M.P. Madhusoodhanan Master v. P. Umavathy and others

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** # **PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN** ## **&** **THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.R.ANITHA** **WEDNESDAY, THE 22[ND] DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2021 / 31ST BHADRA, 1943** **RCREV. NO. 208 OF 2013** **AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 31.01.2013 IN R.C.A.NO.4 OF 2009 OF THE RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY (ADDL. DISTRICT COURT), THALASSERY, KANNUR ARISING FROM ORDER DATED 16.10.2008 IN RCP NO.161/2007 OF RENT CONTROL COURT (PRINCIPAL MUNSIFF) KANNUR.** **REVISION PETITIONER/S:** **M.P.MADHUSOODHANAN S/O. DAMODARAN MASTER, GROCERY SHOP, APVIII/384,KADAPPURAM ROAD, AZHEEKODE AMSOM DESOM, KANNUR DISTRICT.** **BY ADVS. SRI.M.GOPIKRISHNAN NAMBIAR SRI.P.GOPINATH** ## **RESPONDENT/S:** 1 **P.UMAVATHY S/O. CHERUTHOTTATHIL KUNHIRAMAN, CHERUTHOTTATHIL HOUSE, THREE ROAD, AZHEEKODE AMSOM DESOM, KANNUR DISTRICT. PIN-670009.** 2 **C.H. UNILA D/O.CHERUTHOTTATHIL KUNHIRAMAN, CHERUTHOTTATHIL HOUSE, THREE ROAD, AZHEEKODE AMSOM DESOM, KANNUR DISTRICT. PIN-670009.** 3 **C.H. REENA D/O. CHERUTHOTTATHIL KUNHIRAMAN, CHERUTHOTTATHIL HOUSE, THREE ROAD, AZHEEKODE AMSOM DESOM, KANNUR DISTRICT. PIN-670009.** 4 **C.T. ULLASAN S/O.CHERUTHOTTATHIL KUNHIRAMAN, CHERUTHOTTATHIL HOUSE, THREE ROAD, AZHEEKODE AMSOM DESOM, KANNUR DISTRICT. PIN-670009. BY ADV SRI.P.U.SHAILAJAN** **THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 27.07.2021, THE COURT ON 22.09.2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 2 ## **O R D E R** ## **Anil K. Narendran, J.** The petitioner is the respondent-tenant in R.C.P.No.161 of 2007 on the file of the Rent Control Court (Munsiff), Kannur, a petition filed by the respondents herein-landlords under Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, seeking eviction of the tenant from the petition schedule building, originally owned by one C.T. Kunjiraman, the husband of the 1st respondent herein and father of respondents 2 to 4 herein. The bona fide need projected in the Rent Control Petition was that of the 4th respondent herein, to start bakery business. The tenant entered appearance and filed counter, opposing the order of eviction sought for in the Rent Control Petition. 2. Before the Rent Control Court, on the side of the landlords, the 4th respondent herein was examined as PW1 and Exts.A1 to A7 were marked. The tenant was examined as RW1 and Exts.B1 to B3 were marked on his side. After considering the pleadings and materials on records, the Rent Control Court arrived at a conclusion that the need projected in the petition is bona fide and that, the tenant is not entitled to the R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 3 protection of the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act and also protection under the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. Accordingly, the Rent Control Court allowed R.C.P.No.161 of 2007 and the tenant was directed to give vacant possession of the petition schedule building to the landlords, within two months from the date of that order. The tenant was also directed to pay cost to the landlords. 3. Against the order of eviction of the Rent Control Court in R.C.P.No.161 of 2007, the tenant filed R.C.A.No.4 of 2009 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority (Additional District Judge), Thalassery. The Appellate Authority by the judgment dated 31.01.2013 dismissed R.C.A.No.4 of 2009, thereby confirming the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court. 4. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority dated 31.03.2013 in R.C.A.No.4 of 2009 and the order of the Rent Control Court dated 16.10.2008 in R.C.P.No.161 of 2007, the petitioner-tenant is before this Court in this Rent Control Revision, invoking the provisions under Section 20 of the Act. R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 4 5. On 17.06.2013, when this Rent Control Revision came up for admission, this Court admitted the matter on file and issued urgent notice to the respondents. In I.A.No.1397 of 2013, this Court granted an interim order of stay of execution of the order of eviction of the Rent Control Court in R.C.P.No.161 of 2007, as confirmed by the judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority in R.C.A.No.4 of 2009, on condition that arrears of rent, if any, as on that date will be paid to the landlords, within a period of three weeks. The said interim order, which was extended from time to time, was in force till 29.02.2014. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant and also the learned counsel for the respondents-landlords. 7. The issue that arises for consideration in this Rent Control Revision is as to whether any interference is warranted on the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court under Section 11(3) of the Act, which was confirmed by the impugned judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority. 8. The petition schedule building was originally owned by one C.T. Kunjiraman, husband of the 1[st] respondent and father of respondents 2 to 4, which was let out to the tenant R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 5 on a monthly rent of Rs.100/-, vide Ext.A1 register coolie chit bearing No.145/1981 dated 20.05.1981 of the Sub Registrar Office, Valapattanam. Subsequently, the rent was enhanced and the rate of rent at the time of filing of the Rent Control Petition was Rs.450/- per month. The bona fide need projected in paragraph 4 of the Rent Control Petition is that, to augment the income of the 4[th] respondent herein, he is in bona fide need of the petition schedule building. The landlords have got evicted the room of the southern side of the petition schedule th building to start bakery business for the 4 respondent herein. The 4[th] respondent herein wants both the petition schedule building and the next room on its southern side to start bakery shop in a convenient manner, so as to augment his income and the need is bona fide. The back room of the building is intended for bakehouse and for storing firewood. The landlords have no other vacant building in their possession to start bakery business. The tenant is not depending on the income derived from the petition schedule building. There are other suitable building in the locality for the tenant to carry on his business. The tenant has his own building to carry on such business. R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 6 9. Before the Rent Control Court, the tenant contended that the bona fide need projected in the rent control petition is not genuine. The petition schedule building is not suitable for bakery business. The 4[th] respondent herein is conducting bakery business in another building, within 1km from the petition schedule building. There is a separate bake house and godown for his bakery. There are other vacant rooms in his possession. The bona fide need projected is only a ruse to evict the tenant from the petition schedule building. The tenant is a general merchant. He and his family have no other income apart from the income derived from the business conducted in the petition schedule building. Moreover, no other buildings are available in the locality for shifting his business. 10. Section 11 of the Act deals with eviction of tenants. As per Section 11(1), notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract a tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, except in accordance with the provisions of this Act. As per the first proviso to Section 11(1), nothing contained in this Section shall apply to a tenant whose landlord is the State Government or the Central Government or other public R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 7 authority notified under this Act. As per the second proviso to Section 11(1), where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenancy, the Rent Control Court shall decide whether the denial or claim is bona fide and if it records a finding to that effect, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a Civil Court and such Court may pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in this Section, notwithstanding that the court finds that such denial does not involve forfeiture of the lease or that the claim is unfounded. 