P. Subairkunju v. State of Kerala & Ors.

1 WPC© 7827/23 # **`IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM`** ``` PRESENT ``` ## **`THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE BASANT BALAJI`** ``` THURSDAY, THE 7[TH] DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2023 / 16TH BHADRA, 1945 ``` ## **`WP(C) NO. 7827 OF 2023`** ## **`PETITIONER/S:`** ``` P. SUBAIRKUNJUAGED 70 YEARSS/O. PAKEERU MOIDEEN, RESIDING AT NIKUNJAM, VANCHIYOOR, VANCHIYOOR, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695035 ``` ``` BY ADVS. NISHA GEORGE GEORGE POONTHOTTAM (SR.) A.L.NAVANEETH KRISHNAN ``` ## **`RESPONDENT/S:`** - `1 THE STATE OF KERALA,REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION, GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001` - `2 THE CHANCELLOR APJ ABDUL KALAM TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY, KERALA RAJ BHAVAN, VELLAYAMBALAM, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695099` - `3 APJ ABDUL KALAM TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY CET CAMPUS, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 016, REPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR., PIN - 695016` - `4 DR. P.K. BIJUMEMBER, BOARD OF GOVERNORS, APJ ABDUL KALAM TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY, CET CAMPUS, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 016 RESIDING AT PARAYAMPARAMPIL, MANJOOR SOUTH P.O., KOTTAYAM DISTRICT, PIN - 686603` - `5 DR. B.S. JAMUNAMEMBER, BOARD OF GOVERNORS, APJ ABDUL KALAM TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY, CET CAMPUS, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695016` - `6 ADVOCATE I. SAJUMEMBER, BOARD OF GOVERNORS, APJ ABDUL KALAM TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY, CET CAMPUS, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 016. RESIDING AT P.AZEEZ HOUSE, KILLI, KOLLODE P.O., KATTAKKADA, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695571` - `7 DR. VINOD KUMAR JACOB MEMBER, BOARD OF GOVERNORS, APJ ABDUL KALAM TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY, CET CAMPUS,` 2 WPC© 7827/23 ``` THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 016 RESIDING AT PAZHUKUDI, RAMALLOOR, KOTHAMANGALAM P.O., ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN - 686666 8 S. VINOD MOHAN MEMBER, BOARD OF GOVERNORS, APJ ABDUL KALAM TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY, CET CAMPUS, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 016, PRIVATE SECRETARY, MINISTER FOR AGRICULTURE, GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001 9 DR. SAJEEV G.MEMBER, BOARD OF GOVERNORS, APJ ABDUL KALAM TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY, CET CAMPUS, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 016. RESIDING AT DOOR NO.2, LALKKAR LANE, SATHYASAI NAGAR, HEMAMBIKA NAGAR, PALAKKAD, PIN - 678009 BY ADVS. S.PRASANTH ELVIN PETER P.J. LAKSHMI RAMADAS N.KRISHNA PRASAD S.GOPAKUMARAN NAIR (SR.)(K/258/1973) P.RAVINDRAN (SR.)(R-341) M.R.SABU(000K/521/1989) APARNA RAJAN(K/851/2009) SREEDHAR RAVINDRAN(K/559/2012) ABHIRAM KARIYADATH(K/000325/2023) P.SHANES METHAR(K/968/2004) BHARATH MOHAN(K/1392/2020) ADVOCATE GENERAL OFFICE KERALA ADVOCATE GENERAL(AG-1) OTHER PRESENT: SRI .GOPALAKRISHNA KURUP - AG, SRI RAMESH BABU SR - R5,6,7 - SRI P.N RAVINDRAN SR - R4 AND R9 SRI V MANU – SR.GP THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 16.8.2023, THE COURT ON 7.9.2023 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ``` 3 WPC© 7827/23 ## **JUDGMENT** (Dated this the 7[th] day of September 2023) The petitioner has approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for a writ of quo warranto against respondent Nos.4 to 9, who are nominated in the Board of Governors and Syndicate of the 3[rd] respondent university, on the basis of APJ Abdul Kalam Technological University (Amendment) Ordinance, 2021 (Ordinance No.39/2021), which was published on 20.2.2021 in the Kerala Gazette. As per the said ordinance, Section 23 of the Principal Act was amended and clause Nos. (iii) and (viii) were inserted. ## The Amendment reads as follows: _(iii). Under the heading “Nominated members” after item (vii), the following item shall be inserted, namely,_ _(viii). Six members from the field of science, industry and higher education nominated by the Government of whom one shall be a woman and one shall belonging to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes_ _**”.**_ 2. On the basis of the said ordinance, respondent Nos. 4 to 9 were nominated as members of the Board of Governors and 4 WPC© 7827/23 Syndicate of the 3[rd] respondent university as per Ext.P2, G.O. (Rt) No.386/2021/HEDN dated 26.2.2021. 3. The members of the Board of Governors are holding public office as the University is a State University established and incorporated for the promotion of technical education in the State of Kerala. Respondent Nos.4 to 9 were nominated on the basis of Ordinance No.39/2021 and they can continue only if the validity of the nominations on the basis of the Ordinance is replaced by an Act. Though the ordinance was replaced by the University Laws and (Amendment) (No.2) Bill 2021 (in short referred to as ‘Bill No.50') has not received the assent of the Governor till date. Therefore, by virtue of Article 213(2)(a) of the Constitution of India, the Ordinance has ceased to operate. Therefore, the respondent Nos.4 to 9, who are nominated under the Ordinance and continuing as members of the Board of Governors and Syndicate of the 3[rd] respondent University, shall cease to hold the office. But respondent Nos.4 to 9 are continuing as members of the Board of Governors and Syndicate and performing the duties and functions attached to the office. They do not have title to continue. Ordinance No.39/2021 was not passed by the Legislature, therefore it was re-promulgated as Ordinance No.50/2021 and thereafter by 5 WPC© 7827/23 Ordinance No.94/2021. The legislature thereafter passed Bill No.50 in the 14[th] Legislature Assembly. But has not received the assent of the Governor, whereby the ordinance has ceased to have effect from 14[th] November 2021. The mere passing of the Bill by the Legislature will not make the Bill an Act until it is assented by the Governor. As such respondent Nos.4 to 9 have no authority to continue in office beyond the period of 6 months after the publication of the ordinance No.94/2021 and are usurpers in law. Therefore, the petitioner has approached this court for the following reliefs:--- “1. Issue a writ of quo warranto as against respondents 4 to 9 as they are continuing in office without authority of law and being usurpers of power; 2. Issue a writ in the nature of prohibition restraining respondents 4 to 9 from continuing and exercising any power as members of Board of Governors and Syndicate of the respondent University under the grab of Ext-P2, as it has lost its efficacy and legal sanction; 3. Dispense with filing of the translation of vernacular documents; 4. Grant such other reliefs as this Court deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 4. A counter affidavit is filed on behalf of the 1[st] respondent, wherein the allegations and averments in the Writ Petition have been denied except to those which are expressly 6 WPC© 7827/23 admitted. The 1[st] and foremost contention raised in the counter is that the petitioner is not personally aggrieved, and he does not have a cause of action to file this writ petition. The petitioner’s fundamental, constitutional or statutory right is not infringed, thereby his _locus standi_ itself is questioned. The Writ Petition ought to have been filed as a public interest litigation and as such, the compliance of Rules 146A, 146AA, 146AB, 146AC and 146AD of the Kerala High Court Rules 1971, are not complied with. Therefore, the Writ Petition is to be dismissed in _limine._ 5. Respondent Nos.4 to 9 are nominated to Board of Governors and Syndicate of the 3[rd] respondent University in accordance with law and on the basis of Ext.Nos.P1 and P2. The petitioner has no contention that respondent Nos.4 to 9 are not qualified or eligible to be nominated. