High CourtSingle JudgeAppeal dismissed by the Supreme Court

Nagar Nigam, Allahabad through its Municipal Commissioner v. Life Insurance Corporation of India & Ors.

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 7460 of 2009
Neutral Citation:[2017] 7 S.C.R. 518

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • R. F. Nariman
  • Sanjay Kishan Kaul
Judgment Date
2017-08-03
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal dismissed.
Final Disposition
Appeal dismissed by the Supreme Court

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Nagar Nigam, Allahabad through its Municipal Commissioner

Respondents

  • Life Insurance Corporation of India
  • Ors.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • T. N. Singh

Counsels for Respondents

  • • B. B. Sawhney
  • • Ms. Indra Sawhney
  • • Aditya Shandilya

Case Synopsis & Summary

This civil appeal concerns the valid scope of licensing fees levied by Nagar Nigam, Allahabad under the Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1959. The appellant sought to impose licence fees under Section 438 on premises used for various activities, including the business of insurance. The Allahabad High Court had held that the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) was not covered by the expression “insurance company” under a 1999 notification, differentiating LIC’s life-insurance business (governed by the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956) from general insurance activities regulated under the Insurance Act, 1958. The Supreme Court examined whether LIC’s life-insurance operation could be regarded as an insurance company for purposes of the licence levy. It noted that the notification’s schedule includes an item for “Insurance Company (each Branch)” and that LIC’s status, as a life-insurance entity, is distinct under the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 as opposed to Life/Home/General Insurance under the Insurance Act, 1958. The Court applied statutory interpretation principles: where two interpretations are possible, the interpretation favorable to the assessee should be adopted, and concluded that a licence fee under Section 438 can be levied only for trades or operations connected with trades specified by bye-laws; the expression “trade” does not extend to the business of insurance. Accordingly the appeal was dismissed.

Provisions of Law Cited

Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1959 - Section 438Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1959 - Section 438(8)Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1959 - Section 452Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1959 - Section 541Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1959 - Section 541(20)Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1959 - Section 541(41)Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956Insurance Act, 1958Section 2(78)-(80) – definitions: 'trade effluent', 'trade premises', 'trade refuse'

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Principle of interpretation that where two interpretations of a provision imposing a tax/fee are possible, the interpretation that favours the assessee should be adopted.
  • Distinction between Life Insurance Corporation under the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 and general/other insurance companies under the Insurance Act, 1958 for purposes of levy under Section 438.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant contends that the LIC’s life-insurance activities fall within the scope of the term 'insurance company' under the relevant notification; LIC’s business should be liable to licence fees under Section 438, read with the bye-laws, as it constitutes a trade-related operation within municipal competence.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents highlight the statutory distinction between life insurance (LIC under the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956) and general insurance (Insurance Act, 1958). They argue that licence fees under Section 438 apply only to trades or operations connected with trades listed in bye-laws, and that 'trade' does not encompass LIC’s life-insurance business; the byelaw-based levy must exclude LIC’s life-insurance activities.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

