M.R. Lalitha & M.R. Irija v. SahanU Rajam and others (RFA Nos. 419 & 496/2005)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT : THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.R.RAMAN & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE V.K.MOHANAN TUESDAY, THE 8TH JANUARY 2008 / 18TH POUSHA 1929 RFA.No. 419 OF 2005() --------------------OS.418/2001 OF ADDL.SUB COURT, IRINJALAKUDA APPELLANT/PLAINTIFFS. -------------------------------------- 1. M.R.LALITHA, D/O.M.V.RAMAKRISHNAN, T.C. 8/1795, (1) LAKSHMI NAGAR, THIRUMALA, TRIVANDRUM. 2. M.R.IRIJA, D/O.M.V.RAMAKRISHNAN, T.C. 15/646 (30 VELLAYAMBALAM, POST SASTHAMANGALAM, TRIVANDRUM. BY ADV. SRI.O.RAMACHANDRAN NAMBIAR SRI.S.M.PREM SMT.K.P.SANTHI SRI.P.RAMACHANDRAN (PALAKKAD) SMT.ANALAKHUSI BHASKAR RESPONDENTS: DEFENDANTS. ------------------------ 1. SAHANU RAJAM, W/O. LATE M.V.RAMAKRISHNAN MALIAKKAL HOUSE, E.CHALAKKUDY VILLAGE, CHALAKKUDY POST, MUKUNDAPURAM TALUK. 2. M.R.RAJAN, S/O.LATE M.V.RAMAKRISHNAN, MALIAKKAL HOUSE, E.CHALAKKUDY VILLAGE, CHALAKKUDY POST, MUKUNDAPURAM TALUK. (DIED) 3. M.R.MOHANAN, AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS, S/O.LATE M.V.RAMAKRISHNAN, MALIAKKAL HOUSE, E.CHALAKKUDY VILLAGE AND POST, MUKUNDAPURAM TALUK. 4. M.R.BABU, AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS, S/O.LATE M.V.RAMAKRISHNAN, MALIAKKAL HOUSE, - E.CHALAKKUDY VILLAGE AND POST, MUKUNDAPURAM TALUK. 5. M.R.ASOKAN, MALIAKKAL HOUSE, - E.CHALAKUDY VILLAGE, CHALAKKUDY POST, MUKUNDAPURAM TALUK. 6. M.R.SUJATHA, D/O.M.V.RAMAKRISHNAN, MALIAKKAL HOUSE, E.CHALAKKUDY VILLAGE, CHALAKKUDY POST, MUKUNDAPURAM TALUK. 7. P.P.PREMA, W/O.RAJAN, MALIAKKAL HOUSE, E.CHALAKKUDY VILLAGE, CHALAKKUDY POST, MUKUNDAPURAM TALUK. 8. M.R.BABY, S/O.M.R.RAJAN, MALIAKKAL HOUSE E.CHALAKKUDY VILLAGE, CHALAKKUDY POST, MUKUNDAPURAM TALUK. 9. INDIAN BANK, CHALAKKUDY BRANCH, - POST CHALAKKUDY, REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGER, INDIANBANK, CHALAKKJDYBRANCH, POST CHALAKKUDY. 10. SINDHU RAJAN, MALIAKKAL HOUSE, - E.CHALAKKUDY VILLAGE, CHALAKKUDY POST, MUKUNDAPURAM TALUK. 11. BINDHU RAJAN, MALIAKKAL HOUSE, - E.CHALAKKUDY VILLAGE, CHALAKKUDY POST, MUKUNDAPURAM TALUK. 12. SANDHYA RAJAN, MALIAKKAL HOUSE, - E.CHALAKKUDY VILLAGE, CHALAKKUDY POST, MUKUNDAPURAM TALUK. (RESPONDENTS 7,8, & 10 TO 12 ARE RECORDED AS THE LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DECEASED 2ND RESPONDENT AS PER ORDER ON MEMO DATED 4.1.2007 CF NO. 97/07 DATED 8.1.2007.) BY ADV. DR.K.P.SATHEESAN DR.K.P.SATHEESAN SRI.S.SREEKUMAR SRI.K.K.GOPINATHAN NAIR SRI.S.EASWARAN SRI.K.K.RAJEEV THIS REGULAR FIRST APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 10/12/2007, ALONG WITH RFA NO. 496 OF 2005 THE COURT ON 08/01/2008 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: P.R. RAMAN & V. K. MOHANAN, JJ. = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = R.F.A NOS. 419 & 496/2005 = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = DATED THIS, THE 8TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2008. ## J U D G M E N T ## Raman, J. Both the above appeals arise out of the same judgment rendered by the Sub Court, Irinjalakuda, in O.S. 418/2001, dated 19.1.2005. While the plaintiffs filed R.F.A. 419/2005, defendants 1, 4, 5 and 6 filed R.F.A. 496/2005. 2. The suit was one for partition and separate possession of the 1/7th share each from plaint A, B and C schedule properties and its separate possession. Plaint A schedule is immovable properties, B schedule is Rs. 10 lakhs deposited in the Bank, as per the land acquisition proceedings and C schedule is movables worth Rs. 2,05,000/-. The averments in the plaint are as follows: Late Ramakrishnan had married thrice. The first defendant is his third wife and plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 6 are his children. The first plaintiff and the second defendant were born to him through his first wife, second plaintiff is born through the second wife and defendants 3 to 6 are born through his third wife, the first defendant. Plaint A schedule properties were acquired by him and he was in possession and enjoyment of **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05 :2:** those properties till his death on 24.10.1998. After the death of Ramakrishnan, the properties devolved upon the plaintiffs and defendants and they are in joint possession and enjoyment of the same. Ramakrishnan was suffering from liver cancer and due to his illness his health was shattered. He had no sound disposing state of mind and he was bed ridden due to his illness after he was discharged from the hospital. Defendants 2 to 6 were managing the plaint schedule properties and they were appropriating the income therefrom. The plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 5 had 6 acres 7 cents of property in Survey No. 1599/2D, 1600/2B and 1601/1 of Kodakara Village which was subsequently acquired by the Government of Kerala and an amount of Rs.61,363/21 was awarded as compensation. Ramakrishnan received the same as the guardian and father of the other defendants. Since the plaintiff and defendants were minors, the said amount was deposited with the 9th defendant Bank, which was renewed from time to time. The said amount has devolved upon defendants 2 to 5 and the plaintiff, which is shown as B schedule to the plaint. Challenging the award and claiming enhancement, L.A.R. 91/1975 was filed before the Sub Court, Irinjalakuda and by the award rendered on 23.12.1981 that court granted an additional compensation of Rs. 72,600/- towards land value and Rs. 4,572/towards value of coconut trees besides other statutory benefits. A further **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05 :3:** appeal as L.A.A. 249/1982 was preferred before this court which was allowed by judgment dated 11.1.1989 granting further enhancement. The said amount is also available for partition. Plaintiffs are entitled for 1/7th share each and share of Ramakrishnan along with other legal heirs. Plaint C schedule movables belonged to Ramakrishnan in the house in item No.1 of plaint A schedule properties. After the death of Ramakrishnan, the plaintiffs had not been given any share from the income and hence they are entitled for a decree for partition and recovery of their 1/7th share each from the plaint schedule properties and its separate possession. 3. Subsequently, the plaint was amended and it was pleaded that Ramakrishnan had not executed any Will as contended by the defendants and without prejudice to the said contention if the court ultimately finds that the Will was executed validly, even then they are entitled to get the share shown therein. 