11. As per Section 11(3) of the Act, a landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court, for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him. As per the first proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so. As per the second proviso to Section 11(3), the Rent R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 8 Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business. As per the third proviso to Section 11(3), no landlord whose right to recover possession arises under an instrument of transfer inter vivos shall be entitled to apply to be put in possession until the expiry of one year from the date of the instrument. As per the fourth proviso to Section 11(3), if a landlord after obtaining an order to be put in possession transfers his rights in respect of the building to another person, the transferee shall not be entitled to be put in possession unless he proves that he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him. 12. In **R.C. Thamrakar v. Nidi Lekha [(2001) 8 SCC 431]** the Apex Court observed that, it is for the landlord to decide how and in what manner he should live and that he is the best judge of his residential requirement. In deciding the question of the bona fide requirement, it is unnecessary to R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 9 make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself. 13. In **Prathapan v. Rama Warrier [2004 (2) KLT 559]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act uses the expression "any member of his family dependant on him". The word "dependant" is used as an adjective and it literally means, person who depends on or looks to another for support or favour or for his maintenance or livelihood. Since dependant means depending upon something else, that is, dependant has to satisfy that he is a member of the family. Dependant member must be a member of the landlord's family. With regard to that, two tests have to be satisfied; that he must be a member of the family and consequently that member must be dependant on the landlord and dependency is not financial dependency, but dependency so far as the tenanted premises is concerned. 14. In **Adil Jamshed Frenchman v. Sardur Dastur Schools Trust [(2005) 2 SCC 476]** the Apex Court reiterated that, as laid down in **Shiv Samp Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta [(1999) 6 SCC 222]** a bona fide R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 10 requirement must be an outcome of a sincere and honest desire in contradistinction with a mere pretext for evicting the tenant on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family which would entitle the landlord to seek ejectment of the tenant. The question to be asked by a judge of facts by placing himself in the place of the landlord is whether in the given facts proved by the material on record the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere and honest. The concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. As reiterated in **Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal [(2001) 5 SCC 705]** bona fide requirement has to be distinguished from a mere whim or fanciful desire. The bona fide requirement is in praesenti and must be manifested in actual need so as to convince the court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. 15. In **Ammu v. Nafeesa [2015 (5) KHC 718]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, it is a settled proposition of law that the need put forward by the landlord has to be examined on the presumption that the same is a genuine one, in the absence of any materials to the contra. R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 11 16. Before the Rent Control Court, the bona fide need projected in the rent control petition was proved by the oral testimony of PW1. The landlords have filed Rent Control Petition for eviction against the tenant who was occupying the room on the southern side of the petition schedule building. Against the order of eviction granted by the Rent Control Court in R.C.P.No.161 of 2007, the tenant of that room preferred an appeal. As the tenant ceased to occupy the rooms for more than six months, the landlords filed R.C.P.No.66 of 2003 and thereafter, they got vacant possession of the shop room in E.P.No.422 of 2004, on 07.10.2006. 17. Before the Rent Control Court the tenant contended that the bona fide need projected in the Rent Control Petition for an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act is vague and indefinite. Before the Rent Control Appellate Authority the tenant reiterated the above contention. 18. As per Rule 7(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1979, every application under the Act shall, in addition to the particulars necessary to support it, contain also the particulars prescribed in Rule 12 so far as they may be applicable and every application for eviction under R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 12 Section 11 or 11 (A) shall also state the grounds on which the application is made. As per Rule 11(8), the Accommodation Controller, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority deciding the dispute shall record a brief note of the evidence adduced by the parties and witness who attend, and upon the evidence so recorded, and after consideration of any documentary evidence produced by the parties, a decision shall be given in accordance with justice, equity and good conscience. The decision given shall be reduced to writing. In the absence of any party duly summoned to attend, the dispute may be decided exparte. 19. In **Lainakalillath Kooliyangal Kamarunnisa and others v. A. Shabeer [2019 (4) KLJ 508]** a Division Bench of this Court held that strict rules of pleadings applied to Civil Courts as provided by Order VI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, are not to be imported to a Rent Control Court, since the proceeding before it does not commence by presentation of a plaint. What could be then said as applying to the Rent Control Court are rules of fairness and principles of natural justice. Rule 11(8) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1979 fortifies this view to a certain extent R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 13 since as per the said provision decision of the Rent Control Court shall ultimately be governed by notions of justice, equity and good conscience. 20. Before the Rent Control Court, relying on the decision in **Mymoon K.S. and others v. Danlop India Ltd. [ILR 2007 (2) Ker 258 : 2007 (2) KLT SN 52]** the tenant contended that, an indefinite pleading regarding purpose for which the premise is required cannot support a claim under Section 11(3) of the Act. 21. In **Mymoon K.S.