Parambath Balakrishnan v. Kuttukkan Suhara

# **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN** **&** **THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.R.ANITHA** **WEDNESDAY, THE 30[TH] DAY OF JUNE 2021 / 9TH ASHADHA, 1943** **RCREV. NO. 97 OF 2020** **AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN RCA 69/2014 OF RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY(ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT-I),THALASSERY** ## **IN** **R.C.P.No.67 OF 2012 OF RENT CONTROL (MUNSIFF) COURT, TALIPARAMBA** ## **REVISION PETITIONER/APPELLANT/RESPONDENT:** PARAMBATH BALAKRISHNAN AGED 63 YEARS S/OL.KUNHAPPU, GILUBA REFRIGERATION, NEAR SYDAR MASJID, TALIPARAMBA AMSOM, TALIPARAMBA TALUK, KANNUR DISTRICT, PIN - 670 141. BY ADVS. MATHEW KURIAKOSE SRI.G.GIREESH ## **RESPONDENT/RESPONDENT/PETITIONER:** KUTTUKKAN SUHARA AGED 44, W/O.MUHAMMED BASHEER, AYISHA, MAHAL, NEAR SYDAR MASJID, TALIPARAMBA AMSOM DESOM, P.O.TALIPARAMBA, TALIPARAMBA TALUK, KANNUR DISTRICT, PIN - 670141. BY ADVS. SRI.M.MUHAMMED SHAFI SMT.T.RASINI **THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 30.06.2021, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 2 ## **ORDER** ## **Anil K. Narendran, J.** This Rent Control Revision arises out of the judgment dated 22.01.2020 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority (Additional District Judge-I) Thalassery in R.C.A.No.69 of 2014 and the order dated 29.01.2014 of the Rent Control Court (Munsiff), Taliparamba. The respondent herein, who is the landlady of the petition schedule rooms bearing Nos.TMCVI-161 and 162 of Taliparamba Municipality, has filed R.C.P.No.67 of 2012 before the Rent Control Court seeking eviction of the petitioner-tenant, from the petition schedule rooms under Section 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, on the ground that the tenant has committed default in payment of monthly rent at the rate of Rs.600/-, for the period subsequent to 31.05.2012. The husband of the landlady wants to start business in grocery articles in the petition schedule rooms and therefore, the landlady is in bona fide need of those rooms for occupation of her husband. The landlady and her husband are not in possession of any other suitable room for that purpose. R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 3 The landlady contended that the tenant is not depending on the petition schedule rooms for his livelihood. Moreover, vacant rooms are available in the locality for the tenant to take on lease. 2. Before the Rent Control Court the tenant filed objection contending that, on 01.08.1991, he took the petition schedule rooms on lease. There is no arrears of rent, as alleged. The need projected by the landlady for her husband to start business in grocery articles in the petition schedule rooms is only a ruse to evict the tenant. Vacant rooms are available for the proposed business. The landlady and her husband have no need to start business, as they have several properties and sufficient source of income. The tenant’s family are living from the income derived from the petition schedule shops. No other suitable building is available in the locality for the tenant to shift his business. 3. On the side of the landlady PWs.1 and 2 were examined and Exts.A1 to A15 were marked. On the side of the tenant RW1 was examined and Exts.B1 to B4 were marked. R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 4 4. After considering the pleadings and materials on record, the Rent Control Court by the order dated 29.01.2014 rejected the prayer for eviction under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act on a finding that the tenant had paid the entire rent and no rent is kept in arrears. On the bona fide need, the Rent Control Court found that PW1, the husband of the landlady, is depending upon her for a vacant room for starting business in grocery items and that, the bona fide need projected in the Rent Control Petition is genuine and that, the landlady is entitled for vacant possession of the petition schedule rooms, since the tenant could not prove that the landlady is in possession of another owned building in the locality. Therefore, the claim of the landlady for eviction is not hit by the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. The Rent Control Court found that the tenant is not entitled for the benefit of the second proviso to Section 11(3). By the order dated 29.01.2014, the Rent Control Court allowed R.C.P.No.67 of 2012 under Section 11(3) of the Act and directed the tenant to handover vacant possession of the petition schedule rooms to the landlady, within one month from the date of that order. R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 5 5. The order of the Rent Control Court to the extent of ordering eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act was under challenge in R.C.A.No.69 of 2014 filed by the tenant before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Thalasserry. The order of the Rent Control Court declining eviction under Section 11(2) of the Act has attained finality, in the absence of an appeal filed by the landlady. The Rent Control Appellate Authority by judgment dated 22.01.2020 dismissed the appeal with cost, by confirming the findings of the Rent Control Court while ordering eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. Feeling aggrieved by the order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act by the Rent Control Court and the Rent Control Appellate Authority, the tenant is before this Court in this Rent Control Revision, invoking Section 20 of the Act. 6. On 28.07.2020, when this Revision Petition came up for admission, this Court issued notice before admission to the respondent. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant and also the learned counsel for the respondent-landlady. R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 6 8. The issue that arises for consideration in this Rent Control Revision is as to whether any interference is warranted on the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court under Section 11(3) of the Act, which now stands confirmed by the judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority. 