4. The second defendant filed written statement and also an additional written statement. Defendants 1 and 3 to 6 also filed written statement. According to them, the suit is not maintainable. The allegation that Ramakrishnan had no sound disposing mind during his last days is denied. According to them, Ramakrishnan had sound disposing mind till his death and he had executed a Will which was registered as Will No. No. **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:4:** 74/94. Subsequently, he revoked the same and executed Will No. 65/95 which was again revoked in 1998 by executing a third Will - No. 148/98 dated 17.10.1998. These documents are produced as Exts. B1, B2 and B3 respectively. Thus the last of his Will was Ext.B3 and on the death of Ramakrishnan, the Will came into force and the plaintiffs and defendants are in possession of the properties, as per the same. As per Ext.B3 Will, the Bank deposit and movables belonged to Ramakrishnan will go to defendants 3 to 5. Plaintiffs have thus no right to get share over those movables. According to them, Car KLH 4854 included in C schedule is in the ownership of 4th defendant since separate properties have been allotted as per the Will and the parties are in enjoyment of the same, no suit for partition would lie. As per Ext. B3, the properties devolved on various heirs are reiterated in the written statement. According to those defendants, the suit is liable to be dismissed with cost. 5. In the written statement filed by defendants 7, 8 and 10 to 12, it is contended that prior to the death of Ramakrishnan, he was hospitalized due to serious ailments, that he was inpatient for 22 days and thereafter his condition worsened and he was discharged as a hopeless case on 29.9.1998. Ramakrishnan had no sound disposing state of mind after he was discharged from the hospital till his death. According to them, Ext. B2 Will dated **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:5:** 12.5.1995 is the last Will validly executed by Ramakrishnan in which he described as to how the properties will devolve on different heirs. Various other contentions are also raised in the written statement which are not quite relevant for the purpose of disposal of these appeals and hence they are not reiterated herein. Those defendants prayed that the suit be dismissed with costs. 6. There is also a contention by the supporting defendants as well as the plaintiffs that Will No. 148/98 ie. Ext. B3 is as a result of fraud committed by defendants 1 and 3 to 6 and is unnatural and improbable. The only Will which is valid in law, according to them, is Ext. B2. The 9th defendant had also filed a written statement and additional written statement. They disputed the correctness of the amount in deposit. They also disputed the contention that Ramakrishnan was holding the amount in trust for others. 7. Based on the contentions raised by the parties, issues were raised by the court below. One of the issues that arose for consideration was as to whether Ext.B3 was executed by the deceased Ramakrishnan and whether the said Will is result of fraud, undue influence or coercion as alleged. The issues as to whether the properties of Ramakrishnan must be governed by Ext.B2 as contended by the defendants and is it his last Will and whether **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:6:** the plaintiffs are entitled for a decree for partition were also considered. 8. On the side of the plaintiffs PW.1 gave evidence and Exts.A1 to A13 were marked. Evidence on the side of the defendants consist of Exts. B1 to B30, B31, B32 and the oral testimony of DW1 to DW.8. 9. Issue Nos. 1 to 4 were taken together for consideration. After referring to the contentions of the parties and evidence on record, the court below found that, the facts that the plaint schedule properties were acquired by Ramakrishnan,who had three wifes and the relationship of the parties as averred in the plaint, are admitted. During the pendency of the suit, the second defendant died and his children were impleaded as Additional defendants 7,8, 10, 11 and 12. It was also found that Exts.A1 to A13 documents were not disputed by the defendants. Exts.A1 and A2 are the judgment and decree in LAR 91/1995 by which some of the properties belonged to Ramakrishnan and defendants were acquired and compensation was awarded which has been deposited with the 9th defendant. Exts.B1 to B3 are the three Wills produced by the defendants. It was also found that there was no dispute with regard to ExtB1 and admittedly, by executing Ext.B2 Will, Ext.B1 was cancelled and there is no challenge by any of the parties to Ext.B2 Will. But if Ext. B3 is validly executed it contains a recital cancelling Ext.B2 in which event, Ext.B3 Will will be the last of the **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05 :7:** Will executed by Ramakrishnan and therefore, at the later stage of the trial, the dispute was really regarding the validity of Ext.B3 Will and if Ext.B3 is vitiated for any reason, the parties are at agreement that the properties will devolve on the legal heirs of Ramakrishnan, in accordance with the terms contained in Ext.B2 Will. 10. While the plaintiff and Additional Defendants 7 to 12 would contend that Ext.B2 alone is valid and Ext.B3 is vitiated for several reasons, Defendants 1 and 4 to 6 who are the appellants in R.F.A. 496/2005, sought to uphold Ext.B3. According to them, Ext.B3 was validly executed and a registered Will. To prove the same, they also examined the attestors of Ext. B3, besides the Registrar and the identifying witnesses. According to them, the last of the Will Ext.B3 executed by Ramakrishnan cannot be assailed on any valid grounds since it was validly executed with sound state of mind of the testator and the allegation that he was unconscious after he was discharged from the hospital till his death is denied. According to them, once the execution of the Will is proved by examining the attesting witnesses and when it is also a registered Will, there cannot be any doubt regarding the state of mind of the testator rousing any suspicion. The burden of proof is on the persons who pleads the same and absolutely there is no evidence adduced by them. When thus the **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:8:** propoundant of the Will who set up Ext.B3 having proved the registration of the Will, they have discharged their burden and the onus shifts on the others to show that there is any vitiating circumstance to invalidate the Will. 11. The court below found that Ext.B3 cannot be taken as the last Will executed by Ramakrishnan and Ext.B2 is to be considered as the last Will executed by him and the properties will devolve upon the plaintiffs and defendants in accordance with the stipulations contained in Ext.B2. It was further held that since Ext.B2 contains the details of the properties which will devolve upon the legatees, plaint A and C schedule, on the death of Ramakrishnan, will devolve upon the parties in accordance with the stipulations therein. C schedule, as per Ext.B4 registration certificate, belonged to 4th defendant, he being the registered owner even from 23.6.1986 and as such, that item is not available for partition. As regards the deposited amount in B schedule, it was held that on maturity of the deposit, the persons in whose name the deposits are made, will be entitled for the same proportionately. Since Ext. B2 contains stipulations as regards the Bank deposit, the share of Ramakrishnan in the deposited amount will also devolve in accordance with the stipulations contained in Ext. B2. It was further held that Defendants 1, 3,4 , 5 and 6 have failed to prove Ext. B3 as the last of the Will validly executed by deceased Ramakrishnan and **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:9:** Defendants 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12 have succeeded in proving Ext. B2 Will as validly executed by him. In view of the above finding that the properties are already devolved upon the plaintiffs and defendants based on the stipulations contained in Ext.B2, the suit for partition was dismissed. It is against the said judgment that both these appeals are preferred by the respective parties as already noticed above. 