High CourtDivision BenchPartly allowed

Pasupuletti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeals Nos. 2120 to 2122 B of 1972
Neutral Citation:3 S.C.R. 960

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • A. N. Ray
  • K. K. Mathew
  • R. Krishna Iyer
Judgment Date
1975-03-18
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal partly allowed; the revision before the High Court shall stand dismissed; the Rent Controller will take note of the post‑event development disabling the landlord from seeking eviction where an adverse finding already exists; the landlord may amend his petition if there is a case for eviction on any other legally permissible ground; the parties shall be given a fair and full opportunity to file additional pleadings and lead evidence; the finding of legal disability (landlord’s non-residential accommodation) cannot be canvassed again; costs to be borne by the parties as directed. In short, the appellate jurisdiction was exercised to mould relief in light of subsequent events, but within defined limits, and the appeal is partly allowed.
Final Disposition
Partly allowed

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Pasupuletti Venkateswarlu

Respondents

  • The Motor & General Traders

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • K. S. Ramamurthy
  • • M. S. Narayana Achari
  • • C. S. S. Rao

Counsels for Respondents

  • • K. R. Choudhury
  • • K. Rajendra Chaudhry

Case Synopsis & Summary

Pasupuletti Venkateswarlu, the landlord of a large building, rented out portions to several tenants, including the respondent. He sought eviction of the respondent under Section 10(3)(iii)(a) and (b) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. The Rent Controller dismissed the petition. The landlord’s appeal failed, but in revision the High Court remanded the case to the appellate authority. The appellate authority, after hearing the parties, remitted the entire case to the trial Court for fresh disposal, with directions and with permission for further evidence. Instead of concluding, the landlord petitioned again by way of revision to the High Court on the ground that wholesale remittance was illegal and that the High Court, having found the appellate tribunal’s remittal illegal, could not proceed to dismiss the eviction petition. The High Court held that if the landlord’s possession of another accommodation during the pendency of the proceedings had material bearing on the right to evict, then the petition could be dismissed under Section 10(3)(iii). The Supreme Court considered whether a court exercising appellate jurisdiction may take into account events arising after institution of the proceeding to mould relief in the interests of justice, a view supported by UK and US authorities cited in the judgment. Citing Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri and the US cases Patterson v. State of Alabama and Minnesota v. National Tea Co., the Court affirmed that such cognizance is permissible when fairness to both sides is observed. It partially allows the appeal and lays down directions: the revision before the High Court shall stand dismissed; the Rent Controller will take note of the post-event developments limiting eviction; the landlord may amend the petition if there is any other legally permissible ground; and the parties shall be given a fair opportunity to plead and lead evidence. However, the finding of legal disability—the landlord’s prior non-residential accommodation in the town—cannot be reopened. The order closes with “appeal partly allowed.”

Provisions of Law Cited

Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, Section 10(3)(iii)(a)Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, Section 10(3)(iii)(b)

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • The right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding.
  • Procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process.
  • Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fair play is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice.
  • Appeal is by way of a re-hearing; the court may mould relief to give justice, taking into account events and facts after the decree.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

Two submissions were advanced by Sri K. S. Ramamurthy to salvage his client’s case: (i) it was illegal for the High Court to have taken cognisance of subsequent events; and (ii) once the High Court held that the appellate tribunal acted illegally in remitting the whole case to the Rent Controller, it could not go further to dismiss the eviction proceedings. The Court found these submissions lacking in substance, emphasizing that a court may consider subsequent developments that are fair and relevant to the merits in order to render a just and practicable relief, while ensuring that the principles of natural justice are not violated. The decision differentiates between permissible cognizance of post-institution events and any attempt to nullify established findings not reopenable.

