## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM**
## **PRESENT**
**THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.S.DIAS**
**FRIDAY, THE 26TH DAY OF JUNE 2020 / 5TH ASHADHA, 1942**
## **WP(C).No.12017 OF 2020(B)**
## **PETITIONER/S:**
**NAVITHA M.N AGED 23 YEARS NATIONAL TRIBAL UNIVERSITY, AMARKANTAK, ANUPUR DISTRICT, MADHYA PRADESH 484886, REPRESENTED BY REGISTRAR.**
## **BY ADV. SMT.P.K.SANTHAMMA**
## **RESPONDENT/S:**
- **1 INDIRA GANDHI NATIONAL TRIBAL UNIVERSITY AMARKANTAK, ANUPUR DISTRICT, MADHYA PRADESH 484 886 REPRESENTED BY ITS REGISTRAR**
- **2 VICE CHANCELLOR, INDIRA GANDHI NATIONAL TRIBAL UNIVERSITY, AMARKANTAK, ANUPUR DISTRICT, MADHYA PRADESH 484 886**
- **3 REGISTRAR INDIRA GANDHI NATIONAL TRIBAL UNIVERSITY,M AMARKANTAK, ANUPUR DISTRICT, MADHYA PRADESH 484 886**
- **4 UNIVERSITY GRANTS COMMISSION, REPRESENTED BY REGISTRAR, BAHADUR SHAH SAFAR MARG, NEW DELHI PIN 110 002**
- **5 MINISTRY OF HUMAN RESOURCE AND DEVELOPMENT, REPRESENTED BY JOINT SECRETARY, HIGH EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, SASTHRI BHAVAN, NEW DELHI 110 001 R4 BY SRI.S.KRISHNAMOORTHY, CGC**
**THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 22.06.2020, THE COURT ON 26.06.2020 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:**
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## **Dated this the 26[th] day of June, 2020**
## **JUDGMENT**
The petitioner seeks a direction to respondents 1 to 3, i.e., the Indira Gandhi National Tribal University, Madhya Pradesh, its Vice Chancellor and its Registrar, to restore the Centre at Wayanad District, to appear for the entrance examinations for the various educational programmes notified by the 1[st] respondent University for the academic year 2020-21 or to provide any other convenient Centre in the State of Kerala.
2. The case of the petitioner, in a nutshell, is that, the 2[nd] respondent has published Ext.P1 notification dated 21.04.2020, inviting applications from students for pursuing different courses for the academic year 2020-21. Surprisingly, it is noticed that, the Centre for the entrance examinations is only at Chennai, for the whole of the south zone.
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3. The petitioner, who is a resident of Sulthan Bathery, Wayanad, has no option to submit her application. Till 2019, there was a Centre at Wayanad, where entrance examinations was conducted. Nearly 400 students had appeared for the entrance examinations from Kerala. Shifting of the Centre from Wayanad to Chennai, has caused hardship to the students of Kerala. The students have to travel all the way to Chennai and back, to appear for the examinations. The respondents are aware that the students from Scheduled Tribe Community are poor and they cannot afford the expenses of travelling and boarding at Chennai. The reason for shifting of the centre is not known. Moreover, due to Covid-19 pandemic and the restrictions imposed for interstate travel, the petitioner is at a risk of getting infected with the virus. Although the petitioner had submitted Ext.P3 representation, there is inaction on the part of the respondents. Hence, the petitioner, inter - alia, seeks a
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direction to respondents 1to 3 to restore the Centre at Wayanad.
4. The petitioner has further averred that, eventhough the respondents are functioning in the State of Madhya Pradesh and Union Territory of Delhi, by virtue of the amendment to the Constitution of India, this Court has the jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus against the respondents. The petitioner has relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Janet Jeyapaul v. SRM University and Others** [2015 KHC 4810], to fortify her contention.
5. When this writ petition came up for admission on 18.06.2020, this Court had expressed a doubt as regards the maintainability of the writ petition, in view of the enunciation of law by this Court in **Anand Anoop v. Union of India** [2014 (3) KLT 171], **Dental Council of India v. Viswanath** [2018 (3) KLT 255 (F.B.)] and **Indian Maritime University v. Viswanathan** [2014 (4) KLT 798
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(F.B.)]. The writ petition was accordingly adjourned for hearing on the question of maintainability.