12. Heard both sides. Both sides have placed reliance on various decisions in support of their contentions. As we have already noticed, the first question that arises for consideration is as to whether Ext. B3 Will had been validly executed by the testator. Admittedly, Ramakrishnan was undergoing treatment for liver cancer and he was admitted in the hospital as an inpatient for 22 days from 8.9.1998 to 29.9.1998. Ext. B3 is dated 17.10.1998 and Ramakrishnan died on 24.10.1998. So, there is a time gap of seven days from the execution of Ext. B3 and the death of Ramakrishnan. Defendants 7, 8, 10,11 and 12 are the widow and children of the second defendant in the suit. Second defendant was the son of the deceased through his first wife. They challenge Ext. B3 and support the contention that the only Will that is enforceable is Ext. B2. 13. Before we deal with the evidence adduced by the parties, we may refer to some of the case law on the subject already cited by both sides on **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:10:** the point as to what are the legal requirements and the effect of Section 68 of the Evidence Act. 14. In **Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma** (AIR 1959 SC 443) the apex court, after referring to the provisions contained in Sections 67, 68, 45 and 57 of the Evidence Act, held in para 18 as follows: "The party propounding a will or otherwise making a claim under a will is no doubt seeking to prove a document and in deciding how it is to be proved, reference must inevitably be made to the statutory provisions which govern the proof of documents. Sections 67 and 68 of the Evidence Act are relevant for this purpose. Under S. 67, if a document is alleged to be signed by any person, the signature of the said person must be proved to be in his handwriting, and for proving such a handwriting under Ss. 45 and 47 of the Act the opinions of experts and of persons acquainted with the handwriting of the person concerned are made relevant. Section 68 deals with the proof of the execution of the document required by law to be attested and it provides that such a document shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution. These provisions prescribe the requirements and the nature of proof which must be satisfied by the party who relies on a document in a Court of law. Similarly, Ss. 59 and 63 of the Indian Succession Act are also relevant. Thus the question as to whether the will set up by the propounder is proved to be the last will of the testator has to be decided in the light of these provisions. It would prima facie be true to say that the will has to be proved like any other document except as to the special requirements of attestation prescribed by S. 63 of the Indian Succession Act. **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05 :11:** As in the case of proof of other documents so in the case of proof of wills it would be idle to expect proof with mathematical certainty. The test to be applied would be the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters." Further, in paragraph 19 of the same decision, it is held as follows: "However, there is one important feature which distinguishes wills from other documents. Unlike other documents the will speaks from the death of the testator, and so, when it is propounded or produced before a court, the testator who has already departed the world cannot say whether it is his will or not; and this aspect naturally introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the departed testator. Even so, in dealing with the proof of wills the Court will start on the same enquiry as in the case of the proof of documents. The propounder would be called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant time was in a sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free will. Ordinarily when the evidence adduced in support of the will is disinterested, satisfactory and sufficient to prove the sound and disposing state of the testator's mind and his signature as required by law, courts would be justified in making a finding in favour of the propounder. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts just indicated. " 15. Further, it is held that there may, however, be cases in which **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:12:** the execution of the will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The alleged signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful and evidence in support of the propounder's case that the signature in question is the signature of the testator may not remove the doubt created by the appearance of the signature; the condition of the testator's mind may appear to be very feeble and debilitated; and evidence adduced may not succeed in removing the legitimate doubt as to the mental capacity of the testator; the dispositions made in the will may appear to be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances; or, the will may otherwise indicate that the said dispositions may not be the result of the testator's free will and mind. In such cases, the Court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator. It is true that if a caveat is filed alleging the exercise of undue influence, fraud or coercion in respect of the execution of the will propounded, such pleas may have to be proved by the caveators; but, even without such pleas circumstances may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will in executing the will, and in such circumstances, it would be a part of the initial onus to remove any such legitimate doubts in the matter. Apart from the suspicious circumstances to which we have just referred in some cases the wills **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:13:** propounded disclose another infirmity. Propounders themselves take a prominent part in the execution of the wills which confer on them substantial benefits. If it is shown that the propounder has taken a prominent part in the execution of the will and has received substantial benefit under it, that itself is generally treated as a suspicious circumstance attending the execution of the will and the propounder is required to remove the said suspicion by clear and satisfactory evidence. It is in connection with wills that present such suspicious circumstances that decisions of English Courts often mention the test of the satisfaction of judicial conscience. It may be that the reference to judicial conscience in this connection is a heritage from similar observations made by ecclesiastical courts in England when they exercised jurisdiction with reference to wills; but any objection to the use of the word 'conscience' in this context would in our opinion, be purely technical and academic, if not pedantic. The test merely emphasizes that, in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the court is the last will of the testator, the Court is deciding a solemn question and it must be fully satisfied that it had been validly executed by the testator who is no longer alive. It is obvious that for deciding material questions of fact which arise in applications for probate or in actions on wills, no hard and fast or **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:14:** inflexible rules can be laid down for the appreciation of the evidence. It may however, be stated generally that a propounder of the will has to prove the due and valid execution of the will and that if there are any suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will the propounder must remove the said suspicions from the mind of the court by cogent and satisfactory evidence. It is hardly necessary to add that the result of the application of these two general and broad principles would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and on the nature and quality of the evidence adduced by the parties. It is no doubt true that on the proof of the