N Chellappan Pillai Susee Confectionary Industries v. State of Kerala; N Vasavan Ananda Bhavan v. State of Kerala (Common Order in CRL.REV.PET Nos. 552/2015 & 541/2015)

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.S.DIAS** **THURSDAY, THE 2[ND] DAY OF NOVEMBER 2023 / 11TH KARTHIKA, 1945 CRL.REV.PET NO. 552 OF 2015** **AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT CRA 193/2009 OF I ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT & I ADDITIONAL MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM CC 782/1999 OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS , SASTHAMCOTTA REVISION PETITIONER/S:** N CHELLAPPAN PILLAI SUSEE CONFECTIONARY INDUSTRIES, ULIYAKOVIL SOUTH,KOLLAM BY ADV SRI.M.T.SURESHKUMAR ## **RESPONDENT/S:** 1 STATE OF KERALA REP BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR , HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM 2 THE FOOD INSPECTOR SASTHAMCOTTA, CIRCLE, KOLLAM DIST ## **OTHER PRESENT:** PP SRI NIMA JACOB THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 02.11.2023, ALONG WITH Crl.Rev.Pet.541/2015, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: CRL.REV.PET NOs. 552 & 541 OF 2015 2 ## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.S.DIAS** **THURSDAY, THE 2[ND] DAY OF NOVEMBER 2023 / 11TH KARTHIKA, 1945 CRL.REV.PET NO. 541 OF 2015** **AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT CRA 199/2009 OF I ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT & I ADDITIONAL MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS** **TRIBUNAL, KOLLAM** **CC 782/1999 OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF FIRST CLASS ,** ## **SASTHAMCOTTA** ## **REVISION PETITIONER/S:** N.VASAVAN ANANDA BHAVAN, EDAKKAVU PO, PORUVAZHY, KOLLAM BY ADV SRI.B.MOHANLAL ## **RESPONDENT/S:** STATE REPRESENTED BY THE FOOD INSPECTOR, SASTHAMCOTTAH CIRCLE, SASTHAMCOTTAH PO, KOLLAM DISTRICT THROUGH THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM SR PP SMT SEETHA S THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 02.11.2023, ALONG WITH Crl.Rev.Pet.552/2015, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: CRL.REV.PET NOs. 552 & 541 OF 2015 3 Dated this the 2[nd] day of November, 2023 ## **COMMON ORDER** As these revision petitions are filed against the common judgment and are between the same parties, they are being disposed of by this common order. 2. The revision petitions are filed the common in challenging judgment Crl.A.Nos.193/2009 and 199/2009 of the Court of the First Additional Sessions Judge, Kollam (Appellate Court), confirming the judgment in C.C.No.782/1999 of the Court of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Sasthamcottah (Trial Court) holding the revision petitioners guilty and convicting them for the offences under Section 16(1-A) r/w section 2(ia)(j) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and Rule 30 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (in short, ‘Act & Rules) and CRL.REV.PET NOs. 552 & 541 OF 2015 4 consequentially sentencing them. The revision petitioner in Crl.R.P.No.541/2015 was the 1[st] accused and the revision petitioner in Crl.R.P.No.552/2015 was the 2[nd] accused and the 2[nd] respondent-Food Inspector in both the revision petitions was the complainant before the Trial Court. For convenience, the parties are referred to as per their status before the Trial Court. ## Prosecution case in brief: 3. The prosecution case is that, on 06.01.1999, the complainant - Food Inspector found the 1[st] accused engaged in the sale of orange candy sweets. He purchased 1 kg of orange candy sweets, after informing his intention to give the samples for analysis. He sent one of the sample to the Public Analyst, who by Ext.P15 Form III report found that the CRL.REV.PET NOs. 552 & 541 OF 2015 5 sample contained synthetic food colour in excess of the prescribed limits under the PFA Rules and was, therefore, adulterated. The accused 2 and 3 were the partners of the 4[th] accused firm which manufactured the orange candy sweets. Thus, the accused committed the above offences. 4. The accused pleaded not guilty to the substance of accusation read over to them. In the trial, the prosecution examined PWs 1 to 7 and marked Exts.P1 to P24 in evidence. The accused examined DWs 1 and 2 and marked Exts.D1 to D7 on their side. 5. The learned Magistrate, after analysing the materials on record, found the accused guilty for the above offences and convicted and sentenced them to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-, and in default to undergo CRL.REV.PET NOs. 552 & 541 OF 2015 6 simple imprisonment for a further period of two months. 6. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the 1[st] accused preferred Crl.A. No.199/2009 and the accused 2 to 4 filed Crl.A.No.193/2009 before the Appellate Court. 7. The Appellate Court, after re- appreciating the materials placed on record, by the impugned common judgment dismissed the appeals. 8. It is assailing the concurrent judgments of the courts below, the revision petitions are filed. 9. Heard; Sri.B.Mohanlal and Sri.M.T.Suresh Kumar, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners and Smt.Nima Jacob, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent-State. 