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that they are the usurpers to the Board of Governors and syndicate of 3[rd] respondent University and therefore, no writ of quo warranto is liable to be issued. 6. The 2[nd] relief sought is for issuance of a writ of prohibition. A writ of prohibition will not lie against respondents as it is settled law that the said writ will lie only against judicial/quasi judicial authorities. A Bill to replace 7 WPC© 7827/23 Ext.P1 Ordinance by an Act of the State Legislature could not be introduced in and passed by the 15[th] Kerala Legislative Assembly during its session which commenced on 24.5.2021 and ended on 10.6.2021. On 1.7.2021, Ordinance 39/2021 was replaced by Ordinance 50/2021 and published in Kerala Gazette Extraordinary No.1917 dated 2.7.2021. As per Section 15 of Ordinance 50/2021, all actions taken under the repealed Ordinance No.39/2021 were saved. Ordinance No.50/2021 was also not placed before the Kerala Legislative Assembly during its session, which commenced on 22.7.2021 and ended on 13.8.2021. The Governor in exercise of the power under Article 213 of the Constitution re-promulgated Ordinance No.94/2021 on 23.8.2021 and published in the Kerala Gazette Extraordinary No.2455 dated 24.8.2021. Ordinance No.94/2021 was placed before the Kerala Legislative Assembly on 28.10.2021 and has been passed and placed before the Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution of India for assent. But the Governor has not assented to the Bill till date. The passing of the Bill represents the collective will of the people of the State. The nomination of respondents No.4 to 9 is in public interest as the nomination was a valid nomination through Ext.Nos.P1 and P2. Any interdiction of respondent Nos.4 to 9 from performing their duties and functions as members of the Board of Governors and 8 WPC© 7827/23 Syndicate will adversely affect the affairs of the 3[rd] respondent university and it will not be in the interest of public. Therefore, prayed that this Writ Petition may be dismissed. 7. A separate counter affidavit has been filed by the 3[rd] respondent. It is contended that the allegation in the Writ Petition that though the initial nomination of the party respondents is valid in law, their continuation without any authority, is not legally tenable. The allegation of the petitioner that though Ext.P1 Ordinance was promulgated observing due process of law, the same has not been converted into an enactment, and by lapse of time the ordinance has ceased to operate and therefore, their continuation without any authority is without any substance. The writ petitioner is not an aspirant for a nomination to the post of Board of Governors or Syndicate of the 3[rd] respondent university. The Writ Petition is filed on a mistaken notion that ordinance No.94/2021 has ceased to operate and continuation of the respondents 4 to 9 as members of Board of the Governors and Syndicate, is illegal. Though Ext.P1 ordinance has not been transformed into an Act for want of the assent of the Governor, it will not make nomination of respondent Nos.4 to 9 illegal as the legislation has passed bill No.50 in public interest. 9 WPC© 7827/23 8. The 2[nd] respondent has also filed a statement through the standing counsel. The Bill which was passed by Legislature as bill No.50 of 2021 has not received the assent of the Governor and has not become an Act passed by the Legislature. Ordinance has ceased to operate in view of Article 213(2)(a) of the Constitution of India. Once the ordinance ceases to operate, all its legal consequences are lost. Therefore, respondent Nos.4 to 9 cannot continue as members of the Board of Governors and Syndicate. Respondents 4 to 9 are usurpers in the eyes of law and therefore, writ of quo warranto will lie against them. Though the ordinance promulgated initially as No.39 of 2021, was re-promulgated twice and replaced by a Bill, the Governor has not assented to it and since the bill has not received the assent, it will cease to operate in view of Article 213 of the Constitution of India. 9. A counter affidavit is filed by respondent Nos.5, 6 and 7 to the Writ Petition. Ordinance No.39/2021 was promulgated on 20.2.2021 to make necessary amendments to the provisions of the APJ Abdul Kalam Technological University Act, by which respondents have been nominated to the Board of Governors. The Petitioner is not an aspirant for nomination to the post of Board of Governors or Syndicate. The 10 WPC© 7827/23 Ordinance promulgated did not expire on 14.11.2021 as it has been laid before the Legislature and passed. The Legislature has passed the Bill in public interest and it is the will of the people. 10. Heard the learned senior counsel Shri.George Poonthottam for the petitioner, learned Shri Gopalakrishna Kurup, Advocate General for the 1st respondent, learned counsel Shri Gopakumaran Nair for the 2[nd] respondent, Shri Elvin Peter P J for respondent Nos.3 and 8, senior counsel Shri Ramesh Babu for respondent Nos.5, 6 and 7 and Shri P N Ravindran for respondent Nos.4 and 9. 11. The senior counsel appearing for the petitioner argues that though Ordinance No.39/2021 was replaced by two ordinances, i.e.,50/2021 and 94/2021 and passed by the Legislature on 28/10/2021, since the Governor has not assented to it, the Ordinance has ceased to operate within 6 weeks from the reassembly i.e, 14.11.2021. Therefore, respondent Nos.4 to 9 who are nominated to the Board of Governors and Syndicate through Ext.P1 ceased to become the members of the Board from 15.11.2021 onwards. For a clear and proper understanding of the case, the Articles which are relevant are extracted below. 