “plaintiff” and “defendants” with reference to their status before the trial court. 4. In this matter, suit was filed by the plaintiff who ``` R.S.A. No. 679 of 2023 ``` ``` 3 ``` obtained title to the plaint schedule property along with the building therein, on the strength of Ext.A1 gift deed No.4135/2005 of SRO, Kannur, where the 1[st] defendant had been residing with permission of the plaintiff, as a licensee, with prayer to direct the defendants to vacate the same. 5. The 1[st] defendant raised contention that Ext.A1 gift deed in favour of the plaintiff is void as there was an oral partition prior to that. So the reliefs sought for in the suit were opposed. 6. The trial court considered the rival contentions after raising necessary issues. PWs 1 to 4 examined and Exts.A1 to A10 marked on the side of the plaintiff. No witness examined and Exts.B1 to B3 series marked on the side of the defendants. 7. After hearing both sides and on appreciation of evidence, the trial court decreed the suit as under: In the result, the suit is decreed as follows:- 1. The defendants are directed by a decree of mandatory injunction to surrender the vacant possession of the plaint schedule property along with the house therein to the ``` R.S.A. No. 679 of 2023 ``` ``` 4 ``` plaintiff within one month from the date of decree. 2. The plaintiff is entitled to costs of the proceedings. 8. Though, appeal had been filed as A.S. No.15/2019 before the Appellate Court, the same was dismissed confirming the decree and judgment of the trial court. Aggrieved by the concurrent verdicts, the appellant is before this Court. 9. As of now, the trial court as well as the Appellate court granted decree directing the 1[st] defendant to vacate the building on the finding that the plaintiff perfected title over the same as per Ext.A1 gift deed and oral partition at the instance of the 1[st] defendant canvased to beat the gift deed was found against. On scrutiny of the verdicts under challenge, it is perceptible that the plaintiff succeeded in proving plaintiff’s title over the plaint schedule property and the building on the strength of Ext.A1 gift deed. The oral partition prior to the execution of Ext.A1 canvased by the 1[st] defendant is not at all established. Thus the plaintiff who terminated the license in favour of the 1[st] defendant is ``` R.S.A. No. 679 of 2023 ``` ``` 5 ``` entitled to get the relief of mandatory injunction. Therefore, the concurrent verdicts granting the said relief does not require any interference. 10. Thus, it appears that no substantial question of law is available in this matter to be formulated to maintain and admit this regular second appeal. Order XLII Rule 2 of CPC provides thus: **“2. Power of Court to direct that the appeal be heard on the question formulated by it.** -At the time of making an order under rule 11 of Order XLI for the hearing of a second appeal, the Court shall formulate the substantial question of law as required by section 100, and in doing so, the Court may direct that the second appeal be heard on the question so formulated and it shall not be open to the appellant to urge any other ground in the appeal without the leave of the Court, given in accordance with the provision of section 100.” 11. Section 100 of CPC provides that, (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. ``` R.S.A. No. 679 of 2023 ``` ``` 6 ``` (2) An Appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte. (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question. (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question. Proviso stipulates that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question. 12. In the decision reported in **[2020 KHC 6507 : AIR 2020 SC 4321 : 2020 (10) SCALE 168] Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala and Others** , the Apex Court held that: The condition precedent for entertaining and deciding a second appeal being the existence of a substantial question of law, whenever a question is framed by the High Court, the High Court will ``` R.S.A. No. 679 of 2023 ``` ``` 7 ``` have to show that the question is one of law and not just a question of facts, it also has to show that the question is a substantial question of law. In **Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, [(1999) 3 SCC 722]** , the Apex Court held that: "After the amendment a second appeal can be filed only if a substantial question of law is involved in the case. The memorandum of appeal must precisely state the substantial question of law involved and the High Court is obliged to satisfy itself regarding the existence of such a question. If satisfied, the High Court has to formulate the substantial question of law involved in the case. The appeal is required to be heard on the question so formulated. However, the respondent at the time of the hearing of the appeal has a right to argue that the case in the court did not involve any substantial question of law. The proviso to the section acknowledges the powers of the High Court to hear the appeal on a substantial point of law, though not formulated by it with the object of ensuring that no injustice is done to the litigant where such a question was not formulated at the time of admission either by mistake or by inadvertence" "It has been noticed time and again that without insisting for the statement of such a substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal and formulating the same at the time of ``` R.S.A. No. 679 of 2023 ``` ``` 8 ``` admission, the High Courts have been issuing notices and generally deciding the second appeals without adhering to the procedure prescribed under S.100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It has further been found in a number of cases that no efforts are made to distinguish between a question of law and a substantial question of law. In exercise of the powers under this section the findings of fact of the first appellate court are found to have been disturbed. It has to be kept in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The conditions mentioned in the section must