Philip K.I. Kuttickal and others v. Kottayam District Co-operative Bank Ltd and others

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN** **FRIDAY ,THE 07TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2018 / 16TH BHADRA, 1940** ## **WP(C).No. 25828 of 2018** ## **PETITIONER/S:** - **1 PHILIP K.I. KUTTICKAL HOUSE, KANJIPPARA.P.O.,DEVARIGI, KOTTAYAM DISTRICT, PIN- 686 555** - **2 CELINAMMA MATHEW KURISUMMOOTTIL,MUTTUCHIRA.P.O., KOTTAYAM DISTRICT, PIN- 686 613** - **3 MARY JACOB KILIROOPARAMBIL,PONKUNNAM.P.O., KOTTAYAM DISTRICT, PIN- 686 506** - **4 TOM JOYCE.P PANICKEREDOM HOUSE,KURISUMMOODU.P.O.,CHANGANASSERY, KOTTAYAM DISTRICT, PIN- 686 104** - **5 MOLLYKUTTY MATHEW KAROTTUPALACKAL,SOUTH PAMPADY.P.O., KOTTAYAM DISTRICT- 686 521** - **6 C.KURIAN JOSEPH THANNIMOOTTILMUTTAMBALAM.P.O., KOTTAYAM DISTRICT, PIN- 686 004** - **7 ASHOKAN.M.N MATTAPALLIKUNEL,VALLICHIRA.P.O., KOTTAYAM DISTRICT, PIN- 686 575** - **8 SUKU.K.K. SURYA GAYATHRI(KUNNEL),PUTHUPPALLY.P.O., KOTTAYAM DISTRICT, PIN- 686 011** - **9 JOSEPH SEBASTIAN.K KADUVAKUZHIYIL, PATTITHANAM.P.O.ETTUMANOOR, KOTTAYAM DISTRICT, PIN- 686 631** **WP(C).No. 25828 of 2018** **2** - **10 INDIRA DEVI.S MANAKANDATHIL, PULICKAL KAVALA.P.O.,VAZHOOR, KOTTAYAM DISTRICT- PIN- 686 515** - **11 JACOB VARKEY OMALLOKARAN,KADUTHURUTHY.P.O., KOTTAYAM DISTRICT, PIN- 686 604** - **12 NATH.D.L LEKSHMI MANDIR,KOTHALA.P.O., PAMPADY,KOTTAYAM DISTRICT, PIN- 686 502** - **13 ELSAMMA MATHEW KANNUPPALLY HOUSE,T.B.ROAD,KANJIRAPPALLY.P.O., KOTTAYAM DISTRICT, PIN- 686 507** - **14 SEBASTIAN.P.V PALAMOOTTIL PUTHENPURACKAL, AMARA.P.O.,CHANGANASSERY, KOTTAYAM DISTRICT, PIN- 686 546** - **15 PONNAPPAN.P** - **KARUNYAM, UDAYANAPURAM.P.O.,NEREKADAVU, VAIKOM, KOTTAYAM DISTRICT, PIN- 686 143** - **BY ADVS. SRI.V.G.ARUN SRI.T.R.HARIKUMAR** ## **RESPONDENT/S:** - **1 THE KOTTAYAM DISTRICT CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD.NO.4309 REPRESENTED BY ITS GENERAL MANAGER,HEAD OFFICE, KOTTAYAM- 686 001** - **2 THE PART-TIME ADMINISTRATOR THE KOTTAYAM DISTRICT CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD.NO.4309, HEAD OFFICE, KOTTAYAM- 686 001,(JOINT REGISTRAR OF CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES (GENERAL),KOTTAYAM).** - **3 THE REGISTRAR OF CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES THIRUVANANTHAPURAM- 695 001** - **4 STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,COOPERATION (C) DEPARTMENT,GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT,THIRUVANANTHAPURAM- 695 001** **WP(C).No. 25828 of 2018** **3** ## **BY ADVS.** **SRI.ATHUL SHAJI, SC, KOTTAYAM DISTRICT CO.OPERATIVE BANK LTD.** **BY SPL.GOVERNMENT PLEADER SRI.P.SANTHOSHKUMAR** **THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 07.09.2018, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** ## **JUDGMENT** **The petitioners, who are retired employees of the 1[st] respondent Bank, who retired from service on superannuation on various dates during the period between November, 2014 and May, 2018, have filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P3 Government order dated 20.03.2007 and seeking a writ of mandamus commanding respondents 1 and 2 to pay arrears of salary from 01.07.2002 to 30.06.2003 with interest based on the revision of pay effected as per Ext.P1 order dated 21.06.2005. The petitioners have also sought for a declaration that they are entitled to get arrears of salary from 01.07.2002 to 30.06.2003 with interest within a time frame to be fixed by this Court.** **WP(C).No. 25828 of 2018** **4** **2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners, the learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for respondents 3 and 4 and also the learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondents 1 and 2.** **3. The entitlement of the employees of District Co-operative Banks for arrears of salary for the period from 01.07.2002 to 30.06.2003 has now been settled by the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court dated 25.05.2018 in W.A.No.1222 of 2017 and connected cases. Paragraphs 19, 20 and the operative portion of the said judgment read thus :** _**“19. The case on hand is covered by the observations in paragraph 22.3, where the Apex Court has held that if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that**_ **WP(C).No. 25828 of 2018** **5** _**their petition does not suffer from either laches and delay or acquiescence. The appellants in W.A.No.1231 of 2017 have no case that W.P.(C)No.34683 of 2009 is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. The challenge in that writ petition is on the merits of the claim. It is in the connected cases that the ground of delay and laches is put forward. The judgment in W.P. (C)No.34683 of 2009 was delivered on 15.12.2016. The other writ petitions were filed immediately thereafter namely in March and April, 2017. It is no doubt true that none of the petitioners had challenged Ext.P5 Government order dated 20.3.2007 as soon as it was passed. They accepted it and retired from service. It was only after the petitioners in W.P.