11 WPC© 7827/23 ## 12. Article 200 of the Constitution deals with assent to Bills, it reads as follows: ## **“200. Assent to Bills** When a Bill has been passed by the Legislative Assembly of a State or, in the case of a State having a Legislative Council, has been passed by both Houses of the Legislature of the State, it shall be presented to the Governor and the Governor shall declare either that he assents to the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President. PROVIDED that the Governor may, as soon as possible after the presentation to him of the Bill for assent, return the Bill if it is not a Money Bill together with a message requesting that the House or Houses will reconsider the Bill or any specified provisions thereof and, in particular, will consider the desirability of introducing any such amendments as he may recommend in his message and, when a Bill is so returned, the House or Houses shall reconsider the Bill accordingly, and if the Bill is passed again by the House or Houses with or without amendment and presented to the Governor for assent, the Governor shall not withhold assent therefrom: PROVIDED FURTHER that the Governor shall not assent to, but shall reserve for the consideration of the President, any Bill which in the opinion of the Governor would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court as to endanger the position which that Court is by this Constitution designed to fill.” 13. Article 213 of the Constitution of India gives power to the Governor to promulgate Ordinance during recess of Legislature, which reads as follows: 12 WPC© 7827/23 **“213. Power of Governor to promulgate Ordinance during recess of Legislature** - (1) If at any time, except when the Legislative Assembly of a State is in session, or where there is a Legislative Council in a State, except when both Houses of the Legislature are in session, the Governor is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require: PROVIDED that the Governor shall not, without instructions from the President, promulgate any such Ordinance if- (a) a Bill containing the same provisions would under this Constitution have required the previous sanction of the President for the introduction thereof into the Legislature; or (b) he would have deemed it necessary to reserve a Bill containing the same provisions for the consideration of the President, or (c) an Act of the Legislature of the State containing the same provisions would under this Constitution have been invalid unless, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, it had received the assent of the President. 2) An Ordinance promulgated under this article shall have the same force and effect as an Act of the Legislature of the State assented to by the Governor, but every such Ordinance- (a) shall be laid before the Legislative Assembly of the State, or where there is a Legislative Council in the State, before both the Houses, and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of the Legislature, or if before the expiration of that period a resolution disapproving it is passed by the Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Legislative Council, if any, upon the passing of the resolution or, as the case may be, on the resolution being agreed to by the Council; and b) may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor. Explanation: Where the Houses of the Legislature of a State having a Legislative Council are summoned to reassemble on different dates, the period of six weeks shall be reckoned from the later of those dates for the purposes of this clause. 13 WPC© 7827/23 (3) If and so far as an Ordinance under this article makes any provision which would not be valid if enacted in an Act of the Legislature of the State assented to by Governor, it shall be void: PROVIDED that, for the purposes of the provisions of the Constitution relating to the effect of an Act of the Legislature of a State which is repugnant to an Act of Parliament or an existing law with respect to a matter enumerated in the Concurrent List, an Ordinance promulgated under this article in pursuance of instructions from the President shall be deemed to be an Act of the Legislature of the State which has been reserved for the consideration of the President and assented to by him. [xxx]” 14. According to the senior counsel, clause 2(a) of Article 213 of the Constitution of India states that every Ordinance shall be laid before the State Legislature or if there is a legislative council in the State and shall cease to operate at the expiration of 6 weeks from the reassembly of the Legislature or before if it is disapproved by the Legislature or the Legislative council, as the case may be. Admittedly, the Ordinance has been laid before the Legislature as Bill No.50/2021 and though it is passed in the Legislature on 28.10.2021, the same has not received the assent of the Governor even after a lapse of so many months, the Ordinance would lapse on 14.11.2021 as the Bill has not been transformed into an Act. Therefore, respondent Nos.4 to 9 who have come 14 WPC© 7827/23 to the office through Ext.P1 Ordinance ceased to occupy the posts, which they hold on the basis of Ext.P1 from 15.11.2021 as being usurpers in the eye of law. They cannot hold on to the post and a writ of quo warranto must be issued to remove them from the said post. Ordinance No.39/2021 was not laid before the Legislature. Even though there was a session of the Kerala Legislative Assembly from 24.5.2021 to 10.6.2021 it was repromulgation as Ordinance No.50/2021 and was not laid before the State Legislature during the assembly session from 22.7.2021 to 13.8.2021. The re-promulgation as Ordinance No.94/2021 though placed before the Kerala Legislative Assembly and passed, it was not transformed to an Act as the Governor has not assented to it under Article 200 of the Constitution of India. Successive re-promulgation is a fraud on the constitution, and by choice it was not placed before the Legislation twice. 15. In support of the said argument, the Senior counsel relied on **Dr.D.C. Wadhwa and others v. State of Bihar and others [(1987) 1 SCC 378].** Reliance is placed on the said decision of the apex court for the proposition that repromulgation of the ordinance repeatedly in a routine manner amounts to usurpation of legislative function by executive and 15 WPC© 7827/23 it is a colourable exercise of power and fraud on the constitution. 16. The senior counsel also relied on judgment of the Apex Court **Krishna Kumar Singh and another v. State of Bihar and Others [(2017) 3 SCC 1].** According to the senior counsel, as per Article 213(2)(a) of the Constitution of India, the ordinance would cease to operate after a period of 6 weeks from the date of re assembly of the Legislature. An ordinance ceased to operate when it has failed to obtain legislature approval being converted into a duly enacted Legislature. Though the ordinance has the same force and effect as the law enacted by the legislature, it will cease to operate after period of 6 weeks from the re-assembly, if it is not transformed into an enactment. An ordinance has a limited life and it is promulgated only during a period in which the legislative assembly is not in session. Therefore, the intention is only to see that once the legislative assembly is called, the ordinance which was promulgated by the Governor has to be laid before Legislature and passed accordingly or disapproved. If it passed by the legislature, it has to be transformed into an Act through the assent of the Governor. Admittedly, though the Bill was passed by the legislature, the same not been transformed into an act as the assent is not given by the Governor. Therefore, the 16 WPC© 7827/23 Ordinance ceases to operate and respondent Nos.4 to 9 have no authority to continue as Board of Governors on the basis of a ceased ordinance. 