High CourtSingle JudgeAppeal allowed. High Court’s order is set aside...

Peethambaran v. State of Kerala & Anr.

Case / Petition Number:Criminal Appeal No. 1381 of 2023
Neutral Citation:[2023] 4 S.C.R. 1144

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • Krishna Murari
  • Sanjay Karol
Judgment Date
2023-05-03
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal allowed. The High Court’s refusal to quash is set aside. The order dated 6 November 2019 in Crl. MC No. 6314 of 2018 is quashed, and Criminal Case No. 132 of 2017 is disposed/quashed. FR-II is held without basis as it was not issued by a magistrate or a court; the proceedings under Section 420 IPC are quashed against the appellant.
Final Disposition
Appeal allowed. High Court’s order is set aside and the criminal case is quashed against the appellant; FR-II is invalid for lack of magistrate/court order; proceedings under Section 420 IPC are quashed against Peethambaran.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Peethambaran

Respondents

  • State of Kerala
  • Anr.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Zulfiker Ali P. S.
  • • Manoj V. George
  • • Ms. Shilpa Liza George
  • • K M Vignesh Ram
  • • Nasib Masih
  • • Ms. Darshna Nair
  • • Ms. Akshita Agrawal

Counsels for Respondents

  • • G. Prakash

Case Synopsis & Summary

Peethambaran v. State of Kerala & Anr. is a criminal appeal arising from an order of the Kerala High Court dismissing a petition under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of ongoing criminal proceedings under Section 420 IPC for alleged cheating in the matter of securing jobs. The FIR (1838 of 2015) led to a final report FR-I stating a lack of proper evidence and characterizing the case as false. A second final report FR-II records that an Inspector conducted further investigation pursuant to an order of the District Police Chief, which the Appellant contends amounts to reinvestigation outside the proper procedure. The appellant argues that the District Police Chief’s order could not authorise further investigation, as only a magistrate or a higher court may order such reinvestigations or de novo investigations; FR-II is therefore invalid. The respondent State counters on the need to collect additional evidence and relies on established jurisprudence that allows “further investigation” under Section 173(8) CrPC, to be conducted by the executive, and that fresh or de novo investigations lie with higher courts. In its decision, the Court clarifies the distinction between “further investigation” and “reinvestigation/de novo” and holds that the order directing FR-II was improper since it was not issued by a magistrate or a court. Consequently, it quashes the proceedings against the appellant and allows the appeal, setting aside the High Court’s order.

Provisions of Law Cited

CrPC 1973: s. 482CrPC 1973: s. 173(8)IPC 1860: s. 420

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • contemporanea exposito doctrine of interpretation
  • power of 482 CrPC to be exercised sparingly in the ends of justice
  • fresh / de novo / reinvestigation are distinct concepts with higher court jurisdiction
  • difference between further investigation and reinvestigation/de novo (Vinay Tyagi doctrine)

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant contends that the order FR-II, which records further investigation by an Inspector under the District Police Chief’s directive, amounts to reinvestigation outside the authorized procedure. It is argued that Section 173(8) empowers only a magistrate or higher court to direct fresh/reinvestigation, and that the District Police Chief’s order lacks statutory validity. The ingredients of Section 420 IPC have not been satisfactorily established; there is no direct evidence of a financial transaction or honest/intentional deceit. The appellant urges quashing to prevent abuse of process and to safeguard the ends of justice.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents rely on the principle that further investigation can be ordered by the executive in accordance with Section 173(8) CrPC to gather additional evidence, and that reinvestigation/de novo investigations are permissible when directed by a competent court. They stress the need to collect additional evidence given the lack of documents initially, and reference established precedents (Vinay Tyagi, Neeharika Infrastructure, etc.) to justify continued investigation, arguing that the magistrate or higher court should decide on the need for further inquiry.