** , the Division Bench of this Court was dealing with a case in which the case set up in the Rent Control Petition was that the landlords jointly and individually required the buildings for their own use. It was not specified as to what is the specific purpose for which the premises were required. It is just a sweeping statement, i.e., a recital in support of the claim under Section 11(3) of the Act. In the evidence of PW1 nothing is mentioned about the nature of the business proposed to be started although he has stated that the premises are required for starting business. The Division Bench held that such a statement is hardly sufficient to satisfy the bona fides of the need envisaged under Section 11(3) of R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 14 the Act. It would not be possible to properly dispute the bona fides of the alleged need unless the nature of the business or at least the bare details of the same is not mentioned if not in the pleadings at least in evidence. Only then the tenant would be able to expose the hollowness of the claim, if it is so. 22. In the instant case, the bona fide need projected in paragraph 4 of the Rent Control Petition is that, the 4[th] respondent herein is in bona fide need of the petition schedule building to start bakery business using the petition schedule building and the room on its southern side, which the landlords have got vacant possession after evicting the tenant of that room. He wants both the petition schedule building and the next room on its southern side to start bakery shop in a convenient manner, so as to augment his income and the need is bona fide. The back room of the building is intended for bakehouse and for storing firewood. The bona fide need projected in the Rent Control Petition was proved by the oral testimony of PW1. PW1 has deposed that he intends to avail loan from Co-operative Bank to start business. Admittedly, PW1 is conducting bakery business. PW1 narrated how he wants to expand his business. The tenant contended that the R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 15 petition schedule building is not suitable for conducting bakery business, as there is another bakery by name P.R. Bakery situated in the very same building. The Rent Control Court rejected the said contention of the tenant, on the ground that, it is not the look out of the tenant. After considering the pleadings and evidence on record, the Rent Control Court found that the need projected in the Rent Control Petition for seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act is bona fide. 23. Before the Rent Control Court and also before this Court the tenant contended that the landlords did not mention in R.C.P.No.161 of 2007, about the Rent Control Petition filed against another tenant of the room on southern side of the petition schedule building and also the execution petition. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant, the landlords filed R.C.P.No.161 of 2007 suppressing material facts from the notice of the Rent Control Court and as such they are not entitled for an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner has cited various decisions of the Apex Court in support of the said contention. 24. In **Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India** R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 16 **[(2010) 14 SCC 38]** , a decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner tenant, the Apex Court held that the principle that a person, who does not come to the Court with clean hands, is not entitled to be heard on the merits of his grievance and, in any case, such person is not entitled to any reliefs is applicable not only to the petitions filed under Articles 32, 226 and 136 of the Constitution of India but also to the cases instituted in other courts and judicial forums. 25. In **Bhaskar Laxman Jadhav v. Karamveer Kakasaheb Wagh Education Society [(2013) 11 SCC** **531]** , another decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner tenant, the Apex Court held that it is not for a litigant to decide what fact is material for adjudicating a case and what is not material. It is the obligation of a litigant to disclose all the facts of a case and leave the decision making to the court. 26. In the instant case, as already noticed, the bona fide need projected in paragraph 4 of the Rent Control Petition is that, to augment the income of the 4[th] respondent herein, he is in bona fide need of the petition schedule building. The landlords have got evicted the room on the southern side of R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 17 the petition schedule building to start bakery business for the 4 th respondent herein. The 4[th] respondent herein wants both the petition schedule building and the next room on its southern side to start bakery shop in a convenient manner, so as to augment his income and the need is bona fide. The back room of the building is intended for bakehouse and for storing firewood. Before the Rent Control Court, certified copy of the order of eviction of the Rent Control Court in R.C.P.No.66 of 2003 in respect of the room on the southern side of the petition schedule building was marked as Ext.A4; certified copy of Amin’s report in E.P.No.422 of 2004 in R.C.P.No.66 of 2003 as Ext.A5; certified copy of the delivery note of Amin in E.P.No.422 of 2004 in R.C.P.No.66 of 2003 as Ext.A6; and accounts for eviction prepared by the Amin in E.P.No.422 of 2004 in R.C.P.No.66 of 2003 as Ext.A7. Therefore we find no merit in the contention of the petitioner-tenant that the landlords filed R.C.P.No.161 of 2007 suppressing material facts from the notice of the Rent Control Court. The said contention can only be repelled as untenable and we do so. 27. Before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, the tenant filed I.A.No.4 of 2013, seeking permission and leave to R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 18 deliver interrogatories in writing to the landlords. That application was allowed by the Appellate Authority. Along with that application, the tenant produced a news paper in which an advertisement was published to the effect that a two-storied building was for sale. The tenant contended that the building referred to in that advertisement is the petition schedule building. The said subsequent event completely eclipse the bona fide need projected in the Rent Control Petition. The 4[th] respondent herein has filed an affidavit in that application, admitting that the landlords have given such an advertisement on 08.09.2012 in 'Sudinam' daily, for sale of the building and the phone number given in that advertisement belongs to PW1. The 4[th] respondent herein has explained that, to put an end to mounting loan interest, penal interest and other liabilities, the landlords thought it wise to sell the petition schedule building and such an advertisement was released after five years of filing of the Rent Control Petition and four years after the order of eviction. In the said affidavit, the 4[th] respondent herein has stated that, the bona fide need still subsists. 28. Before the Appellate Authority, relying on the R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 19 decision of a Division Bench of this Court in **Iritty Cooperative Hospital Society Ltd. v. Damodaran [2010 (3) KLT 823]** argued that the aforesaid fact eclipse the bona fide need projected in the Rent Control Petition. In the said decision, this Court held that, only those subsequent events completely eclipse the need projected by the landlord or have a fundamental impact either on the right of the landlord to get eviction or on the liability of the tenant to suffer eviction need be noticed by the various authorities under the Statute. 29. In **M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma [(1981) 3 SCC 36]** , a decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant, a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which landlord who sought to evict the tenant for his own occupation of the building lost his interest in entirety in the building during the pendency of the appeal, which is a continuation of the suit. 30. In **Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad [(1981) 3 SCC 103]** a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that, once an appeal against a decree or an order of eviction is preferred, the appeal being a continuation of the suit, the landlord's need must be shown to continue to exist at R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 20 appellate stage. If the tenant is in a position to show that the need or requirement no more exist because of the subsequent events, it would be open to point out such events and the courts including the Appellate Courts has to examine, evaluate and adjudicate the same. 31. In **P.V. Papanna v. K. Padmanabhaiah [(1994) 2 SCC 316]** the Apex Court reiterated that when eviction of a tenant is sought for on the ground of personal need of the landlord, such a need must not only exist on the date of the suit but must also exist when higher c ourts deal with order of eviction in appeal or revision. 