Cited Precedents (3)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshiwar Lal Chaudhuri[1940] F.C.R. 85PositiveCited as a leading precedent supporting the power to mould relief by considering events after the institution of proceedings.
Patterson v. State of Alabama294 U.S. 600, 607PositiveUsed to illustrate appellate courts’ ability to correct or modify judgments by considering subsequent developments.
Minnesota v. National Tea Co.309 U.S. 551, 555PositiveCited in support of the principle that relief on appeal may be shaped by later events to achieve justice.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

958 PASUPULETI VENKATESW ARLU _v._ THE MOTOR & GENERAL TRADERS _March_ 18, 1975 ## [A. N. RAY, C.J., K. K. MATHEW AND v. R. KRISHNA IYER, JJ.] _Appellate_ _Jurisdicti'on,_ _exercise_ _of-Court, if_ _can_ _mould_ _reliefs_ _in_ _appeal_ _iy_ _taking_ _into_ _arcount_ _facts_ _subsequent_ _to_ _i11stz'tution_ _of_ _proceedings._ _Andhra_ _Pradesh_ _Buildirrgs_ _(Lease,_ _Rent_ _and_ _Eviction)_ _Control_ _Act,_ 1960, _Section_ 10(3)(iii) (a) _a11a_ _(b)-Revis/011_ _to_ _High_ _Court_ _against_ _order_ _of whole·_ _sale_ _remillal_ _to_ _trial_ _Court-High_ _Court,_ _if can_ _take_ _into_ _account_ _subsequent_ _fact_ _and_ _dismiss_ _the_ _eviction_ _petition_ _also._ ## A. 8 The appellant, a landlord of a large building, had leased out in separate por## c tions his building to several tenants. One of such tenants is the respondent. Tho former resolved to start a businr:ss in automobile spares and claimed eviction of the respond,~nt by Rent <:ontrol proceedings, under~. 10(3)(iii)(a) and (b) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 19.60. The petition was resiste.rl and the Rent Controller dismissed the petition. Tue appeal by the landlord failed but, in revision, the High Court chose to remand the case to· the appellate authority. The appellate authority, after hearing par· ties, remitted the whole case to the trial Court for fresh disposal in accordance with certain dir~ctions and, after allowing parties to lead evidence. Instead of finishing the case at the trial Court level, the landlord preferred a revision to the High Court on the ground that a wholesale rcmittal, as agaimt calling for a finding on a specific point, was illegal. The High Court held that if the fac:t _of_ the landlord having come into possession during the pendency of the proccedingll of Shop No. 2 is to be taken into account, then clearly the petition is no longer maintainabl.e under section 10(3) (iii) of the Act. The inevitable sequel was the dismissal, not only of the civil revision, but also of the eviction petition. D E In this appeal by special leave, _:.i_ was contended for the appellants : (i) It was illegal for the High Court to have taken cognisance of subsequent events; and (ii) Once thi: High Court held-as it did-that the appellate tribunal acted illegally in remit ing the whole case to the Rent Controller, it could not go further to dismiss his whole eviction proceedings. Allowing the appeal partially, HELD : (i) For making the light or rei;nedy, claimed by the party just and F meaningful as also legally and factuallv in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. On both occasions the High Court, in revision, correctly took this view. The la~r recovery of another accommodation by the landlord, during the pendency of the case, has as the Hi&l1 Court twice pointed out, a mMerial bearing on the right to evict, in view of the inhibition written into s. 10(3)(iii) itself. The High Court was right in taking G into consideration the facts which came into being subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. [960 G·H] _Lachmeshwar_ _Prasad_ _Shukul_ v. _Kes/iwar_ _Lal_ _Chaudhuri_ [1940] F.C.R. 85; _Patterson_ v. _State_ _of_ _Alabama,_ 294 U.S. 600, 607 and _Mirnesota_ v. _National_ _1"e«_ _Co._ 309 U.S. 551, _555,_ referred to. (ii) It is unfair to drive parties to a new litigation of unknown duration anJ H therefore, in the special circumstances of this case, it is directed that : (a) the revision before the High Court shall stand dismissed; (b) the Rent Controlle1: will take note of the subsequent development disabling the landlord from seeking eviction on whicb there is already an adverse finding by the High Court; (c) the PASUPULETT _v._ MOTOR TRADERS _(Krishna_ _Iyer,_ _J.)