be strictly fulfilled before a second appeal can be maintained and no court has the power to add to or enlarge those grounds. The second appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of facts howsoever erroneous cannot be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under this section. The substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a substantial question of fact." "If the question of law termed as a substantial question stands already decided by a larger Bench of the High Court concerned or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or by the Supreme Court, its merely wrong application on the facts of ``` R.S.A. No. 679 of 2023 ``` ``` 9 ``` the case would not be termed to be a substantial question of law. Where a point of law has not been pleaded or is found to be arising between the parties in the absence of any factual format, a litigant should not be allowed to raise that question as a substantial question of law in second appeal. The mere appreciation of the facts, the documentary evidence or the meaning of entries and the contents of the document cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of law. But where it is found that the first appellate court has assumed jurisdiction which did not vest in it, the same can be adjudicated in the second appeal, treating it as a substantial question of law. Where the first appellate court is shown to have exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, it cannot be termed to be an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal." When no substantial question of law is formulated, but a Second Appeal is decided by the High Court, the judgment of the High Court is vitiated in law, as held by this Court in Biswanath Ghosh v. Gobinda Ghose, AIR 2014 SC 152. Formulation of substantial question of law is mandatory and the mere reference to the ground mentioned in Memorandum of Second Appeal can not satisfy the mandate of S. 100 of the CPC. 13. In a latest decision of the Apex Court reported in ``` R.S.A. No. 679 of 2023 ``` ``` 10 ``` ## **[2023 (5) KHC 264 : 2023 (5) KLT 74 SC] Government** ## **of Kerala v. Joseph** , it was held as under: For an appeal to be maintainable under Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure ('CPC', for brevity) it must fulfill certain well – established requirements. The primary and most important of them all is that the appeal should pose a substantial question of law. The sort of question that qualifies this criterion has been time and again reiterated by this Court. We may only refer to **Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, [2001 (3) SCC 179]** (three – Judge Bench) wherein this Court observed as follows: “12. The phrase “substantial question of law”, as occurring in the amended S.100 is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying “question of law”, means – of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with – technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of “substantial question of law” by suffixing the words “of general importance” as has been done in many other ``` R.S.A. No. 679 of 2023 ``` ``` 11 ``` provisions such as S.109 of the Code or Art.133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. 14. The legal position is no more res-integra on the point that in order to admit and maintain a second appeal under Section 100 of CPC, the Court shall formulate substantial question/s of law, and the said procedure is mandatory. Although the phrase 'substantial question of law' is not defined in the Code, 'substantial question of law' means; of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with – technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of “substantial question of law” by suffixing the words “of general importance” as has been done in many other provisions such as S.109 of the Code or Art.133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a ``` R.S.A. No. 679 of 2023 ``` ``` 12 ``` substantial question of law of general importance. As such, second appeal cannot be decided on equitable grounds and the conditions mentioned in Section 100 read with Order XLII Rule 2 of CPC must be complied to admit and maintain a second appeal. 15. In the instant case, it appears that the decree and judgments entered into by the trial court and confirmed by the Appellate Court based on the facts and evidence are found to be in order. Therefore, the same does not require any interference at the hands of this Court. 16. In this matter, no substantial question of law arises for consideration so as to admit this second appeal. It is the well settled law that a second appeal involving no substantial question of law cannot be admitted. Therefore, the decree and judgment under challenge do not require any interference and no substantial question of law to be formulated to adjudicate in this regular second appeal. 17. Faced with the situation, the learned counsel for the appellant fairly submitted that the appellant is satisfied with grant of three months time more for vacation of the building and the appellant/1[st] defendant is none other than ``` R.S.A. No. 679 of 2023 ``` ``` 13 ``` the sister of the plaintiff. 18. The learned counsel for the respondents also did not seriously oppose grant of three months time to vacate the building. 19. Since this regular second appeal could not be admitted for want of any substantial question of law, I am inclined to dismiss the appeal without admission, granting three months time to the appellant to vacate the building on condition that the appellant shall file an affidavit before the trial court, within a period of two weeks from today undertaking to vacate the building within three months from today. It is specifically ordered that, if the affidavit is not filed as directed, the time granted by this Court shall not be available and the execution proceedings can go on, forthwith. 20. Accordingly, this regular second appeal stands dismissed, without being admitted, as indicated above. All interlocutory application also stands dismissed. **Sd/-** **A. BADHARUDEEN JUDGE** SK