(C)No.34683 of 2009 succeeded in getting relief that the other writ petitions were filed. As the dispute is about denial of arrears of salary and allowances, which stood revised with effect from 1.7.2002, for a period of 12 months commencing from 1.7.2002 and ending with 30.6.2003 and as the petitioners had moved this court within three months after W.P. (C)No.34683 of 2009 was allowed by a learned single Judge of this court, we find no reason or justification to deny relief to the petitioners on the ground that there was delay and laches and acquiescence on their part.**_ **WP(C).No. 25828 of 2018** **6** _**20. We however notice that the learned single Judge has directed disbursement of arrears of salary and allowances during the period from 1.7.2002 to 30.6.2003 with 6% interest. Except the petitioners in W.P.(C)No.34683 of 2009, the others had not moved the Government or this court in time. The petitioners in the connected writ petitions moved this court only in the year 2017. The Apex Court has in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh [2009 (1) KLT 101 (SC)] held that where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. It was also held that in such cases interest on arrears should be declined. In the instant case, if the claim made by the petitioners is granted it would not affect the settled rights of third parties. It will also not result in the reopening of issues already concluded. It would not also affect the seniority of employees in service or their promotions. In the light of these facts, we find no reason or justification to deny relief to the petitioners on the ground of delay and laches. However, as the petitioners in W.P. (C)Nos.7146, 11337, 11344, 20741, 22430, 26955 and 27455 of 2017 moved this court only after W.P.(C)No.34683 of 2009 was heard and allowed, in the light of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (supra) we are of the opinion that they**_ **WP(C).No. 25828 of 2018** **7** _**are not entitled to interest. The petitioners in W.P.(C)No.34683 of 2009, from which W.A.No.1231 of 2017 arises, stand on a different footing. They had moved the Government claiming arrears of salary and allowances in the year 2008. They had thereafter moved this court on two occasions and it was in the last occasion that relief was granted to them. Merely for the reason that they were granted interest the petitioners in the other cases be granted that benefit. We are therefore of the opinion that except the petitioners in W.P.(C)No.34683 of 2009, the petitioners in the other writ petitions are not entitled to interest on the arrears of salary and allowances during the period from 1.7.2002 to 30.6.2003.**_ _**For the reasons stated above, we dismiss W.A.No.1231 of 2017, allow W.A.Nos.1222, 1247 and 1538 of 2017 and W.A.Nos.162, 163, 380 and 390 of 2018 in part to the extent it relates to the award of interest and vacate the direction issued by the learned single Judge in the respective writ petitions to pay interest on the amounts due and payable to the petitioners therein towards arrears of salary and allowances during the period from 1.7.2002 to 30.6.2003. The judgments impugned in W.A.Nos.1222, 1247 and 1538 of 2017 and W.A.Nos.162, 163, 380 and 390 of 2018 shall stand affirmed in all other respects. No costs.” (underline supplied)**_ **WP(C).No. 25828 of 2018** **8** **4. In the judgment dated 25.05.2018 in W.A.No.1222 of 2017 and connected cases the Division Bench held that, as the dispute is about denial of arrears of salary and allowances, which stood revised with effect from 1.7.2002, for a period of 12 months commencing from 1.7.2002 and ending with 30.6.2003 and as the petitioners had moved this court within three months after W.P. (C)No.34683 of 2009 was allowed by the learned single Judge by the judgment dated 15.12.2016, there is no reason or justification to deny relief to the petitioners on the ground that there was delay and laches and acquiescence on their part. It was also held that if the claim made by the petitioners is granted it would not affect the settled rights of third parties. It will also not result in the reopening of issues already concluded. It would not also affect the seniority of employees in service or their promotions. In such circumstances, the Division Bench found no** **WP(C).No. 25828 of 2018** **9** **reason or justification to deny relief to the petitioners on the ground of delay and laches. However, as the petitioners in W.P.(C)Nos.7146, 11337, 11344, 20741, 22430, 26955 and 27455 of 2017 moved this Court only after W.P.(C)No.34683 of 2009 was heard and allowed, in the light of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh (supra), the Division Bench held that they are not entitled to interest.** **5. One of the main contentions raised by the learned Standing Counsel for the District Cooperative Bank is that the petitioners, who have waited till the disposal of W.A.No.1222 of 2017 and connected cases in approaching this Court, are not entitled for any relief on account of the delay and laches. The principle of denial of relief to fencesitters has application in the facts of the case on hand and as such, they are not entitled for the relief sought for in this writ petition. The learned Standing Counsel would place reliance on** **WP(C).No. 25828 of 2018** **10** **the judgments of the Apex Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Aravind Kumar Srivastava [(2015) 1 SCC 347] and Union of India v. Shri Hanuman Industries [(2015) 6 SCC 600].