Nouharsha v. Parameswaran and State of Kerala

# **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** # **PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN THURSDAY, THE 20[TH] DAY OF OCTOBER 2022/28TH ASWINA, 1944 CRL.REV.PET NO.645 OF 2022** **AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN CRA 56/2019 OF ADDITIONAL DISTRICT & SESSIONS COURT, PALAKKAD ST 40/2018 OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS II,** ## **ALATHUR** ## **REVISION PETITIONER/APPELLANT/ACCUSED:** NOUHARSHA, AGED 48 YEARS, SON OF KOYAKUTTY, NADAKKEPARAMBIL VEEDU, MAMBRA, KARUKUTTY P.O., ERNAKULAM DISTRICT., PIN – 683576. BY ADVS. ARUN ASHOK IYYANI NEENA JAMES ## **RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT & STATE OF KERALA:** 1 PARAMESWARAN, AGED 52 YEARS, SON OF NARAYANAN EZHUTHACHAN, KIZHAKUMPARAM VEEDU, PADINJARATHARA, MUDAPALOOR AMSOM, ALATHUR TALUK, PALAKKAD DISTRICT, PIN – 678705. 2 STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM, PIN – 682031. BY ADV. SRI.T.R.RENJITH, SR.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 10.10.2022, THE COURT ON 20.10.2022, DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: **Crl.R.P.No.645 of 2022** 2 ## **O R D E R** ## **Dated this the 20[th] day of October, 2022** This Revision Petition has been filed under Sections 397 and 401 of Cr.P.C., by the revision petitioner, who is the sole accused in S.T.No.40/2018 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II, Alathur arraying the original complainant as the 1[st] respondent and State of Kerala as the 2[nd] respondent. 2. The revision petitioner impugns judgment in S.T.No.40/2018 dated 26.02.2019 of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II, Alathur and the judgment in Criminal Appeal No.56/2019 dated 30.07.2022 on the file of the 3[rd] Additional Sessions Judge, Palakkad arising therefrom. **==> picture [372 x 10] intentionally omitted <==** revision petitioner as well as the learned Public Prosecutor on admission. **==> picture [372 x 13] intentionally omitted <==** ## **Crl.R.P.No.645 of 2022** **==> picture [7 x 9] intentionally omitted <==** revision as 'complainant' and 'accused' for easy reference. 5. The brief facts of the case put up by the complainant before the trial court is as under: According to the complainant, the accused was engaged in construction works in Palakkad and the complainant unloaded granite, metal, cement and rods as requested by the accused. In repayment of the price towards the said materials, the accused issued cheque dated 31.03.2015 for Rs.1,46,690/- and when the cheque was presented for collection, the same got dishonoured. After issuance of demand notice also, the accused did not heed to pay the amount. Accordingly, the complainant launched prosecution alleging commission of offences under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act (for short 'NI Act' hereinafter). 6. The trial court proceeded with trial. ## **Crl.R.P.No.645 of 2022** **==> picture [7 x 9] intentionally omitted <==** During trial, PWs 1 and 2 were examined and Exts.P1 to P4 were marked. Though opportunity was given to the accused to adduce defence evidence, after questioning him under Section 313(1)(b) of Cr.P.C, no defence evidence was adduced. 7. The trial court appraised the evidence and finally found the accused guilty for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and he was convicted thereunder. He was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay fine of Rs.1,46,690/- (Rupees One Lakh Forty Six Thousand Six Hundred and Ninety Only) and the fine was ordered to be given as compensation to the complainant under Section 357(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. It was ordered further that in case of default in payment of fine, the accused would undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of six months. 8. The judgment in S.T.No.40/2018 dated ## **Crl.R.P.No.645 of 2022** 5 26.02.2019 was challenged before the Additional Sessions Court-III, Palakkad. The learned Sessions Judge also confirmed the said conviction while modifying the sentence, on re-appreciation of the evidence as per judgment dated 30.07.2022. 9. While impeaching the veracity of the concurrent verdicts of the trial court, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the accused that there should be correct proof of the transaction based on which the cheque in question was originated to fasten criminal culpability upon the accused. Further, it is pointed out that courts below went wrong in disarming the contention raised by the accused that there was no statutory notice served to the accused in this matter. 10. In this case, the courts below relied on the evidence of PWs.1 and 2. PW1 supported the prosecution case led to unloading of the materials as contended by him and ## **Crl.R.P.No.645 of 2022** 6 issuance of Ext.P1 cheque to discharge the liability arose out of the same. PW2, the Manager of PW1 also supported the evidence of PW1. 