signature of the deceased or his acknowledgment that he has signed the will he will be presumed to have known the provisions of the instrument he has signed' but the said presumption is liable to be rebutted by proof of suspicious circumstances. What circumstances would be regarded as suspicious cannot be precisely defined or exhaustively enumerated. That inevitably would be a question of fact in each case.' 16. In **Pentakota Satyanarayana v. Pentakota Seetharatnam** ((2005) 8 SCC 67) it was held by the apex court that initial onus is on the propounder to prove execution of the Will and thereafter it shifts to the party alleging undue influence or coercion in execution of the Will to establish its case. The onus on the propounder can be discharged on **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:15:** adducing satisfactory evidence that the Will was signed by the testator who was at that time in a sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the disposition and signed of his own free will. Admission of the executor that he had executed the Will and got it registered could not be easily brushed aside. The mere fact that the beneficiaries under the Will had actively participated in the execution thereof, or that natural heirs were debarred thereby, or that the testator had a draft Will with him while going to the scribe or that he was at that time accompanied by a number of persons or that one of the beneficiaries was present at the time of registration cannot make out a case of a suspicious circumstance, undue influence, coercion or fraud. The mere presence at the time of registration does not amount to playing a prominent part. On the facts of that case, it was found that the will was genuine and proved. 17. **Daulat Ram & Others. v. Sodha & Others** (JT 2004 (10) SC50) was a case where one P executed a will in 1977 bequeathing his entire property in favour of his nephew. There was no provision made by P either for his wife G or for his daughter S. The will was duly executed, attested and registered. In 1983 another will was executed by P by which he revoked and cancelled his earlier Will of 1977 and bequeathed his property to his daughter which was duly executed and attested; but was not **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05 :16:** registered. Later. the testator died on 10.5.1983. The daughter sought for injunction restraining the others from interfering with her possession claiming herself to be the sole owner in possession of the entire property. The suit was dismissed by the trial court holding that the plaintiff is not the daughter of the testator and that he did not execute any will in her favour. There was an appeal and a second appeal and ultimately the matter reached before the apex court. The only point that raised was that the second will of the year 1983 executed by the testator was surrounded by suspicious circumstances and the same was forged. Though such a plea was raised in the written statement no issue was raised and no evidence was let in to prove the same. In that context it was held as follows: "Will being a document has to be proved by primary evidence except where the court permits a document to be proved by leading secondary evidence. Since it is required to be attested, as provided in Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it cannot be used as evidence until one of the attesting witnesses at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence. In addition it has to satisfy the requirements of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. In order to assess as to whether the Will has been validly executed and is a genuine document, the propounder has to show that the Will was signed by the testator and that he had put his signatures to **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05 :17:** the testament of his own free will,; that he was at the relevant time in a sound disposing state of mind and understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and that the testator had signed it in the presence of two witnesses who attested it in his presence and in the presence of each other. Once these elements are established, the onus which rests on the propounder is discharged. But where there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to remove the suspicion by leading appropriate evidence. The burden to prove that the Will was forged or that it was obtained under undue influence or coercion or by playing a fraud is on the person who alleges it to be so." 18. On facts, it was found that the the propounder has discharged the onus of proving the due execution of the Will by examining the attesting witness who clearly stated in their deposition that the testator was in sound disposing mind and had put his thumb mark on the said Will after the same was read over to him in their presence and that they had signed Will in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each other. Their evidence was held to be credible. It was also held that the Will propounded by the appellants has been specifically revoked/cancelled by the testator in his later Will stating that the earlier Will was got written from him forcibly by the appellants. The assertion in the second Will that the earlier Will had been forcibly got executed is corroborated by the other facts and circumstances in the case. The appellant contented that thumb **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:18:** impression of the testator was put on the second Will whereas the earlier Will was signed by him and that the testator was physically handicapped to execute the second Will as he became unconscious 2 to 3 days prior to his death. These contentions were considered by the apex court and though one of the witnesses (DW6) stated that he had gone to the testator's house a day or earlier for pundhan which was done by one of the appellants as the testator was not in a position to do so being unconscious, the court did not found much substance in the said submission as it has come on record that though the testator was illiterate he had learnt to put his signatures; but most of the time he used to put his thumb impression and it was further held that in the face of the unequivocal and trustworthy statements of the scribe, attesting witness and PW.5, much reliance cannot be placed on the testimony of DW.6. 19. Thus, it can be seen that it is the matter of appreciation of entire evidence from which the court will have to come to the conclusion as to whether onus has been discharged by the propounders of the Will - both in the matter of execution as also regarding the sound state of disposition of the mind of the testator. ## 20. In **Savithri v. Karthyayani Amma** (2007 (4) KLT 811 (SC)) the apex court held that 'onus of proving will is on the propounder and only **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:19:** when there exists suspicious circumstances, onus would be on propounder to explain them to satisfaction of court, before it can be accepted as genuine'. 