High Court of KeralaSingle JudgeAppeal dismissed

National Insurance Company Limited v. Prakashan (MACA No. 640 of 2011)

Case / Petition Number:MACA No.640 of 2011

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • C. S. Dias
Judgment Date
2021-09-06
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal dismissed; Tribunal’s direction to pay the entire compensation amount by NIC upheld in principle, but with liberty for NIC to pursue recovery from other joint tortfeasors in execution proceedings; costs to follow the final order; parties shall bear their own costs.
Final Disposition
Appeal dismissed

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • National Insurance Company Limited

Respondents

  • Prakashan, S/o Krishnan, Chittilapara House, Pilakkod, ChelaKKara – 680 586

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Mathews Jacob

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Rajit R.

Case Synopsis & Summary

Prakashan, the claimant, sustained injuries in a road traffic accident on 04.10.2003 while traveling in an autorickshaw in Thrissur. A car coming from the opposite direction collided with the autorickshaw, allegedly due to the negligence of the car driver. The petitioner claimed compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, asserting negligence by both drivers. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thrissur, decided a common award in several petitions and held composite negligence by drivers of both vehicles, directing the insurer (National Insurance Company) to pay the entire compensation amount. The insurer appealed (MACA No.640 of 2011), contending that liability in composite negligence cases should be apportioned in proportion to fault, with the insurer not liable for the full amount. The respondent contends that the claimant is entitled to full compensation from any jointly liable tortfeasor. The Kerala High Court examined precedents, noting that United India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Mariamma George had been overruled by the Supreme Court in Khenyei v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd, which clarified joint and several liability and remedies available to insurers to recover from other joint tortfeasors. The Court ultimately held that, given non-implementation of all liable parties, the Tribunal rightly did not fix inter se liability, and the insurer may pursue its remedies in execution proceedings. The appeal is dismissed with costs to be borne by the parties, and rights of recovery left open for the insurer.

Provisions of Law Cited

Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Joint tort-feasors are jointly liable and severally liable; inter se liability may be determined where both were impleaded
  • In composite negligence, claimant may recover whole damages from any one or more joint tort-feasors; apportionment is for inter se liability
  • Insurer may satisfy the award and recover the amount from the insured or the other joint tortfeasor through execution proceedings without filing a suit

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant argues that in cases of composite negligence the liability should be apportioned according to the extent of fault of each vehicle's driver, relying on prior decisions such as United India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Mariamma George. It is argued that the Tribunal’s direction to pay the entire compensation amount by the insurer is not sustainable, particularly since the autorickshaw and car had separate policies and the actual inter se liability among joint tortfeasors was not determined due to non-impleadment of all parties. The Supreme Court’s Khenyei decision (2015) is cited to emphasize joint and several liability and the remedies available to insurers to recover from other tortfeasors, including execution proceedings, where necessary. The insurer contends that apportionment should be allowed where appropriate and that full payment by one insurer is not mandatory when multiple tortfeasors are involved.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondent (claimant) contends that where composite negligence exists, the insurer can be directed to satisfy the entire award, and the inter se liability can later be resolved through execution or separate proceedings. The respondent cites the Khenyei decision and related precedents to support the principle of joint and several liability in composite negligence and the insurer’s obligation to compensate the claimant without immediate apportionment, while reserving the right to seek recovery from other liable parties through proper legal channels.

Cited Precedents (8)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
United India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Mariamma George2010(2) KLT 44OverruledKhenyei (2015) overruled the earlier stance that liability in composite negligence could not be apportioned or that insurer had to pay full amount irrespective of fault.
Khenyei v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd and others2015 (9) SCC 273PositiveThree-judge bench clarifies joint and several liability of tort feasors and permits recovery from other tortfeasors; forms the doctrinal basis for insurer remedies and inter se liability in execution.
Pawan Kumar & Anr. v. Harkishan Dass Mohan Lal & Ors.2014 KHC 4058; 2014 (3) SCC 590; 2014 (2) KHC SN 4; 2014: 2014 (1) KLT 571; 2014(2) KLJ 224PositiveAffirms prior decisions (T.O. Anthony, Hemlatha) and lays down inter se liability and damages principles in composite negligence; supports claimant's remedy.
Machindranath Kernath Kasar v D.S. Mylarappa & Ors.2008 KHC 6379; 2008 (13) SCC 198; AIR 2008 SC 2545; 2008 (7) SCALE 496PositiveCites joint tort-feasors’ liability and related considerations; foundational to joint and several liability framework.
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Challa Bharathamma & Ors.2004 KHC 1153; 2004 (8) SCC 517; 2004(3) KLT 454; AIR 2004 SC 4882PositiveOn insurer’s obligation to satisfy award and recover from insured or other tortfeasors; supports execution-based recovery.
Baljit Kaur's case2004 (2) SCC 1Mentioned OnlyCited in passing in related discussion; not central to the dispositive reasoning.
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanjappan & Ors.2004 KHC 1939; 2004(13) SCC 224; 2005 SCC (Cri)148; AIR SC 1630; 2004 (119) Comp Cas 139; 2004 (15) AIC 1(SC)PositiveSets out insurer-payment-with-recovery framework and executing court mechanics.
Challa Bharathamma & Nanjappan (supra)See National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Challa Bharathamma & Ors.PositiveApplied discussive parallel in inter se liability and recovery in execution; treated as corroborative authority.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

