High Court of KeralaSingle JudgeQuashed (Crl.M.C. allowed; Annexure-A1 final re...

P. Muhammed Ajmal v. State of Kerala

Case / Petition Number:Crl.M.C. No. 1561 of 2013
Neutral Citation:/

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • C. T. Ravikumar
Judgment Date
2013-04-11
Court Decision / Holding
Crl.M.C. allowed. Annexure-A1 final report in Crime No. 103/2009 of Hosdurg Police Station and all further proceedings against the petitioner in S.C.No.49 of 2012 on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge (Adhoc-II), Kasaragod are quashed.
Final Disposition
Quashed (Crl.M.C. allowed; Annexure-A1 final report and all further proceedings quashed)

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • P. Muhammed Ajmal

Respondents

  • The State of Kerala through the Station House Officer, Hosdurg Police Station, represented by the Public Prosecutor, High Court of Kerala
  • T. Shaji, S/o. Gangadhar, Residing at Krishna Nilayam House, North Kottachery, Bella Village, Hosdurg Taluk, Kasaragod District

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Sri. T. Madhu
  • • Smt. C. R. Saradamani

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Smt. Seena Ramakrishnan
  • • Smt. Bindumol Joseph

Case Synopsis & Summary

This is a Kerala High Court criminal misc. case (Crl.M.C. No. 1561 of 2013) challenging the final report and continuation of trial in S.C. No. 49 of 2012 arising from Hosdurg Police Station Crime No. 103/2009. The sixth accused, P. Muhammed Ajmal, seeks to quash the final report (Annexure-A1) and all further proceedings against him in S.C. No. 49 of 2012, on the premise that the substratum of the prosecution has been lost after the acquittal of co-accused (Annexure-A2) and a subsequent settlement affidavit by the injured defacto complainant (Annexure-A4). The court analyzes whether this scenario falls within the exception carved out by the Full Bench in Moosa v. Sub Inspector of Police (2006 (1) KLT 552 (F.B.)) that the substratum may be lost, thereby justifying discharge or quashing. It notes the prosecution’s limited evidence (two witnesses PW1 and PW2, with PW2 hostile) and the absence of a specific overt act against the petitioner, who is implicated only through Section 149 IPC. The court also considers Amar Singh and others v. State of Punjab, Maiku and others v. State of U.P., and Gian Singh v. State of Punjab to assess the impact of co-accused acquittals on the law of unlawful assembly (Section 141 IPC) and the necessity to continue proceedings. Relying on these authorities and the test of substratum, the court invokes its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to terminate the proceedings and quash the final report and all further actions against the petitioner.

Provisions of Law Cited

IPC Sections 143, 147, 148, 341, 326 and 307 read with Section 149 IPCSection 149 IPCSection 141 IPC (unlawful assembly)Cr.P.C. 482

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
  • Substratum of the prosecution case
  • Five or more persons required for unlawful assembly under Section 141 IPC
  • Duty of High Courts to terminate unnecessary criminal proceedings (Gian Singh)

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The petitioner contends that once Annexure-A2 acquittal of co-accused renders the substratum of the case lost, the continued prosecution falls within the exception recognized in Moosa’s case, and the High Court should exercise its inherent power to terminate the proceedings. He relies on the lack of independent eyewitnesses, the inconsistent testimony of PW1 and the unaided declarant in Annexure-A4, and the absence of any overt act by the petitioner. He argues that the case cannot sustain conviction under Section 149 IPC in the absence of five persons and that continuing proceedings would be futile.

Contentions of Respondents

The State and the co-accused contend that acquittal of some co-accused does not automatically erase the prosecution’s substratum; the trial must consider the available evidence, and that the second respondent’s settlement cannot undermine the integrity of the charge. They urge that the law relating to unlawful assembly (Section 141 IPC) and the involvement of multiple accused under Section 149 IPC remains applicable, and that the proceedings should not be quashed solely on the acquittal of others.

Cited Precedents (4)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Moosa v. Sub Inspector of Police2006 (1) KLT 552 (F.B.)PositiveFull Bench recognized an exception that substratum may be lost, justifying termination of proceedings; the present case relies on this to evaluate substratum.
Amar Singh and others v. State of PunjabAIR 1987 SC 826PositiveApex Court held that when the number of surviving accused falls below five, unlawful assembly may not be constituted; used to argue about Section 141 IPC applicability.
Maiku and others v. State of U.P.AIR 1989 SC 667PositiveSimilar principle on surviving accused under unlawful assembly; used to support the substratum analysis.
Gian Singh v. State of Punjab2012 (4) KLT 108 (SC)PositiveHigh Courts must prevent continuation of absolutely unnecessary criminal proceedings; basis for terminating proceedings under 482 Cr.P.C.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

## IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.T.RAVIKUMAR THURSDAY, THE 11TH DAY OF APRIL 2013/21ST CHAITHRA 1935 Crl.MC.No. 1561 of 2013 () --------------------------AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN SC 49/2012 of ADDL.SESSIONS COURT (ADHOC-II)KASARAGOD CRIME NO. 103/2009 OF HOSDURG POLICE STATION , KASARGOD PETITIONER/6TH ACCUSED : ------------------------------ P.MUHAMMED AJMAL, AGED 24 YEARS S/O. IBRAHIM, RESIDING AT AMINAS HOUSE, ATHINHAL AJANOOR VILLAGE, HOSDURG TALUK, KASARAGOD DISTRICT. BY ADVS.SRI.T.MADHU SMT.C.R.SARADAMANI RESPONDENTS/STATE & COMPLAINANT : -------------------------------------------- 1. THE STATE OF KERALA THROUGH THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER HOSDURG POLICE STATION REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM-682 031. 2. T.SHAJI , AGED 34 YEARS S/O. GANGADHARAN, RESIDING AT KRISHNA NILAYAM HOUSE NORTH KOTTACHERY, BELLA VILLAGE, HOSDURG TALUK KASARAGOD DISTRICT-671 531. R2 BY ADV. SMT.BINDUMOL JOSEPH R1 BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SMT.SEENA RAMAKRISHNAN THIS CRIMINAL MISC. CASE HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 1104-2013, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY PASSED THE FOLLOWING: Crl.MC.No. 1561 of 2013 () --------------------------- ## APPENDIX ## PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS --------------------------- ANNEXURE A1 : CERTIFIED COPY OF THE FINAL REPORT IN CRIME NO.103/2009 OF HOSDURG POLICE STATION. ANNEXURE A2 : COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DTD.21.3.2013 IN SC NO.203/2010 ON THE FILE OF THE LEARNED ADDITIONAL SESSIONS COURT, (ADHOC-II), KASARAGOD. ANNEXURE A3 : TRUE CERTIFIED COPY OF THE MEMO EVIDENCE IN CRIME NO.103/2009 OF HOSDURG POLICE STATION. ANNEXURE A4 : AFFIDAVIT DTD.30.3.2013 SWORN IIN BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT. RESPONDENTS EXHIBITS : NIL ----------------------------- // TRUE COPY // TKS P.S. TO JUDGE ## **C.T.RAVIKUMAR, J.** ---------------------------- Crl.M.C.No.1561 of 2013 ---------------------------Dated 11[th] April, 2013 ## **ORDER** The petitioner is the sixth accused in S.C.No.49 of 2012 on the files of the Court of Additional Sessions Judge (Adhoc-II), Kasaragod arising from Crime No.103 of 2009 of Hosdurg Police Station. The petitioner and his co-accused were charge sheeted for commission of offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 341, 326 and 307 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The gist of the allegation against them is that on 4.2.2009 at about 10.30 p.m. accused Nos.1 to 7 who are the Indian Union Muslim League sympathizers, on account of political enmity towards the second respondent who is a CITU worker, formed themselves into an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons such as sword, iron rod etc., and in prosecution of their common object wrongfully restrained the second respondent at the public road in Padikkan in Ajanoor village and unleashed attack on him. In the said attack the defacto complainant sustained injuries on his left hand and left leg. Accused Nos.1, 3 and 5 in the aforesaid crime stood the trial before the Court of Additional Sessions Judge (Adhoc-II), Kasaragod in S.C.No.203 of 2010 and they were acquitted as per Annexure-A2 judgment. This petition carrying the prayer for quashing Anexure-A1 final report and all further Crl.M.C.No.1561/2013 2 proceedings pursuant thereto against the petitioner in S.C.No.49 of 2012 on the file of the Court of Additional Sessions Judge (Adhoc-II), Kasaragod is made on the strength of Annexure-A2 judgment and Annexure-A4 affidavit sworn in by the second respondent/defacto complainant who is the sole injured in the alleged attack. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent and also the learned Public Prosecutor. 3. As noticed hereinbefore, the main contention of the petitioner is that with the pronouncement of Annexure-A2 judgment of acquittal in respect of accused Nos.1, 3 and 5 who are the co-accused of the petitioner the very substratum of the prosecution case is lost and in the said circumstances it is a case falling within the exception carved out by the Full Bench of this Court in **Moosa v. Sub Inspector of Police (2006 (1) KLT 552 (F.B.))** . In the said case, the Full Bench held that a judgment of acquittal of a co-accused in a particular case would not and could not act as a bar for the subsequent trial of an absconding accused in that case. The sole exception carved out by the Full Bench in that decision is in a case where with the pronouncement of the judgment Crl.M.C.No.1561/2013 3 of acquittal the very substratum of the prosecution case is lost. Therefore, the question is whether the petitioner could rely on the exception carved out by the Full Bench in paragraph 50 of the decision in **Moosa's** case (supra). The petitioner contends that the criminal proceedings pending against him are liable to be interfered with. In that context, it is relevant to refer to Annexure-A2 judgment. The second respondent herein viz., the defacto complainant who sustained injuries allegedly at the hands of the accused including the petitioner herein, was examined as PW1 in S.C.No.203 of 2010. He would depose that he could not identify any of the assailants as the incident took place at night. The prosecution examined only two witnesses viz., the second respondent herein and one Unnikrishnan (PW2). PW2 had also turned hostile to the prosecution. True that the evidence in that case cannot be looked into for the purpose of deciding the culpability or otherwise of the petitioner who is the sixth accused in the aforesaid crime. However, in the light of the decision in **Moosa's** case (supra) it is possible and permissible to look into Annexure-A2 for the purpose of ascertaining whether by its pronouncement the very substratum of the prosecution case