21. In **Thayyullathil Kunhikannan v. Thayyullathil Kalliani** (AIR 1990 Ker. 226) a Division Bench of this Court considered the requirement to call an attesting witness to prove the execution of the Will when such execution or attestation is not disputed. In paragraph 34 of the judgment, it was held as follows: Section 68 relates to those documents which require to be proved at the trial of a suit. If by any rule of law or of pleadings, such proof is not required, S. 68 cannot operate to insist on formal proof by calling an attesting witness. S. 58 has to be read as overriding S. 68 and as obviating the necessity for calling an attesting witness, unless the execution of the will or the attestation is in dispute. In the absence of any such plea in the written statement, it will be the height of technicality and waste of judicial time to insist on examination of an attesting witness, before a will could be used as evidence. O.8, R.5 CPC deems the execution of the will to be admitted in the absence of any denial thereof in the written statement. Examination of an attesting witness is therefore unnecessary when the parties have not joined issue on the validity or genuineness of the will." 22. In **Joseph v. Ippunny** (2007(4) KLT 853) it was held that the obligation under Sections 68 and 70 is only to call at least one of the **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05 :20:** attesting witness, if he is alive ; but even if he denies the Will, if by other evidence it is proved that there is proper attestation, Will can be accepted. Referring to Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, it was held as follows: "It is for profounder to prove the Will. The maxim " _probandi necessistas incumbit illi qui agit"_ means the necessity of proving his claim or contention lies upon him who brings the charge. Same is the principle behind the maxim "affirmandi incumbit probatio" which means the burden of proof lies with the party affirming and negatives cannot be proved. One alleging a fact is bound, when it is disputed, to prove it. Requirement of proof that the Will has duly been executed is on the profounder of the Will. In order to prove due attestation of the Will, the profounder will have to prove that testator has signed the Will, that too, in the presence of two witnesses and they themselves signed the same in the presence of the testator. Mere proof of the signature is also not enough. If it is proved that Will was executed by executant with full testamentary capacity, in presence of two witnesses and there are no suspicious circumstances, burden is shifted to defendant who opposes the Will." 23. The appellants in RFA 419/2005 relied on a Single Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in **P. Ramachandran Nair v. Suparna Tapan Das** (AIR 2003 Bombay 457) to contend that the execution and attestation of the Will by the testator is in suspicious circumstances. According to him, in a situation where the testator was though seriously ill **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05 :21:** but was conscious and in fit mental condition, but affixed thumb marks to the Will when he could have signed it, was held as creating suspicion about the execution and attestation of the Will. It was held in the decision cited supra that in the absence of any averments in the petition regarding due attestation of the Will and the name of the persons who attested the Will, the original will filed according to Rule 374 of Original Side Rules and copy thereof annexed to the petition mentioning the names of the attesting witnesses would not satisfy the requirement of proper pleading regarding the Will having been duly attested. 24. In **Bithaldas v. Chandratan** (AIR 1955 RAJ. 39) a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, while considering Section 68 of the Evidence Act and regarding the procedure to be followed, held as follows: "The proper procedure to follow under Section 68 is that the witness should not only be asked whether he had attested a particular document but the document itself should be shown to him and he should be questioned whether it bears his signature. It should be further put to him whether the executant had also signed the document in his presence or that he had admitted his signature on the document before him. If the witness says that the executant had signed the document in his presence he should also be asked to identify the signature thereon. It is necessary to bring out from the witness that he has attested the document in the sense referred in S.3, Transfer of Property Act." **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:22:** 25. Based on the above discussion, now we shall consider as to the nature of the pleadings raised by the parties and whether the propounder of the Will has discharged his initial burden of proving the same in the sense that whether he has discharged his burden of proving by examination of attesting witnesses and as also the mental capacity of the person who executed the Will and as to whether he was having sound disposition of the mind at the time of execution of the Will. 26. In the plaint as amended, in para 16, it is averred that the plaintiffs never conceded that the deceased had executed any Will as contended by the defendants. But without prejudice to that contention, in case the court upholds after evidence, that any of the Wills is executed and validly proved, then also the plaintiffs are entitled to get the shares shown therein and that relief also may be included as an alternative prayer in the suit. The prayer portion was also amended and it is prayed that "in case the court finds that any of the Wills set up by the defendants in the suit is executed and binding on the estate of the deceased, the plaintiffs may be granted a decree in respect of the estate of the deceased to get the shares so found by the court as per the Will, if found by the Court, along with the other prayer, for partition of the money portion of the plaintiffs as their own." **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:23:** 27. There is paucity of necessary averments in the plaint specifically challenging the Will as such. There is however, a general plea that they do not concede to the contention of the defendants that there is a Will executed validly by the testator. However, PW.1, while in the box has given evidence but in the absence of any specific plea, it may not be legally permissible to look into such evidence at least as against the plaintiff to say that there was any invalidity attached to the Will. But in this case, the contesting defendants have filed an additional written statement and we shall now refer to the additional written statement filed by them. 28. In the additional written statement filed by Defendants 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12, it is averred that on verification of the files, it is seen that the document styled as a Will bearing No. 148/98 dated 17.10.98 is produced by defendants 1, 3,4,5 and 6. But according to them, the last of the Will executed by the testator was Ext. B2 and the rights of the parties are to be governed by the same. The alleged Will Ext. B3 is not a genuine one which is not properly executed on testamentary capacity and proper attestation. The testator had no testamentary capacity at the time of execution of Ext. B3 and he died after a few days later. Ext.B3 claimed to have been executed on 17.10.1998 at a time when the testator was not in a sound disposing mind and he was not in the capacity of recognizing the **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:24:** consequence of what he was doing. Thus, the alleged Will Ext. B3 is the result of undue influence and fraud practised on the deceased and so it is null and void. While Ramakrishnan was having full sense, he used to express his pious wish of 8th defendant starting a business of his own as contained in Will No. 65/95. Ext. B3 would show that defendants 3, 4,5 and 6 alone are benefited and the right of others are taken away by fraudulent means. The so called Will Ext. B3 itself is self defeating, unnatural, improbable and unfair. 