9. Section 11 of the Act deals with eviction of tenants. As per Section 11(1), notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. As per the first proviso to Section 11(1), nothing contained in this Section shall apply to a tenant whose landlord is the State Government or the Central Government or other public authority notified under this Act. As per the second proviso to Section 11(1), where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy, the Rent Control Court shall decide whether the denial or claim is bona fide and if it records a finding to that effect, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a Civil Court R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 7 and such Court may pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in this Section, notwithstanding that the court finds that such denial does not involve forfeiture of the lease or that the claim is unfounded. 10. As per Section 11(3) of the Act, a landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court, for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him. As per the first proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so. As per the second proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to 8 R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 carry on such trade or business. As per the third proviso to Section 11(3), no landlord whose right to recover possession arises under an instrument of transfer inter vivos shall be entitled to apply to be put in possession until the expiry of one year from the date of the instrument. As per the fourth proviso to Section 11(3), if a landlord after obtaining an order to be put in possession transfers his rights in respect of the building to another person, the transferee shall not be entitled to be put in possession unless he proves that he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him. 11. The bona fide need projected in the Rent Control Petition by the landlady is to get possession of the petition schedule rooms for the occupation of her husband to start business in grocery items. In order to prove bona fide need, the husband of the landlady was examined as PW1, who gave evidence in support of the bona fide need projected in the Rent Control Petition. He has deposed that the petition schedule rooms are convenient for the proposed business. He R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 9 does not have a job or occupation and leading an idle life. At the time of examination he was aged 44 years. 12. In **R.C. Thamrakar v. Nidi Lekha [(2001) 8 SCC 431]** the Apex Court observed that, it is for the landlord to decide how and in what manner he should live and that he is the best judge of his residential requirement. In deciding the question of the bona fide requirement, it is unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself. 13. In the instant case, though the tenant contended that the landlady and her husband have no need to earn income by starting a business, as they are having sufficient immovable properties and other source of income, there is no satisfactory evidence before the Rent Control Court to prove that they are having sufficient source of income. It is for the landlady to decide how and in what manner she should use the petition schedule rooms and that, she is the best judge of her non-residential requirement. As rightly observed by the Appellate Authority, even if it is found that the landlady and her husband are having other sources of income, that is not a R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 10 valid ground to doubt the bona fide need projected by the landlady. 14. Before the Appellate Authority and also before this Court the tenant contended that, the Rent Control Petition does not contain pleadings to the effect that PW1 is a dependant of the landlady. In Para.3 of the Rent Control Petition it is pleaded that, PW1 is depending on the landlady. 15. As per Rule 7(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1979, every application under the Act shall, in addition to the particulars necessary to support it, contain also the particulars prescribed in Rule 12 so far as they may be applicable and every application for eviction under Section 11 or 11 (A) shall also state the grounds on which the application is made. As per Rule 11(8), the Accommodation Controller, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority deciding the dispute shall record a brief note of the evidence adduced by the parties and witness who attend, and upon the evidence so recorded, and after consideration of any documentary evidence produced by the parties, a decision shall be given in accordance with justice, R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 11 equity and good conscience. The decision given shall be reduced to writing. In the absence of any party duly summoned to attend, the dispute may be decided exparte. 16. In **Lainakalillath Kooliyangal Kamarunnisa and others v. A. Shabeer [2019 (4) KLJ 508]** a Division Bench of this Court held that strict rules of pleadings applied to Civil Courts as provided by Order VI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, are not to be imported to a Rent Control Court, since the proceeding before it does not commence by presentation of a plaint. What could be then said as applying to the Rent Control Court are rules of fairness and principles of natural justice. Rule 11(8) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1979 fortifies this view to a certain extent since as per the said provision decision of the Rent Control Court shall ultimately be governed by notions of justice, equity and good conscience. ## 17. In **Prathapan v. Rama Warrier [2004 (2) KLT** **559]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act uses the expression "any member of his family dependant on him". The R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 12 word "dependant" is used as an adjective and it literally means, person who depends on or looks to another for support or favour or for his maintenance or livelihood. Since dependant means depending upon something else, that is, dependant has to satisfy that he is a member of the family. Dependant member must be a member of the landlord's family. With regard to that, two tests have to be satisfied; that he must be a member of the family and consequently that member must be dependant on the landlord and dependency is not financial dependency, but dependency so far as the tenanted premises is concerned. 