32. In **Kamleshwar Prasad v. Pradumanju Agarwal (Dead) by LRs. [(1997) 4 SCC 413]** , a decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents-landlords, the Apex Court held that the crucial date for existence of the landlord's requirement is the date of filing of eviction application. The Appellate Authority's finding of fact that the landlord bona fide required the premises for starting his business has become final. Subsequent death of the landlord during the pendency of writ petition filed by the tenant was inconsequential. The bona fide need cannot be said to have lapsed as the business in R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 21 ## question can be carried on by the widow or any son. 33. In **Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava [(2001) 2 SCC 604]** the Apex Court held that the crucial date for deciding as to the bona fide requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps have utility for him to reach the said crucial date of consideration. If every subsequent development during the post petition period is to be taken into account for judging the bona fides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate situation in our litigative slow process system subsists. During 23 years after the landlord moved for eviction on the ground that his son needed the building, neither the landlord nor his son is expected to remain the idle without doing any work, lest, joining any new assignment or starting any new work would be at the peril of forfeiting his requirement to occupy the building. It is a stark reality that the longer the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and on that ground he or his father R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 22 seeks eviction of a tenant from the building, the proposed enterprise would not get faded out by subsequent developments during the traditional lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. It is pernicious, and we may say, unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of his reaching a finale, after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation, merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period. 34. In **Balan v. Bijina [2004 (3) KLT 180]** a Division Bench of this Court held that the attempt made by the landlady to sell away the tenanted premises to the tenant during the pendency of the rent control proceedings is not fatal to a plea under Section 11(3) of the Act. In that case, the Rent Control Petition was filed in the year 2000. Though landlady is the owner of the tenanted premises, her father tried to sell away the property at her instance and received Rs.10,000/from the tenant, vide Ext.XI dated 25.3.2002. The Division R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 23 Bench held that, even if such a proposal was originated from the side of the landlady that itself would not show there is no bona fides in the plea. During the pendency of the rent control proceedings if tenant makes an attractive offer so as to subdue the bona fide need the Rent Control Petition cannot be rejected on the ground that the landlady was also desirous of selling away the tenanted premises. The delay in disposal of the rent control proceedings, uncertainty in conduct of business and many other factors might have influenced the mind of the landlady while an attractive offer was made. Landlady may also in a given case sell away the tenanted premises and start business elsewhere with the amounts received. Rent Control Court took the view that since attempts were made by the landlady to sell away the property during the pendency of the proceedings to the tenant it would be sufficient to hold that there is no bona fides in the plea. The Division Bench agreed with the conclusion of the Appellate Authority that the mere fact that there was some negotiations between the father of the landlady and the tenant that itself is not a ground to hold that there is no bona fides in the plea. 35. The learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant would R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 24 contend that in **Balan** the Division Bench decided the matter without reference to the binding decisions to the effect that subsequent events which have a fundamental impact either on the right of the landlord to get eviction or on the liability of the tenant to suffer eviction need be noticed by various authorities under the Statute. We notice that, the principle laid down in the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitionertenant has application only in a case in which the tenant is able to show that the need or requirement of the landlord is no more exist because of any subsequent event. 36. In **Sheshambal (dead) through LRs. v. Chelur Corporation, Chelur Building [(2010) 3 SCC 470]** the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which the landlords, late Shri K. Sachindanda Iyer and his wife late Smt. A. Sheshambal Sachindanda Iyer, let out the premises in dispute to the 1[st] respondent for a period of three years in terms of a lease deed dated 12.04.1983. On the expiry of the lease period the landlords filed R.C.P.No.116 of 1986 before the Rent Control Court, Ernakulam seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground that they required the same for their bona fide personal occupation within the meaning of Section 11(3) of the Kerala R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 25 Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The prayer for eviction was opposed by the tenant, _inter alia_ , on the ground that the landlords did not require the demised premises and that, the tenant would find it difficult to shift its business to any other premises on account of non-availability of a suitable accommodation. The Rent Control Court eventually came to the conclusion that the landlords had failed to establish their bona fide requirement of the premises. The Rent Control Court found that the landlords had shifted their residence from Cochin and were living with their daughter and son-in-law, who were running a nursing home in that city. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Rent Control Court, the landlords appealed to the Rent Control Appellate Authority, who affirmed the decision taken by the Rent Control Court, holding that the landlords were residing with their daughter and son-in-law at Ernakulam in a building owned by the landlords. The Appellate Authority also found that the landlords had a cottage at Kodaikanal and that, they being fairly old had no reason to shift back to Ernakulam in search of better medical facilities, especially when their son-in-law was running a nursing home at Coimbatore, where such facilities were available to them. R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 26 Aggrieved by the order passed by the Rent Control Court and the judgment of the Appellate Authority, the landlords approached the High Court in a revision filed under Section 20 of the Act. During the pendency of the revision the landlord Shri K. Sachindanda Iyer passed away on 24.04.1996. The High Court refused to intervene with the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below and accordingly, dismissed the revision petition. Feeling aggrieved, Smt. A. Sheshambal Sachindanda Iyer approached the Apex Court. During the pendency of the Civil Appeal, Smt. Sheshambal passed away. In I.A.No.7 of 2008 filed on 14.11.2008 permission was sought for substitution of her legal heirs on the basis of a will left behind by the deceased, as per which the property in question has to devolve upon her three daughters, out of which two of the daughters are living in India, one each at Coimbatore and Bihar, and the third daughter is settled in America. 