High CourtDivision BenchAppeal allowed; High Court judgment set aside; ...

MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, PUSAD v. GOKAL DAS (GOKALDAS DOSSA & CO. LTD.)

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 259 of 1970
Neutral Citation:[1980] 2 SCR

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • R. S. Sarkaria
  • C. N. Chinnappa Reddy
Judgment Date
1979-11-13
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal allowed; the demand notice is valid and does not contravene Article 276(2) or Section 142A(2); High Court’s quashing of the demand is set aside and writ petition dismissed; costs borne by the parties.
Final Disposition
Appeal allowed; High Court judgment set aside; writ petition dismissed; costs to be borne by the parties.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Municipal Council, Pusad

Respondents

  • M/s Gokuldas Dossa & Co. Ltd.

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • M. N. Phadke
  • • Naunit Lal

Counsels for Respondents

  • • A. G. Ramaparkhi
  • • M. N. Shroff

Case Synopsis & Summary

Pusad, part of Berar, was governed by the Central Provinces Municipalities Act, 1922, with Berar later being brought within the CP framework. In 1924 a Governor‑General‑in‑Council notification made Berar subject to the CP Municipalities Act, and in 1932 a local notification imposed Boja and Bale Tax on ginning and pressing cotton under CPMA 1922, Section 66(1)(b) read with Section 67(5) & (7). The matter concerned whether this tax, fixed as Boja (Annas 2 per Boja) and Bale (Annas 4 per Bale) on 392 lb lots, was ultra vires or exceeded constitutional ceilings. The 1941 Profession Tax Limitation Act imposed a ceiling of Rs 50 per annum on taxes on professions/trades, with an exemption (Item 4 of Schedule) for taxes imposed under Section 66(1)(b) of CPMA 1922. The Act also contained a proviso aligning with Article 276(2) of the Constitution and the proviso to 142A(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935. The High Court quashed the demand as exceeding the Rs 250 ceiling, but the Supreme Court reverses, holding the tax valid under the exemption, since it was actually imposed in 1932 under CPMA 1922, before the 1941 Act. The judgment revisits Municipal Committee Akot v. Manilal Manekji Pvt. Ltd. and Ballabhadas Lakhani v. Municipal Committee, Malkapur, distinguishing and ultimately endorsing the pre‑1941 imposition as exempt.

Provisions of Law Cited

Constitution of India, 1950, Article 276(2)Government of India Act, 1935, Section 142A(2)Central Provinces Municipalities Act, 1922, Section 66(1)(b); Section 67(5); Section 67(7)Profession Tax Limitation Act, 1941, Section 3; Schedule Item 4Berar Municipal Law, 1886India (Foreign Jurisdiction) Order-in-Council, 1902India (Foreign Jurisdiction) Order-in-Council, 1904Central Provinces and Berar Act, 1941 (Act 15 of 1941) implementing the ’and Berar’ addition

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant contends that the Boja and Bale Tax was validly imposed under the CP Municipalities Act, 1922 and, by virtue of Section 3 and Item 4 of Schedule to the Profession Tax Limitation Act, 1941, falls within the exemption for taxes on professions imposed before 1941. It was actually imposed in 1932, prior to the 1941 Act, and, as such, should be saved by the proviso to Article 142A(2) and by Article 276(2) of the Constitution. The decision in Municipal Committee Akot v. Manilal Manekji Pvt. Ltd. is cited to support the interpretation of “imposed” in Item 4, and Ballabhadas Lakhani is noted as following Akot’s ratio.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents argued that the High Court correctly quashed the demand as beyond the constitutional ceiling (Rs 250 per annum) under Article 276(2) and the 142A(2) proviso; they maintained that the pre‑1941 imposition should be read strictly as under the CPMA, with the deeming fiction of Berar’s notification not altering the fact that the imposition was not made under CPMA before 1941; they relied on the established line of cases to limit the exemption to taxes actually imposed under CPMA before 1941.