[2017] 7 S.C.R. 518 A # NAGAR NIGAM, ALLAHABAD THROUGH ITS MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER v. B ## LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA & ORS. (Civil Appeal No. 7460 of2009) ## AUGUST 03, 2017 ## **[R.F. NARIMAN AND SANJAY K.ISHAN KAUL, JJ.I** C _Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1959_ - _ss.438, 452, 541_ - _Licence Fee_ - _Levy of_ - _On business of insurance_ - _Propriety_ - _Held: s.438 deals with licence fee which is chargeable for activities related.to functions of Municipal Corporations, which activities refer to premises in which goods or animals are kept for sale or any other purpose, and to premises in which manufacture of_ D _goods takes place_ - _Licence fee can be levied uls.438(d) only if any trade or operations connected with any trade are specified in bye-laws and expression 'trade' would not include business of insurance._ ## CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7460 - E of2009. From the Judgment and Order dated 19.01.2005 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition Nos. 386, 16861, 16948, 13287, 14251, 14253and14255 of2004 F T. N. Singh, Adv. for the Appellant. B. B. Sawhney, Sr. Adv. Ms. Indra Sawhney, Aditya Shandilya, Advs. for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by **R.F. NARIMAN, J.** I. Mr. T.N. Singh, learned counsel G appearing on behalf of the appellant-Nagar Nigam has assailed the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in which the respondent-Life Insurance Corporation of India was held not to be covered by the expression "insurance company" under a notification dated 30.01.1999 issued by the appellant. H 518 NAGAR NIGAM, ALLAHABADTHR.ITS MUNICIPAL COMMR v. 519 LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA [ R. F. NARIMAN, l]. ## 2. The judgment under appeal has held: A "We also notice that in Item No. 25 of the Schedule annexed with the Nagar Nigam, Allahabad Notification dated 13.01.99/ Annexure-2 to the writ petition without an exception various establishments, undertakings etc. are all in essence pure and simple business or commercial units. In category Ga, Serial No.l of the list refers to Finance Company/Chit Fund. It is followed by Item No.2 referring to Insurance Company '(each Branch)'. It goes to show that respondents provided license fee with respect to business of a Company in the nature of 'Financial Companies' 'Chit Fund Companies' and the like Insurance Companies dealing in general insurance (i.e. other than Life Insurance-exclusively carried on by LIC of India). B c Aforesaid conclusion is further discernible from the fact that the list does not embarrass in itself any charitable hospital or government hospital or other likewise establishments. In that view of the matter we do find a clear distinction between Insurance Company (carrying on business under Insurance Act 1958) vis-a-vis the Life Insurance Corporation carrying business of life insurance under Life Insurance Corporation of India Act, 1956. Otherwise also Principle of Interpretation. It is an accepted principle of Statutory Interpretation that in a case where two interpretations of a provision imposing tax/fee is possible, Court should accept the interpretation which leans in favour of the assessee i.e. the person who is sought to be burdened." D E 3. Mr. B.B. Sawhney, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has sought to support the judgment under appeal by advancing slightly different arguments, which we have permitted him to advance. He has referred to the statutory authority to levy licence fee and read to us Section 438 of the Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1959, which reads as follows:- "438. Certain things not to be kept, and certain trades and operations not to be carried on without licence.- ( 1) Except under and in confonnity with the terms and conditions of a licence granted by the Municipal Commissioner, no person shall- F G H 520 [2017) 7 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS A (a) keep in or upon any premises any article specified in the byelaws in any quantity or in excess of the quantity specified in the bye-laws as the maximum quantity of such article which may at one time be kept in or upon the same premises without a licence; and B (b) keep in or upon any building intended for or used as a dwelling or within fifteen feet of such building cotton, in pressed bales or boras or loose, in quantity exceeding four hundred-weight; (c) keep, or allow to be kept, in or upon any premises horses, cattle or other four-footed animals- c (i) for sale, (ii) for letting out on hire, (iii) for any purposes for which any charge is made or any remuneration is received, or D (iv) for sale of any produce thereof; ( d) carry on or allow to be carried on, in or upon any premises- (i) any trade or operations connected with any trade specified in the bye-laws, E (ii) any trade or operation which is dangerous to life or health or property, or likely to create a nuisance either from its nature or by reason of the manner in which or the conditions under which, the same, is or is proposed to be carried on; F ( e) carry on within the City, or use any premises, for the trade or operation of a farrier." He has referred to and relied upon sub-clause (d) of Section 43 8 which states that a licence fee can be levied only if any trade or operations connected with any trade specified in the bye-laws is there. G According to him, the expression "trade" would not, by any stretch of imagination, include the business of insurance since what is referred to in Section 438 is keeping for sale or otherwise goods or animals or the manufacture of goods in premises. To buttress his submission, he has referred to Section 2 sub-sections (78), (79) and ( 80) which reads as follows:- H NAGAR NIGAM, ALLAHABADTHR.ITS MUNICIPAL COMMR v. 521 LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA [ R. F. NARIMAN, J.]. "(78) "trade effluent" means any liquid either with or without particles of matter in suspension therein, which is so wholly or in part produced in the course of any trade or industry carried on at trade premises and in relation to any trade premises, means any such liquid as aforesaid which is so produced in the course of any trade or industry carried on at those premises, but does not include domestic sewage; A B (79) "trade premises" means any premises used or intended to be used for carrying on any trade or industry; (80) "trade refuse" means and includes the refuse of any trade, manufacture or business;" c 4. When the Court questioned learned counsel for the appellant as to this interpretation, the answer it got was that bye-laws can be framed, in any event, under Section 541 and, in particular, sub-clause (41) which reads as follows:- "( 41) fixing offees for any licence, sanction or permission to be granted by or under this Act;" D 5. We were also refen-ed to Section 452 which reads as follows:- "452. Licence fees, etc.- The Municipal Commissioner may charge a fee to be fixed by bye-law for any licence, sanction or permission which he is entitled or required to grant by or under this Act." 6. It will be noticed that both the aforesaid provisions, namely, Section 541 as well as Section 452 only refer back to a provision in the Act which specifies that a levy may be made for licence fees. We were not 1:eferred to any provision other than Section 438 for the purpose of locating such levy. 7. In our opinion, learned counsel for the respondents appears to be correct in his submission, inasmuch as Section 4 38 deals with licence fee which is chargeable for activities related to functions of Municipal Corporations, which activities refer to premises in which goods or animals are kept for sale or for any other purpose, and to premises in which manufacture of goods takes place. This becomes further clear when we refer to Section 438(8) of the Act which reads as under:- E F G "(8) Nothing in sub-sections ( 6) ad (7) shall be deemed to apply to mills for spinning or weaving cotton, jute, wool or silk to any other H 522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 7 S.C.R. A large mill or factory which the Municipal Commissioner may from time to time with the approval of the Executive Committee, specially exempt from the operation thereof." 8. Mr. B.B. Sawhney, learned Senior Counsel, also referred to Section 541(20) which reads as under:- B c "20. the control and supervision of all premises used for any of the purposes mentioned in Section 438 and of all trades and manufactures carried thereon and the prescribing and regulating of the construction, dimensions, ventilation, lighting, cleansing, drainage and water-supply of any such premises;" This provision also has direct reference to Section 438 and supports the interpretation that he has suggested. 9. In the premises, we dismiss the appeal, but for the reasons stated by us. D Ankit Gyan Appeal dismissed.