High CourtSingle JudgeAppeal allowed

Praveen Ansari & Ors. v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow & Ors.

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 2520 of 1980
Neutral Citation:1981 SCR 982

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • D. A. Desai
  • E. S. Venkatariah
Judgment Date
1980-10-29
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal allowed. The orders of the State Transport Authority, State Transport Appellate Tribunal and the Allahabad High Court are set aside. The matter is remitted to the State Transport Authority to consider the applications of the appellants for the remaining four vacancies and pass orders in accordance with law.
Final Disposition
Appeal allowed

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Praveen Ansari and others

Respondents

  • State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow
  • State Transport Authority
  • Regional Transport Authority

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Yogeshwar Prasad
  • • Mrs. Rani Chhabra

Counsels for Respondents

  • • C. P. Rana
  • • P. K. Pillai

Case Synopsis & Summary

This Supreme Court decision examines temporary permits under Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, on an inter-regional route. The appellants, Praveen Ansari and others, sought temporary permits under section 68-F(1-C) for seven vacancies on a Khurja–Palasiu–Chhatari–Dabai–Rajghat–Ramghat–Atrauli route after a route scheme was published. The Corporation had applied for permits for only three vacancies and the State Transport Authority (STA) granted those to the Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, rejecting the appellants’ applications for the remaining four. The core issue was how to interpret sections 68-F(1-A) and 68-F(1-C) together, specifically whether the Corporation’s preferential entitlement subsists when it opts for less than the full number of permits. The Court held that the combined reading makes it clear that, during the inter-regnum between scheme publication and the approved/modified scheme, the authority must first consider the Corporation’s application for the number of temporary permits available; if the Corporation applies for all vacancies, it is entitled to permits to the exclusion of others. However, if the Corporation does not apply for all permits, section 68-F(1-C) permits the STA to grant temporary permits to others (the expression "any person" includes others). The judgment stresses that the primary objective is service to the travelling public, and increases in fleet strength must be exercised in public interest. The Court remanded the matter to the STA to consider the appellants’ applications for the four remaining vacancies and pass orders in accordance with law.

Provisions of Law Cited

Motor Vehicles Act, 1939Section 68-F(1-A)Section 68-F(1-C)Section 68-F(1-B)Section 68-F(1-D)Section 68-CChapter IV-A, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Service to the travelling public as the primary consideration
  • Public interest as the guiding principle for increasing fleet strength
  • Corporation enjoys preferential treatment in obtaining permits, but this must be harmonized with public service obligations

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellants argued that when the Corporation does not apply for all temporary permits, the remaining vacancies must be opened to other competent applicants under section 68-F(1-C); the expressions ‘any person’ should be read to include parties other than the Corporation, and the aim is to serve the travelling public, not to perpetuate the Corporation’s sole control. They urged a harmonious reading of sections 68-F(1-A) and (1-C) to ensure public service during the interregnum and to grant the remaining permits to eligible applicants.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents contended that the Corporation has a preferential right under section 68-F(1-A) to obtain permits to the exclusion of others; if the Corporation applies for permits, permits to others should not be granted; section 68-F(1-C) applies only when the Corporation does not apply for all permits; authorities must respect the statutory scheme and grant permits accordingly.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