18. In the impugned judgment, relying on the law laid down in the decision of the Division Bench in **Lainakalillath Kooliyangal Kamarunnisa** , the Appellate Authority rightly found that the pleadings in the Rent Control Petition that PW1 is depending on the landlady is sufficient pleadings for the purpose of seeking eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. 19. Before the Appellate Authority and also before this Court the tenant contended that, in order to prove the alleged bona fide need of PW1, the landlady was not examined before R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 13 the Rent Control Court. On the other hand, the landlady contended that the evidence of PW1 is sufficient to prove the bona fide need projected in the Rent Control Petition. 20. As per Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, notwithstanding anything contained in the said Act, but subject to the provisions of Sections 15 and 15A, a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the court is satisfied that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust that the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the trust. 21. In **Ramkubai v. Hajarimal Dhokalchand Chandak [(1999) 6 SCC 540]** the Apex Court held that, a plain reading of Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 shows that the landlord is entitled to recover possession of any premises if he satisfies the court, inter alia, that the premises are reasonably R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 14 and bona fide required by him for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held. Before the Apex Court it was not disputed that the requirement of the landlady to set up her son Bhikchand in business falls under clause (g) of Section 13(1) of the Act. It was contended that the landlady does not bona fide require the premises to set up kirana business for Bhikchand and that ground is a mere ruse to seek recovery of possession of the premises. The ground of bona fide requirement of the landlady was accepted by the Trial Court but it was negatived by the Appellate Court and the same was confirmed by the High Court. The appellate court was swayed away by the fact that the landlady herself did not come into the witness box to support her claim. What is not appreciated by the appellate court is that her son Bhikchand who was also her general power of attorney holder and for whose benefit the business is to be set up, did come into the witness box to support the case of personal requirement. The appellate court was of the view that the bona fide requirement is in the first place a state of mind and might be something more and that could be R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 15 established only by the landlady. The Apex Court held that the above reasoning of the appellate court could not be supported. The law laid down by the Apex Court is that, where the eviction on the ground of bona fide need was sought for the purpose of carrying on the business of the son, who was the landlady's power of attorney holder, it was sufficient that power of attorney holder son deposed as a witness. 22. In **Joseph Mathew v. Jose Thomas [2005 (4) KLT 764 (SC)]** the Apex Court noticed that, in **Ramkubai [(1999) 6 SCC 540]** the Apex Court was dealing with a case of eviction on the ground of bona fide need. In that case the landlady required the premises in question for carrying on business by her son, who was her power of attorney holder and deposed as a witness on her behalf. In those circumstances, in **Ramkubai** , the Apex Court upheld the order of eviction holding that the evidence of the power of attorney holder, who was son of the landlady, could be taken into consideration for passing order of eviction as the premises was required by the landlady for use of her son R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 16 whose evidence alone could form the basis of eviction order though the landlady herself did not come in the witness box. 23. In the instant case, the landlady sought for eviction of the petition schedule rooms for the occupation of her husband, who was examined as PW1. Therefore, the Appellate Authority rightly held that the evidence of PW1 was sufficient to prove the bona fide need projected in the Rent Control Petition. 24. In **Adil Jamshed Frenchman v. Sardur Dastur Schools Trust [(2005) 2 SCC 476]** the Apex Court reiterated that, as laid down in **Shiv Samp Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta [(1999) 6 SCC 222]** a bona fide requirement must be an outcome of a sincere and honest desire in contradistinction with a mere pretext for evicting the tenant on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family which would entitle the landlord to seek ejectment of the tenant. The question to be asked by a judge of facts by placing himself in the place of the landlord is whether in the given facts proved by the material on record the need to occupy the R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 17 premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere and honest. The concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. As reiterated in **Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal [(2001) 5 SCC 705]** bona fide requirement has to be distinguished from a mere whim or fanciful desire. The bona fide requirement is in praesenti and must be manifested in actual need so as to convince the court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. 