Cited Precedents (14)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali(2013) 5 SCC 762PositiveUsed to articulate the premise that ‘fresh’, ‘de novo’ and ‘reinvestigation’ are synonymous and that such orders lie within higher courts’ domain; distinguishes further investigation as a continuance of original inquiry.
T. T. Antony v. State of Kerala(2001) 6 SCC 181PositiveCited in the context of the scope and limits of investigation and the exercise of powers under CrPC; supports judicial scrutiny over investigations.
Vinubhai Haribhai Malviya and Ors v. State of Gujarat(2019) SCC OnLine 1346PositiveReferenced for principles on interpretation of 173(8) and the nature of further investigation within law.
Randhir Singh Rana v. State (NCT of Delhi)(1997) 1 SCC 361PositiveCited for the framework of offences and the elements of Section 420 IPC.
G.V Rao v. L.H.V Prasad(2000) 3 SCC 693PositiveCited for the elements of cheating under Section 420 IPC and related standards.
Hari Prasad Chamaria v. Bishun Kumar Surekha(1973) 2 SCC 823PositiveCited for general principles governing criminal proceedings and the assessment of evidence.
Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar(2006) 4 SCC 359PositiveCited for the Court’s options after a report under Section 173(2) (i) is submitted.
Hemant Dhasmana v. CBI(2001) 7 SCC 536PositiveCited for the authority of courts to order further investigation and its non-interference in higher jurisdictions.
Devendra Nath Singh v. State of Bihar and Ors.(2023) 1 SCC 48PositiveCited for interpreting permission to file supplementary reports and lack of necessity for court leave for further investigation.
Paramjit Batra v. State of Uttarakhand(2013) 13 SCC 673PositiveCited for the policy that Section 482 powers should be exercised sparingly to prevent abuse of process.
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal(1992) Supp (1) SCC 335PositiveCited for the seven indicative circumstances when 482/Article 226 powers may be exercised.
Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra(2021) SCC OnLine 315PositiveCited for the well-known principles governing exercise of Sections 482/226 to ensure ends of justice.
Vijay Kumar Ghai and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors.(2022) 7 SCC 124PositiveCited for the ingredients of Section 420 IPC and the elements required for proving cheating.
R.K. Vijayasarathy v. Sudha Seetharam(2019) 16 SCC 739PositiveCited for interpretation of the elements and the application of 420 IPC.