Cited Precedents (2)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Municipal Committee Akot v. Manilal Manekji Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.[1967] 2 SCR 100PositiveThe Court discusses Akot’s ratio regarding the interpretation of ‘imposed’ and the pre‑1941 exemption; the present judgment aligns with Akot’s strict reading of item 4 and ultimately uses it to support the appellant.
Ballabhadas Matliuradas Lakhani & Ors. v. Municipal Committee, MalkapurA.L.R. 1970 S.C. 1002PositiveNoted as following the ratio of Akot; the Lakhani decision reinforces the Akot interpretation used in the present case.

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Extracted Judgment Text

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7 MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, PUSAD ##### "· GOKALDAS DOSSA & CO. LTD. ###### • ### • l _CaltStltution_ _of_ _India_ 1950, _Article_ 276(2), _Government_ _of_ _Indio_ _Act_ 1935, _S._ 142At2), _Central Provinces and B&ar Municipalities_ _Act_ 1922, _S._ 66(l)(b) _&_ _Profession Tax Limitation_ _Act_ 1941, _S_ 3 _arid_ _Item_ 4 _of_ _Schedule-Baja_ . _and_ Bal~ _T(lx-Ta:r_ _by_ _municipality on ginning and pressing_ _cotton-Continuance_ _o.f_ _irnposifion_ _in_ ex~s _of_ _constitutional limits-Validity of._ C _November_ 13, 1979 [R. S. SARKARIA ~ND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.) A B Pu.sad was part of District Akola, which was one of the four Hydel'l\b•d A11iped Districts, popularly known as Berar. These districts not forming a part of British India, were administered by the Govemor-General·in-Cpuncil, who enacted .. law applicable in Berar, known as the Berar Municipal Law, 1886. ! On January 22, 1924 1lle Governor-General-in-Council issued a notification the effect of which was that the Berar Municipal Law, 1886, was repealed and in _its_ place the Central Provinces Municipalities Act, 1922 was made applicable to Berar. Further, the taxes imposed under the Berar Municipal law were _.dct!med_ to have been imposed under the Central Provinces ~Iunicipalities Act, \ 1922. On August I, 1941, the C.P. and Berar Legislature enacted the C.P. and Berar .Act as a result of which, the words "and Berar" were added after the words "Central Provinces" in the Central Provinces Municipalities Act, 1922. D E In the meanwhile, the Profession 1'ax Limitation Act, 194·1 'vas enacted by the Dominion- Legislature in pursuance of the power given by the Government of India Act, 1935, and it came into force on April 1, 1941. It proTided that F after· its commencement, the Municipalities would not impose or levy taxes # .. which exceeded Rs. 50/- per arinum. However, by section 3 1 fead with Item 4 of the Schedule to the Act, any tax levied by a Municipality in respect of any profession, trade, or calling imposed under section 66 (1 )(b) of the C.P. Municipalities Act, 1922 was eXempted fron1 the aforesaid ceiling . The appellant Municipality which was constituted .. a Municipal· Com- G mittec under the Central ProTinces Municipalities Act 1922, imposed a tax under 1cction 66(1)(b) read with section 67, sub-sections _5_ and 7 of the said Act on ginning and pressing cotwn by a notification dated January 9, 1932. The tax was known as Boja and Bale Tax. It issued a demand noti.ce and a bill in nw;pect of the said tax to the respondent firm who was doing the business of ginning and pressing cotton within the limits of the municipality. The objectioos: of the responde.nt having been turned down, they approached the R High Court in a Writ Petition for a declaration that the Boja and Bale Tax imposed on them was _ultra vires_ and unconstitutional and that the demand 8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 S.C.R. A notice be quashed. The High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the demand notice on the ground that the tax was in excess of the ceiling limit of Rs. _250_ /- per annum fixed in Article 276 of the Constitution. In the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant, rely**ing** **on** **the** **decision of** **this** **Court** **in** _**A1unicipal Conunittee**_ _**Akot**_ **v.** _**Manila!**_ _Manekji Pvt._ _Ud._ & _Anr._ [1967] 2 SCR 100. th~t the Boja and Bale Tax having **B** b<en imposed under the C.P. Municipalities Ac~ 1922, in 1932, 3Jld there being no question of importing any deeming fiction the demand for the tax was valid. Allowing the appeal, #### **c** **HELD :** **1.