_ 959 A landlord be allowed to amend his petition if he has a case for eviction on any other !egally permissible ground; and (d) the parties be given fair and full op· portunity to file additional pleadings and lead evidence thereon. But the subse· quent event that the petitioner had come by a non-residential accommodation of his own in the same town having been found by the High Court, cannot be canvassed ever again. That finding of legal disability cannot be reopen~d. [961 G-H] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 2120 to 2122 B of 1972, Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 7th April 1972 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in C.R.P. No. 1576-78 of 1971. _K._ _S._ _Ramamurthi,_ _M._ _S._ _Narayana_ _Achari_ and _C._ _S._ _S._ _Rao,_ for C the appellant. _K._ _R._ _Choudhury_ and _K._ _Rajendra_ _Chaudhry,_ for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by D E F H KRISHNA IYER, J.-Once the facts are stated fairly, one is left to wonder what substantial issue of law deserving of adjudication by the Supreme Court survives at all in these appeals. We may straightway proceed to state, with brevity, the case of the appellant presented for our scrutiny and make short shrift of it as it merits little more. The appellant, a landlord of a large building, had leased out in separate portions his building to several tenants. One of such tenants is the respondent. The former resolved to start a business in automo· bile spares and claimed eviction of the respondent by Rent Control proceedings, under s. 10(3) (iii) (a) and (b) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960. The petition was resisted and the Rent Controller dismissed the petition. The appeal by che landlord failed but, in revision, the High Court chose to remand the case to the appellate authority. The litigation lengthened further because the latter, after hearing parties, rerilitted the whole case to the trial Court for fresh disposal. in accordance with some directions and, after allowing parties to lead evidence. Instead of finishing the case at the trial court level, the landlord repeated a revision to the High Court on the perhaps technically correct stand that a wholesale remittal, as against calling for a finding on a specific point, was illegal. While hearing protracted arguments it came to the ken of the court that certain material events of fatal import to the maintainability of the eviction proceedings had come to pass and so it decided to mould the relief in the light of these admitted happenings. The learned judge observed : "If the fact of the landlord having come into possession during the pendency of the proceedings of Shop No. 2 is to be taken into account, as indeed it must be, then clearly t'he peti· tion is no longer maintainable under Section 10(3) (iii) of the Act, as the requisite condition for the invoking of - that provision has ceased to exist viz., that the landlord was net occupying a non-residential building in the town. 'Building', 960 SUPREME CQURT REPORTS [1975] 3 S.C.R. of course means a portion of a building. .As the prerequisite for the entitlement of the petitioner to institute and continue a petition has ceased to eXJst, it must follow that ABA No. 5/1967 is no longer maintainable and must be dismissed." The inevitable sequel was the dismissal, not only of the civil revision, but also of the eviction petition. Thus, after a marathon forensic battle lasting over six years, the landlord lost even the flickering hope of success before the trial Court as a result of supererogatory revision to the High Court. It is against this adverse decision he has, by special leave, come to this Court. Two submissions were advanced by Sri K. S. Ramamurthy to salvage his client's case. He argued that it was illegal for the High Court ro have taken cognisance of subsequent events, disastrous as they proved to be, Secondly, he urged that once the High· Court held-as it didthat the appellate tribunal acted illegally in remitting the whole case to the Rent Controller, it could not go further to dismiss his whole eviction proceedings, a misfortune heavier than would have been, had he not moved the High Court at all. A B D· We feel the submissions devoid of substance. First about the )urisdiction and propriety _vis_ _a vis_ circumstances which come into being subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. It is basic to ow: processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is E . the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the _tis_ has come to court and has a fundamental impact on th': right to relief tor the manner of mould·· ing it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, lt cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decrctal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is violated, with a view to promote subs- F tantial justice-subject, of course, to the ab~ence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power -exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. ~ulings on this point arc legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule arc myraid. We affirm the propooition that for making the C