P. Sasindran v. Chairman, Regional Transport Authority, Kannur and Others

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.T.RAVIKUMAR** **&** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE K.HARIPAL** **THURSDAY, THE 15TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2020 / 23RD ASWINA, 1942** **WA.No.2655 OF 2017** **AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN WPC 8265/2017 DATED 04-07-2017 OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA** ## **APPELLANT/5TH PETITIONER:** **P.SASINDRAN AGED 64 YEARS, S/O KUMARAN, SREEVALSAM,CHOVVA P.O., KANNUR-670 006.** **BY ADVS. SRI.G.S.KRISHNAN KARTHA SRI.LIJIN THAMBAN SRI.M.RETHEESH KUMAR SRI.SANJAY THAMPI** ## **RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS ANDN PETITIONERS 1 TO 4 & 6:** - **1 CHAIRMAN, REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, KANNUR PIN-670 002.** - **2 THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY KANNUR REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, RTO OFFICE,KANNUR, PIN:670 002.** - **3 THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT OFFICER RTO OFFICE, KANNUR, PIN:670 002.** - **4 THE SECRETARY KANNUR MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, KANNUR DISTRICT, PIN-670 001.** **5 THE MAYOR KANNUR MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, KANNUR DISTRICT, PIN:670 001.** W.A.No.2655/2017 :2: - **6 SWETHANTHRA AUTORIKSHAW THOZHILALI UNION (SATU) AFFILIATED TO H.M.S/35/2007, SAFIYA TOWER, YOGASALA ROAD, KANNUR, PIN:670 001, REPRESENTED BY ITS DISTRICT SECRETARY N. LAKSHMANAN, S/O KANNAN.** - **7 AUTO DRIVERS UNION** - **INDIAN NATIONAL TRADE UNION CONGRESS (INTUC), KANNUR DIVISION COMMITTEE, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT K. RAJEEVAN, S/O RAGHAVAN, INTUC OFFICE PORT ROAD, KANNUR.** - **8 DRIVERS UNION** - **SWETHANTHRA THOZHILALI UNION (STU)REPRESENTED BY ITS TREASURER K.ASHRAF,S/O MUHAMMED, STU OFFICE, KANNUR, MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE OF STU, MARKET ROAD, KANNUR.** - **9 JAYARAJAN C.K S/O BAPPU, AGED 50 YEARS, CHALIL VEEDU-6, MUNDERI P.O. ECHOOR, KANNUR-670591.** - **10 SANOOP O., S/O SAHADEVAN, AGED 36 YEARS, KEERAKKARAN HOUSE, P.O. ALAVIL, KANNUR-670 008.** - **R1-3 BY SR.GOVT. PLEADER SRI. T.K. ANANDAKRISHNAN R4-5 BY ADV. SMT.M.MEENA JOHN, SC, KANNUR MUNICIPAL CORPORATION** **R6-10 BY ADV. SRI.M.JAYAKRISHNAN** **THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 18-06-2020, THE COURT ON 15-10-2020 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** W.A.No.2655/2017 :3: ## **JUDGMENT** ## **Haripal, J.** On 31/12/2016 the Mayor, Corporation of Kannur convened a meeting of leaders of political parties of the Council, Circle Inspector, Regional Transport Authority and among other things, resolved to grant city permit to autorikshaws which were allotted parking in the Corporation limit by assigning KC number, which stands for Kannur Corporation, substituting KMC number, abbreviation of Kannur Municipal Corporation. It appears that the above change in the nomenclature became necessary after the Kannur Corporation was formed taking portions of the Kannur Municipality. It was also resolved that the above resolution shall be sent to the Regional Transport Officer for follow-up action. Thereafter, on 03/03/2017, the Regional Transport Officer, Kannur sent an intimation requesting the District Information Officer which suggests that, on the basis of the decision of the Corporation, facilitating the assignment of KC numbers, applications will be W.A.No.2655/2017 :4: invited from 08/03/2017 onwards. It was also stated that the applications should be accompanied by a testimonial from the Corporation Councilor as well. Aggrieved by the above, three registered trade unions, claiming to be representing the interests of autorikshaw employees, moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking to quash the above said resolution and the communication dated 03/03/2017, branding it as illegal, arbitrary and discriminatory. They contended that Exts.P4 and P5 documents usurp into the powers of the Regional Transport Authority under Rule 133 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. They also placed reliance on the decision reported in **Sunil Kumar and others v. State of Kerala and others [2015 (3) KHC 230]** . 