** **The demand notice** **in** **question does not** **contravene section** 142A(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and Article 276(2) cf the **Constitution** **and** **is** **valid.** **[15** **A]** **2.** **Jn** _**Z..funic:ipal**_ _**Con1nzittee,**_ _**Akot**_ **v.** _**Manilal Manekji**_ _**Pi't.**_ _**Ltd,**_ **&** _**Anr.**_ [1967] 2 S.C.R. 100, this Court held that the word 'imposed' in Item 4 of the Schedule to the Profession Tax Limitation Act, 1941, meant that the taxes which can be continued to be levied should have been Imposed before the said Act **D** came into foi;ce. [14 DJ **3.** **Jf** **the tax** **in** **question** **bad** **in** **fact been imposed** **under** **section** **66(1) (b)** **of** **the Central Provinces Municipalities Act, 1922, before the coming** **into** **force** of the 1941 Act, it would fall within the exemption of item 4 read with section 3 of the Profession Tax Limitation Act, 1941 and the continuance of such an **imposition in excess** **of** **the constitutional** **limit,** **will** **be** **in** **consonance with the** **E** proviso to section 142A(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, <Uld also Article 276(2) of the Constitution. [14 E-F] In the instant case, tho tax was actually _imposed_ under section 66(1)(b) of the C.P. Municipalities Act, 1922, in 1932, when this Act was applicable and in force in Berar by virtue of the notification dated January 22, 1924 issued by the Governor-General-in-Council. Even if section 3 and item 4 of the 1941 **F** Act were to be strictly construed, the impugned tax will squarely fall within **the** **ambit** **of** **the** **exemption enacted in the aforesaid item** **4.** **[l3** **DJ** CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 259 of 1970. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 17-7**G** 1968 of the Bombay Hrgh Court (Nagpur Bench) in Special Civil . Application No. 329/67. _M. N. Phadke_ and _Naunit_ _Lal_ for the Appellant. _A._ _G._ _Ramaparkhi_ for Respondent No. 1 **H** _M._ _N._ _Shroff_ for Respondent No. 2. _S._ B~ _Saharya_ and _V._ _B._ _Saharya_ for the Intervener. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL _v._ GOKAL DAS _(Sarkaria,_ _!.)_ 9 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment, dated July 17, 1968, of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur ' Bench). It arises out of these facts : ~·· The appellant herein, Municipal Council, Pusad was constituted as a Municipal Committee under the Central Provinces Municipalities Act 1922. Thereafter, on January 9, 1932 the appellant with the sanction of the local government, imposed a tax known as Boja Tax & Bale Tax under section 66(1) (b) read with section 67, sub-sections (5) and (7) of the C. P. Municipalities Act on ginning and pressing cotton. The rate fixed was Annas 2 for each Boja of 392 lbs. and Annas 4 for each Bale of 392 lbs. The respondents M/s. Gokuldas Dossa & Co. Ltd. were doing the business of ginning and pressing cotton by mechanical pr 0 cesses within the limits of the said Municipality. In pursuance of tlie aforesaid Notification of January 9, 1932 imposing the tax, the appellant on November 22, 1966 issued demand notice and a bill for Rs. 3,971.75 in respe<:t of Boja and Bale Tax for the year 1965-66 requiring the respondents to pay that amount of tax. The respondents submitted objections to this Demand on March 28, 1967. The objections were rejected by the appellant on April 7, 1967. Aggrieved, the respondents filed a writ petition on April 9, .1967 in the High Court nnder Article 226 0'[ the constitution seeking a declaration that the Boja & Bale Tax imposed on them was _ultra vires_ and unconstitutional. They prayed that the Bale and Demand Notice be quashed. They further claimed a writ of prohibition against the appellant prohibiting it from recovering the tax from the respondent beyond the maximun1 laid down in Article 276 of the Constitution. The High Court by its order dated April 29, 1967 granted an interim stay of the recovery of the tax from respondent no. 1. Thereafter, by its judgment nnder appeal, the High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the Demand Notice on the ground that the tax was in excess of the ceiling limit of Rs. 250 per annum fixed in **B** #### **c** **D** **E** **F** Article 276 of the Constitution. **G** The High Court purporting to follow, what it says, "a series of decisions" pronounced by !'1.at Court and the Supreme Court, has held **that** the demand by way of Bale and Boja tax in excess of the limits prescribed In Article 276 of the constitution is illegal. It, therefore, quashed the demand notice in question. When the High Court ~poke **H** of "a series of decisions" of the Supreme Court, it had, perhaps .. in mind two decisions of this Court, namely : _Municipal_ _Committe,_ _Akot_ 2-868SCI/79 **A** n ##### c **0** **'F** **H** 10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 S.C.R. v. _Mani/al Manekji Pvt._ _Ltd._ _&_ _Anr._ (l) and _Ballobhdas Matliuradas_ _Lakhani_ _&_ _Ors._ v. _Municipal_ _Com111ittee,_ _Malkapur.