10. The learned Counsel appearing for the CRL.REV.PET NOs. 552 & 541 OF 2015 7 revision petitioners placed reliance on the judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court in **Pepsico India Holdings Pvt. Ltd v. Food Inspector and Another** [2010 (4) KHC 767] and the Division Bench of this Court in **Rasheed v. Food Inspector** [2016 (2) KLT 390] and argued that since the sample was analysed in a laboratory not recognised by the Central Government as provided under Section 23(1-A)(ee) of the Act, the prosecution has to fail and the revision petitioners are to be acquitted. They submitted that without even going into merits of the other grounds urged, the revision petitions are to be allowed. 11. The learned Public Prosecutor on the contrary contended that the decision in **Pepsico** **India Holdings Pvt. Ltd.** (supra) needs to be reconsidered, particularly because Section 8 of the Act enables the Central Government and the CRL.REV.PET NOs. 552 & 541 OF 2015 8 State Government to appoint a Public Analyst for the local areas as assigned by the Central Government and State Government. In the State of Kerala, Public Analysts have been appointed invoking the above provision. Therefore, the decision in **Pepsico India Holdings Pvt. Ltd.** (supra) has no application to the cases on hand. Hence, the revision petitions may be dismissed. 12. Is there any illegality, impropriety or irregularity in the impugned judgments. 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered the judgment in **Pepsico India Holdings Private Ltd.** (supra) on 18.11.2010. Subsequent to the pronouncement of the judgment, there were several cases filed before this Court to quash the proceedings initiated under the Act. CRL.REV.PET NOs. 552 & 541 OF 2015 9 14. There was cleavage of opinion and divergent views taken by three learned Single Judges of this Court in interpreting the ratio decidendi in **Pepsico India Holdings Private Ltd.** (supra). 15. Due to cleavage of opinion in interpreting the above judgment, a bunch of cases were referred to a Division Bench of this Court for an authoritative pronouncement. 16. Accordingly, in **Rasheed v. Food Inspector** (supra), a Division Bench of this Court, on a threadbare analysis of the law laid down in **Pepsico India Holdings Private Ltd.** (supra), has answered the reference in the following manner: “18. Bearing in mind the fact that the Hon'ble Apex Court in Pepsico's case (supra) held that the provisions under S.23(1A)(ee) and (hh) are not directory and that this Court has erred in holding that they are only enabling provisions we will proceed further to answer the referred questions. For answering the terms of reference a broad understanding of the said declaration is necessary. **When once the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the said provisions are not directory and the failure to adhere to the provisions cannot be said to be not** CRL.REV.PET NOs. 552 & 541 OF 2015 10 **fatal to the prosecution it has to be understood and applied in all cases where a public analyst was to carry out an analysis and to give a report to form the basis for launching the prosecution. Thus, evidently, for that purpose the report should be one made after conducting an analysis in a laboratory defined under S. 23(1A)(ee).** It is to be noted that after the decision in Pepsico's case (supra) by the Hon'ble Apex Court a notification was followed whereby Rule in relation to S.23(1A)(hh) was framed as R. 4(9) of the PFA Rules. **Thus, in the light of Pepsico's case (supra) in order to be reliable and to be taken the basis for the purpose of launching prosecution a report by a public analyst must be one made after conducting an analysis in a laboratory defined under S.23(1A) (ee) of the Act. In that context the indisputable common case is that till the repealing of 1954 Act no laboratory was defined in terms of the provision under S.23(1A)(ee). If that be so, there could not have been any question of conducting an analysis by a public analyst under the PFA Act in a laboratory defined under S. 23(1A)(ee) of the PFA Act** . In view of the above findings and conclusions we will answer the questions referred. First question referred is as follows: (1) Could all the prosecutions under the Act of 1954 be stifled by raising a contention that the laboratories or methods of analysis were not defined? In the light of what we have held herein before the said it can only be answered in the following manner: **Wherever an analysis has to be conducted from a laboratory to find whether the particular sample of item of the particular food article is adulterated, to form the basis for initiation of prosecution under the PFA Act the report of the analyst in relation to that sample must be one conducted in a laboratory defined under S.23(1A) (ee). Since no such laboratory was defined till the repealing of the PFA Act wherever an analysis from a laboratory was inevitable for making a report regarding item concerned as adulterated there cannot be any successful prosecution in the absence of such a report. In such circumstances the prosecution proceedings have to be terminated for the failure to define laboratories in terms of S. 23(1A)(ee) and the consequential failure to conduct an analysis of the particular sample by the public analyst from such a laboratory.