11. In this matter, the contention raised by the accused that there is no evidence to prove the transaction is not appreciable, since the evidence of PWs.1 and 2 convincingly established that the accused herein issued cheque towards the price of the materials. Therefore, the said challenge cannot be considered in this case. The said contention was negatived by the trial court in view of the admission of the accused under Section 313(1)(b) of Cr.P.C that the complainant was a supplier of goods to him. In fact, the said finding does not require any interference. 12.Though the learned counsel for the accused challenged the concurrent verdicts of the courts below relying on a decision reported in _**Sunil Todi and Others v. State of**_ ## **Crl.R.P.No.645 of 2022** **==> picture [7 x 9] intentionally omitted <==** _**Gujarat and Another**_ [2022 (1) KHC 35], in the said decision, the Apex Court held that there is no inflexible rule which precludes drawee of a cheque issued as security from presenting it for payment in terms of contract. In fact, the ratio of the above decision is in favour of the complainant. 13. Relying on a decision of the Madras High Court reported in _**Murugan Financiers v. P.V.Perumal**_ [2005 KHC 2372], it is argued that the when complainant being a finance company not produced books of account to support the claim, order acquitting the accused on the finding that complainant had not proved the debt or legally enforceable liability satisfactorily, is proper. Applying the said ratio, it is argued that in this case also, the documents supporting unloading of materials not produced. In this case, the complainant is not a finance company and he is an individual supplying materials, for which, there may not **Crl.R.P.No.645 of 2022** 8 always records or books of accounts. Hence, the ratio has no application in this case. 14. Another decision reported in _**Yohannan**_ _**N.M. v. P.N.Sabu and Another**_ [2012(2) KHC 761] it is highlighted to contended to failure to reply notice is of no consequences. This legal position is not in dispute. 15. In this matter, this Court is exercising power of revision and the power of revision is not available to appreciate or re- appreciate to have a contra-finding. 16. It is the settled law that power of revision available to this Court under Section 401 of Cr.P.C r/w Section 397 is not wide and exhaustive to re-appreciate the evidence to have a contra finding. In the decision reported in [(1999) 2 SCC 452 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], _**State of Kerala v. Puttumana**_ _**Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri**_ , the Apex Court, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, laid down the **Crl.R.P.No.645 of 2022** 9 following principles (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5): _“5. …... In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. ...”_ **==> picture [372 x 13] intentionally omitted <==** **==> picture [408 x 13] intentionally omitted <==** **Crl.R.P.No.645 of 2022** 10 _**Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao**_ _**Phalke**_ , the Apex Court held that the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly - unreasonable or there is non consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. Following has been laid down in para.14 (SCC p.135): _“14. …... Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is nonconsideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 Cr.P.C is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse_ **Crl.R.P.No.645 of 2022** 11 _or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaring unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”_ 18. The said ratio has been followed in a latest decision of the Supreme Court reported in [(2018) 8 SCC 165], _**Kishan Rao v.**_ _**Shankargouda**_ . Thus the law is clear on the point that the whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence and, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence had already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the court which would ## **Crl.R.P.No.645 of 2022** 12 otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. To put it otherwise, if there is non-consideration of any relevant materials, which would go to the root of the matter or any fundamental violation of the principle of law, then only the power of revision would be made available. 19. In fact, the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 was relied on by the trial court as well as the appellate court to enter into conviction and to impose sentence on the finding that the complainant discharged his initial burden in the matter of transaction led to execution of the cheque. Therefore, the courts below given benefit of the twin presumptions in favour of the complainant. In fact, the said presumptions not stand rebutted by the available evidence. 