(2)_ Mr. M. N. Phadke, appearing for the appellant, submits that on facts, the aforesaid two decisions of this Court are clearly distinguishable. According to the counsel, properly read, these decisions, support his C1)ntention that the demand for the Baja and Bale Tax of the appellant is valid. It is pointed out that the tax with which this Court **\Vas** **concerned'** **in** _**.'Vlunicipal**_ _**Conunittee.,4ko(s**_ **case** **{ibi<l)** **w·as** **a tax** levied under the old Municipal Law, which was by virtue of the notification of January 27, 1924 _deemed_ to be imposed under the C. P. Municipalities Act, 1922; that it was on this ground that this Court strictly construing Item 4 of the Schedule to the Professions Tax Limitation Act, 1941, held that only taxes _i111posed_ under the C. P. Municipalities Act, 1922 and not those which arc _deemed_ _to_ _be_ _imposed_ und·~r that Act by virtue of the deeming fiction. were saved by the proviso to Article 142A(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and the corresponding clause in Article 276 of the Constitution. Stress bas been laid on the fact that, in the instant case, the tax was imposed under the C.P. Municipalities Act, 1922, in 1932, and there was no question of importing any deeming fiction. As against this, Mr. Ratnaparkhi submits that the imposition in question was directly hit by the ratio of _Municipal_ _Committee_ _Akot's_ case (ibid). Further, it is half-heartedly submitted, for tile irst time, that even under the old law, the Municipal Committee coul<i levy a tax on professions _tp_ a maximum limit of Rs. 500 per annum, only. Taking the last contention of Mr. Ratnaparkhi first, we find no substance in the same. The C. P. Municipalities Act of 1922 does not fix any ceiling on the profession tax on professons that may be imposed by a Municipality. We therefore, have no hesitation in rejecting this contention. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to have an idea of the **various provisions bearing on** **the** **point** **in** **issue.** Pusad was a part of District Akola, which was oae of the four Hyderabad Assi~ned Districts, popularly known as Berar. Those Districts were not a part of British India but wert administered by the Governor-General-in-Council under the India (Foreign Jurisdiction) Order-in-Council of 1904. In exercise of those powers, the GovernorGeneral-in-Council ·enacted a law applicable i11 Berar, known as Berar Municipal Law, 1886, which enabled the Municipalities functioning (\) [19671 2 S.C.R. 100. (2) A.LR. 1970 S.C. 1002. _y_ .·~ MUNICIPAL COUNCIL _v._ GOKAL DAS _(Sarkaria,_ J.) 11 in Berar to impose professional taxes. On January 22, 1924, the A Governor-General-in-Council issued a notification, which so far as material for our purpose, rau thus : ### r After Entry No. 149, the following Entry shall be inserted namely: 150. The Central ·Provinces Municipalities Act, 1922 (II of 1922) (1) in section 2 : "No. 58-1.-In exercise of the powers conferred by the Iudiau (Foreign Jurisdiction) Order-in-Council, 1902 and of all other powers enabling him in that behalf, the G,overnor- **B** General-in-Council is pleased to direct that the following further amendments shall be made in the First Schedule to the Notification of the Government of In.dia in the Foreign Department No. 8510-I.B., dated the 3rd November, 1913, applying certain enactments to Berar, namely : ### c (a) for sub-section (1) the following shall be substituted, **D** namely: "(!) The Berar Municipal Law, 1886, is hereby rep**ealed."