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1144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2023] 4 S.C.R. 1144 [2023] 4 S.C.R. A ## PEETHAMBARAN v. ## STATE OF KERALA & ANR. B (Criminal Appeal No. 1381 of 2023) MAY 03, 2023 ## **[KRISHNA MURARI AND SANJAY KAROL, JJ.]** - _Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s. 482 – Quashing of_ - _proceedings – Non-exercise of power u/s. 482 – Justification of – Appellant charged u/s. 420 along with the other accused persons_ - C _for cheating the_ de-facto _complainant and other persons for certain sum in exchange for securing jobs – Registration of FIR – Final report that as no proper evidence, case should be considered as a false case – Another final report filed which stated that Inspector of Police conducted further investigation as per order passed by_ - D _District Police Chief – Petition for quashing of the proceedings – Petition not quashed – On appeal, held: No material on record to show that the representation made by accused No.1, the appellant or the_ de facto _complainant, was false or that they had prior knowledge of such representation being false and made only with the intention to deceive – Only ingredient was that in the ordinary_ - E _course, none of the persons would have given the accused any money, and thus, were induced to deliver property which otherwise they would have not – With only one ingredient being fulfilled and mere statements made to show dishonest intention or falsity of statement, the threshold of s. 420 is not breached, constituting the_ - F _offence – Thus, the non-exercise of the power u/s. 482 not justified – Order passed by the High Court set aside – Penal Code, 1860 – s. 420._ _Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s. 173(8) – Report of police officer on completion of investigation – District Police Chief_ G _ordered the further investigation pursuant to which the second final report filed – Permissibility of – Held: Magistrate has the power to order further investigation – Fresh investigation/re-investigation/_ de novo _investigation fall within the purview of the jurisdiction of a higher court – Order from the District Police Chief is not the same as an order issued by the concerned Magistrate – Thus, the District_ - H 1144 1145 PEETHAMBARAN v. STATE OF KERALA & ANR. _Police Chief could not have ordered further investigation, as that_ A _power rests either with the magistrate or with a higher court and not with an investigating agency._ _Investigation: Further investigation and fresh investigation/ re-investigation/_ de novo _investigation – Difference between – Explained – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973._ _Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali_ **(2013) 5 SCC 762 : [2012] 13 SCR 1005;** _T.T Antony v. State of Kerala_ **(2001) 6 SCC 181 : [2001] 3 SCR 942;** _Vinubhai Haribhai Malviya and Ors v. State of Gujarat_ **2019 SCC OnLine 1346;** _Randhir Singh Rana v. State (NCT of Delhi)_ **(1997) 1 SCC 361 : [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 880;** _G.V Rao v. L.H.V Prasad_ **(2000) 3 SCC 693 : [2000] 2 SCR 123;** _Hari Prasad Chamaria v. Bishun Kumar Surekha_ **(1973) 2 SCC 823;** _Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar_ **(2006) 4 SCC 359 : [2006] 3 SCR 1086;** _Hemant Dhasmana v. CBI_ **(2001) 7 SCC 536 : [2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 646;** _Devendra Nath Singh v. State of Bihar and Ors._ **(2023) 1 SCC 48;** _Paramjit Batra v. State of Uttarakhand_ **(2013) 13 SCC 673;** _State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal_ **1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259;** _Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra_ **2021 SCC OnLine 315;** _Vijay Kumar Ghai and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors._ **(2022) 7 SCC 124** _**–**_ **referred to.** B C D E ## **Case Law Reference** |**[2012]**|**13 SCR 1005**|**referred to**|**Para 7**|F| |---|---|---|---|---| |**[2001]**|**3 SCR 942**|**referred to**|**Para 7**|| |**[1996]**|**10 Suppl. SCR 880**|**referred to**|**Para 7**|| |**[2000]**|**2 SCR 123**|**referred to**|**Para 7**|| |**(1973)**|**2 SCC 823**|**referred to**|**Para 7**|G| |**[2006]**|**3 SCR 1086**|**referred to**|**Para 15**|| |**[2001]**|**1 Suppl. SCR 646**|**referred to**|**Para 16**|| |**(2023)**|**1 SCC 48**|**referred to**|**Para 19**|| |**(2013)**|**13 SCC 673**|**referred to**|**Para 21**|H| 1146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R. |A|**[1990]**|**3**|**Suppl. SCR 259**|**referred to**|**Para 22**| |---|---|---|---|---|---| ||**(2022)**|**7**|**SCC 124**|**referred to**|**Para 24**| CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1381 of 2023. B From the Judgment and Order dated 06.11.2019 of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in CRLMC No. 6314 of 2018. Zulfiker Ali P. S., Manoj V. George, Ms. Shilpa Liza George, K M Vignesh Ram, Nasib Masih, Ms. Darshna Nair, Ms. Akshita Agrawal, Advs. for the Appellant. C G. Prakash, Adv. for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ## **SANJAY KAROL, J.** Leave Granted. D 1. Two questions arise for consideration- one, whether under the recognized parameters of exercise of power under Section 482, in the facts of the present case, the non- exercise of power is justified and two, whether the District Police Chief, Kottayam could have ordered the further investigation pursuant to which the second final report was E filed? 2. The instant appeal by special leave petition has been filed against an order of the High Court of Kerala passed in Crl. MC No. 6314 of 2018 dated 6[th] of November, 2019 whereby a prayer to exercise powers under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was disallowed F and proceedings under Criminal Case No. 1326/2017 was found unfit to be quashed. 