** **6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the petitioners would point out that the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.1222 of 2017 and connected cases is one rendered after taking note of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Arvind Kumar Srivastava's case (supra). The learned counsel would also place reliance on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Viswanathan v. Haripad Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. [2018 (3) KLT 815].** **7. In Arvind Kumar Srivastava's case (supra), the Apex Court has stated in categorical terms that the normal rule is that when a particular set of employees are given relief by court, all other identically situated persons should be treated alike by extending the same benefit. In the said** **WP(C).No. 25828 of 2018** **11** **decision, the Apex Court has also held that the said principle will be subject to well recognized exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the said judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. Paragraphs 22 of the said decision reads thus :** _**“22. The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the aforesaid judgments, cited both by the appellants as well as the respondents, can be summed up as under:**_ _**22.1. Normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all**_ **WP(C).No. 25828 of 2018** **12** _**other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently.**_ _**22.2. However, this principle is subject to well recognized exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.**_ _**22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the Court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not. With**_ **WP(C).No. 25828 of 2018** **13** _**such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma and Ors. v. Union of India, (supra). On the other hand, if the judgment of the Court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the Court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence.”**_ **8. In Shri Hanuman Industries's case (supra), another decision relied on by the learned Standing Counsel for the District Co-operative Bank, the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which the coapplicants in the earlier round of litigation immediately approached the court and obtained relief. However, the respondent applicants before the Apex Court waited till the said relief was affirmed by the Apex Court on 01.05.2009 and only thereafter, on 27.08.2009, approached the High** **WP(C).No. 25828 of 2018** **14** **Court for similar relief. The Apex Court held that, the respondent applicants, in view of their deliberate laches, negligence and inaction have disentitled themselves to the benefit of adjudication in the earlier lis. Paragraphs 18 and 22 of the said decision read thus:** _**“18. The pleaded facts and the competing arguments have received our due attention. To start with, it is not disputed that the writ petitioners in the earlier round of adjudication were applicants under SPINE alike the respondents herein. They being appalled by the delay in the grant of their receivables thereunder and being faced with the letter dated 05-02-2007 whereby pending receipt and scrutiny of the reports as called for, further sanction/disbursement of Grants-in-Aid under the said scheme was stopped, did promptly approach the Guwahati High Court with a batch of writ petitions in the year 2007 itself and as narrated hereinabove were favoured with a direction to the implementing authorities for consideration of their application for the investment subsidy in accordance with law without being influenced by the said letter. Admittedly, the respondents herein elected not to join them and instead, soon thereafter this Court affirmed the above verdict on 01-05-**_ **WP(C).No. 25828 of 2018** **15** _**2009, staked their claim on 27-08-2009. There is evidently thus a time lag of more than two years by which the respondents’ challenge was delayed.