17. He also relied on the decision reported in on **Rajesh Awasthi v. Nand Lal Jaiswal and others [(2013)1 SCC 501]** for the proposition of _locus standi_ in filing the Writ Petition, He therefore argues that any person can invoke the writ jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if the appointment is in violation of any statutory provision. 18. Even though the constitutional, fundamental and statutory right is not infringed, every citizen has a locus standi to file a writ of quo-warranto and that too not as a public litigation. In such a case, the compliance of Rules 146A, 146AA, 146AB, 146AC and 146AD of the Kerala High Court Rules cannot be insisted upon. The petitioner being a practicing lawyer is therefore entitled to approach this court for issuance of a writ of quo warranto. It cannot be disputed that the post to 17 WPC© 7827/23 which respondent Nos.4 to 9 are nominated are not public offices, because, they are performing public functions and are discharging duties and functions and they are answerable to the public. The 3[rd] respondent university is a State University established and incorporated for the promotion of technical education in the State of Kerala. The post to which the respondent Nos.4 to 9 are nominated are public offices. Secondly, respondent Nos.4 to 9 have been nominated as members of the Board of Governors on the basis of Ext.P1 Ordinance and once the Ordinance has ceased to operate due to operation of law, the party respondents have no authority to continue the said post. Since the two conditions are satisfied, the Writ Petition is perfectly maintainable. 19. The learned Advocate General appearing for the 1[st] respondent/State has argued that the petitioner being a practicing lawyer, has no locus standi to file this writ petition, for issuance of quo warranto as no fundamental, constitutional 18 WPC© 7827/23 or statutory right is infringed but necessarily he can approach this court with a writ of quo warranto as a public interest litigation and in such a case, compliance of Rule 146 of Kerala High Court Rules is mandatory and in the absence of compliance of above Rule, the Writ Petition is not maintainable. 20. The petitioner does not have a case that as on the nomination as Board of Governors on the basis of Ext.P1 ordinance, respondent Nos.4 to 9 were not qualified. Any subsequent event will not give rise to a cause of action for issuance of a writ of quo warranto. Ext.P2 is the order issued by the 1[st] respondent nominating respondent Nos.4 to 9 as Board of Governors and Syndicate. The petitioner has not challenged the said Government Order. Unless and until the government order is challenged, the present Writ Petition for issue of a quo warranto is not maintainable. He argued that an ordinance promulgated under Article 213 of the Constitution of India shall have the same force and effect as an Act of 19 WPC© 7827/23 legislature of the state assented to by the Governor but the only requirement that it shall be laid before the Legislative Assembly of the state and shall cease to operate at the expiration of 6 weeks from the reassembly of Legislature or before the expiration of that period, a resolution is passed disapproving it, or if it is withdrawn by the Governor. So as on the date of nomination on the basis of Ext.P1, the Ordinance has the same force of law and there was no challenge to any of the Ordinances by the petitioner. It is only for the sole reason that there was no statutory violation in the appointment of respondent Nos.4 to 9 on the basis of Ext.P1 ordinance. Once the nomination is valid, and before the expiry of 6 weeks of reassembly of the Legislature, the first ordinance has been replaced by the 2[nd] and 3[rd] Ordinance and has been placed before the Legislature as a bill and passed by the Legislature and awaiting assent of the Governor, the Ordinance will not cease to operate and therefore, the continuation of respondent 20 WPC© 7827/23 Nos.4 to 9, as members of the Board of Governors and Syndicate of the 3[rd] respondent University, is with the authority of law. 21. The learned Advocate General specifically relying on paragraph Nos.90 and 94 of the decision reported in _**Krishna Kumar Singh**_ **(supra)** , argued that even if the Ordinance has ceased to operate it is not void and during the tenure of the Ordinance it has same force and effect as a law by the legislature. 22. The senior counsel appearing for respondent Nos.4 to 9 supported the contentions raised by the learned Advocate General and in addition to that, he argued that once the Legislature has approved the Bill, it will relate back to the date of Ordinance and therefore, it cannot be said that the ordinance has ceased to operate after 6 weeks from the date of reassembly i.e., 14.11.2021. The petitioner has not approached this court with clean hands. Ext.P1 Ordinance was issued on 20.2.2021. 21 WPC© 7827/23 Though it was re-promulgated twice, by Ordinance no.50/21 and 94/21 and even after bill No.50 was passed on 28.10.2021, the petitioner has filed this Writ Petition only on 5.3.2023. This shows that the nomination of respondent Nos.4 to 9, as per Ext.P2 order dated 26.2.2021 was in order and strictly in conformity with the parent Act. The senior counsel also argued that unless Ext.P2 is challenged in this Writ Petition, which is lacking, the reliefs sought for in this writ Petition cannot be granted. 23. The learned counsel, Sri Elvin Peter appearing for 3[rd] respondent argued that once the ordinance is placed before the Legislative Assembly and passed by the legislature, it becomes the will of the people, and it is awaiting assent of the Governor. So it has the same force and effect of an Act of the Legislature and once the assent is granted, it transforms into an Act. So any challenge by way of writ of quo warranto after the Bill has been passed by the Legislature, is not maintainable. The bill was 22 WPC© 7827/23 passed on 28.10.2021 and it was placed before the Governor on 12.11.2021. Since the Bill is passed by the Legislative Assembly there is no question of “ceased to operate” of ordinance. Article 213 clause 2(a) will not come to the aid of the petitioner to contend that the Ordinance has ceased to operate on 14.11.2021. 