** In other words taking note of the nature of the food article involved and the method to be employed to find out the adulteration if an CRL.REV.PET NOs. 552 & 541 OF 2015 11 analysis from a laboratory is not at all required in such circumstances the prosecution cannot be stifled on the ground that the laboratories in terms of provisions under S.23(1A)(ee) were not defined. It cannot be said that all the prosecutions under the 1954 Act should be stifled owing to the failure to define laboratories in terms of S.23(1A)(ee) as there may be cases registered against persons for contravention of the provisions under S.16(1) (c), S.16(1)(d) and S.14A (Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954). So also a case where the Article in food was lifted and sent for analysis prior to the introduction of the provisions under S.23(1A)(ee) viz. 01/04/1976 cannot be stifled as anything previously done could not be invalidated owing to the failure to define laboratory in terms of S.23(1A)(ee) in view of the provisions under S.23(2). **In the context of the term of reference No. 1 it is to be noted that subsequent to Pepsico's case (supra) the method of analysis was, in fact, defined and it was brought into by incorporating R.9(4) in the PFA Rules with effect from 25/03/2008.** 19. The second question referred is as hereunder: (2) Is it proper to hold that since Central Government has not taken steps to effectuate S.23(1A)(ee) and (hh) of the Act of 1954, no prosecution will lie under the Act of 1954 even if it is established that the standards prescribed for various food items have been flouted? **In respect of items of food articles where, for holding that the standard prescribed for the same was flouted or it was not maintained if an analysis from a laboratory is inevitable in such cases also if the analysis was conducted by the public analyst under the PFA Act in a laboratory not defined in terms of S.23(1A)(ee), in the light of Pepsico's decision, no prosecution will lie based a report made after such an analysis.** The last question referred is follows: (3) Whether the ratio in Pepsico's case (supra) can be applied to all cases of alleged food adulteration under the Act of 1954 irrespective of the fact whether or not standards have been prescribed for food items? In cases where standard is prescribed or in respect of a food item to say that the said item of food is adulterated and to launch the prosecution, if an analysis from a laboratory by a public analyst is inevitable in such circumstances also the ratio in Pepsico's case (supra) will be applicable. In the light of the answers to the referred questions it has become absolutely unnecessary to go into the question referred herein before based on the decision in Narayana Reddiar's case which was declined to be referred. CRL.REV.PET NOs. 552 & 541 OF 2015 12 20. Having answered the reference as above, we are of the view that the fate of the criminal revision petitions and the Crl MCs depend upon the question whether in respect the item of food involved in individual cases, the sample of which was collected, an analysis from a laboratory is required or not for holding the same as adulterated. **If the answer is in the affirmative necessarily in the absence of a report made after an analysis from a laboratory defined in terms of the provisions under S.23(1A)(ee) there can be no successful prosecution** . We will therefore, consider the individual cases in the aforesaid manner and in the light of the answers to the referred questions. Needless to say that if the answer to the aforesaid question in respect of a particular case is in the negative there can be no legal impediment in continuing with the prosecution. In view of the fact that till the repealing of the said Act no laboratories were defined in terms of S.23(1A)(ee) all those cases have to be decided based on a consideration as aforesaid.” (emphasis given by me) ## 17. The exposition of law in **Rasheed v.** **Food Inspector** (supra), following the declaration in **Pepsico India Holdings Private Ltd** (supra) leaves no room for any further interpretation on the question that, if an allegedly adulterated food sample is not analysed in a laboratory under Section 23(1-A) (ee) of the Act, the same is fatal to the CRL.REV.PET NOs. 552 & 541 OF 2015 13 prosecution and the prosecution has to necessarily fail. 18. In the cases at hand, the prosecution was launched on the basis of Ext.P15 Form III report of the Public Analyst, who found the sample of orange candy sweets to be adulterated as it contained an excess of synthetic food colour. 19. Admittedly, the sample was not tested in a laboratory notified by the Central Government under Section 23(1-A) (ee) of the Act. Thus, the ratio decidendi in **Pepsico India Holdings Private Ltd** and **Rasheed vs. Food** **Inspector** (supra) stands attracted and necessarily the prosecution fails. Consequentially, the revision petitioners/ accused 1 and 2 have to be found not guilty and have to be acquitted. 20. In the result, (i) The revision petitions are allowed; CRL.REV.PET NOs. 552 & 541 OF 2015 **==> picture [13 x 9] intentionally omitted <==** (ii) The impugned judgments in Crl.Appeal Nos.193/2009 and 199/2009 and in C.C.No.782/1999 of the courts below are set aside. (iii) The revision petitioners/accused 1 and 2 are held not guilty and are acquitted, and are set at liberty. (iv) The bail bonds executed by the revision petitioners and their sureties are hereby cancelled. **Sd/-** **C.S.DIAS,JUDGE** rkc/02.11.23