29. The first plaintiff was examined as PW.1. In her proof affidavit, he has averred that Ramakrishnan, her father had not executed any Will and the Will produced by the defendants are not true, that her father was suffering from liver cancer, that he was affectionate towards her as also towards her brother Rajan, the second defendant and that in 1990, that her father was suffering from chest pain, breathing trouble and blood pressure that in case the first defendant got executed a Will and registered the same at a time when her father was suffering from such ailment, such Will has no validity and will not affect his properties, that during the last days of Ramakrishnan, he was totally bed-ridden and he was in the Medical Centre Hospital from 8.9.1998 to 29.9.2998 as an inpatient and many times in the ICU and was unconscious, that she used to visit him in the hospital and **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:25:** attended him and on all these days he had lost his memory, that her father was discharged from the hospital as a hopeless case and this information was obtained by her on 30.9.1998 when she visited the hospital, that immediately, she went to her father's house at Chalakkudy and stayed there and she was nursing him who was totally unconscious, that Defendants 1 and 3 to 6 did not like her stay with her father, that Rajan, the second defendant was staying in a separate house, that he asked them to go back saying that he will inform if there is any change in the situation, that relectuantly they returned; but were enquiring about their father by telephoning their brother, that till 16.10.1998 they were with their father and that thereafter they were informed that their father did not regain consciousness. 30. In cross examination on behalf of Defendants 1 and 3 to 6, she has stated that she do not know as to who was the doctor treating her father for his various ailments and as to the date, month or the year when her father was in the hospital, that her father was mentally upset on knowing that he is suffering from those ailments, that besides herself, others have also nursed him, that her father regained consciousness at intervals and at that time her father used to enquire about her well-beings and that her father was admitted in the hospital on several occasions. To a specific **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **==> picture [21 x 10] intentionally omitted <==** question as to whether there is any special reason as to why she did not specifically pleaded that her father was unconscious she answered as follows: " **==> picture [7 x 5] intentionally omitted <==** To the suggestion that the Will executed on 17.10.1998 was executed by her father, when he was fully conscious and on his own accord, she stated that she does not know about it. " **==> picture [7 x 5] intentionally omitted <==** In cross examination by Defendants 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12, it is stated that on 30.9.1998 when she visited her father at Palakkad, her father was unconscious. 31. DW.1 has filed a proof affidavit for and on behalf of Defendants 4, 5 and 6, in which it is averred that his father had executed a Will Ext. B1 which was subsequently cancelled by executing another Will Ext. B2 which was again cancelled and executed Ext. B3 Will in 1998 as document No. 148/98 and the said Will has come into effect and that the parties are in **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:27:** possession and enjoyment of the properties as per the last Will of his father Ext. B3, that his father was residing with him along with his mother and elder brother Mohan and that the entire bank deposit was bequeathed in favour of Defendants 3, 4 and 5. He admits that his father was admitted in the Medical Centre Hospital, that his father had full testamentary capacity till his death and he was fully conscious, that till his death he was being looked after by DW.1, that since Ramakrishnan expressed a desire to celebrate Onam he was discharged from the Hospital and after the Onam celebration he was re-admitted, that he was never in an unconscious state, that one Dr. George Chakkola at Chalakkudy was treating him till his death, that the second defendant was a drunkard and had also connections with other ladies and so, his father excluded him from the Will, but properties were set apart in favour of the grant sons and wife of the second defendant, that all the three daughters of the second defendant were given in marriage by Ramakrishnan and that it is for that reason that they were not given any property as per the Will. 32. In cross examination by Defendants 7, 8 and 10 to 12, DW.1 admitted that his father was suffering from liver cancer and that he had also breathing problem, that Ext.B3 was given to him after the death of his father from the document writer's office, that the other two Wills Exts. B1 **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:28:** and B2 were in the almirah in the tarwad house where defendants 1, 3, 5 and 6 were staying at that time, that all the legal heirs were present besides other relations, when the almirah was opened, that at the time of preparing Ext. B3 Will, though he was present in the house he was not present in the room from where it was prepared, that no other brothers were present there and all of them were asked to go and he did not know as to what happened and that on the previous day of execution of the Will he was asked to call the document writer and he accordingly, called him. He denied any difference in the signature in Ext. B3 and admitted that in the year 1995, his father was fully conscious and had full testamentary capacity. One of the attestors in Ext. B3 Will is the driver of his sister's husband. Reji Paul is his class mate. Reji's Office situates opposite to his house. There are also other offices functioning in the same building and he is close with Reji. 33. DW.2 is Viswambharan, who is a document writer by profession, attached with one Chandrasekharan. He says that Exts. B1, B2 and B3 Wills are in his hand-writing and prepared by Chandrasekharan, that he is a witness to Exts. B1, B2 and B3, that he has signed as a witness in Exts. B1, B2 and B3 and he identified the signature of Ramakrishnan in Ext. B3 as also in Exts. B1 and B2 that Exts. B1 and B2 were prepared from his Office, that Ext. B3 was also written from his Office, that Exts. B1 and B2 **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:29:** were signed by Ramakrishnan at his Office whereas Ext. B3 was signed by him at his house, that while Ramakrishnan was signing the Will, DW.2, Chandrasekharan and Ramakrishnan alone were present and that before putting the signature, the Will was read over to Ramakrishnan. In the cross examination on behalf of Defendants 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12, he has stated that he was working under document writer Chandrasekharan, that he saw Ramakrishnan only at the time when he signed the Will and not before, that Ramakrishnan had not given any instruction to him and that Ramakrishnan had visited his Office during 1995, 1996 and 1997 in connection with several matters. To a question that Ramakrishnan was conscious and healthy in 1995, his answer was that not only in 1995, even in 1998 he was fully conscious and healthy and that when he visited Ramakrishnan's house in 1998 he had spent half an hour there. According to him, he came to know that Ramakrishnan was not keeping well after execution of the Will. " " He does not know that Ramakrishnan was sent back to his house as