24. Sri. Ramesh Babu, counsel appearing for respondent Nos.5 to 7 also argued that the Ordinance is not bad in law and the writ of quo warranto will not lie against the respondents. He relied on the judgment of the apex court **Purushothaman Nambudiri v. state of Kerala (1962 KHC 231)** , and argued that a reading of Article Nos.200 and 201 shows that the said Articles do not provide for a time limit within which the Governor or the President should come to a decision on the Bill referred to him for his assent, whereas the constitution itself has made appropriate provisions for time limits which were necessary, namely in Articles 197(i)(b) and 2(b) of the 23 WPC© 7827/23 Constitution of India. The proviso to Article 201 requires the house of the Legislature of the State, When it is remitted with a message from the President for reconsideration within a period of 6 months from the date of receipt of message clearly indicates that the Governor or the President is under any obligation to give assent to the Bill presented before him and it shall not cease to operate. This is the reason why no time limit is prescribed under Articles 200 and 201, which support to the conclusion a bill pending with the Governor or President does not cease to operate as a result of the dissolution of the assembly. Therefore, he argued that once the Bill is passed by the legislature and sent to the Governor for assent even if the assembly is dissolved, the Bill will not cease to operate and therefore nomination of respondent Nos.4 to 9 on the basis of Ext.P1 is valid and the present Writ Petition for issuance of a quo warranto will not lie. 25. The questions that come up for consideration in this 24 WPC© 7827/23 Writ Petition are: (i)Whether the petitioner has locus standi to file this Writ Petition for issuance of a writ of quo warranto? and (ii) whether the ordinance issued by the Governor in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would cease to operate after expiry of 6 weeks from the date of reassembly when the Ordinance has been replaced by a Bill and passed by the Legislative Assembly, but awaiting assent of the Governor? ## **Question No (I)** 26. According to the petitioner, he is a lawyer practicing in Thiruvananthapuram. He has approached this court for a writ of quo warranto against respondents Nos.4 to 9 as they are continuing in office without any authority of law. To invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the applicant should ordinarily be one person, who has a personal or individual right in the subject matter of the application. In other words, there should be an 25 WPC© 7827/23 infringement of his constitutional, fundamental, or statutory right. But writ of habeas corpus or writ of quo warranto are exceptions to the General Rule. A writ of quo warranto can be filed by any citizen under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The two ingredients he has to show before the court is that the person against whom the writ of quo warranto is filed, is holding a public office and the appointment to the said post is against any statutory provision. If these two conditions are satisfied, the court will entertain the Writ Petition. It need not be filed as a public interest litigation. The apex court in in paragraph Nos.19, 31 and 32 of the judgment reported in ## **Rajesh Awasthi (supra).** **19.** A writ of quo warranto will lie when the appointment is made contrary to the statutory provisions. This Court in _Mor Modern Coop. Transport Society Ltd._ v. _Govt. of Haryana_ [(2002) 6 SCC 269] held that a writ of quo warranto can be issued when appointment is contrary to the statutory provisions. In _B. Srinivasa Reddy_ [(2006) 11 SCC 731 (2) : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 548 (2)] , this Court has reiterated the legal position that the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of quo warranto is limited to one which can only be issued if the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. The said position has been reiterated by this Court in _Hari Bansh Lal_ [(2010) 9 26 WPC© 7827/23 SCC 655 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 771] wherein this Court has held that for the issuance of writ of quo warranto, the High Court has to satisfy itself that the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. **31.** From the aforesaid pronouncements it is graphically clear that a citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto and he stands in the position of a relater. He need not have any special interest or personal interest. The real test is to see whether the person holding the office is authorised to hold the same as per law. Delay and laches do not constitute any impediment to deal with the lis on merits and it has been so stated in _Kashinath G. Jalmi_ v. _Speaker_ [(1993) 2 SCC 703 : AIR 1993 SC 1873] . **32.** In _High Court of Gujarat_ v. _Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat_ [(2003) 4 SCC 712 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 565] it has been laid down by this Court that a writ of quo warranto can be issued when there is violation of statutory provisions/rules. The said principle has been reiterated in _Retd. Armed Forces Medical Assn._ v. _Union of India_ [(2006) 11 SCC 731 (1) : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 548 (1)] . So it is evidently clear that any person can move this court under the extraordinary jurisdiction for issuance of a writ of quo warranto even if he has no special or personal interest. It is also stated that delay and latches do not constitute any impediment to deal with lis on merits. Therefore, even if the petitioner's constitutional, fundamental or statutory right is not violated, he can maintain a Writ Petition for issuance of a writ of quo 27 WPC© 7827/23 warranto. The petitioner has satisfied this Court that respondent Nos.4 to 9 are holding public office and the allegation is that they ceased to be members of the Board of Governors as the ordinance through which they became members have ceased to operate due to efflux of time. Therefore, the petitioner has a _locus standi_ to file this writ petition and therefore the Writ is perfectly maintainable. The compliance of Rule 146A of the High court Rules is mandatory only if the Writ Petition is filed as the public interest litigation. Since this Writ Petition is filed not as a public interest litigation, the compliance of Rule 146A of High Court Rules cannot be insisted by this court. Therefore, in view of the declaration laid by the apex court in **Rajesh Avasthi (supra** ), I am of the opinion that the Writ Petition is maintainable at the instance of the petitioner. So the question is answered in favour of the petitioner. ## Question No.2 27. Article 213 of the Constitution of India gives the 28 WPC© 7827/23 power to the Governor to promulgate Ordinance when there is no legislative session. The said power can be invoked by the Governor when it appears to him that immediate action is necessary for the promulgation of the ordinance when the Legislative Assembly is not in session or if the State has two houses, when one of the houses is not in session. The general Rule is that the Legislative Assembly is the Rule making authority. But in order to tide over an emergency or exigency the executive is invoking the power and the government under Article 213(1) has the power to promulgate an ordinance which shall have the same force and effect as an Act of Legislative Assembly. 