High Court of KeralaSingle JudgeSecond Appeal allowed; decrees of both the tria...

N. Thankappan Pillai v. Sarasamma @ Thankamma

Case / Petition Number:SA.No. 325 of 2002 (E)

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • K. Harilal
Judgment Date
2016-12-17
Court Decision / Holding
This Second Appeal will stand allowed. All pending interlocutory applications will stand closed.
Final Disposition
Second Appeal allowed; decrees of both the trial court and the first appellate court set aside; plaintiffs may proceed in accordance with Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act; interlocutory applications closed.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • N. Thankappan Pillai
  • Bharathy Amma
  • N. Babu
  • Ravindran Pillai
  • Geetha
  • Surendan
  • Baiju
  • Thriveni
  • Abhiram
  • Devika Raveendran

Respondents

  • Sarasamma @ Thankamma
  • Gopalakrishnan Nair
  • RadhaKrishnan Nair
  • Sumadevi
  • Sandeep G. Nair
  • Chitra B.S.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Sri O.V. Radhakrishnan (Sr.)
  • • Sri Antony Mukkath
  • • Sri R. Joy
  • • Sri K. Ramachandran

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Sri P.N. Ramakrishnan Nair
  • • Sri P. Viswanathan

Case Synopsis & Summary

The respondents, Sarasamma @ Thankamma and others, filed O.S.613/1991 in the Prl. Munsiff Court, Kollam, seeking declaration of title and recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property from the defendant, N. Thankappan Pillai, who had been their father’s tenant. The plaintiffs claimed title by succession after Parameswaran Unnithan’s death (1985) and sought possession for their bona fide residential needs. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding no title or possession in the plaintiffs. On appeal, the lower appellate court reversed and decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs. The Second Appeal (SA 325 of 2002) challenges these findings, arguing that commencement of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act during pendency altered civil court jurisdiction and invalidated the decree. The court traverses precedents such as Gowrikutty Amma v. Kesavan (1988) which held that Section 11(1) does not oust civil court jurisdiction to evict, and Kuruvilla Abraham v. John (F.B., 1995) relying on M/s East India Corporation Ltd. v. Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. (AIR 1991 SC 1094) to hold that changes in jurisdiction due to statutory notification can render decrees a nullity. Ultimately, the High Court allows the Second Appeal, sets aside the decrees of both courts below, and directs the plaintiffs to proceed in accordance with Section 11 of the Act, closing all interlocutory applications.

Provisions of Law Cited

Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act — Section 11(1)Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act — Section 1(3)

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellants (defendant) contend that the civil court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate the eviction and related reliefs during pendency was ousted by the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, especially after the notification under Section 1(3) applying to the area. They argue that Section 11(1) of the Act does not oust the civil court’s jurisdiction to pass a decree for eviction; the decree can only be executed under the Act. They rely on Gowrikutty Amma v. Kesavan to justify the pre-Act position and challenge the appellate decree as a potential nullity in light of subsequent judicial pronouncements (Kuruvilla Abraham, East India). The appellants seek to sustain the decree under the earlier framework or, at minimum, allow application of Section 11 in the revised jurisdictional regime.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents contend that the suit for title and possession is maintainable and that the decrees should be upheld or correctly remitted under the Act’s regime. They argue that the notification under Section 1(3) shifts or limits civil court jurisdiction, but the appellate outcomes should be compatible with the statutory scheme; they rely on the established jurisprudence to argue that the decrees cannot be rendered a nullity without a valid legal basis under the Act. They maintain that the courts below did not err in applying the law as it stood during the relevant period.