** (h) In Sub-Section (2), ~or the word "Acts" the word "Law" shall be substituted." E The effect of this notification was that the Berar Municipal Law, 1136 was repealed and Central Provinces Municipalities Act, 1922 was 1'1ade applicable to Berar; and further, the taxes· imposed under the Berar Municipal Law were _deemed_ to have been imposed or assessed u•der ihe Central Provinces Municipalities Act. F Thereafter on January 9, 1932, a notification was issued im]1Josiag the Boja and Bale Tax ~nder 5ection 66 (1) (b) of the C. P. Mu•ici·palities Act. 1922. The impugned demand notice was issued by virtue of this notification. This tax came into force from the date of the publication of the notification in the Central Provinces. Section 142A(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 provided **.as** **under** : ##, G "142A (2).-The total amount payable in respect of any one person to the province or to any one Municipality, dis trict board, local board, or other local authority in the Pro- H vince by way of taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments shall not, after the thirty-first day of March, 12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 s.c.R. **A** nineteen hundred and thirty-nine, exceed fifty rupees per annum: **B** ### **c** **D** **E** - **F** In pursuance of the powers given by the Government of India Act, 1935, the Dominion Legislature enacted the Profession Tax Limitation Act, 1941 which came into force on April 1, 1941. This Act provided that after the commencement of that Act, the Municipalities would not impose or levy taxes which exceeded Rs. _501-_ per annum. However, by Section 3 of this Act, the taxes specified in the Schedule thereto were exempted from this ceiling. Item **4** of the Schedule is in these terms: 1 "The taxes on person exercising any profession or carrying on any trade or calling within the limits of the Municipalities, imposed under clause (b) of Section **1** or Section 66 of the C. P. Municipalities Act, 1922." Provided that, if in the financial year ending with that date there was in force in the case of any Province or any such municipality, board or authority a tax on pr;ofes~ions, trades, callings or employments the rate, or the maximum rate, of which exceeded fifty rupees per annum, the preceding provisions of this sub-section shall, unless for the time being provision on the contrary is made by a law of the Dominion Legislature, have effect in relation to that Province, municipality, board or authority as if for the reference to fifty rupees per annum there was substituted a reference to that rate or maximum rate, or such lower rate, if any (being a rate greater than fifty rupees per annum), as may for the time being be fixed by a law of the Dominion Legislature; and any law of the Dominion Legislature made for any of the purposes of this poviso may be made **either** generally or in relation to any specific Provh\.ces, municipalities, boards or authorities." l ' **G** On August 1, 1941, the C. P. and Berar Legislature enacted Act 15 of 1941 called C. P. and Berar Act, as a result of which, the words "and Berar" were added after the words "Central Provinces'' wherever . occurring in the Central Provinces Municipalities Act, 1922. A provision analogous to Section 142A (2) proviso is to be found in the proviso to Article 276 (2) of the Constitution, which reads as follows : **H** "Provided that if in the financial year immediately preceding the commencement of this Constitution there was in force in the case of any State or any such municipality, board or _t_ ##### ' MUNICIPAL COUNCIL _v._ GOKAL DAS _(Sarkaria,_ _!.)_ 13 authority a tax on professions, trades, callings or employments the rate or the maximum rate,, . of which exceeded two hundred and fifty rupees per annum, such tax may continue to be levied until provision to the contrary is made by . Parliament by law, and any law so made by Parliament may be either generally or in relation to any specified States, municipalities boards or authorities." It will be seen from the above conspectus, that in order to qualify for the ·exemption under item 4 in the Schedule to the Profession Tax Limitation Act, 1941 (1941 Act, for short) from the limitation imposed by Section 2 of that Act, the tax in question must have been _imposed_ under clause (b) of sub-Section (1) of Section 66 of the C.P. Municipalities Act, 1922, before the 1941 Act passed by the Dominion Legislature by virtue of the power derived from the enabling proviso to Section 112A (2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, came into force. This condition has been satisfied by the impugned tax. This tax was actually _imposed_ under section 66 (1 )(b) of the said Act of 1922, in 1932, when this Act was applicable and in force in Berar by virtue of