PRAVE.EN. ANSARI & ORS. _v._ STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, LUCKNOW & ORS. _October,_ 29 1980 [D. A. DESAI AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.] _Motor Vehicles Act,_ 1939, _sections_ 68-F(I}, _section_ 68-F (I-A) _and_ 68-F (1-C), _interpretation_ _of-Whe•n_ _once the Corporation made an application for_ _1emporary per mils_ _not_ _for the full strength_ _but_ _something short_ _of_ _it, whether_ _there was no power left in the State Transport Authority to grant temporary_ _fJermits to anyone else-words_ _and_ _phrases-The_ _expression "any_ _person"_ _comprehends any person even other than the Corporation._ Allowing the appeal by special leave, the Court HELD: 1. The combined reading of section 68-F (l-A) and section 68-F (1-C) makes it clear that keeping in view the strength of the vehicles fixed in public interest by the competent authority under section 68-F (I-A), for the period intervening between the date of publication of the scheme and the date of publication of the approved or modified scheme, the authority should first examine the application for number of temporary permits made by the Corporation. 1£ the Corporation has made application for temporary permits covering all the vacancies, the authority must grant permit to the Corporation to the exclusion of any other applicant, as section 68-F(l) makes it obligatory upon the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority, .as the case may be, to grant the same. If the Corporation does not apply for all the permit9 but only for some, the inescapable conclusion will be that for the remaining strength the Corporation has mad~ no application for the temporary permits and section 68-F (1-C) of the Act squarely being attracted, the State Tran'Sport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be, will have · to examine the application for temporary permits made by persons other than the Corporation and if they are found to be competent eligible and qualified! they may have to be granted permits for the benefit o~ the largo travelling public. That is why power to increase strength of fleet operating on the route is conferred under section 68-F (l·A) of the Act and has to be exercised in public interest meaning transport facility to travelling public. Jn this case there were 7 vacancies for temporary permits. The Corporation applied for only 3. It was incumbent upon · the Sta1e Transport Authority to consider the applications of the present appellants for the remaining four vacancies and grant four permits according to law. [986A-D] 2. The expression "any person" in section 68-F (l·C) of the Motor Vehicles Act would· comprehend any person to mean any one other than the Corporation. (985A·B] A B ## c D G Section 68-F (l·C} caters to such a situation where a scheme bas been published and, therefore, the Corporation would be entitled to temporary H permits till the approved scheme is published, yet if the Corporation is unable to provide vehicles for the optimum strength fixed by the State Transport 2-·6 _S._ C. India/ND/81 982 B D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R Authority or the Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be, the concerned authority in exercise of power conferred specifically upon it - by section 68-F (l-C) can grant temporary permits to persons other than the Corporation to operate vehicles on the route for which the scheme is published till modified or approved scheme is published. [984C·E] 3. In interpreting the provisions of Chapter IV-A of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 it is, undoubtedly, true that the Corporation enjoys a pre.ferential treatment in the matter oE obtaining permits the authority under the Act must not ever lose sight of the fact that the primary consideration must be ihe ~ervice available to the travelling public. While interpreting the provisiom :Jf tlie Motor Vehicles Act, undoubtedly, the competing claims between the Corporation and the other private operators may be examined with reference to the provisions of the Act. But the overall consideration namely the service is for the benefit of the travelling public should never be overlooked for a moment. [985F·G] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2520 of 1980. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 3-12-1979 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writ No. NIL of 1979. _Y ogeshwar Prasad_ and _Mrs. Rani Chhabra_ for the Appellants. _0._ P~ _Rana_ and _P. K. Pillai_ for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DESAI, J .-The appellants applied for temporary permits under section 68-F (1-C) for plying the passenger vehides on KhurjaPaliasu-Chhatari-Dabai-Rajghat-Ramghat-Atrauli route (route for short) which. applications came to be rejected by the State Transport Authority and their appeal to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal and a writ petition to the High Court of Allahabad did not meet with &uccess. It is a common ground that in respect of the route a scheme has been prepared and published under section 68C of Chapter IV-A of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The route in que~tion is an inter Fegional route and therefore an application for temporary permit for the period intervening between the date of publication of the scheme and the date of publication of the approved or modified scheme has to be made to the State Transport Authority under sec.68(1-C). Ignoring the previous his~ory of the litigation for the present, it may be noticed that the appellants made applications to the State Transport Authority for grants of temporary permits to ply their vehicles on the route. The U.P. State Road Transport Corporation (Corpotation for short) also made an application for granj of three temporary \ ~. _(_ \ PRAVEEN ANSARI _v._ STATE TRANSPORT LUCKNOW _(Desai_ _J.)