28. Article 213(2)(a) prescribes that the ordinance promulgated by the Governor shall be laid before the Legislative assembly of the State or where there is a Legislative Council in the State before both the houses and shall cease to operate at the expiration of 6 weeks from the reassembly of the 29 WPC© 7827/23 Legislature or the resolution is disapproved by the Legislative Assembly and agreed by the Legislative Council or withdrawn by the Governor at any time. So, any ordinance promulgated by the Governor has to be laid before the Legislative Assembly to transform it into an Act after passing and through assent of the Governor. Ordinance No.39/2021 was promulgated on 20.2.2021. But the said ordinance could not be pushed through the Legislative Assembly session which commenced on 24.5.2021 for some reason. Therefore in order to keep the ordinance alive, Ordinance no.50/2021 was re-promulgated by the Governor on 2.7.2021 and as per section 15 of the Ordinance, all actions taken under the Principal Act as repealed by Ordinance 39/2021 were saved. A bill to replace Ordinance no.50/2021 also ended with the same fate as it could not be passed by the Kerala Legislative Assembly during its session which commenced on 22.7.2021. Therefore ordinance No.94/21 was re-promulgated on 24.8.2021. But this time, the 30 WPC© 7827/23 Ordinance 94/21 was laid before the legislature as mandated in Article 213(2)(a) of the Constitution of India and it was passed 28.10.2021. It is also on record that the Bill after passing by the legislative assembly has been placed before the Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution of India for assent on 12.11.2021. Though the bill was presented before the Governor for assent, till date assent is not accorded. 29. Article 200 of the Constitution of India speaks about assent to Bills. When a Bill is passed by Legislative Assembly of a State or if it has a Legislative Councils and passed by both the houses, it shall be presented to the Governor and the Governor shall declare that he assents to it or withholds assent therefrom or reserves the Bill for consideration of the President. The 1[st] proviso to Article 200 of the Constitution of India prescribes that the Governor may as soon as possible after the presentation of the Bill for assent, returns the bill if it is not a money Bill with a message to the house to reconsider the bill 31 WPC© 7827/23 or any specified provision or introducing any amendments or withhold the assent there from or reserve it for consideration of the President, if in his opinion if it became of law so derogate from the powers of the high court as to endanger the position which that court is by this constitution design to fill. It is to be noted that in Article 200 of the Constitution of India, there is no time limit prescribed for giving assent to the Bill. It only says that the Governor as soon as possible, returns the Bill with message to the house or withhold assent therefrom. So there is no compulsion on the Governor under the Constitution of India to act within Article 200 in a particular period. Withholding of assent is the prerogative of the Governor and when he withholds the Bill for some reasons, it cannot be said that the Ordinance which was promulgated by him and laid before the legislature as a bill and passed by the legislature, has ceased to operate after the expiry of 6 weeks from the date of reassembly of the Legislature. Once the ordinance is laid before the Legislature as 32 WPC© 7827/23 a bill and passed by the Legislature and as no time limit is prescribed for assent the bill, the Ordinance or the Bill will not lapse under Article 213(2)(a) of the Constitution of India. 30. The decision relied on by the counsel for the petitioner in **Krishna Kumar (supra)** dealt with a situation regarding successive re-promulgation of an Ordinance without laying it before the State Legislature and transforming it into an Act. The apex court, in the said judgment held in paragraph Nos.74, 82, 92, 93 and 94 as follows: “74. Section 6 in its terms applies only to a repeal. An Ordinance ceases to have effect six weeks from the date on which the legislature reassembles (or upon the passing of a legislative resolution disapproving it). An Ordinance which lapses upon the expiry of its tenure of six weeks from the reassembly of the legislature is not repealed as such. Repeal of a legislation results from a positive or affirmative act of the legislative body based on its determination that the law is no longer required. Repeal takes place through legislation. An Ordinance lapses (ceases to operate) when it has failed to obtain legislative approval by being converted into a duly enacted legislation. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act protects rights, privileges and obligations and continues liabilities in cases of repeal of an enactment. The issue as to whether rights. privileges, obligations and liabilities which have arisen under an Ordinance which has ceased to operate would endure is not answered by Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. What then is the touchstone on which this question should be resolved? 33 WPC© 7827/23 82. What then is the effect upon rights, privileges, obligations or liabilities which arise under an Ordinance which ceases to operate? There are two critical expressions in Article 213(2) which bear a close analysis. The first is that an Ordinance "shall have the same force and effect" as an act of the legislature while the second is that it "shall cease to operate" on the period of six weeks of the reassembling of the legislature or upon a resolution of disapproval. The expression "shall have the same force and effect" is prefaced by the words "an Ordinance promulgated under this Article". In referring to an Ordinance which is promulgated under Article 213, the Constitution evidently conveys the meaning that in order to have the same force and effect as a Legislative enactment, the Ordinance must satisfy the requirements of Article 213. Moreover, the expression "shall have the same force and effect" is succeeded by the expression "but every such Ordinance..." shall be subject to what is stated in sub-clauses (a) and (b). The preconditions for a valid exercise of the power to promulgate as well as the conditions subsequent to promulgation are both part of a composite scheme. Both sets of conditions have to be fulfilled for an Ordinance to have the protection of the "same force and effect" clause. Once the deeming fiction operates, its consequence is that during its tenure, an Ordinance shall operate in the same manner as an act of the legislature. What is the consequence of an Ordinance ceasing to operate by virtue of the provisions of Article 213(2)(a)? There are two competing of constructions which fall for consideration. The expression "shall cease to operate" can on the one hand be construed to mean that with effect from the date on which six weeks have expired after the reassembling of the legislature or upon the disapproval of the Ordinance, it would cease to operate from that date. "Cease" to operate in this sense would mean that with effect from that date, the Ordinance would prospectively have no operation. The Ordinance is not void at its inception. The second meaning which can be considered for interpretation is that the expression "shall cease to operate" will mean that all legal consequences that arose during the tenure of the Ordinance would stand obliterated. According to the second construction, which is wider than the first, the consequence of an Ordinance having ceased to operate would relate back 34 WPC© 7827/23 ## to the validity of an Ordinance. 