6. Smt. P.K. Santhamma, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner addressed her arguments on the question of maintainability of the writ petition. The learned counsel argued that, notwithstanding the fact that the respondents are functioning in Madhya Pradesh and New Delhi, which are outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Janet Jeyapaul v. SRM University and Others** (cited supra), the respondents being authorities falling within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, this writ petition is maintainable. She also relied on paragraphs 22 and 25 of the decision in **Maharashtra Chess Association v. Union of India and others** [2019 KHC 6725], to fortify her contention. According to her, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that writ jurisdiction of the High Court is
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fundamentally discretionary in nature and the existence of an alternate remedy is merely an additional factor to be taken into consideration by the High Court, in deciding whether or not to exercise its writ jurisdiction. In exercising its discretion to entertain a particular case under Article 226, the High Court may take into consideration various factors including the nature of injustice that is meted out to the petitioner. Similarly, the scrutiny to be applied to every writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is a crucial safeguard of the rule of law. It is not open to High Court to abdicate this responsibility merely due to existence of a privately negotiated document ousting its jurisdiction. Hence, she contended that this Court has jurisdiction. She also relied on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in **Anand Anoop v. Union of India** [cited supra] and argued that, subsequent to the 42[nd] amendment of the Constitution of India and insertion of Article 226(2), this
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Court has jurisdiction, as the cause of action in respect of the relief sought for has arisen in part within the jurisdiction of this Court.
7. The sole point that emerges for consideration is whether this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition.
8. The Full Bench of this Court in **Dental Council of India v. Viswanath** (cited supra), while interpretting Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, in paragraphs 21 and 30 laid down thus:-
"21. These judgments were followed by another Full Bench of this court in Indian Maritime University V. Viswanathan (2014 (4) KLT 798) (F.B). that was a case where in response to a notification issued at Chennai, the respondent made an application from Palakkad in Kerala State for appointment as Professor under the Indian Maritime University. He attended the interview at Chennai, he was offered appointment from Chennai and he also reported for duty at Chennai. Subsequently, by a communication issued from Chennai, the appointment order was cancelled and this communication was received at Palakkad. A writ petition was filed before the Kerala High Court challenging the cancellation of his appointment. Maintainability of the writ petition was referred to Full Bench and the Full Bench upheld the preliminary objection that no part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, holding thus:
"28. thus, law is settled that in view of the provisions contained in Art.226 (2) of the Constitution of India, a writ
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petition can be maintained in a High Court within the territorial jurisdiction of which an integral part of the cause of action has arisen. Though the expression “cause of action” is not defined either in the Constitution or in the Code of Civil Procedure. It has to be understood in the light of S.20(c) of the CPC and it means a bundle of facts which are required to be proved for a petitioner or a plaintiff to seek relief in a court of law. It is also the settled principle of law that in a service dispute, issue of an order of termination gives rise to cause of action and service of that communication, though is necessary to give effect to the order, does not amount to a part of the cause of action much less an integral part of the cause of action. In other words, the issue of the order gives rise to the cause of action and the service of the order gives rise to a right of action.
29. Having understood the principles laid down in Nakul Deo Singh as above, the further question is whether there is any distinction between the service of the order or dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority and the order of the appellate authority rejecting an appeal filed against the order of dismissal. We have already seen from the Full Bench judgment that when an appeal is filed against an order of dismissal and the appellate authority passed an order thereon, the order of the disciplinary authority would merge into the appellate authority's order. If the principles governing cause of action with respect to the order issued by the disciplinary authority are applied in the context of an order issued by the appellate authority, the conclusion is irresistible that the cause of action arises on the issue of the appellate order and the service of the appellate authority's order does not become any part of the cause of action except that it gives right of action to the aggrieved. If service of the appellate order is not an integral part of the cause of action, the service of the order of the disciplinary authority also will not give right to any part of the cause of action. This will be so even in a case where the situation is in the reverse and the fact that only on service on the addressee such orders become effective does not alter the situation in any manner, except that it gives right of action to the aggrieved.
• In this context, we should also make reference to paragraph 27 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd., where, the Apex Court has held that challenge can be maintained against an order passed by the original authority and the appellate authority where the seats of the original authority and appellate authority are situated
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and the Apex Court did not mention that such challenge is possible at the place where orders are served. Therefore, irrespective of whether it is the disciplinary authority's order or appellate authority's order, service of order does not give rise to any part of the cause of action to an aggrieved person.""
xxx xxx xxx xxxx xxxx xxx xxx xxx xxxx xxxx
"30. The upshot of the above discussion is that a writ petition can be maintained only in a High Court, within whose territorial jurisdiction, the person, authority or the Government against which relief is sought is situated and within whose jurisdiction, cause of action, either wholly or in part, has arisen. For determining the question of jurisdiction, the fact that the authority or Government concerned has been invested with power all over the country or affecting all citizens, is not of any relevance. "
[Emphasis given]
9. The Division Bench of this Court in **Anand Anoop v. Union of India** (cited supra), after considering the various precedents observed, in paragraph 10 as follows:-
"10.