3. The Appellant has been charged under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for having cheated, alongside accused no.1, now deceased, the de-facto complainant, namely Sunesh and seven other G persons of a sum totaling three lakh eighty-three thousand five hundred and eighty-three rupees, in exchange for securing jobs for them or their wives at the Kottayam Rubber Board, as clerks. H 4. An FIR was registered bearing number 1838 of 2015 under the above stated section on 24[th] October, 2015. The accused No.2 before us is the uncle of the de-facto complainant. 1147 PEETHAMBARAN v. STATE OF KERALA & ANR. [SANJAY KAROL, J.] 5. The Final Report (hereafter, FR-I) placed on record dated 30[th] A December, 2015 records that the complainant was asked to produce documents in this regard, but despite notice, the same were not produced, nor were any other documents, in regards to any financial transaction. It then states- “As there is no proper evidence in this regard, it shall be considered as a false case…” B 6. Interestingly, another Final Report (hereafter, FR-II) forms part of the record. It states that witness number 10, namely S. Anilkumar, Inspector of Police, Viakom, conducted further investigation as per Order No. D2-43642/16/K passed by the District Police Chief, Kottayam. 7. It has been urged by way of this appeal that in effect, a reinvestigation had been ordered, in violation of the procedure laid down in law. Further it has been argued that; the ingredients of Section 420, IPC have not been met- and therefore the High court has erred in not quashing the proceedings subject of the petition under Section 482; No specific role has been attributed to the appellant; That in all of the witness statements, the name mentioned is that of the de-facto complainant who gave the money to the deceased accused number 1 namely, Babu and was the instigator in other people giving the money to him. The Appellant seeks reliance on **Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali[1] ; T.T Antony v. State of Kerala[2] ; Vinubhai Haribhai Malviya and Ors v. State of Gujarat[3] ; Randhir Singh Rana v. State (NCT of Delhi)[4] ; G.V Rao v. L.H.V Prasad[5] ; Hari Prasad Chamaria v. Bishun Kumar Surekha[6] .** C D E 8. Having taken note of the facts that have led to the present appeal by special leave petition and the chief arguments made, we now proceed to examine the law on the issues before us. 9. On the second question, that is whether District Police Chief, Kottayam’s order was permissible in law or not, the relevant provisions of CrPC is Section 173 (8) which reads as under: F “ **(8)** Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under subsection (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, where upon G 1 (2013) 5 SCC 762 2 (2001) 6 SCC 181 3 2019 SCC OnLine 1346 4 (1997) 1 SCC 361 5 (2000) 3 SCC 693 6 (1973) 2 SCC 823 H 1148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R. A such investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed; and the provisions of sub- sections (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub- section B (2).” 10. The evolution of Section 173 CrPC has been noted by this Court in **Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya** (supra). In Para 25, it is opined that investigation after the coming into force of the Cr.PC, 1973 will include all proceedings under Cr.PC for collection of evidence conducted C by a police officer. “All” would undoubtedly then include Section 173 (8) as well. The power therefore, under Section 190, of a Magistrate ordering such investigation, would encompass further investigation under Section 173 (8). 11. It has been argued on behalf of appellants that, in effect, a D reinvestigation has been conducted, 12. This Court in **Vinay Tyagi (supra)** gave detailed consideration to the powers under Section 173 and Section 482 of CrPC. **“43.** At this stage, we may also state another well- settled canon E of the criminal jurisprudence that the superior courts have the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code or even Article 226 of the Constitution of India to direct “further investigation”, “fresh” or “de novo” and even “reinvestigation”. “Fresh”, “de novo” and “reinvestigation” are synonymous expressions and their result in law would be the same. The superior courts are even vested with F the power of transferring investigation from one agency to another, provided the ends of justice so demand such action. Of course, it is also a settled principle that this power has to be exercised by the superior courts very sparingly and with great circumspection. *** *** *** *** G H **45.** The power to order/direct “reinvestigation” or “de novo” investigation falls in the domain of higher courts, that too in exceptional cases. If one examines the provisions of the Code, there is no specific provision for cancellation of the reports, except that the investigating agency can file a closure report (where according to the investigating agency, no offence is made out). 1149 PEETHAMBARAN v. STATE OF KERALA & ANR. [SANJAY KAROL, J.] Even such a report is subject to acceptance by the learned A Magistrate who, in his wisdom, may or may not accept such a report. For valid reasons, the court may, by declining to accept such a report, direct “further investigation”, or even on the basis of the record of the case and the documents annexed thereto, summon the accused.” B 13. _Per contra,_ the State would contend that only further investigation upon the order of the District Police Chief was conducted. In respect of further investigation, in **Vinay Tyagi** (supra) this Court has observed: **22.