_ 983 permits for the same purpose and the application of the Corporation for three permits was granted while the application made by each of the appellants was rejected on the ground that once a scheme has been published in view of the provision contained in Sec. 68-F(l-A) the Corporation alone to !he exclusion of others, is entitled to apply for temporary permit and if such application is made by the Corporration and granted no one else is entitled to obtain a temporary permit. Tl)is decision of !he State Transport Authority has been · npheld both by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal and the High Court. Section 68-F(l) makes it obligatory upon the State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Aµthority as the case may be to grant permit of the nature envisaged in the section to the Corporation to the exclusion of any other applicant. ·section 68-F (1-A) confers power on the State Traruport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority as the case may be, for the period intervening between the date of publication of the scheme and the date of publication of the approved or modified scheme to increase in public interest the - number of vehicles operating on the route or the area in respect of which the scheme has been published by State Transport Corporation under section 68C and further enables the Corporation to apply for temporary permits to ply the vehicles during the inter-regnum. On -such applications being made it is obligatory upon the State Transport ~uthority or the Regional Transport Authority as the case may be 'to grant such temporary permits. Section 68-F (1-B) is not relevant for the present purpose . . Section 68-F(l-C) reads as under: A B #### c D E F G "If no application for a temporary permit is made under sub-section (1-A), the StateTransport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be, may gra!Jt, subject to such conditions as it may think fit, . temporary permit to any . person in respect of the area or route or portio~ thereof specified in the scheme and the permit so granted shall cease to be effective on the issue of a permit to the State Transport Undertaking in respect of that area or route or portion thereof." . ', 'Section 68-F (lD) takes away the power of permit granting authority to grant or renew any permit during the period intervening between the date of publication, under section 68-C of any scheme and the ·date of publication of the approved or modified scheme, in favour · ·<'lf any person for any class of road transport service in relation to an H area or route or portion thereof covered by such scheme except as provided in sub-section (1-A) and snl>-section (1-C). 984 A B ## c D E F G ##### SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 s.c~ The Corporation has published a scheme .in respect of the route.I Even when a scheme is published it is open to the State Transport~ Authority or the Regional Transport Authority as the case may b6 to fix or increase the number of vehicles that may opera~e on the route. But the power fo increase the number must be exercised in public interest. It is <:ommon ground that the strength of vehicles on the route in question was raised from 13 to 20. Hence in view of this raising of the strength, 7 temporary permits could be granted. However, in view of the provision contained in section 68-F(l-A) consequent upon the scheme being p1,1blished by the Corporatio~ under section 68-C in respect of the route the Corporation will be entitled to all the temporary· permits lo the exclusion of any other operator. But Legislature was aware of a possible situation where the Corporation though entitled to ~emporary permits to the exclusion of other operators may not be _in_ a position to avail of this statutory right. Section 68-F(l-C) appears to have been introduced to meet with the situation arising out of the inability of the Corporation to obtain all available temporary permits. Sf~ction 68-F(l-C) caters to such a situation where a scheme has been published and, therefore, the Corporation would be entitled to temporary permits till the approved scheme Is published, yet if the Corporation _is_ unable to provide service by obtaining all requisite temporary permits, the StateTransport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority as the case may be, in exercise of power conferred specifically upon it by section 68-F ( 1-C) can grant temporary permits to persons other than the Corporation to operate vehicles on the route for which the schem~ is published till modified or approved scl).eme is published. It is not in dispute that there are 7 vacancies for temporary permits. It is an admitted position that the Corporation applied for only 3 permits. The State Transport Authority has not recorded a· finding that in public interest remaining 4 permits were not required to be issued. Und.oubtedly, therefore, there were 4 vacancies for which 4 temporary permits could be issued by the State Transport Authority on this inter regional route. Undoubtedly the permits. will have to be temporary permits because the