.............................................................................................................................. It is on the basis of the said facts that the appellant seeks directions against the 1[st] and 2[nd] respondents, who are authorities of the Central Government, to consider his application for nomination to the central pool seats for admission to the 3[rd] respondent institute. The decision to be taken by the 1[st] and 2[nd] respondents is essentially one that will determine the eligibility of the appellant for the benefit of a nomination to the central pool seats. The right that is urged by the appellant is, therefore, a right to a fair consideration of his candidature for nomination, in his capacity as a “ward of defence personnel”. We do not think there is any fact, having
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candidature for nomination, in his capacity as a “ward of defence personnel”. We do not think there is any fact, having a nexus to the territorial limits of jurisdiction of this Court, which the appellant would have to prove in order to establish his right to a fair consideration of his candidature for nomination. The decision is one that the 1st and 2 nd respondents would have to take in New Delhi, where they are situated, and based on relevant material made available to them by the appellant. In that view of the matter, the appellant would have to approach the High Court in New Delhi for agitating his rights under Art.226 of the Constitution. We are of the view that no cause of action, either wholly or in part, arises within the jurisdictional limits of this Court in the instant case. The appeal therefore fails, and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs."
[Emphasis given]
10. In view of the categoric declaration of law in **Dental Council of India v. Viswanath and Anand Anoop v. Union of India** (cited supra) that a writ petition can be entertained in a High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the authority or Government is situated or within whose jurisdiction the cause of action either wholly or in part has arisen, I am of the considered opinion that this Court is denuded of jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition. I say this because the decision to shift the Centre from Wayanad to Chennai, has obviously not been taken in Kerala, but in Madhya Pradesh,
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where the respondents 1 to 3 are functioning. Merely because the respondents 1 to 3 had published a notification in the last academic year allotting a Centre at Wayanad District, and subsequently shifted the Centre to Chennai, by the impugned Ext.P1 notification cannot be treated to be an integral part of the cause of action, to confer territorial jurisdiction on this Court.
11. According to me, the decision in **Janet Jeyapaul v. SRM University and Others** ( cited supra) is inapplicable to the facts of this case, as it pertains to defining an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Likewise, the decision in **Maharashtra Chess**
**Association v. Union of India and others** (supra) is a case where the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction dehors the existence of an alternate remedy. Even in the said decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has succinctly observed in paragraph 25, that the scrutiny to be applied
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to every writ petition under Article 226 by the High Court is a crucial safeguard of the rule of law under the Constitution “in the relevant territorial jurisdiction”.
12. In the light of the enunciation of law in the aforecited precedents, I hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to direct the respondents 1 to 3, who are admittedly functioning in Madhya Pradesh, to shift the Centre from Chennai to Wayanad or any other place in Kerala. Resultantly, this writ petition is dismissed, without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to move the competent court having territorial jurisdiction.
Sd/- **C.S.DIAS, JUDGE**
kkj
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## W.P.(C)No.12017 of 2020
## **APPENDIX**
**PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:**
**EXHIBIT P1 THE COPY OF THE NOTIFICATION DATED 2104-2020 BY R2**
- **EXHIBIT P2 THE COPY OF APPLICATION DATED 8-6-2020 BY PETITIONER**
**EXHIBIT P3 THE COPY OF REPRESENTATION DATED 8-62020 BY PETITIONER TO R1 TO R5**
- **EXHIBIT P4 THE COPY OF REPRESENTATIOND ATED 24-42020 BY RAHUL GANDHI, HON'BLE MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT**
- **EXHIBIT P5 THE COPY OF THE TABLE WITH THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CENTERS FOR ENTRANCE EXAMINATIONS 2019-=20 WITH MAPS BY PETITIONER.**
- **EXHIBIT P6 COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGES OF THE GUIDELINES BY 4TH RESPONDENT REGARDING IGNTU**
**EXHIBIT P7 COPY OF RELEVANT PAGES OF NATIONAL EDUCATION POLICY 1986**