right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realitie8, the court can, and in ;many .cases must. take cautious cognisance of events and developments / ~ubsequcnt to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairv ness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. On both occasions the High Court, in revision, correctly took this view. The later recovery of another accommodation by the landlord, during the pendency of the H case, has as the High Court twice pointed out, a material bearing on the right to evict in tjew of the inhibition written into s. 10(3 )(iii) itself. _We_ lre not disposed to disturb this approach in law or finding of fact. A B # c D . PASUPULETI _v._ MOTOR TRADERS _(Krishna_ _Iyer,!.)_ . 961 - The law we have set out is of <mcient vintage. We will merely refer to _Lachmeshwar_ _Prasad_ _Shukul_ v. _Keshwar_ _Lal_ _Chaudhuri(!)_ which is a leading case on the point. Gwyer C.J., in the above case, referred to the rule ado?ted by the Supreme Court of the United States in _Pat-_ _terson_ v. _State_ _of_ _Alabama(2)_ : ''We have frequently held that in the exerc.!se of our appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct error in the judgment under review but to make such disposition of .the case as justice requires. And in determining what justice does require, the Court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or.in law, which has supervened since the judgment was entered." and said that that view of the Court's powers was reaffirmed once again · in the then recent case of _Minnesota_ v. _National_ _Tea_ Co.( [3] ). Sulaim:m J., in the same case( [1] ) relied on English cases and took the view that an appeal is by way of a re-hearing and the Court may make such order as the Judge of the first instance could have made if the case had been heard by him _at_ _the_ _date_ _on_ _which_ _the_ _ap,peal_ _was_ _heard._ (emphasis, ours). Varadachariar J., dealt with the same point a little more com prehensively. We may content ourselves with excerpting one passage which brings out the poi_gt luminously (at p. 103) : . "It is also on the theory of an appeal being in the nature of a re-hearing that the courts in this country have in numerous cases recognized that in moulding the relief to be granted in a . case on appeal, the court of appeal is entitled to take into account even facts and events which have come into existence E after the decree appealed against." The High Court, in this case, in the concluding stages slightly selfcontradicted itself and observed : 'the civil revision petition cannot be entertained' and proceeded further to state : 'It will not be desirable that I should exercise my discretion in directing an amendment of the petition'. In conclusion, the Court did interfere in revision by setting aside F the order of remittal to the Rent Controller. and dismissing the eviction petition, leaving the near decade-old litigation to be reopened in a fresh unending chapter of forensic fight. The learned Judge gave little comfort to the litigant who had come with a proved case of _bona fide_ requirement to start his own business by his obscure observation : 'If so advised the petitioner may seek to obtain such relief as may be open to him by filing a fresh petition under the appropriate provision of the Act, in G view of the subsequent event of his 111aving come into possession of a portion of the building'. 'We think it unfair to drive parties to a new litigation of unknown duration but direct, in the special circumstances of the case (which are peculiar) that : (a) the re"ision before the High Court shall stand dismissed; (b) the Rent Controller will take note of the subsequent development disabling the landlord from seeking evic-, - tion on which there is already an adverse finding by the High Court; H (I) [1940} F.C.R. 85. (2) 294 U.S. 600, 607. E F G (3) 309 u. s. 551, 555. 15-564SupCl/75 96~ SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19751 -3 s.c:R. ( c) the landlord be allowed to amend his petition if he has a case for eviction on any other legally permissible ground; and ( d) the parties - be given fair and full opportunity to file additional pleadings anq lead evidence thereon. But we make it clear that the subsequent event that the petitioner had come by a non-residential accommodation of his own in the same town having been found by the High Court, cannot be canvassed over again. That finding of legal disability cannot be reopened. We keep open for enquiry only grounds, 1£ any, which may reasonably be permitted by amendment if they are of any relevance or use for eviction. With these observations we partially allow the appeal as indicated above and direct the parties to bear their respective costs. V.M.K. _Appeal_ _partly_ _allowed._ A B # c