scheme has been published in respect of the route under section 68C. The State Transport Authority, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal and the High Court fell into arl error by interpreting section 68-F(l-C) only to mean that even though there are 7 vacancies and H the Corporation applied for only 3 temporary permits, once the Corporation made an application for temporary permits not for t~e . full strength but something short of it there was no power left m;. PRAVEEN ANSARI _v._ STATE TRANSPORT LUCKNOW _(Desai_ J.) 985 ### ' ,,. the State Transport Authority to grant temporary permits to any -0ne else. Obviously section 68-F(l-C) does no~ admit of such a construction. The State Transport Authority has power under sub section ( 1-C) to grant temporary permit to any person in respect of the area or the route or part thereof specified in the scheme. The expression 'any person' would comprehend any person even other than the Corporation. One has to read section 68-F ( 1-A) and section 68-F (1-C) harmoniously. If the Corporation applies for-temporary permits undoubtedly the State Transport Authority cannot grant permit to any one else if the Corporation has applied for all the permits. But section 68-F (1-C) clearly envisaged a situation where application for a temporary permit is not made under section 68-F {1-A) by the Corporation. And there is felt need for providing transport service on the route in question. Now it cannot be gain said that there were 7 vacancies for temporary permits because the strength was increased from 13 to 20. The State Transport Authority is the proper authority to decide the strength of vehicles . to be plied on a route. If !he Corporation is willing to operate vehicles· to the maximum strength undoubtedly the State Transport Authority will have to grant permit to the Corporation under section 68-F(l-A) to the exclusion of others. But if the Corporation was unable to provide vehicles for the optimum strength fixed by the State Transport Authority the remaining permits will have to be granted to any other person willing to obtain tern porary , permit and ply vehicle because in respect of the remaining strength there would be no application by the Corporation and section 68-F {1-C) would be squarely attracted. In interpreting the provisions of Chapter IV-A of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 it is undoubtedly true that the Corporation enjoys a preferential treatment in the matter of obtaining permits. The authority under the Act must not ever lose •igbt of the fact that the primary consideration must be the service available to the travelling public. While interpreting the'provision! -0f the Motor Vehicles Act undoubtedly the competing claims between the Corporation and the other private operators may be examined with reference to the l'rovisions of the Act:; But the overall consideration namely the service is for the benefit 'of the travelling public should never be overlooked for a moment. A #### _!.B_ ### c D E F G Reverting to the facts of this case if the approach of the High Court is accepted it would lead to a startling result. Assuming there were 10 vacancies for temporary permits and the Corporation was able to provide only one vehicle and therefore applied for only one permit, H according to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal as well as the High Court no temporary permit can be granted to any one els~ 986 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R. ## • B **D** E F # L for the remaining 9 vacancies. Such is. not the position emerging from a combined reading of section 68-F(l-A) and·· Sectio.n 68-F(l-C). The correct approach would be that keepi.'1g in view the strength of the vehicles fixed by· the competent authority, the authority should first examine the applieation fo: number of temporary permits made by the Corporation. If the Corporation has made· application for temporary permits covering all the vacancies the matter ends there. But if !he Corporation does not apply for all the permits but ollly for some, the inescapable conclusion is that' for the· remaining strength the Corporation has made no application for the \emporary permits and section 68-F(l-C) ·would be squarely attracted. In that event the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority as the case may be will have to examine - the application for temporary permits made by persons other than ##### the Corporation and if they are found to be competent, eligible and qualified they may have to be granted permits fqr the benefit of the large· travelling public. That· is why power to increase strength of fleet operating on \he .route is conferred and has to be exercised in public interest meaning transport facili\y to travelling public. In this case there were 7 vacancies for temporary permits. The Corporation applied for only 3. It was incumbent upon the S_tate Transport Authori\y to .consider the applications of the present appellants for **the remaining 4 vacancies and grant** **follr** **permits according to law.** Accordingly this appeal is allowed and tbe orders of the State Transport Authority, the State Transpor\ Appellate Tribunal and the . High Court are set aside and the matter is remitted to the State Trans port Authority to consider the applications of the present appellants for the remaimng 4 vacancies and pass orders according to law. In the circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs. S'.R. _Appeal allowed._ •,