92. We have already expressed our reasons for coming to the conclusion that the basic foundation upon which the decision of the Constitution Bench in Bhupendra Kumar Bose rested is erroneous. The Constitution Bench equated an Ordinance with a temporary act enacted by the competent legislature. This approach, with respect, fails to notice the critical distinction between an enactment of a competent legislature and an Ordinance. The constitutional power of promulgating Ordinances is carefully conditioned by the requirements spelt out in Articles 123 and 213. The power is subject to limitations both of a durational and supervisory character. The intent of the Framers of the Constitution, as reflected in the text of Article 123 and Article 213, is to subject the Ordinance-making power to parliamentary control. The enduring rights theory which was accepted in the judgment in Bhupendra Kumar Bose was extrapolated from the consequences emanating from the expiry of a temporary Act. That theory cannot be applied to the power to frame Ordinances. Acceptance of the doctrine of enduring rights in the context of an Ordinance would lead to a situation where the exercise of power by the Governor would survive in terms of the creation of rights and privileges, obligations and liabilities on the hypothesis that these are of an enduring character. The legislature may not have had an opportunity to even discuss or debate the Ordinance (where, as in the present case, none of the Ordinances was laid before the legislature); an Ordinance may have been specifically disapproved or may have ceased to operate upon the expiry of the prescribed period. The enduring rights theory attributes a degree of permanence to the power to promulgate Ordinances in derogation of parliamentary control and supremacy. Any such assumption in regard to the conferment of power would run contrary to the principles which have been laid down in S.R. Bommai. The judgment in T. Venkata Reddy essentially follows the same logic but goes on to hold that if Parliament intends to reverse matters which have been completed under an Ordinance, it would have to enact a specific law with retrospective effect. This, in our view, reverses the constitutional ordering in regard to the exercise of legislative power. 35 WPC© 7827/23 93. The issue which confronts itself before the Court is whether upon an Ordinance ceasing to operate, either as a result of its disapproval by the legislature or upon its expiry after the prescribed period of six months of the assembling of the legislature, all consequences that have ensued necessarily stand effaced and obliterated. The judgment of Sujata Manohar, J. in the referring order in the present case adverted to the ambiguity inherent in the expression "permanent effect" and "rights of an enduring character". The Bench consisting of Sujata Manohar and D.P. Wadhwa, JJ. being a Bench of two learned Judges, was confronted with the binding effect of the decisions of the two Constitution Benches in Bhupendra Kumar Bose and T. Venkata Reddy. Within the framework provided by the two binding precedents, Sujata Manohar, J. held that the effect of an Ordinance can be considered as permanent when it is irreversible or when it would be "highly impractical or against public interest to reverse it". A threefold test has been laid down: the first is of the irreversibility of effect; the second, the impracticality of reversing a consequence which has ensued under the Ordinance and the third, is the test of public interest. The principle which we will lay down is not constrained by the two Constitution Bench decisions which propounded the enduring rights theory, once we have held that the theory has been incorrectly lifted from the context of a temporary law and applied to the Ordinance-making power. 94. The judgment of Sujata Manohar, J. does indicate (as one commentator on the subject States), that the learned Judge "is willing to engage in some form of heightened scrutiny". Yet, the threefold test of irreversibility, impracticality or public interest may, if broadly applied, cover almost every situation where an Ordinance has ceased to operate. A demolition may have been effected. An order of conviction may have been passed upon a trial. An acquisition of an industrial undertaking may be made. Large-scale regularisation of contractual or casual employees may be effected. Legalisation of unauthorised structures may be made. A myriad different situations can be contemplated. Must every action under an Ordinance produce binding rights, obligations and liabilities which will survive its demise? In our view, in determining the issue the overarching consideration must be the element of public 36 WPC© 7827/23 interest or constitutional necessity. Ultimately, it is this element of public interest which would have guided the Court in Bhupendra Kumar Bose' in holding that the validation of an election by an Ordinance should not be set at naught (though the logic adopted by the Court was flawed). Bhupendra Kumar Bose also raises troubling aspects independently on its facts because in that case a Bill which was moved before the State Legislature to incorporate provisions similar to those of the Ordinance was defeated. Be that as it may, in deciding to mould the relief, the effort of the Court would be to determine whether undoing what has been done under the Ordinance would manifestly be contrary to public interest. Impracticality and irreversibility in that sense are aspects which in subsumed in the considerations which weigh in the balance while deciding where public interest lies. Impracticality cannot by itself be raised to an independent status because it would then be simple enough for the executive to assert the supposed complexities in undoing the effects of an Ordinance. Since the basic constitutional value which is at issue is of parliamentary supremacy and control, the moulding of relief can be justified in cases involving grave elements of public interest or constitutional necessity demonstrated by clear and cogent material.” 31. The apex court, in the above decision, has taken note of the successive re-promulgation of the Ordinance without laying it before the State Legislature. The Ordinance making power given to the Governor is to tide over an emergency situation when the Legislative Assembly is not in session. Once the Ordinance is promulgated, necessarily it has to be placed before the State Legislature so that the legislature has an opportunity to debate and discuss on the Ordinance and to pass 37 WPC© 7827/23 it or disapprove it. Without laying it before the Legislature and re-promulgating the Ordinance, was held to be not the spirit of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the apex court has held that a responsibility is cast on the Governor of the State by the Constitution to promulgate or re-promulgate an Ordinance, only if he is satisfied of the existence of circumstances rendering immediate action necessary. 