37. In **Seshambal** the Apex Court noticed that, in the eviction petition the landlords had pleaded their own requirement for the premises to be occupied by them for residential as well as commercial purposes. The eviction petition was totally silent about the requirements of any R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 27 member of the family of the landlords leave alone any member of their family who was dependent upon them. That being so the parties went to trial before the Rent Control Court on the basis of the case pleaded in the petition and limited to the requirement of the owners for their personal occupation. Neither before the Rent Control Court nor before the Appellate Authority it was argued that the requirement in question was not only the requirement of the landlords but also that of any other member of their family, whether dependent upon them or otherwise. Not only that, even in the petition filed before the Apex Court the requirement pleaded was that of the deceased widowed landlord and not that of any member of her family. 38. In **Seshambal** the Apex Court further noticed that, the legal representatives who now claim to be the family members of the deceased landlords are all married daughters of the deceased couple each one settled in their respective matrimonial homes in different cities and at different places. That none of them was dependent upon the deceased landlord was also a fact undisputed before the Apex Court. Even otherwise, in the social milieu to which we are accustomed, R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 28 daughters happily married have their own families and commitments, financial and otherwise. Such being the position the Apex Court found it difficult to see how the legal representatives of the deceased landlord can be allowed to set up a case which was never set up before the courts below so as to bring forth a requirement that was never pleaded at any stage of the proceedings. Allowing the legal heirs to do so would amount to permitting them to introduce a case which is totally different from the one set up before the Rent Control Court, the Appellate Authority or even the High Court. The position may indeed have been differentiated if in the original petition the landlords had pleaded their own requirement and the requirement of any member of their family dependent upon them. In such a case the demise of the landlords or any one of them may have made little difference for the person for whose benefit and bona fide requirement the eviction was sought, who could pursue the case to prove and satisfy any such requirement. 39. In **Seshambal** , before the Apex Court it was contended on behalf of the appellants that the rights and obligations of the parties get crystallised at the time of R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 29 institution of the suit so that any subsequent development is not only inconsequential but also wholly irrelevant for determination of the case before the Apex Court. In that context, the Apex Court observed that, while it is true that the right to relief must be judged by reference to the date suit or the legal proceedings were instituted, it is equally true that if subsequent to the filing of the suit, certain developments take place that have a bearing on the right to relief claimed by a party, such subsequent events cannot be shut out from consideration. What the court in such a situation is expected to do is to examine the impact of the said subsequent development on the right to relief claimed by a party and, if necessary, mould the relief suitably so that the same is tailored to the situation that obtains on the date the relief is actually granted. 40. In **Seshambal** , the Apex Court noticed that, the above proposition of law is fairly settled by the decision in **Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders [(1975) 1 SCC 770]** . To the same effect is the decision in **Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal [(2002) 2 SCC 256]** where it was declared that although the ordinary rule of R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 30 civil law is that the rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of the institution of the suit, yet the court has power to mould the relief in case the following three conditions are satisfied (i) that the relief, as claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted; (ii) that taking note of such subsequent event or changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable complete justice being done to the parties; and (iii) that such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the court promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise. In **Hasmat Rai v. Reghunath Prasad [(1981) 3 SCC 103]** it was observed that, if the tenant is in a position to show that the need or requirement no more exists because of subsequent events, it would be open to him to point out such events, and the court including the appellate court has to examine, evaluate and adjudicate upon the same. To the same effect is the decision in **Baba Kashinath Bhinge v. Samast Lingayat Gavali [(1994) Supp. 3 SCC 698]** where relying upon the decision in **Hasmat Rai** it was held that in a case of bona fide requirement it is necessary to establish that the landlord needs R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 31 the premises and the need subsists till a decree is passed in his favour. In a case where such need is available at the time of the filing of the petition but becomes extinct by the time the matter attains finality in appeal for revision no decree will be justified. For that purpose the court should take all the subsequent events into consideration and mould the relief accordingly. 41. In **Seshambal** , at Para.22 of the decision (SCC page 477), the Apex Court quoted with approval the following passage from the decision in **Baba Kashinath Bhinge** (SCC pages 699-700, para 2) as complete answer to the question raised before it, which reads thus; “ _2_ . Equally it is settled by this Court in series of judgments and a reference in this behalf would be sufficient by citing **Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad** **[(1981) 3 SCC 103]** that in a case of bona fide requirement, _it is always necessary, till the decree of eviction is passed that the landlord should satisfy that the need is bona fide and the need subsists_ . _In a case where the need is available at the time of filing of the petition, but at the time of granting decree it may not continue to subsist, in that event, the decree for eviction could not be made_ . _Similarly pending appeal or revision or writ petition, the need may become more acute._ The R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 32 court should take into account all the subsequent events to mould the relief. The High Court may not be justified in omitting to consider this aspect of the matter but that does not render the judgment illegal for the subsequent discussion we are going to make.” (emphasis in original) 42. In **Seshambal** , the Apex Court noticed that, a similar view was expressed in **Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram** **[(1992) Supp. 2 SCC 623]** (SCC pages 626-27, para 6), wherein it was held that, the normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded from taking a ‘cautious cognizance’ of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief. Similarly, in **Maganlal Kishanlal Godha v. Nanasaheb Uddhaorao Gadewar [(2008) 13 SCC 758]** it was held that, if the litigation keeps extending and number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum, the court should adopt a pragmatic approach in the matter and determine whether or not the R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 33 development pending finalisation of the litigation is such as would completely non-suit the party concerned. In **Seshambal** , the Apex Court observed that the decision in **Maganlal Kishanlal Godha** is no authority for the proposition that subsequent developments having material impact on the rights and obligations of the parties can be ignored by a court simply because such rights and obligations have to be determined by reference to the date on which the litigation was instituted. 