a hopeless patient. To a specific question that Ramakrishnan had lost his consciousness on 14.10.1998 on the date on which the Will was executed, **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:30:** he denied the same and said that he was sitting on a sofa set. He denied that there is any difference in the signature in Exts. B2 and B3. On behalf of the plaintiff also DW.2 was cross examined. In the cross examination, he has stated that he has seen the will was executed at 9.30 A.M. on 17.10.1998. He also stated that on 16th and 17th he had not gone from his Office between 8 AM and 6 PM; but he corrected it by saying that he had gone for attestation of the Will on 17th. On 16th morning Chandrasekharan gave him the draft of the Will for preparing the same. On 17th at the time when he went for attestation Ramakrishnan's wife and children were not seen there. he also stated that Ramakrishnan has executed the Will with full consciousness. He denied knowledge as to whether there was any enmity between Ramakrishnan and his neighbours. To a question that the Will was an artificial creation because of his close relationship with Babu, he denied the same. In the re-examination he has stated that the original of Ext. B3 was prepared by him and that the same was prepared on 17th at 8 AM and the draft was prepared by Chandrasekharan. He also admitted in further cross examination that Ext. B2 was also prepared in his own handwriting. 34. DW.3 is one Reji Paul, who is a witness to Ext. B3 document when it was registered. He identified his signature in Ext. B3. According **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05 :31:** to him, he has witnessed the registration of the Will in the house of Ramakrishnan and at that time, Ramakrishnan, the Registrar, the Assistant, himself and Sibi were all present, that it was at the instance of Ramakrishnan that he was called when he was in his Office, that his office is situated near to the residence of Ramakrishnan and he is a tenant under Ramakrishnan and that it was Ramakrishnan who signed in the Will first and as witness he signed first. To a question while cross examination by Defendants 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12 that the third defendant Mohanan and himself were working in the same building, he said that he is a friend of Rajan from childhood and Mohanan and Asokan from his schooldays onwards, and he had occasion to see Dr. George Chakkola visiting Ramakrishnan's house. According to him, when he went to Ramakrishnan's house on the alleged day of execution of Will, Ramakrishnan was sitting in the front room on a chair. There was a teapoy in front of the chair and after he went there Ramakrishnan asked him as to whether he has any objection for being a witness to the document. He agreed and then Ramakrishnan signed and thereafter he signed as the first witness. Again Ramakrishnan signed. To a specific question that after Ramakrishnan was discharged from the hospital, he was fully unconscious he answered saying "absolutely wrong". **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05 :32:** 35. DW.4 is Chandrasekharan, who is a document writer by profession. He says that Exts. B1, B2 and B3 Wills were prepared by him and that they were in the hand-writing of Viswambharan - DW.2. He identified the signature of Ramakrishnan and said that he has signed as an attestor to Exts. B1, B2 and B3. Exts. B1 and B2 were signed by Ramakrishnan at his Office and Ext. B3 was signed at his house and at that time besides himself, Viswambharan and Ramakrishnan were also present and that it was Ramakrishnan who signed first. Then Viswambharan signed and again Ramakrishnan put his second signature. They have seen each other signing. Ext. B3 was handed over by him at the residence of Ramakrishnan. At that time, Ramakrishnan's wife and children were there. He had read over the Will to Ramakrishnan before he signed the same. Ext. B6 is the Will executed by Ramakrishnan's son Rajan, which was also prepared by him. he is an attesting witness to Ext. B6 also. In the cross examination by Defendants 7, 8, 10, 11 and 12 that he has no role in the matter of registration of the Will, he said that it was Babu who called him for preparing the Will, that before preparing Ext. B3 Will he had gone to Ramakrishnan's house twice, ie. on 16.10.1998 and 17.10.1998, that usually if there is anything, Ramakrishnan used to call him directly; but he did not know why on that day Babu called him and told him to see Ramakrishnan. **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05 :33:** xxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxx " " He further stated that Ramakrishnan's belly was in an enlarged condition, that the Photostat copies of certain original documents were handed over to him by Ramakrishnan along with the previous Will, that all these documents were kept ready when he visited his house, that during the three hours' talk nobody else had come to that room, that the discussion was regarding the preparation of the Will, that Ramakrishnan told him in what manner the property should be set apart the different legatees and accordingly, as per his instruction, the draft Will was prepared. 36. DW.5 is one Prema, wife of Rajan. She is the 7th defendant in the case. Second defendant is her husband. According to DW.5, there is discrepancy in the signature of Ramakrishnan in Ext. B3 Will and hence she disputes the signature of Ramakrishnan, contained in Ext. B3. According to her, after executing Ext. B1 Will in 1994 one item of property was sold and hence another Will Ext. B2 was written cancelling the earlier Will Ext. B1. Her son the 8th defendant Babby is unemployed. Her father **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:34:** had wished that her son the 8th defendant start a business in Chalakkudy Municipality and even advised the 8th defendant to start such a business. All the Bank balance, deposits etc. are thus not included in the Will in respect of which right was given to Bhabby. Besides 25 Cents each were given as per Ext. B2 Will and with a view to deny due share that the purported Will Ext. B3 was fraudulently got executed. In the cross examination by Defendants 1, 3,4, 5 and 6 to a question as to whether Ext. B6 was a Will executed by her husband she denied of any such Will. She denied the suggestion that her husband was leading an immoral life. 37. DW.7 is Abdul Khader. He is the Sub Registrar, Kallettinkara Sub Registrar Office. He stated that during October during 1998, he was the Head Clerk of Chalakkury Sub Registrar Office, that it was at that time, that Ext. B3 was registered in the house of Ramakrishnan, that since Ramakrishnan was not keeping well and requested for house registration through a special messenger, he went to the house of Ramakrishnan for registration of the document, that since the Sub Registrar was on leave he was in charge of his Office, that it was at about 5'o Clock that he went to the house of Ramakrishnan by car along with his peon, that the messenger showed Ramakrishnan to him and he took the statement of Ramakrishnan, that Ramakrishnan was sitting in the front room of his house in a chair or **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:35:** on a sofa and he handed over the Will to DW.7, and it was thereafter that his statement was taken. Thereafter, DW.7 explained the procedures that followed. According to him, it was in the presence of the witnesses that the whole procedures were carried out. Thumb impression of Ramakrishnan was also taken. Ramakrishnan was answering to all the questions and he returned by about 5.15 P.M. after completing the registration. 