# **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** # **PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.S.DIAS** **MONDAY, THE 6[TH] DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2021 / 15TH BHADRA, 1943 MACA NO. 640 OF 2011** **OPMV 3683/2004 MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, THRISSUR** ## **APPELLANT/2ND PETITIONER:** NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED THRISSUR NOW REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGER, KOCHI, REGIONAL OFFICE, OMANA BUILDING,, M.G.ROAD, KOCHI – 35. ADV. MATHEWS JACOB ## **RESPONDENT/PETITIONER:** PRAKASHAN, S/O KRISHNAN, CHITTILAPARA HOUSE, PILAKKOD, CHELAKKARA - 680 586. ADV. RAJIT R. THIS MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 06.09.2021, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: 2 MACA No.640 of 2011 ## **JUDGMENT** The appellant/insurer was the 2[nd] respondent in OP(M.V) No.3683/2004 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thrissur. The respondent in the appeal was the petitioner before the Tribunal. The 1[st] respondent before the Tribunal has not been impleaded as a party in the appeal. Therefore, the parties are, for the sake of convenience, referred to as per the status in the claim petition. 2. The petitioner had filed the claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, seeking compensation on account of the injuries that he sustained in an accident on 04.10.2003. It was his case that while he was travelling in an autorickshaw bearing registration No. KL-8/Q-5452 (autorickshaw) from Thrissur to Shornur, when the autorickshaw reached Thiroor temple, a car bearing 3 MACA No.640 of 2011 registration No. KL8/N 6345 (car), driven and owned by the 1[st] respondent before the Tribunal, came from the opposite direction and hit the autorickshaw. The petitioner sustained injuries and was treated at the Aswani Hospital, Thrissur for a period of six months. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the car. The petitioner was a cook by profession earning a monthly income of Rs.4000/-. The petitioner claimed a compensation of Rs.42,000/- from the respondents. 3. The driver and other passengers in the autorickshaw also filed OP (M.V) Nos.410/2004, 3682/2004, 3685/2004 and 3691/2004 before the same Tribunal, seeking compensation from the respondents in the claim petitions. 4. The first respondent had filed a written statement in the leading case namely, O.P.(M.V) No. No.410/2004 contending that the car was covered 4 MACA No.640 of 2011 by a valid insurance policy. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the autorickshaw, who was the 4[th] respondent in O.P. (M.V.) No.410/2004 and the petitioner in O.P.(M.V) No.3685/2004. It was also contended that the autorickshaw belonged to the 3[rd] respondent in O.P. (M.V) No.410/2004, but had no valid insurance coverage. The 1[st] respondent prayed that the claim petition be dismissed. 5. The 2[nd] respondent(appellant/insurer) filed written statements in all the claim petitions, admitting that the car had a valid insurance coverage. The 2[nd] respondent reiterated the contentions of the 1[st] respondent that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the driver of the autorickshaw and that the autorickshaw had no valid insurance coverage. The autorickshaw was overloaded with seven passengers, which was the cause for the accident. Therefore, it was the owner 5 MACA No.640 of 2011 of the autorickshaw who was vicariously liable for the negligence of his driver. The claim petition was bad for non-impleadment of the owner, driver and insurer of the autorickshaw. Hence, the claim petition be dismissed. 6. The Tribunal consolidated and jointly tried all the claim petitions. A witness was examined on behalf of the petitioner as PW1 and Exhibits A1 to A19 were marked in evidence. The 2[nd] respondent produced the insurance policy and marked it as ‘B1’ in evidence. 7. The Tribunal by its common award allowed all the claim petitions finding that there was composite negligence on the part of the drivers of the autorickshaw and the car based on Exhibits A3 and A4 final reports and Exhibits A5 and A6 AMVI reports, which established damage to both the vehicles. The Tribunal directed the 2[nd] respondent to pay the compensation amount to the petitioners. In 6 MACA No.640 of 2011 the instant case an amount of Rs.24,368/- was directed to be paid. 8. Aggrieved by the impugned award directing the 2[nd] respondent/insurer to pay the entire compensation amount, the 2[nd] respondent has filed the appeal. 9. Heard; Sri.Mathews Jacob, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant/ 2[nd] respondent/insurer and Sri.Rejit, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent/petitioner. 10. The sole question that arises for consideration in the appeal is whether the direction of the Tribunal to the appellant/2[nd] respondent/insurer to pay the entire compensation amount, despite the finding that there was composite negligence on the part of the driver of the car as well as the driver of the autorickshaw, is justifiable or not ? 