25. In **Ammu v. Nafeesa [2015 (5) KHC 718]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, it is a settled proposition of law that the need put forward by the landlord has to be examined on the presumption that the same is a genuine one, in the absence of any materials to the contra. 26. In the impugned judgment, the Rent Control Appellate Authority found that the Rent Control Court after a correct appreciation of the evidence on record upheld the need projected by the landlady as bona fide and accordingly held that the need projected by the landlady to get possession of the petition schedule rooms for the occupation of her R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 18 husband, who was examined as PW1, has been proved to be bona fide. 27. As per the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act, the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so. 28. Before the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority the tenant contended that the landlady i s having possession of other rooms, in an attempt to bring out the application of the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. In para.3 of the objection filed in the Rent Control Petition the tenant pleaded that the landlady is having vacant possession of several rooms. As rightly noticed by the Appellate Authority, the details of the rooms allegedly in vacant possession of the landlady are not pleaded in the objection. The pleading in the objection is confined to the general allegation that the landlady is having possession of other rooms. R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 19 29. The tenant, relying on Ext.B2 certified copy of Building Tax Assessment Register, contended that the landlady is having vacant possession of other rooms. It is shown in Ext.B2 that shop rooms bearing Nos.VI/163 and VI/164 belong to the landlady. Among them, the landlady herself is shown as the possessor of shop room bearing No.VI/163 and one Sainaba is shown as the possessor of shop room bearing No.VI/164. Therefore, the tenant contended that the landlady is in possession of shop room bearing No.VI/164. On the side of the landlady, Ext.A4 licence dated 19.04.2001 issued to one Muhammed Kunhi K.P. and Ext.A5 receipt No.194781 and Ext.A6 Profession Tax receipt dated 25.03.2013 were marked in order to show that the said Muhammed Kunhi has been given licence to run business in shop room bearing No.VI/164. Ext.A7 receipt No.3190978 was marked in order to show that one Ibrahim has been given licence to run business in spare parts in shop room bearing No.VI/163. 30. In **Panoli Alikutty v. Suresh Babu [2018 (5) KHC 621]** a Full Bench of this Court laid down that the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in **Cheruvalath** R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 20 **Krishnadasan v. Addissery Raghavan [2017 (4) KHC 894]** that the entries in the property tax assessment register cannot be taken as conclusive proof of the vacancy position of a building conforms to the provisions of Section 26 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and therefore, in order. The scheme of the Act does not indicate that the legislature intended the parties to a proceeding for eviction under the Act to prove the vacancy or occupancy of a building by producing certified extracts of the property tax or the building tax assessment books of the local authority. The said certified extracts can at best be a piece of evidence and the occupancy of the building needs to be established by the parties by other corroborative evidence. 31. In the impugned judgment, the Appellate Authority held that the plea of the tenant as to application of the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act cannot be upheld on the basis of Ext.B2, in the absence of any corroborative evidence. In the light of the documentary evidence on the side of the landlord, the Appellate Authority found that the shop rooms referred to by the tenant are not in the possession of the 21 R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 landlady, as contended by the tenant. Accordingly, the Appellate Authority rightly found that the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act has no application in the case on hand. 32. As per the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act, the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business. 33. Before the Rent Control Appellate Authority and before this Court the tenant contended that he is entitled to the protection of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. 34. In **Ammeer Hamsa v. Ramabhadran and another [2019 (2) KHC 465]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, it is trite law that both limbs under the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act are conjunctive and the burden of proof is R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 22 on the tenant. Thus, the legal position has been settled by a long line of decisions and the courts below have rightly placed reliance upon those decisions. Vide: **Narayanan Nair v. Pachumma [1980 KLT 430]** , **Prasannan v. Haris [2005 (2) KLT 365]** , **Vineethan v. Fathima and others [2016 (1) KHC 631]** . In view of the legal position well settled by the aforesaid decisions, the landlord is not required to plead or prove other sources of income of the tenant. That apart, income is a fact which remains exclusively in the knowledge of each person only and another person cannot adduce evidence to prove income. Merely on the reason that the landlord has stated that the tenant has other sources of income and he is not mainly depending upon the income from the business carried on in the tenanted premises, for his livelihood and he failed to prove so, the tenant cannot escape from the burden of proof cast on him under the first limb of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. Where the statutory provision itself explicitly imposes the burden of proof on a party to the lis, there cannot be any variation whatever be the pleadings of the other party in that respect. The second proviso to Section R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 23 11(3) is an exception to the principal provision, granting protection to the tenant. When the second proviso itself imposes the burden of proof on the tenant, the question whether the landlord has pleaded or proved the facts constituting the said proviso is insignificant and irrelevant. Even if the landlord pleaded so, the burden of proof will not be shifted to him. Since the second proviso to Section 11(3) is an exception to the principal provision, which would dis-entitle the landlord to get the order of eviction under Section 11(3), the burden of proof, under the said proviso is always on the tenant and unless the burden of proof under the second proviso is discharged satisfactorily, the tenant is not entitled to get protection under the said proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. 