**_ _**18.1. It is a matter of record, that by letter/notification dated 04-05-2010 issued by the Secretary, Ministry of DONER, NEC, Shillong, confirmation of the decision of withdrawal and closure of SPINE with effect from 23-02-2007, was notified. A plain perusal of the contents of this document would reveal in no uncertain terms that the withdrawal and closure of SPINE had been effected by an Order of Government of India vide NEC/PLAN/ii-23-22007. Thus the letter/notification dated 0405-2010, did relate back to 23-02-2007 for all intents and purposes. Therefore the scheme, SPINE stood withdrawn and/or closed on and from 23-02-2007. As a corollary, on a cumulative reading of the letters dated 05-022007, 23-02-2007 and 04-05-2010 as well as the resolution dated 21-02-2007 it is indubitable that SPINE stood withdrawn and/or closed with effect from 23-02-2007. As adverted to hereinabove, by letter dated 01-10.2007, as a consequential step, the proposal which had remained unprocessed as per the standard procedures of the scheme were returned to the State Governments. The list of proposals remitted back admittedly included those amongst others of the respondents herein. It**_ **WP(C).No. 25828 of 2018** **16** _**is thus patent that on such date i.e. 01-102007, the claims of the respondents had not been accepted and in view of the closure of the scheme, were returned to the respective State Governments. In this pronounced backdrop, the plea of the respondents that at the institution of the writ petitions in 2009, no decision had been taken rejecting their applications fades into insignificance, as those by implication had not been entertained under the scheme.**_ _**18.2 The letters dated 04-08-2006, 04-09-2007 and 12-09-2007 to which our attention has been drawn in course of the arguments, suffice it to mention, do not contain any assurance on the part of the implementing authorities promising grant of the subsidy allowance under the scheme or any other incentive to the respondent. No reference has been made before us of any other document qua the other respondents. We are thus constrained to hold that there was no promise on the part of the public functionaries in charge of implementation of SPINE to the respondents to extend benefits thereunder, inspite of the decision to withdraw or close the same with effect from 23-02-2007.**_ ## _**xxx xxx**_ _**22. On a consideration of the totality of the aspects involved, we are thus of the**_ **WP(C).No. 25828 of 2018** **17** _**unhesitant view that the respondents herein in view of their deliberate laches, negligence and inaction have disentitled themselves to the benefit of the adjudication in the earlier lis. In the accompanying facts and circumstances in our comprehension, it would be iniquitous and repugnant as well to the public exchequer to entertain the belated claim of the respondents on the basis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel which is even otherwise inapplicable to the case in hand.”**_ **9. In the instant case, a reading of judgment of the Division Bench of this Court dated 25.05.2018 in W.A.No.1222 of 2017 and connected cases would show that, after referring to the law laid down by the Apex Court in Arvind Kumar Srivastava's case (supra), the Division Bench held in paragraph 19 that, the case before it is covered by the observations in paragraph 22.3 wherein the Apex Court held that, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out** **WP(C).No. 25828 of 2018** **18** **from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delay or acquiescence. The Division Bench noticed that the appellants in W.A.No.1231 of 2017 have no case that W.P.(C).No.34683 of 2009 is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. The challenge in that writ petition is on the merits of the claim. It is in the connected cases that the ground of delay and laches is put forward. The judgment in W.P.(C).No.34683 of 2009 was delivered on 15.05.2016. The other writ petitions were filed immediately thereafter, namely in March and April, 2017. None of the petitioners had challenged Ext.P5 Government Order dated 20.03.2007 as soon as it was passed. They accepted it and retired from service. It was only after the petitioners in W.P. (C).No.34683 of 2009 succeeded in getting relief that the other writ petitions were filed. As the** **WP(C).No. 25828 of 2018** **19** **dispute is about denial of arrears of salary and allowances, which stood revised with effect from 01.07.2002, for a period of 12 months commencing from 01.07.2002 and ending with 30.06.2003 and as the petitioners had moved this Court within three months after W.P.(C).No.34683 of 2009 was allowed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, the Division Bench found no reason or justification to deny relief to the petitioners on the ground that there was delay and laches and acquiescence on their part. However, the Division Bench found that the petitioners are not entitled for interest.** **10. In Viswanathan's case (supra), a decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners, a Division Bench of this Court held that, the mere fact that the Co-operative Bank thought it fit to postpone the disbursement of the pay revision arrears in implementation does not affect the entitlement thereof. In the said decision, the Division Bench was dealing with a** **WP(C).No. 25828 of 2018** **20** **belated claim for pay revision arrears for the period from 01.07.1991 to 17.07.1998. After referring to the law laid down by the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Balkaran Singh [(2006) 12 SCC 709] and also the provisions under Article 43 of the Constitution of India, the Division Bench held that the entitlement of the employees for the revised pay is not seriously in dispute and the main contention of the Co-operative Bank is that it was