2. The learned single Judge, after hearing both sides, by the impugned judgment, held that the direction in Ext.P5 insisting production of recommendation of the councilor is not in accordance W.A.No.2655/2017 :5: with law and thus that part of the document was quashed and the respondents were directed to consider the applications submitted by the petitioners in accordance with law, after providing sufficient opportunity of hearing to all concerned, including Kannur Municipal Corporation, and take decisions on the applications within six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment. Now, the appellant, who is the 5[th] petitioner in the above writ petition has preferred this appeal under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act. 3. We heard the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Standing Counsel for the Municipal Corporation and the learned Government Pleader. 4. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the respondents have adopted a wrong procedure, the authority to issue permit is the Regional Transport Authority as provided under W.A.No.2655/2017 :6: Section 74 of the Motor Vehicles Act, now the powers of the RTA are tried to be usurped on political considerations and political dictates cannot be allowed to hold the field. He pointed out that the Regional Transport Authority is a quasi judicial authority whereas political interests would creep in when the powers are taken over by the Corporation and the councilors and others, which is illegal. He also placed reliance on the decision reported in **Pancham Chand and Others v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others [2008 (2) KHC 147]** . We cannot comprehend as to how the decision will apply to the facts of the case. There, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with a case in which the Chief Minister had endorsed an application for stage carriage permit. Here, the appellant does not have such a case, even though it was alleged that recommendation of the councilor was intended to achieve political ends. But, in the light of the judgment of the learned single Judge, such an apprehension cannot survive since that part of Ext.P5 stands quashed. W.A.No.2655/2017 :7: 5. Ext.P4, as adverted to earlier, is a resolution passed by a meeting chaired by the Mayor of the Corporation, which was participated by council members, leaders of political parties, Inspector of Police and the Regional Transport Officer. Among other things, the meeting resolved to instruct the Regional Transport Officer to grant permits to autorikshaws which were to be plied and parked within city limits. Similarly, Ext.P5 is a communication sent by the Regional Transport Officer to the District Information Officer for publicizing an intimation pursuant to the suggestions of the Corporation to assign KC numbers to autorikshaws, which were allowed to be operated within Corporation limits. 6. We have no doubt that Ext.P4 or Ext.P5 does not transgress into the powers of the Regional Transport Authority. W.A.No.2655/2017 :8: We need not have to say that a contract carriage permit is given under Section 73 of the Motor Vehicles Act controlled by Section 74 of the Act. It is very patent that the Authority conferred with the power for granting permit to an autorikshaw is the Regional Transport Authority. Sub-section (2) of Section 74 of the Act enumerates conditions under which such carriage permit is granted by the Authority. The proviso to Section 74(1) makes it abundantly clear that such permit shall not be granted in respect of any area not specified in the application. 7. As noticed earlier, there is absolutely nothing to decipher that Ext.P4 or Ext.P5 surpasses the statutory powers conferred on the Regional Transport Authority. What was untenable in Ext.P5 was the direction to obtain certificate from the councilor. As it went against the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, the learned single Judge quashed that direction W.A.No.2655/2017 :9: and thereafter nothing survives for consideration warranting interference by this Court in appeal. It appears that the appellant is still reeling under the notion that the Corporation has taken up the task of granting permit. But, in the light of the provisions under Sections 73 and 74 of the Motor Vehicles Act, any such apprehension is out of place. In the circumstance, the appeal is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. Dismissed. No costs. Sd/- ## **C.T. RAVIKUMAR, JUDGE** Sd/- ## **K. HARIPAL, JUDGE** //True copy// P.S. to Judge **okb/19/06/2020**