32. At this point, it is important to note that the petitioner has no case nor has challenged the Ordinances issued by the Governor as Ordinance No.39/2021, 50/2021 and 94/2021. His cause of action for filing the Writ Petition arises only after passing of the Bill by the Legislature on 28.10.2021 and after it is presented before the Governor for assent. Because of the fact that the assent is not accorded by the Governor, till date the petitioner contends that the Ordinance has ceased to operate on the expiry of 6 weeks from the date of reassembly i.e., 14.11.2021. Moreover, Ext.P2 is the order of the 1[st] respondent dated 26.2.2021, nominating respondent Nos.4 to 9 as members of Board of members and syndicate of the 3[rd] respondent university. As I have stated earlier, the Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution of India can withhold the assent without returning it to the house or reserving it for the consideration of 38 WPC© 7827/23 the President. No time limit is prescribed in Article 200 of the Constitution of India to act on the Bill for assent. At this juncture, it is worthwhile to note that article 201 of the Constitution of India deals with the bills reserved for consideration. It deals situation where the Governor reserves the Bill for consideration of the President. Once the President declares his assent or withhold the assent, the President may direct the Governor to return the Bill to the house together with a message as mentioned in the 1[st] proviso to Article 200 of the Constitution of India and when the bill is so returned, the house or houses shall reconsider it accordingly, within a period of 6 weeks from the date of receipt of 6 months as if it has been again passed by the house or houses. In **Purushothaman Nambudiri (supra),** the apex court has held in paragraph 15 as follows: It is clear that if a Bill pending the assent of the Governor or the President is held to lapse on the dissolution of the Assembly it is not unlikely that a fair number of Bills which may have been passed by the Assembly, say during the last six months of its existence, may be exposed to the risk of lapse consequent on the dissolution of the Assembly, unless assent is either withheld or granted before the date of the dissolution. If we look at the relevant provisions of Art.200 and 201 from this point of view it would be significant that neither Article provides for a time limit within which the Governor or the President should come to a decision on the Bill referred to him for his assent. Where it appeared necessary and expedient to prescribe a time limit the Constitution has made appropriate provisions in that behalf (vide Art. 197 [1][b] and [2] [b]. In fact the proviso to Art.201 39 WPC© 7827/23 requires that the House to which the Bill is remitted with a message from the President shall reconsider it accordingly within a period of six months from the date of the receipt of such message. Therefore, the failure to make any provision as to the time within which the Governor or the President should reach a decision may suggest that the Constitution-makers knew that a Bill which was pending the assent of the Governor or the President did not stand the risk of lapse on the dissolution of the Assembly. That is why no time limit was prescribed by Art.200 and 201. Therefore, in our opinion, the scheme of Art.200 & 201 supports the conclusion that a Bill pending the assent of the Governor or the President does not lapse as a result of the dissolution of the Assembly, and that incidentally shows that the provisions of Article 196(5) are exhaustive. 33. Once the legislature has passed a bill brought in through an Ordinance it is the Will of the people and it is a constitutional necessity also. Successive re-promulgation is not barred by the Constitution and Ordinance ceases to operate if not passed by the legislature within 6 months from the reassembly of the legislature. Article 174 of the constitution of India states that the Governor shall from time to time summon the house or each house of Legislature of the State to meet as such time and place as he thinks fit. But 6 months shall not be intervened between its last sitting in one session and the date 40 WPC© 7827/23 appointed for its first sitting in the next session. Therefore, the Assembly has to meet within 6 months of its last session and a reading of Article 174 and 213 of the Constitution of India would show that the maximum life of an Ordinance can only be 7 ½ months. This 7 ½ months is applicable to any Ordinance which has not been passed by the Legislature, but since the ordinance has been placed before the Legislature and passed by it, the time period of 7 ½ months as the life of ordinance is not applicable to the fact of this case. The Constitution limits the duration of the ordinance but does not limit the number of times the power can be exercised by the Governor on the same subject. 34. Therefore, the conclusion that can be arrived at is since no time limit is prescribed under Articles 200 of the Constitution of India, the Bill presented for assent to the Governor shall not cease to operate after the expiry of six weeks of the re assembly as argued by the counsel for the petitioner. The Ordinance No.94/2021 was laid before the 41 WPC© 7827/23 legislature and passed on 28.10.2021 and has been placed before the Governor for assent. So, the Ordinance will not lapse on 14.11.2021. Merely because the Governor has withheld the assent for a considerable period of time, it cannot be said that the ordinance has ceased to operate. Therefore, going by the dictum laid down by the apex court in decisions mentioned above and constitutional provision especially 200, 201 and 213 of the Constitution of India, the only conclusion that can be arrived by this court is that the Ordinance which was promulgated by the Governor will not lapse on 14.11.2021. Therefore, the continuation of respondent Nos.4 to 9 as members of Board and Syndicate of the 3[rd] respondent University, is legal and in order. The grounds raised by the petitioner in this Writ Petition are not sufficient for the issuance of a writ or quo warranto. The conclusions can be summarised as follows: ## (i) The petitioner, whose fundamental, constitutional 42 WPC© 7827/23 or statutory rights, though not infringed and who has not raised any claim, as a nominee for the Board of Governors can maintain this writ petition for a writ of quo warranto. - (ii) Article 200 of the Constitution does not prescribe a time limit for the Governor to give assent to the bill and therefore once the bill laid before the legislature is passed being the will of the people, the ordinance promulgated will not cease to operate. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to reliefs sought for, and accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. Sd/- **BASANT BALAJI, JUDGE** _dl/_ 43 WPC© 7827/23 ## **`APPENDIX OF WP(C) 7827/2023`** ``` PETITIONER EXHIBITS ``` ``` Exhibit-P1 TRUE COPY OF THE APJ ABDUL KALAM TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY (AMENDMENT) ORDINANCE, 2021 (ORDINANCE NO. 39/2021) ISSUED IN THIS REGARD AND PUBLISHED IN THE KERALA GAZETTE ON 20.02.2021. ``` ``` Exhibit-P2 TRUE COPY OF THE GOVERNMENT ORDER BEARING G.O.(RT)NO. 386/2021/HEDN DATED 26.02.2021, BY WHICH RESPONDENTS 4 TO 9 HAVE BEEN NOMINATED TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS AND THE SYNDICATE OF THE 3RD RESPONDENT UNIVERSITY ``` ``` RESPONDENT EXHIBITS ``` ``` Exhibit R1(c) A true photocopy of the University (Amendment) (No.2) Bill, 2021 passed by the Kerala Legislative Assembly on 28.10.2021 ``` ``` Exhibit R1(b) A true photocopy of the English translation of Ordinance No. 94 of 2021 published under the authority of the Honourable Governor. ``` ``` Exhibit R1(a) A true copy of the English translation of Ordinance No.50 of 2021, published under the authority of the Honourable Governor ```