35. In the impugned judgment, the Rent Control Appellate Authority found that, with regard to the first limb of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act, there is no satisfactory evidence to bring out the nature of the business being carried out by the tenant in the petition schedule shops. The objection filed by the tenant does not reveal the nature of 24 R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 the business, in which it is pleaded that the tenant and his family are living from the income derived from the petition schedule shops. The tenant, who was examined as RW1, during cross examination stated that he is running an institution, namely, M/s.Giluba Refrigeration in the petition schedule shops. Such a case was not pleaded and proved. No documentary evidence was placed on record to prove that he is running such an institution in the petition schedule shops. No licence or books of account were produced. In the absence of any satisfactory pleadings and evidence in this regard, it was not possible for the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority to arrive at a finding that any income being derived from the business conducted in the petition schedule shops is the main source of livelihood of the tenant. Therefore, as rightly found in the impugned judgment of the Appellate Authority, the tenant failed to bring out the application of the first limb of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. 36. In so far as the second limb of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act is concerned, the case of the tenant to the effect that no other suitable buildings are R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 25 available in the locality for such business is not proved by any satisfactory evidence. As rightly noticed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority, the interested and uncorroborated testimony of the tenant as RW1 is not at all sufficient to prove non-availability of other suitable buildings in the locality for such business and as such, the tenant failed to bring out the application of the second limb of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. Therefore, the Appellate Authority held that the tenant is not entitled to the protection of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. In the impugned judgment, after answering the points for consideration, the Appellate Authority concluded that, after a correct appreciation of the evidence on record, the Rent Control Court ordered eviction of the building under Section 11(3) of the Act and the order of eviction warrants no interference in the appeal. 37. Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act deals with revision. As per sub-section (1) of Section 20, in cases, where the appellate authority empowered under Section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 26 District Court, and in other cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. As per sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, the costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under subsection (1) shall be in its discretion. 38. In **Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana [(1993) 1 SCC 499]** , the scope of revisional powers of the High Court under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 came up for consideration before the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court. While considering whether the High Court could have re-appreciated entire evidence, the Apex Court held that, even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise, the distinction between appellate and R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 27 revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in re-appreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner's report. The High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the word ‘propriety’ it - cannot mean that there could be a re appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 39. In **T. Sivasubramaniam v. Kasinath Pujari [(1999) 7 SCC 275]** the Apex Court held that, the words ‘to satisfy itself’ employed in Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 no doubt is a power of superintendence, and the High Court is not required to interfere with the finding of fact merely because the High Court is not in agreement with the findings of the courts below. It is also true that the power exercisable by the High Court under Section 25 of the Act is not an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a different R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 28 finding contrary to the finding recorded by the courts below. But where a finding arrived at by the courts below is based on no evidence, the High Court would be justified in interfering with such a finding recorded by the courts below. 