11. The learned Senior counsel appearing for 7 MACA No.640 of 2011 the appellant/insurer placed reliance on the decision of this Court in **United India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Mariamma George** [2010(2) KLT 44], wherein it was held that in a case of composite negligence, the driver,owner and insurance company of each vehicle can be held liable only to the extent of liability fixed on them based on the percentage of the negligence, and insurer of one vehicle cannot be directed to make the entire payment of compensation. 12. The above legal position is no longer good law in view of the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in **Khenyei v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd and others** [2015 (9) SCC 273], wherein a three Judge Bench has in paragraph 16 to 18 held as follows:- _16. In Pawan Kumar & Anr. v. Harkishan Dass Mohan Lal & Ors. 2014 KHC 4058; 2014 (3) SCC 590; 2014 (2) KHC SN 4: 2014: 2014 (1) KLT 571: 2014(2) KLJ 224], the decisions in T.O. Anthony (supra) and Hemlatha (supra) have been affirmed, and this Court has laid down that where plaintiff/claimant himself is found to be negligent jointly and severally, liability cannot arise and the plaintiff’s claim to the extent of his own negligence, as may be quantified, will have_ 8 MACA No.640 of 2011 _to be severed. He is entitled to damages not attributable to his own negligence. The law/distinction with respect to contributory as well as composite negligence has been considered by this Court in Machindranath Kernath Kasar v D.S. Mylarappa & Ors. [2008 KHC 6379: 2008 (13) SCC 198: AIR 2008 SC 2545:2008 (7) SCALE 496] and also as to joint tort feasors. This Court has referred to Charlesworth &_ _Percy on negligence as to cause of action in regard to joint tort feasors thus: “42. Joint tort-feasors, as per 10th Edn. of Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence, have been described as under :_ _Wrongdoers are deemed to be joint tort-feasors, within the meaning of the rule, where the cause of action against each of them is the same, namely, that the same evidence would support an action against them, individually….. Accordingly, they will be jointly liable for a tort which they both commit or for which they are responsible because the law imputes the commission of the same wrongful act to two or more persons at the same time. This occurs in cases of (a) agency; (b) vicarious liability; and (c) where a tort is committed in the course of a joint act, whilst pursuing a common purpose agreed between them.” The question also arises as to the remedies available to one of the joint tort -feasors from whom compensation has been recovered. When the other joint tort feasor has not been impleaded, obviously question of negligence of non-impleaded driver could not be decided apportionment of composite negligence cannot be made in the absence of impleadment of joint tort feasor. Thus, it would be open to the impleaded joint tort feasors after making payment of compensation, so as to sue the other joint tort feasor and to recover from him the contribution to the extent of his negligence. However, in case when both the tort feasors are before the court/tribunal, if evidence is sufficient, it may determine the extent of their negligence so that one joint tort feasor can recover the amount so determined from the other joint tort feasor in the execution proceedings, whereas the claimant has right to recover the compensation from both or any one of them. This Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Challa Bharathamma & Ors. [2004 KHC 1153: 2004 (8) SCC 517: 2004(3) KLT 454: AIR 2004 SC 4882] with respect to mode of recovery has laid down thus :_ 9 ## MACA No.640 of 2011 _“13. The residual question is what would be the appropriate direction. Considering the beneficial object of the Act, it would be proper for the insurer to satisfy the award, though in law it has no liability. In some cases the insurer has been given the option and liberty to recover the amount from the insured. For the purpose of recovering the amount paid from the owner, the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the concerned Executive Court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the claimants, owner of the offending vehicle shall furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises the Executive Court shall take assistance of the concerned Regional Transport Authority. The Executing Court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the owner of the vehicle shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default it shall be open to the Executing Court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle i.e. the insured. In the instant case considering the quantum involved we leave it to the discretion of the insurer to decide whether it would take steps for recovery of the amount from the insured.”