Cited Precedents (3)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Gowrikutty Amma v. Kesavan1988 (1) KLT 649OverruledFull Bench held the proposition that Section 11(1) does not oust civil court jurisdiction is not tenable; decrees can become null when jurisdiction is altered by notification.
M/s East India Corporation Ltd. v. Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd.AIR 1991 SC 1094PositiveCited to support the proposition that change in jurisdiction due to statutory notification can affect the validity of decrees.
Kuruvilla Abraham v. John1995 (1) KLT 161 (F.B.)PositiveFull Bench decision cited to explain the evolving view on jurisdictional changes and decree nullity in light of Section 1(3) notification.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.HARILAL SATURDAY, THE 17TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2016/26TH AGRAHAYANA, 1938 SA.No. 325 of 2002 (E) ----------------------- AGAINST THE JUDGMENT & DECREE DATED 02-01-2002 IN AS 199/1996 of III ADDL. DISTRICT COURT, KOLLAM AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 31-07-1995 IN OS 613/1991 of PRL. MUNSIFF COURT, KOLLAM APPELLANT(S)/RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT: --------------------------------- *1. N.THANKAPPAN PILLAI RESIDING AT CHERAKUNNATHU THEKKETHIL, KILIKOLLOOR VILLAGE, AYATHIL CHERRY, KOLLAM TALUK, KOLLAM DISTRICT. *(DIED; LRs 2 TO 7 IMPLEADED) ## ADDL.APPELLANTS: 2. BHARATHY AMMA, S/O. LATE THANKAPPAN PILLAI, AGED 64 YEARS, CHERUKUNNATHU VEEDU, AYATHIL P.O., KOLLAM-17. 3. N.BABU, S/O. LATE THANKAPPAN PILLAI, AGED 45 YEARS, MALU'S AYATHIL P.O., KOLLAM. **4. RAVINDRAN PILLAI, LATE THANKAPPAN PILLAI, CHERUKUNNATHU VEEDU, AYATHIL P.O., KOLLAM-17. **(DIED. LRS. ADDL.8 TO10 IMPLEADED) 5. GEETHA, D/O. LATE THANKAPPAN PILLAI, AGED 39 YEARS, MANGALASSERY PUTHAN VEEDU, KANDACHIRA, PERINAD P.O. 6. SURENDRAN, S/O. LATE THANKAPPAN PILLAI, AGED 35 YEARS, CHERUKUNNATHU VEEDU, AYATHIL P.O., KOLLAM-17. 7. BAIJU, S/O. LATE THANKAPPAN PILLAI, AGED 30 YEARS OF DO. DO. - *(ADDL.APPELLANTS 2 TO 7 ARE IMPLEADED AS THE Lrs OF DECEASED SOLE APPELLANT AS PER ORDER DT.9.10.2006 IN IA 2171/06) ....2/- SA.No. 325 of 2002 (E) 2 ** ADDL.APPELLANTS 8 TO 10: 8. THRIVENI, W/O.LATE RAVEENDRAN PILLAI, AGED 42 YEARS, SREEMAKAM, PERUMON DESOM, PANAYAM VILLAGE, KOLLAM. 9. ABHIRAM (MINOR), S/O. LATE RAVEENDRAN PILLAI, AGED 15 YEARS, SREEMAKAM, PERUMON DESOM, PANAYAM VILLAGE, KOLLAM, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER THRIVENI. 10. DEVIKA RAVEENDRAN (MINOR) D/O. LATE RAVEENDRAN PILLAI, AGED 10 YEARS, SREEMAKAM, PERUMON DESOM, PANAYAM VILLAGE, KOLLAM, REPRESENTED BY HER MOTHER THRIVENI. **(THE LEGAL HEIRS OF DECEASED 4TH APPELLANT ARE IMPLEADED AS ADDL. APPELLANTS 8 TO 10 AS PER ORDER DATED 12.3.2015 IN IA.621/2015) ADDL.APPELLANTS 2-10 BY ADVS.SRI.O.V.RADHAKRISHNAN (SR.) SRI.ANTONY MUKKATH SRI.R.V.JOY SRI.K.RAMACHANDRAN RESPONDENT(S)/APPELLANTS/PLAINTIFFS: ------------------------------------ 1. SARASAMMA @ THANKAMMA, AGED 76 YEARS, W/O. PARAMESWARAN UNNITHAN, RESIDING AT KAMBIYIL VEEDU, KANNIMEL CHERRY,KILIKOLLOOR VILLAGE, KOLLAM TALUK, KOLLAM DISTRICT. - # 2. GOPALAKRISHNAN NAIR,AGED 51 YEARS, S/O.PARAMESWARAN UNNITHAN, DO. DO. (DIED. LRS. 4 TO 6 IMPLEADED) 3. RADHAKRISHNAN NAIR, AGED 44 YEARS, S/O.PARAMESWARAN UNNITHAN, DO. DO. ## #ADDL.RESPONDENTS: 4. SUMADEVI, W/O.LATE GOPALAKRISHNAN NAIR, ELAMPEZHATHU HOUSE, KULANGARA BHAGAM, CHAVARA P.O., KOLLAM-691583. 5. SANDEEP G. NAIR, S/O.LATE GOPALAKRISHNAN NAIR, -DO- -DO- 6. CHITRA B.S., D/O.LATE GOPALAKRISHNAN NAIR, -DO-DO- - # (ADDL. RESPONDENTS 4 TO 6 ARE IMPLEADED AS THE LRS OF DECEASED R2 AS PER ORDER DTD.28.7011 IN IA 1196/11) ......3/- SA.No. 325 of 2002 (E) 3 R2 & R3 BY ADVS. SRI.P.N.RAMAKRISHNAN NAIR SRI.P.VISWANATHAN THIS SECOND APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 17-122016, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: OKB ## K.HARILAL, J. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ## S.A. No.325 of 2002 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Dated this the 17[th] day of December, 2016 ## JUDGMENT ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ The respondents herein are the plaintiffs in O.S.No.613/1991 and the appellants in A.S.No.199/1996. The respondents/plaintiffs filed O.S.No.613/1991 seeking for declaration of title and recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property from the appellant/defendant. According to the plaintiffs, the plaint schedule property belongs to late Parameswaran Unnithan, the husband of the 1[st] plaintiff and the father of the plaintiffs 2 and 3 as per Ext.A1 Patta. The said Parameswaran Unnithan expired on 13.9.1985 and the right over the property devolved on the plaintiffs herein. The defendant was a tenant under the said Parameswaran Unnithan in the plaint schedule shop room and after the death of Parameswaran Unnithan he was attorned by the plaintiffs as landlord. The plaintiffs are in bona fide need of the plaint schedule property for erecting a building for the purpose of their residence. But SA.325/02-E **:2:** the defendant was not willing to vacate the premises on the demand of the plaintiffs. Hence they filed a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession with damages. 