40. In **Ubaiba v. Damodaran [(1999) 5 SCC 645]** the Apex Court considered the exercise of revisional power by the High Court, under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, in the context of an issue as to whether the relationship of landlord-tenant existed or not. It was urged that whether such relationship existed would be a jurisdictional fact. Relying on the decision in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** it was contended that, however wide the jurisdiction of the revisional court under Section 20 of the Act may be, it cannot have jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding upsetting the finding arrived at by the appellate authority. The Apex Court held that, though the revisional power under Section 20 of the Act may be wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 it cannot be equated even with the second appellate power conferred on the civil court under R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 29 the Code. Therefore, notwithstanding the use of the expression ‘propriety’ in Section 20 of the Act, the revisional - court will not be entitled to re appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of the conclusion of the appellate authority. On examining the impugned judgment of the High Court, in the light of the aforesaid ratio, the Apex Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reappreciating the evidence and in coming to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord-tenant did not exist. 41. In **Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh [(2014) 9 SCC 78]** a Five-Judge Bench of the Apex Court considered the revisional powers of the High Court under Rent Acts operating in different States. After referring to the law laid down in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** the Apex Court reiterated that even the wider language of Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 does not enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. The Constitution Bench agreed with the view of the Three-Judge Bench in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** that the word ‘propriety’ does not confer R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 30 power upon the High Court to re-appreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion, but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 42. In **Thankamony Amma v. Omana Amma [AIR 2019 SC 3803 : 2019 (4) KHC 412]** considering the matter in the backdrop of law laid down in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** , **Ubaiba** and **Dilbahar Singh** the Apex Court held that the findings rendered by the courts below were well supported by evidence on record and could not even be said - to be perverse in any way. The High Court could not have re appreciated the evidence and the concurrent findings rendered by the courts below ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction. 43. Viewed in the light of the law laid in the decisions referred to supra, it cannot be said that the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court, which now stands confirmed by the Appellate Authority, is either perverse or patently illegal or it suffers from any legal infirmity warranting R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 31 interference under Section 20 of the Act. Therefore, we find no reason to interfere with the order of eviction concurrently passed by the authorities below. 44. The learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant would submit that the petitioner is aged around 60 years. Considering the situation prevailing in the country on account of Covid-19 pandemic, the tenant may be given at least one year time to give vacant possession of the petition schedule shops. 45. On the above request made by the learned counsel for the tenant, the learned counsel for the respondentlandlady would submit that a reasonable period of four months may be granted to the tenant for giving vacant possession of the petition schedule shops, on condition that the tenant shall clear the entire dues towards arrears of rent and continue to pay the monthly rent for the remaining period, without any default. 46. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the tenant is prepared to clear the entire dues towards arrears of rent, within a time limit that may be fixed by this R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 32 Court and he shall continue to pay the monthly rent for the remaining period, without any default, till he gives vacant possession of the petition schedule rooms to the landlady. 47. In such circumstances, this Rent Control Revision Petition is dismissed declining interference on the impugned order of the Rent Control Court and the impugned judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority; however by granting six months time to the petitioner-tenant, to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule rooms to the respondentlandlady, within six months, considering the situation prevailing in the Country on account of COVID-19 pandemic, subject to the following conditions: - (i) The respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition shall file an affidavit before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, expressing an unconditional undertaking that he will surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule rooms to the petitioner-landlady within six months from the date of this order and that, he shall not induct third parties into possession of the petition schedule rooms; - (ii) The respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition shall deposit the entire arrears of rent as on date, if any, before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as R.C.R.No.97 of 2020 33 the case may be, within four weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, and shall continue to pay rent for every succeeding month, without any default; (iii) Needless to say that, in the event of the respondenttenant in the Rent Control Petition failing to comply with any one of the conditions stated above, the time limit granted by this order to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule rooms will stand cancelled automatically and the petitioner-landlady will be at liberty to proceed with the execution of the order of eviction. **Sd/-** **ANIL K. NARENDRAN JUDGE** **Sd/-** **M.R. ANITHA** **JUDGE** shg