43. In **Seshambal** , the Apex Court further noticed that, the decision in **Kedar Nath Agrawal v. Dhanraji Devi [(2004) 8 SCC 76]** has reiterated the legal position after a detailed review of the case law on the subject. That was also a case where the two landlords seeking eviction of the tenant had passed away during the pendency of the eviction petition and the question was whether the three married daughters left behind by the couple could continue with the same. In the said decision (SCC page 86, para 31) it was observed that, in view of the settled legal position as also the decisions in **Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu [(1975) 1 SCC 770]** and **Hasmat Rai [(1981) 3 SCC 103]** the High Court was in error R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 34 in not considering the subsequent event of death of both the landlords. It was the power as well as the duty of the High Court to consider the fact of death of the landlords during the pendency of the writ petition. Since it was the case of the tenant that all the three daughters got married and were - staying with their in laws, obviously, the said fact was relevant and material. 44. In **Seshambal** (SCC page 478, paras 26 and 27), the Apex Court noticed that, the decisions in **Pratap Rai Tanwani v. Uttam Chand [(2004) 8 SCC 490]** , **Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava [(2001) 2 SCC 604]** , **Kamleshwar Prasad v. Pradumanju Agarwal [(1997) 4 SCC 413]** , **Shakuntala Bai v. Narayan Das [(2004) 5 SCC 772]** , **G.C. Kapoor v. Nand Kumar Bhasin [(2002) 1 SCC 610]** , **Shantilal Thakordas v. Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala [(1976) 4 SCC 417]** and **Pukhraj Jain v. Padma Kashyap [(1990) 2 SCC 431]** do not lend any support to the proposition that subsequent developments cannot be noticed by the court, especially when such developments have an impact on the right of a party to the relief prayed for. In **Shantilal Thakordas v. Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala** R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 35 **[(1976) 4 SCC 417]** the earlier decision rendered in **Phool Rani v. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia [(1973) 1 SCC 688]** was overrules and it was held that the law permitted the eviction of the tenant for the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the landlord as residence for himself and members of his family and that, such a requirement was both of the landlord and the members of his family so that upon the death of the landlord the right to sue survived to the members of his family. That is not the position in the case on hand. 45. In **Seshambal** , on the facts of the case on hand, the Apex Court noticed that, the requirement pleaded in the eviction petition by the landlords was their own personal requirement and not the requirement of the members of their family whether dependent or otherwise. Indeed if the deceased landlords had any dependent member of the family, the Court may have, even in the absence of a pleading assumed that the requirement pleaded extended also to the dependent member of their family. That unfortunately, for the appellants is neither the case set up nor the position on facts. The deceased couple did not have any dependent member of the family for whose benefit they could have sought eviction on the ground that she R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 36 required the premises for personal occupation. In the light of what have been stated above, the Apex Court held that on the death of the landlords in the original eviction petition their right to seek eviction on the ground of personal requirement for the demised premises became extinct and no order could on the basis of any such requirement be passed at this point of time. 46. The law laid down by the Apex Court in **Sheshambal** , which we have dealt with in extenso hereinbefore, gives a complete answer to the question as to whether the subsequent event, i.e., release of an advertisement by the landlords, on 08.09.2012, for sale of the building in question, during the pendency of R.C.A.No.4 of 2009 is of such a magnitude as to completely eclipse the bona fide need projected in R.C.P.No.161 of 2007. 47. In the instant case, the bona fide need projected in the Rent Control Petition is that of the 4[th] respondent herein, who wants both the petition schedule building and the next room on its southern side to start bakery shop in a convenient manner, so as to augment his income. The Rent Control Petition was of the year 2007, in which an order of eviction R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 37 was passed on 16.10.2008. The Rent Control Appeal filed by the tenant was of the year 2009, which was dismissed only on 31.01.2013. The release of an advertisement by the landlords, on 08.09.2012, for sale of the building in question, during the pendency of R.C.A.No.4 of 2009, can at the most cast a shadow of doubt over the bona fide need projected in the Rent Control Petition. 48. In the affidavit filed in I.A.No.4 of 2013 in R.C.A.No.4 of 2009, the 4[th] respondent herein has explained that, to put an end to mounting loan interest, penal interest and other liabilities, the landlords thought it wise to sell the petition schedule building and such an advertisement was released after five years of filing of the Rent Control Petition and four years after the order of eviction. The Rent Control Petition was filed to augment the income of the 4[th] respondent herein, but due to procedural delay the landlords were faced with financial liability. To overcome the same, advertisement was made to sell the petition schedule building. In the said affidavit, the 4[th] respondent herein has stated that, the bona fide need still subsists. Though such an advertisement was released in the year 2012, admittedly, the petition schedule R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 38 building is still owned by the landlords. The petitioner-tenant has absolutely no case that, the landlords made an attempt after 2012 to sell the petition schedule building. Due to financial stringency, on the spur of the moment, the landlords thought it wise to sell the petition schedule building. The release of such an advertisement by the landlords, after five years of institution of the Rent Control Petition and four years after the order of eviction by the Rent Control Court, is not of such a magnitude as to completely eclipse the bona fide need projected in the Rent Control Petition. The finding of the Appellate Authority to that effect is neither perverse nor patently illegal, warranting interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20 of the Act. 49. As per the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act, the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so. 50. In **Raghavan v. Govindan Nambiar [1995 (1) KLT 596]** a Division Bench of this Court, in the context of the R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 39 first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act, held that, in the absence of special reasons, the fact of the landlord having possession of another building as his own in the same town or village may tell upon his genuineness or his need. 51. In **Kunju T.P. v. Fathima [2014 (3) KHC 127]** a Division Bench of this Court held that the scope of the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act is to be understood in the context of the provisions in Section 11(3). A combined reading of the provision and the first proviso would indicate beyond doubt that it is only when it is established that the landlord has another building of his own in his possession for his occupation for the proposed need, he needs satisfy the Rent Control Court the special reasons for not occupying the said premises. In other words, to non-suit the landlord, the vacant building should be of such a character, which would meet the requirements of the landlord. Any other interpretation of the proviso would lead to absurdity and cannot be accepted. 