2. The defendant contended that the suit is not maintainable and same is barred by limitation and adverse possession. According to the defendant, he is in possession of the plaint schedule property from 1969 onwards and he had constructed the shed in the plaint schedule property and he is doing tea shop business therein. He disputed the patta also contending that the said patta had been obtained fraudulently when the plaintiffs were in the Revenue Department. In short, according to the defendant, the plaintiffs have no title over the plaint schedule property and even if they have title, the same is lost by adverse possession. 3. On the rival pleadings both parties adduced evidence before the trial court and the trial court, after considering the evidence on record, dismissed the suit on a finding that the plaintiffs have no title or possession over the property and hence they are not entitled to SA.325/02-E **:3:** recover plaint schedule property from the defendant. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiffs preferred the aforesaid appeal. After reappreciating the evidence on record, the lower appellate court reversed the said finding and decreed the suit. This second appeal is filed challenging the findings of the courts below. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondents. 5. In view of the submissions at the Bar, the question to be considered is whether the decree and judgment passed by the courts below are legally sustainable and valid in view of the commencement of the provisions of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act during the pendency of the original suit before the trial court. 6. Going by the pleadings, it could be seen that the defendant has specifically contended that the civil court has no jurisdiction till the commencement of Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act during the pendency of the original suit. It is not disputed that when the original suit was pending the provisions under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act was made SA.325/02-E **:4:** applicable to Kilikollur Panchayat, the area where plaint schedule shop room is situated. But, ignoring the said notification, the trial court proceeded further and passed the decree dismissing the original suit and, in appeal, the appellate court reversed the findings and allowed the appeal. 7. The point to be considered is, whether the courts below are justified in proceeding further notwithstanding the declaration under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, making the provisions of the Act applicable to the area wherein the plaint schedule property is situated. 8. Going by the judgment passed by the trial court, it could be seen that the trial court has framed an issue, 'whether the suit is maintainable or not' and found that the suit is maintainable in view of the decision in Gowrikutty Amma v. Kesavan [1988 (1) KLT 649], wherein this Court held that Section 11(1) of the Act does not oust the jurisdiction of the civil court to pass a decree for eviction and the only prohibition is that the said decree could be executed only in accordance with the provisions SA.325/02-E **:5:** of the Act. Therefore, I cannot find fault with the trial court and held in such a way as the law prevailing then was that. 9. But, thereafter the aforesaid decision was referred to Full Bench of this Court for determining the correctness of the said proposition and this Court in Kuruvilla Abraham v. John [1995 (1) KLT 161 (F.B.)], relying on the decision of the Apex Court in M/s. East India Corporation Ltd. v. Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. [AIR 1991 SC 1094] held that “merely because when the decree was passed Munsiff had jurisdiction to try the suit the Lower Appellate Court cannot shut its eyes to the changed situations whereby the jurisdiction of the civil court has been taken off by notification under Section 1(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent control) Act. As the decree has been challenged in appeal and as the appellate court judgment was pronounced only at a stage when decree has become incapable of being affirmed because it has become invalid, the contention that the decree cannot be said to be a nullity is not tenable.” When applying the above proposition to the instant case, the judgment and SA.325/02-E **:6:** decree passed by both courts below are, in fact, nullity, in law. Hence the impugned decree and judgment passed by the courts below will stand set aside. The plaintiffs are at liberty to proceed in accordance with Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. This Second Appeal will stand allowed. All pending interlocutory applications will stand closed. K.HARILAL, Judge. okb