20. Regarding law on presumptions, I would like to refer a 3 Bench decision of the Apex Court in [2010 (2) KLT 682 (SC)], _**Rangappa v. Mohan**_ . In the above decision, the Apex Court ## **Crl.R.P.No.645 of 2022** 13 considered the presumption available to a complainant in a prosecution under Section 138 of the N.I Act and held as under: _“The presumption mandated by S.139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat [2008 (1) KLT 425 (SC)] may not be correct. This is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant. S.139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While S.138 of the Act specified a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under S.139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by S.138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in_ 14 ## **Crl.R.P.No.645 of 2022** _commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under S.139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of `preponderance of probabilities'. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. Accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own.”_ 21. In the decision reported in [2019 (1) KLT 598 (SC) : 2019 (1) KHC 774 : (2019) 4 SCC 197 : 2019 (1) KLD 420 : 2019 (2) KLJ 205 : AIR 2019 SC 2446 : 2019 CriLJ 3227], _**Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar**_ , the Apex Court while dealing with a case where the accused has a contention 15 ## **Crl.R.P.No.645 of 2022** that the cheque issued was a blank cheque, it was held as under: _“A meaningful reading of the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act including, in particular, Sections 20, 87 and 139, makes it amply clear that a person who signs a cheque and makes it over to the payee remains liable unless he adduces evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque had been issued for payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability. It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of S.138 would be attracted. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and other particulars. This in itself would not invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence.”_ 22. In a latest 3 Bench decision of the Apex Court reported in [2021 (2) KHC 517 : 2021 KHC OnLine 6063 : 2021 (1) KLD 527 : 2021 (2) SCALE 434 : ILR 2021 (1) Ker. 855 : 2021 ## **Crl.R.P.No.645 of 2022** 16 - (5) SCC 283 : 2021 (1) KLT OnLine 1132], _**Kalamani Tex (M/s.) & anr. v.**_ _**P.Balasubramanian**_ the Apex Court considered the amplitude of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I Act it was held as under: _“Adverting to the case in hand, we find on a plain reading of its judgment that the Trial Court completely overlooked the provisions and failed to appreciate the statutory presumption drawn under S.118 and S.139 of NIA. The Statute mandates that once the signature(s) of an accused on the cheque/negotiable instrument are established, then these `reverse onus' clauses become operative. In such a situation, the obligation shifts upon the accused to discharge the presumption imposed upon him. Once the 2[nd] Appellant had admitted his signatures on the cheque and the Deed, the Trial Court ought to have presumed that the cheque was issued as consideration for a legally enforceable debt. The Trial Court fell in error when it called upon the Complainant-Respondent to explain the circumstances under which the appellants were liable to pay._ _…................_ **Crl.R.P.No.645 of 2022** 17 _18. Even if we take the arguments raised by the appellants at face value that only a blank cheque and signed blank stamp papers were given to the respondent, yet the statutory presumption cannot be obliterated. It is useful to cite Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar (2019 (1) KHC 774 : (2019) 4 SCC 197 : 2019 (1) KLD 420 : 2019 (1) KLT 598 : 2019 (2) KLJ 205 : AIR 2019 SC 2446 : 2019 CriLJ 3227], P.36., where this Court held that:_ _“Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption under S.139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt.”_ 23. Thus the law is clear on the point that when the complainant discharged the initial burden to prove the transaction led to execution of the cheque, the presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I Act would come into play. No doubt, these presumptions are rebuttable and it is the duty of the accused to rebut the presumptions and the standard of ## **Crl.R.P.No.645 of 2022** 18 proof of rebuttal is nothing but preponderance of probabilities. 24. In this matter, the concurrent finding of the courts below in the matter of conviction as well as sentence is within the sweep of power of the courts and there is no illegality to interfere the same by exercising the power of revision. Therefore, the revision petition is dismissed. 25. Faced with the situation, the learned counsel for the accused sought three months' time to pay the compensation. 26. In the interest of justice and taking note of the fact that the transaction is of the year 2015, I am inclined to grant two months' time from today to pay the compensation. Therefore, the revision petitioner/the accused is directed to appear before the trial court on 19.12.2022 to undergo the sentence and to pay fine. In default to do so, the trial ## **Crl.R.P.No.645 of 2022** **==> picture [13 x 9] intentionally omitted <==** court is directed to execute the sentence as per law without fail. Till 19.12.2022, the execution of the sentence shall stand deferred. Sd/- ## **A.BADHARUDEEN, JUDGE.** ww