38. In cross examination on behalf of Defendants 7, 8, 11 and 12, he has stated that he does not remember as to who was the special messenger who came to his Office; but it was not the document writer, that it was at his request that witnesses were called , that the witnesses who identified Ramakrishnan were there till he returned after completing the registration, that he had no previous contact with Ramakrishnan prior to 17.10.1998 and that the registered document was given to the authorised person by somebody from Chandrasekharan's Office. He asserted that the signature in Ext. B3 is that of Ramakrishnan and denied that Ramakrishnan was unconscious at the time of registering the document. He took five minutes to read over the document and another five minutes to take statement from the executor and it was thereafter that the witness came there. 39. From the foregoing discussion of the evidence, it can be seen that all the three Wills Exts. B1 to B3 were prepared by the same document **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:36:** writer. The attesting witnesses in these Wills were also the same which shows that Ramakrishnan had got trust and confidence in the document writer as even according to the defendants, Ext. B2 was validly executed. Even Ext. B2 was prepared by the same document writer. Therefore, there is nothing improbable in the same document writer being called and according to Chandrasekharan, DW.4 he was called by Babu and asked him to meet his father Ramakrishnan. it was accordingly, that he came on the previous day evening, discussed with Ramakrishnan and prepared a draft Will and handed over to his Assistant who prepared the original and on the next day, the same was executed in the presence of the attesting witnesses. Both the attesting witnesses, Chandrasekharan and his Assistant were examined in the case. Nothing is brought out in the cross examination to discredit their testimony. Further, Ext. B3 was registered and the Sub Registrar was also examined int he case. There is a normal presumption that all the procedural formalities have been complied with when it is a registered document. Added to this, the Sub Registrar who was in charge on the date on which ext. B 3was executed was also examined to prove due registration of the document. Two neighbouring witnesses had identified the executant Ramakrishnan. The Sub Registrar had denied the suggestion that Ramakrishnan had no testamentary capacity at the time of document. It **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:37:** is the consistent version of the witnesses examined on the side of the defendants that Ramakrishnan was sitting in the front room of the house and he was sitting on a sofa or chair. Thus, both the execution as well as the registration is amply proved by the evidence in the case. When the document is a registered one, as held by this Court in **Varghese V. Oommen** (1994(2) KLT 620), it may not be sufficient proof of due execution; but at the same time, the certificate enforced by the Registration Officer on the document is admissible to prove that the executant was of sound mind. It is conceivable with the aid of Illustration (e) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act the court could also presume that the official act of registration has been regularly performed and that the facts mentioned in the endorsements have occurred as mentioned therein. As respect the execution is concerned, the law is clear in this regard, namely that atleast one of the attesting witnesses has to be examined if alive. In this case, both the attesting witnesses to the document were examined to prove due execution and in spite of elaborate cross examination nothing could be brought out to discredit their testimony. Thus, both aspects namely due execution of the Will as well as the testamentary capacity of Ramakrishnan are proved beyond reasonable doubt. Though there was an attempt to show by the contesting parties that the execution of the Will by Ramakrishnan **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:38:** was not at a time when he has got testamentary capacity or of sound mind, in the light of the evidence adduced by Defendants 1, 3,4,5 and 6, the onus of proving the validity of the Will stand discharged and the same has shifted to the shoulders of the persons who allege invalidity to it. Except the ipsi dixit of the interested testimony of such person who pleaded invalidity of the Will, there is no independent evidence in this case. On the other hand, two witnesses who introduced Ramakrishnan to the Registrar were neighbours who were called as witnesseses to the document for registration, as requested by the Registrar. One of them is a Chartered Accountant. The mere fact that witnesses were very close with DW.1 by itself is not a reason to impeach their version since it is only probable and natural that during the time of house registration immediate neighbours who will be available are called since the purpose being to identify the person only a known person can be called. 40. Though it is true that Ramakrishnan was suffering from serious ailment and he was in hospital as an inpatient, the fact remains that he was discharged and he was continuing to reside in his own house till his death. His death occurred one week after registration of the Will. All the witnesses who spoke in support of the Will had in one voice said that Ramakrishnan had the testamentary capacity and sound mind at the time of execution of **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:39:** the Will. No contra evidence is available except as discussed above, the interested testimony of the defence witnesses. As we have already stated, it would have been different had another document writer was called for preparation of the Will since that might have arose some suspicion in the mind of the court as to why a document writer familiar to the testator who admittedly had prepared two Wills earlier - Exts. B1 and B2, and was attending to all the matters of the testator, was not called. But in this case, it was the very same document writer who had prepared Ext. B3. The attesting witnesses were also the same. If Ext. B2 is valid as contended by Defendants 7, 8, and 10 to 12, there is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of the document writer who is also an attesting witness to Ext. B3 merely because some variations from Ext. B2 has been made in Ext. B3. It is not disputed that all the legal heirs have been given properties even as per Ext. B3, though there may be some changes in the extent of the property allotted to some of them. That by itself is not a reason to invalidate the Will especially in the light of the evidence adduced in the case. 41. On an overall consideration of the entire evidence in the case, we have no hesitation to hold that Ext. B3 was validly executed and registered and it is the last Will of the testator. Since the properties have been divided as per the Will, the court below has rightly dismissed the suit for partition. **RFA NOS. 419 & 496/05** **:40:** The finding contra regarding the validity of the Will Ext. B3 is reversed. The amount derived from the land acquisition proceedings is deposited in the Bank in different names. As respect the money already in the name of Ramakrishnan it will go to the legatees as per Ext. B3. R.F.A. 496/2005 is allowed as above. R.F.A. 419/2005 is dismissed. The parties will bear their respective costs. P.R. RAMAN, (JUDGE) V. K. MOHANAN, (JUDGE) knc/-