** “Further investigation” is where the investigating officer obtains further oral or documentary evidence after the final report has been filed before the court in terms of Section 173(8). This power is vested with the executive. It is the continuation of previous investigation and, therefore, is understood and described as “further investigation”. The scope of such investigation is restricted to the discovery of further oral and documentary evidence. Its purpose is to bring the true facts before the court even if they are discovered at a subsequent stage to the primary investigation. It is commonly described as “supplementary report”. “Supplementary report” would be the correct expression as the subsequent investigation is meant and intended to supplement the primary investigation conducted by the empowered police officer. Another significant feature of further investigation is that it does not have the effect of wiping out directly or impliedly the initial investigation conducted by the investigating agency. This is a kind of continuation of the previous investigation. The basis is discovery of fresh evidence and in continuation of the same offence and chain of events relating to the same occurrence incidental thereto. In other words, it has to be understood in complete contradistinction to a “reinvestigation”, “fresh” or “de novo” investigation. 14. This distinction between further investigation and fresh investigation/reinvestigation/ _de novo_ investigation being that the former is a continuation of the previous investigation and is done on the basis of discovery of fresh material, whereas the latter can only be done when there is a definite order of the court to that effect which must states the reason as to why the previous investigation is incapable of being acted upon. C D E F G H 1150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R. A 15. In **Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar[7]** , it was observed that upon submission of a report in terms of Section 173 (2) (i) the concerned Magistrate has three courses of action available before him: - (i) Accept the report and proceed further - B - (ii) Disagree with the report and drop the proceedings. - (iii) Direct further investigation under Section 156 (3) which is the power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence, and require them to make a further report. 16. In **Hemant Dhasmana v. CBI[8]** it was observed that although C the section is not specific in respect of the Court’s power to order further investigation, the power of the police can be set into motion upon the order of such a court. It was further observed that this order should not be interfered with even in the exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of a higher court. D 17. The above two cases make it amply clear that a magistrate has the power to order further investigation and the cases referred to earlier make clear that fresh investigation/reinvestigation/ _de novo_ investigation fall into the purview of the jurisdiction of a higher court. 18. In the present case, as is clear from FR II that S. Anilkumar, Inspector of Police, Vaikom conducted further investigation as per Order E No.D2-43642/16/K, passed by a police officer and not by any duly empowered judicial officer. 19. The Chief Police Officer of a district is the Superintendent of Police who is an officer of the Indian Police Service. Needless to state, an order from the District Police Chief is not the same as an order F issued by the concerned Magistrate. Referring to **Vinay Tyagi** (supra), this Court in **Devendra Nath Singh v. State of Bihar and Ors.[9]** noted that there is no specific requirement to seek leave of the court for further investigation or to file a supplementary report but investigation agencies, have not only understood it to be so but have also adopted the same as a G legal requirement. The doctrine of _contemporanea exposito_ aids such an interpretation of matters which have been long understood and implemented in a particular manner to be accepted into the interpretive 7 (2006) 4 SCC 359 8 (2001) 7 SCC 536 H 9 (2023) 1 SCC 48 1151 PEETHAMBARAN v. STATE OF KERALA & ANR. [SANJAY KAROL, J.] process. In other words, the requirement of permission for further A investigation or to file a supplementary report is accepted within law and is therefore required to be complied with. 20. In the facts at hand, it is clear that such a permission was never taken, granted or ordered. Consequently, FR-II is without basis. In FR-I it has been stated that in the absence of any documents in respect of the financial transactions, the instant case may be treated as a false case. This, then would necessarily imply that after due investigation conducted by a duly authorized person, the conclusion is that the ingredients of the section mentioned in the FIR have not been met and no case is made out. B C 21. In **Paramjit Batra v. State of Uttarakhand[10]** (two-Judge bench) it was observed that the High Court must use its powers under Section 482 only sparingly and to facilitate the ends of justice. It was also observed that the court must see must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court. 22. In **State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal[11]** (two-Judge bench) seven instances were laid out wherein the exercise of either the power of Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the Inherent Powers under Section 482, Cr.PC would be justifiably exercised. They are- D E - _“_ (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. F - (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. G - (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same - 10 (2013) 13 SCC 673 11 1992 Supp (1) 335 H 1152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R. A do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. - (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer - B without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. C - (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. - (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, - D providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. - (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance - E on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 23. These categories of cases have been quoted with approval by a bench of three judges in **Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra[12] .