52. In **Preman v. Gopi [2016 (1) KLT 441]** , in the context of the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act, a Division Bench of this Court held that the first proviso to Section 11(3) shows that the expressions 'city, town, village' R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 40 have been used in the general sense to indicate the rural and urban areas that constitute the different parts of the State. Therefore, it is sufficient that the other building in the ownership and possession of landlord is within the same village, town or city. The expression 'city and town' encompasses larger areas which would include panchayats also and therefore, it cannot be said that, panchayats would form a different area to which the first proviso would have no application. Even assuming that the use of the expression 'village' denotes the revenue village, the definition of a panchayat contained in Section 2(xxv) of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 puts the matter beyond any doubt. 53. In **Kunhamina K. v. V.K.T. Aboobacker Haji [2016 (3) KLJ 247]** a Division Bench of this Court held that even if the landlord did not disclose the availability of another building in his possession, if the materials were placed before the court and he had given special reasons for not occupying the same and both parties have adduced evidence on that aspect understanding the case each other, then no prejudice would be caused to the tenant. It is for the court to consider the suitability or otherwise of the building so as to deny R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 41 eviction on the ground of bona fide need. 54. In **Vinod v. K.K. Mujeeb [2018 (2) KHC 837]** a Division Bench of this Court held that if it is convincingly established by the tenant that the vacant room is available in the possession of the landlord, the landlord has to state special reason, why he has not chosen to occupy the said room for commencing the proposed business. Therefore, special reason shall come from the landlord. It is not the satisfaction of the landlord as to the reason that matters but the satisfaction of the Rent Control Court as to its sufficiency, that is decisive in the matter of granting the relief of eviction. 55. In **Dineshan Pillai P.B. v. Joseph @ Jose [2019 (3) KHC 206]** a Division Bench of this Court held that it is obligatory on the part of the tenant to plead and prove the identity of the vacant building in possession of the landlord. In the absence of specific pleadings, disclosing the identity of vacant building in the possession of the landlord, it can be said that the tenant has not discharged the initial burden of proof under the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. Paragraph 12 of that decision reads thus; “12. Coming to the second question, it is the case of the R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 42 respondent that the petitioner has several other vacant buildings of his own in his possession to start the proposed business. In view of the submission, we have gone through the counter statement filed by the respondent and we find that the pleadings are very vague with respect to the first proviso to S.11(3) of the Act. It is stated that the petitioner has several other buildings. No particular vacant room has been identified or pointed out in the pleadings. We are of the opinion that it is obligatory on the part of the tenant to plead and prove the identity of the vacant building in the possession of the landlord. In the absence of specific pleadings, disclosing the identity of the vacant building in the possession of the landlord, it can be said that the respondent/tenant has not discharged the initial burden of proof under the 1st Proviso to S.11(3) of the Act.” 56. In the instant case, the bona fide need projected in the Rent Control Petition is that of the 4[th] respondent herein to start bakery business, for which he wants both the petition schedule building and the next room on its southern side. The aforesaid rooms bearing Nos.VIII/384 and VIII/385 of Azheekode Grama Panchayath are having a length of 12 feet and width of 9.5 feet. The varandha in front of the petition schedule building is having a width of 5.5 feet, whereas that in front of the room on its southern side is having a width of only R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 43 1.9 feet. When the bona fide need projected in the Rent Control Petition is for starting bakery business utilising both the rooms, the fact that the landlords are in vacant possession of room bearing No.VIII/385 will not attract the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. 57. PW1 is admittedly conducting bakery business at Alavil, in Chirackal Grama Panchayath. Ext.B2 extract of building tax assessment register would show that there are 3 rooms in possession of the landlords at Alavil. PW1 has deposed that, out of the above 3 rooms, he is conducting bakery business in two rooms. One room is lying vacant. During cross-examination PW1 has categorically stated that he was conducting a restaurant at Alavil. Now he stopped that business and that room is lying vacant. According to PW1 petition schedule building is situated in Azheekode Grama Panchayath, 2 kms. away from Alavil. Since PW1 is admittedly conducting bakery in 2 rooms out of 3 rooms available at Alavil, it cannot be contended that the room presently lying vacant at Alavil is suitable for the need projected in R.C.P.No.161 of 2007, for seeking an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. Therefore, the fact that the landlords R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 44 are in possession of one vacant room adjacent to their bakery at Alavil, will not attract the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. Therefore, the finding of the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority that the first proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act has no application to the facts of the instant case cannot be said to be either perverse or patently illegal warranting interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20 of the Act. 58. As per the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act, the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business. 59. In **Ammeer Hamsa v. Ramabhadran and another [2019 (2) KHC 465]** a Division Bench of this Court held that, it is trite law that both limbs under the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act are conjunctive and the burden of proof is on the tenant. Thus, the legal position has been settled by a long R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 45 line of decisions and the courts below have rightly placed reliance upon those decisions. Vide: **Narayanan Nair v. Pachumma [1980 KLT 430]** , **Prasannan v. Haris [2005 (2) KLT 365]** , **Vineethan v. Fathima and others [2016 (1) KHC 631]** . In view of the legal position well settled by the aforesaid decisions, the landlord is not required to plead or prove other sources of income of the tenant. That apart, income is a fact which remains exclusively in the knowledge of each person only and another person cannot adduce evidence to prove income. Merely on the reason that the landlord has stated that the tenant has other sources of income and he is not mainly depending upon the income from the business carried on in the tenanted premises, for his livelihood and he failed to prove so, the tenant cannot escape from the burden of proof cast on him under the first limb of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. Where the statutory provision itself explicitly imposes the burden of proof on a party to the lis, there cannot be any variation whatever be the pleadings of the other party in that respect. The second proviso to Section 11(3) is an exception to the principal provision, granting protection to the tenant. When the second proviso itself R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 46 imposes the burden of proof on the tenant, the question whether the landlord has pleaded or proved the facts constituting the said proviso is insignificant and irrelevant. Even if the landlord pleaded so, the burden of proof will not be shifted to him. Since the second proviso to Section 11(3) is an exception to the principal provision, which would dis-entitle the landlord to get the order of eviction under Section 11(3), the burden of proof, under the said proviso is always on the tenant and unless the burden of proof under the second proviso is discharged satisfactorily, the tenant is not entitled to get protection under the said proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. 