is lost or not. Evidently, there were only two eye witnesses. The defacto complainant viz., the second respondent who allegedly sustained injuries in the alleged attack deposed before the court that as the incident took Crl.M.C.No.1561/2013 4 place at night he could not identify any of the assailants. It is to be noted that he had not deposed that he could not identify the accused whilst he deposed that he could not identify any of the assailants. It is also to be noted that in the light of the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 prosecution had given up all the remaining witnesses. It was taking note of all those circumstances that the co-accused of the petitioner who stood the trial in S.C.No.203 of 2010 were acquitted as per Annexure-A2. On a consideration of Annexure-A2 in the light of the decision of this Court in **Moosa's** case (supra) I find no reason to disagree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the very substratum of the prosecution case has been lost with the pronouncement of Annexure-A2 judgment. 4. As already stated, in this case Annexure-A4 affidavit was sworn in by the second respondent. It is to be noted that the second respondent who had deposed before the court in S.C.No.203 of 2010 that he could not identify any of the assailants as the incident occurred at night now stated in Annexure-A4 that he had settled the entire disputes with the petitioner herein who is the 6[th] accused in the aforesaid crime and in the said circumstances, he did not wish to prosecute the petitioner and also got no objection in quashing the proceedings. I am of Crl.M.C.No.1561/2013 5 the view that the oral testimony of the second respondent given while being examined as PW1 in S.C.No.203 of 2010 and the statements now, made in Annexure-A4 cannot co-exist. If he had not identified the petitioner as one of the assailants what prompted the parties to reach into a settlement and how the second respondent could compromise the offence with the petitioner. However, to consider the question whether the criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner should be continued even after the pronouncement of Annexure-A2 some other aspects have to be considered. Annexure-A2 judgment assumes relevance for the purpose of considering the prayer of the petitioner in the light of the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in **Amar Singh and others** v. **State of Punjab** ( **AIR 1987 SC 826** ) and **Maiku and others** v. **State of U.P.** ( **AIR 1989 SC 667** ). In the said decisions the Hon'ble Apex Court considered the impact of a judgment of acquittal of a coaccused in a case on the prospects of prosecution against surviving accused where the accusation is one of commission of offences under Sections 143, 147, 148, 149 and other IPC offences and when the surviving accused is implicated with the help of Section 149 IPC. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that if with the pronouncement of judgment of acquittal the number of surviving accused is brought below five and if there is no case for the prosecution regarding involvement of any Crl.M.C.No.1561/2013 6 person/persons other than the acquitted person/persons and surviving accused in the alleged crime there cannot be any question of unlawful assembly within the definition of Section 141 I.P.C. for the simple reason that for an unlawful assemblage there should an assembly of five or more persons. It is also to be noted in this context that there is no case for the prosecution that apart from the seven accused including the petitioner, anyone had any involvement in the commission of alleged offences. As noticed hereinbefore, as per Annexure-A2 judgment, three out of seven accused persons have already been acquitted and thereby the number of surviving accused has become less than five. In the absence of a case for the prosecution that any person/persons had involvement in the commission of the aforesaid offences and they together with the surviving accused would constitute five or more in the light of the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in **Amar Singh's** case (supra) and **Maiku's** case (supra) there will not be any question of convicting and sentencing the petitioner who is one of the surviving accused in the aforesaid crime registered for offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 341, 326 and 307 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code in the absence of accusation of any specific overt act against him. It is also to be noted that no specific overt act is alleged against the petitioner. He was implicated as an accused in the aforesaid Crl.M.C.No.1561/2013 7 crime only with the help of Section 149 IPC. In the said circumstances, I am of the view that even if the criminal proceeding against the petitioner is allowed to be continued the chance for a successful prosecution against the petitioner is very remote and bleak. The Hon'ble Apex Court in **Gian Singh** v. **State of Punjab** reported in **2012 (4) KLT 108 (SC)** held that it is the duty of the High Courts to prevent continuation of criminal proceedings which became absolutely unnecessary. In this case, evidently, continuation of criminal proceedings would be a wasteful exercise. In view of the circumstances expatiated above, I am of the view that this is eminently a fit case wherein this Court should invoke the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to terminate the criminal proceedings against the petitioner in the interest of justice. In the result, this Crl.M.C. is allowed. Annexure-A1 final report laid in Crime No.103 of 2009 of Hosdurg Police Station and all further proceedings pursuant thereto against the petitioner in S.C.No.49 of 2012 on the file of the Court of Additional Sessions Judge (Adhoc-II), Kasaragod are hereby quashed. Sd/- **==> picture [321 x 29] intentionally omitted <==** TKS