** The principles in respect of the exercise of F power under Section 482 CrPC have been summarised as under: - A. The Police has a statutory right as well as a duty under the Code of Criminal Procedure to investigate cognizable offences; - B. Courts are not to stymie any investigation into a cognizable - G offence; - C. When the perusal of the FIR however, does not disclose any offense of any nature whatsoever, the court is not to permit the investigation to proceed. - H 12 2021 SCC OnLine 315 1153 PEETHAMBARAN v. STATE OF KERALA & ANR. [SANJAY KAROL, J.] - D. The powers under this section are to be used ‘sparingly’ A and with due circumspection. While doing so, the Court ought to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of the cognizable offence or not, without going into the merits of the case. - E. In exercise of this power, it is not for the court to go into B questions of legitimacy or reliability of the allegations made in the FIR/Complaint; - F. Quashing of a complaint should not acquire the stature of the rule, and should be a rarity, and nor should, in exercise of such power, an investigation be unnecessarily cut short; C - G. The Police and the Courts are two distinct organs of the State with perspicuous spheres of activities, with complementary functions, and so, unwarranted interference by the latter into the former’s work is loathe, save in the interest of securing justice and preventing miscarriage thereof; - H. It must be noted that procedure is well establish to deal with an FIR upon which, post investigation, no merit is found, then the officer can file the suitable application to that effect which will be considered by the learned Magistrate seized of the matter; 24. The offence alleged in the FIR is Section 420 IPC which is a serious form of cheating include inducement in terms of delivery of property and/or valuable securities. The ingredients that must be met in order to constitute an offence under the section have been noted by this Court in **Vijay Kumar Ghai and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors.[13]** by a bench of two judges (consisting one of us, Krishna Murari, J.): “35.To establish the offence of cheating in inducing the delivery of property, the following ingredients need to be proved: D E F G (i) The representation made by the person was false. (ii) The accused had prior knowledge that the representation he made was false. 13 (2022) 7 SCC 124 H 1154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R. - A (iii) The accused made false representation with dishonest intention in order to deceive the person to whom it was made. (iv) The act where the accused induced the person to deliver the property or to perform or to abstain from any act which the person would have not done or had otherwise committed. - B 36. As observed and held by this Court in R.K. Vijayasarathy v. Sudha Seetharam [R.K. Vijayasarathy v. Sudha Seetharam, (2019) 16 SCC 739 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 454] , the ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 420 are as follows: (i) a person must commit the offence of cheating under Section C 415; and (ii) the person cheated must be dishonestly induced to: - (a) deliver property to any person; or - D (b) make, alter or destroy valuable security or anything signed or sealed and capable of being converted into valuable security. Thus, cheating is an essential ingredient for an act to constitute an offence under Section 420IPC.” 25. Significantly, no material has been placed on record to show E that the representation made by accused No.1 Babu (now deceased), the present appellant or the de facto complainant, was false or that they had prior knowledge of such representation being false and made only with the intention to deceive. There are only statements to the effect that despite reminders by the seven persons no jobs were secured for them or their wives. The only ingredient out of the four required, being in F the present case is that in the ordinary course, none of the persons would have given the accused any money, and therefore were induced to deliver property which otherwise they would have not. No proof of any financial transaction is on record, much less concerning the present appellant. 26. With only one ingredient being fulfilled and mere statements G made to show dishonest intention or falsity of statement, the threshold of Section 420 is not breached, constituting the offence. 27. Therefore, the first question is answered in the negative. 28. In terms of second question, the above discussion makes clear H that the District Police Chief, Kottayam could not have ordered further 1155 PEETHAMBARAN v. STATE OF KERALA & ANR. [SANJAY KAROL, J.] investigation, as that power rests either with the concerned magistrate A or with a higher court and not with an investigating agency. 29. Given the above, the order dated 6[th] of November, 2019 in Crl. MC No. 6314 of 2018 passed by the High Court of Kerala is set aside and Criminal Case No.132 of 2017 is quashed. The appeal is allowed in the above terms and the pending application(s), if any, stand disposed B of. Nidhi Jain (Assisted by : Rakhi, LCRA) Appeal allowed. C D E F G H