implemented much later. Therefore, the Division Bench held that, the mere fact that the Cooperative Bank thought it fit to postpone the disbursement of pay revision arrears in implementation does not affect the entitlement thereof. The pay revision orders issued by the Government itself enables the Registrar to grant time for effecting payment depending on the financial position of the Co-operative Bank. The obligation is on the Co-operative Bank (which is the employer) to disburse the salary promptly even** **WP(C).No. 25828 of 2018** **21** **without waiting for the employee to make a demand. The total salary included the pre-revised and revised pay and the admitted disbursement of a portion to the appellant during the period in question saves limitation even if there is any. Accordingly, the Division Bench directed the competent among the respondents to disburse the pay revision arrears due to the appellant within a period of three months from that judgment.** **11. In the instant case, the claim of the petitioners is for disbursement of pay arrears for the period from 01.07.2002 to 30.06.2003, which was sanctioned vide Ext.P3 G.O.(MS)No.96/07 dated 20.03.2007, with a restriction that the disbursement of monetary benefits on account of pay revision will be given only to the employees who have retired prior to 31.05.2005. The fact that the petitioners have also enjoyed the benefit of pay revision is not in dispute. However, they were denied arrears for the period from 01.07.2002 to** **WP(C).No. 25828 of 2018** **22** **30.06.2003, in view of the restriction imposed in Ext.P3. By Ext.P4 judgment dated 15.12.2016 the said benefit was extended to the petitioners in W.P.(C).No.34683 of 2009. Ext.P4 judgment and the judgments in W.P.(C).Nos.7146 of 2017, 11344 of 2017, 11337 of 2017, etc. were under challenge before the Division Bench in W.A.No.1222 of 2017 and connected cases, which were filed in the year 2017 and 2018 respectively. Those writ appeals were disposed of by judgment dated 25.05.2018. Now the petitioners have filed this writ petition on 31.07.2018 seeking extension of the benefit of Ext.P4 judgment dated 15.12.2016, which was affirmed by the Division Bench in the judgment dated 25.05.2018 in W.A.No.1222 of 2017 and connected cases. The petitioners would also place reliance on the judgment of this Court dated 11.06.2018 in W.P.(C).No.16806 of 2017, whereby, the benefit of the judgment of the Division Bench in W.A.No.1222 of 2017 was extended to the** **WP(C).No. 25828 of 2018** **23** **petitioner therein, who filed that writ petition in May, 2017, during the pendendcy of writ appeals challenging Ext.P4 judgment and connected matters.** **12. In the instant case, admittedly, the petitioners have not chosen to approach this Court either immediately after Ext.P4 judgment of the learned Single Judge or during the pendency of W.A.No.1222 of 2017 and connected cases. No reason whatsoever has been stated in the writ petition for the delay in approaching this Court.** **13. In Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana (AIR 1988 SC 2181), the Apex Court held that, when a point which is ostensibly a point of law is required to be substantiated by facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent, from the counter-affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or** **WP(C).No. 25828 of 2018** **24** **to the counter-affidavit, as the case may be, the Court will not entertain the point. The Apex Court held further that there is a distinction between a pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and a writ petition or a counter-affidavit. While in a pleading, i.e., a plaint or a written statement, the facts and not evidence are required to be pleaded, in a writ petition or in the counter-affidavit not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it.** **14. Having considered the averments in the writ petition and also the arguments advanced by the learned counsel on both sides, conclusion is irresistible that the petitioners who have waited till Ext.P4 judgment dated 15.12.2016 is affirmed by the Division Bench by judgment dated 25.05.2018 and thereafter filed this writ petition on 31.07.2018, offering no explanation whatsoever for the delay in approaching this Court, going by the** **WP(C).No. 25828 of 2018** **25** **averments in the writ petition are not entitled for any relief in this writ petition, in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.** **In the result, this writ petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed.** ## **Sd/-** ## **ANIL K.NARENDRAN, JUDGE** ## **APPENDIX** ## **PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:** **EXHIBIT P1 A TRUE COPY OF THE GO(MS) NO.145/05/COOP DATED 21.6.2005** **EXHIBIT P2 A TRUE COPY OF THE GO(MS) NO 21/07/COOP DATED 6.1.2007** **EXHIBIT P3 A TRUE COPY OF THE GO(MS) NO96/07/CO-OP DATED 20.3.2007** **EXHIBIT P4 A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 15.12.2016 IN WPC NO 34683/2009** **EXHIBIT P5 A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 17.7.2018 IN WPC NO 10916/2018.** **AV/11/10**