_ _17. In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanjappan & Ors. [2004 KHC 1939 : 2004(13) SCC 224: 2005 SCC (Cri)148:AIR SC 1630: 2004 (119) Comp Cas 139 : 2004 (15) AIC 1(SC)] also, this Court has laid down thus :_ _“8. Therefore, while setting aside the judgment of the High court we direct in terms of what has been stated in Baljit Kaur's case [2004 (2) SCC 1] that the insurer shall pay the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, about which there was no dispute raised, to the respondents- claimants within three months from today. The for the purpose of recovering the same from the insured, the insurer shall not be required to file a suit. It may initiate a proceeding before the concerned Executing Court as if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was_ 10 MACA No.640 of 2011 _the subject matter of determination before the Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. Before release of the amount to the insured, owner of the vehicle shall be issued a notice and he shall be required to furnish security for the entire amount which the insurer will pay to the claimants. The offending vehicle shall be attached, as a part of the security. If necessity arises the Executing Court shall take assistance of the concerned Regional Transport authority. The Executing Court shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law as to the manner in which the insured, owner of the vehicle shall make payment to the insurer. In case there is any default it shall be open to the Executing Court to direct realization by disposal of the securities to be furnished or from any other property or properties of the owner of the vehicle, the insured. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms, with no order as to costs.”_ _18. This Court in Challa Bharathamma & Nanjappan (supra) has dealt with the breach of policy conditions by the owner when the insurer was asked to pay the compensation fixed by the tribunal and the right to recover the same was given to the insurer in the executing court concerned if the dispute between the insurer and the owner was the subject-matter of determination for the tribunal and the issue has been decided in favour of the insured. The same analogy can be applied to the instant cases as the liability of the joint tort feasor is joint and several. In the instant case, there is determination of inter se liability of composite negligence to the extent of negligence of 2/3rd and 1/3rd of respective drivers. Thus, the vehicle – trailor-truck which was not insured with the insurer, was negligent to the extent of 2/3rd. It would be open to the insurer being insurer of the bus after making payment to claimant to recover from the owner of the trailor-truck the amount to the aforesaid extent in the execution proceedings._ _**Had there been no determination of the inter se liability for want of evidence or other joint tort feasor had not been impleaded, it was not open to settle such a dispute and to recover the amount in execution proceedings but the remedy would be to file another suit or appropriate proceedings in accordance with law.**_ _**What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is as follows** :_ 11 MACA No.640 of 2011 _**(i) In the case of composite negligence, plaintiff/claimant is entitled to sue both or any one of the joint tort feasors and to recover the entire compensation as liability of joint tort feasors is joint and several.**_ _**(ii) In the case of composite negligence, apportionment of compensation between two tort feasors vis a vis the plaintiff/claimant is not permissible. He can recover at his option whole damages from any of them.**_ _**(iii) In case all the joint tort feasors have been impleaded and evidence is sufficient, it is open to the court/tribunal to determine inter se extent of composite negligence of the drivers. However, determination of the extent of negligence between the joint tort feasors is only for the purpose of their inter se liability so that one may recover the sum from the other after making whole of payment to the plaintiff/claimant to the extent it has satisfied the liability of the other. In case both of them have been impleaded and the apportionment/ extent of their negligence has been determined by the court/tribunal, in main case one joint tort feasor can recover the amount from the other in the execution proceedings.**_ _**(iv) It would not be appropriate for the court/tribunal to determine the extent of composite negligence of the drivers of two vehicles in the absence of impleadment of other joint tort feasors. In such a case, impleaded joint tort feasor should be left, in case he so desires, to sue the other joint tort feasor in independent proceedings after passing of the decree or award.** (emphasis supplied)_ 13. In view of the categoric declaration of law in the **Khenyei (supra)** and the fact that the driver, owner and the insurer of the autorickshaw were not impleaded as parties before the Tribunal, the Tribunal has rightly not fixed the extent of 12 MACA No.640 of 2011 composite negligence on the drivers of the two vehicles. As observed in the afore-cited decision, it would be open for the appellant/insurer to move the Tribunal and sue the other joint tort feasor in independent proceedings, in accordance with law, as observed in clause (iv) of paragraph 18 of . **Khenyei (supra)** In the above view of the matter, the appeal is dismissed, without prejudice to the right of the appellant to workout its remedies by moving the Tribunal, as observed in clause (iv) of paragraph 18 of **Khenyei** (supra). In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear the respective costs. Sd/- ## **C.S.DIAS, JUDGE** rmm