the notification dated January 22, 1924 issued by the Governor-General-in-Council. Thus, even if Section 3 and item 4 of · the 1941 Act were to be strictly construed, the impugned tax will squarely fall within the ambit of. the exemption enacted in the aforesaid item 4. Now. let us notice the _Municipal Committee_ _Akofs_ case (ibid) which was presumably relied upon by the High Court. It will be presently seen that this decision if properly read does not support the decision under appeal. In that case, the impugned tax was not actually _imposed_ by the Municipal Committee after the coming into force of the 1941 Act, "under the C.P. Muuicipalities Act of 1922, but was imposed under a notification Nq. 98, dated March 14, 1899. The contention on behalf of the appellant, Municipal Committee was that since this notification of 1899 would be deemed to be issued under the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 (which only changed the name of the C.P. Municipalities. Act of 1922), it would be a tax 'imposed' under Section 66 (1') (b) of the C.P. Municipalities Act of 1922, within the contemplation of item 4 of the Schedule tG the 1'141 Act. Sikri, J., speaking for the Court, repelled this contention in these terms : "In our opinion the High Court came to the correct conclusi'On. First, item No. 4 is an exemption from the limitation imposed by s. 2 of the· Professions Tax Limitation Act, A B ###### c D E F G H 14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [t980] 2 S.C.R. A 1941, and the exemption must be construed strictly. Secondly, the effect of s. 3 and item 4 of the Schedule is to continue the leviability of a tax and, in our opinion, this item must be construed strictly like· a taxing. statute. If Mr. Gupte had been able to convince us that the item would be otiose if The crucial words are those which have been underlined. These words clearly lay down that if the tax in question had, in fact, been _imposed_ under Section 66 (l ) (b) of the Central Provinces Municipalities Act, 1922, before the coming into force of the 1941 Act, it woµld fall within the exemption cf item 4 read with Section 3 of the Professions Tax Limitation Act, 1941, and the continuance of such an inlposition in excess of the constitutional linlit, will be in consonance with the proviso to Section 142A(2) of the Gove~nment of India Act, 1935, and also Article 276(2) of the Constitution. Since in the instant c3se, the tax in question was _impcsed_ under Section 66(1) (b) of the C.P. Municipalities Act, 1922, in 1932, long before the 1941 Act came into force, and no question of invoking any deeming fiction was involved, the ratio of _Municipal Committee'_ _Akot's_ case, in fact, supports the contention of the appellant-Municipal Council, and highlights the error in the High Court decision. this interpretation is put, there would be something to say in his favour. But the item will not be otiose even if we do not treat item 4 as a case of misdescri ption but give t11e plain meaning that .the Central Provinces Municipalities Act, 1922, means the Central Provinces Municipalities Act, 1922, and not the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922. Various taxes must have been imposed by the Municipalities in the Central Provinces by virtue of notifications issued under s. 66(l)(b) of the Central Provinces Municipalities Act, 1922, and they would fall within the ambit of item 4 .... The word _"imposed" ._ .. _ill_ _our view, means that the taxes_ _which can continue_ _to_ _be levied should have been imposed_ _in_ _tlze_ _past before_ _1he_ _Professionl Tax Limitation Act,_ 1941, _came inta force._ This is in consonance• with s. 142A(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935." B ### c D E F G ## _f:._ It is not necessary to discuss the case, _Ballabhadas Mathwadas_ H _Lakhani_ _&_ _Ors._ v. _Municipal Committee, Malkapur_ (ibid), because it, simply follows the ratio of _Municipal Committee,_ _Akal_ v. _Manilal_ _y_ _Mnnekji Pvt. Ltd. and Anr._ (ibid). T A B T .•. ' ~: ###### ' MUNICIPAL COUNCIL _v._ GOKAL DAS _lSarkarid,_ _!.)_ 15 In view of all that has been said above, we am of opinion that the demand notice in question does not contravene Section 142A(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and Article 276(2) of the Constitution, and is valid. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the writ petition of respondent L Jcnyjng the parties to bear their own costs. N.V.K. _Appeal allowed__ \ /