60. Insofar as the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act is concerned, the tenant produced Exts.B1(a) and B1(b), which are acknowledgments received from the Income Tax Department for filing tax returns. After considering the oral testimony of RW1 and Ext.B1 series of documents, the Rent Control Court and also the Appellate Authority found that the materials on record are not sufficient to arrive at a conclusion that the income derived from the petition schedule building is the main source of livelihood of the tenant. Other than Ext.B1 series, no materials were produced before the R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 47 Rent Control Court to prove the ingredients for the first limb of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. Insofar as the second limb of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act is concerned, the tenant as RW1 has admitted that the enquiry conducted by him as to the availability of other suitable rooms in the locality was confined within a radius of 200 meters from the petition schedule building. On the side of the landlords, Ext.B3 building tax assessment register maintained in Azheekode Grama Panchayat was produced, as per which a shop room is available in the name of the tenant. In the above circumstances, the Appellate Authority rightly found that, in the judgment dated 16.10.2018, the Rent Control Court rightly concluded that the tenant is not entitled to protection under the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act. 61. Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act deals with revision. As per sub-section (1) of Section 20, in cases, where the appellate authority empowered under Section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 48 under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. As per sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, the costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under sub-section (1) shall be in its discretion. 62. Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act deals with revision. As per sub-section (1) of Section 20, in cases, where the appellate authority empowered under Section 18 is a Subordinate Judge, the District Court, and in other cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit. As per sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, the costs of and incident to all proceedings before the High Court or District Court under sub-section (1) shall be in its discretion. R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 49 63. In **Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana [(1993) 1 SCC 499]** , the scope of revisional powers of the High Court under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 came up for consideration before the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court. While considering whether the High Court could have reappreciated entire evidence, the Apex Court held that, even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise, the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in re-appreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner's report. The High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the word ‘propriety’ it cannot mean - that there could be a re appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 50 ## 64. In **T. Sivasubramaniam v. Kasinath Pujari** **[(1999) 7 SCC 275]** the Apex Court held that, the words ‘to satisfy itself’ employed in Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 no doubt is a power of superintendence, and the High Court is not required to interfere with the finding of fact merely because the High Court is not in agreement with the findings of the courts below. It is also true that the power exercisable by the High Court under Section 25 of the Act is not an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the courts below. But where a finding arrived at by the courts below is based on no evidence, the High Court would be justified in interfering with such a finding recorded by the courts below. 65. In **Ubaiba v. Damodaran [(1999) 5 SCC 645]** the Apex Court considered the exercise of revisional power by the High Court, under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, in the context of an issue as to whether the relationship of landlord-tenant existed or not. It was urged that whether such relationship existed would be a jurisdictional fact. Relying on the decision in **Rukmini** R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 51 **Amma Saradamma** it was contended that, however wide the jurisdiction of the revisional court under Section 20 of the Act may be, it cannot have jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding upsetting the finding arrived at by the appellate authority. The Apex Court held that, though the revisional power under Section 20 of the Act may be wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 it cannot be equated even with the second appellate power conferred on the civil court under the Code. Therefore, notwithstanding the use of the expression ‘propriety’ in Section - 20 of the Act, the revisional court will not be entitled to re appreciate the evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of the conclusion of the appellate authority. On examining the impugned judgment of the High Court, in the light of the aforesaid ratio, the Apex Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by re-appreciating the evidence and in coming to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord-tenant did not exist. 66. In **Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh [(2014) 9 SCC 78]** a Five-Judge Bench of the Apex Court considered the revisional powers of the High R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 52 Court under Rent Acts operating in different States. After referring to the law laid down in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** the Apex Court reiterated that even the wider language of Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 does not enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. The Constitution Bench agreed with the view of the Three-Judge Bench in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** that the word ‘propriety’ does not confer power upon the High Court to re-appreciate evidence to come to a different conclusion, but its consideration of evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. 67. In **Thankamony Amma v. Omana Amma [AIR 2019 SC 3803 : 2019 (4) KHC 412]** considering the matter in the backdrop of law laid down in **Rukmini Amma Saradamma** , **Ubaiba** and **Dilbahar Singh** the Apex Court held that the findings rendered by the courts below were well supported by evidence on record and could not even be said to - be perverse in any way. The High Court could not have re appreciated the evidence and the concurrent findings rendered by the courts below ought not to have been interfered with by R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 53 ## the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction. 68. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, it cannot be said that the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court, which now stands confirmed by the Appellate Authority, is either perverse or patently illegal or it suffers from any legal infirmity warranting interference under Section 20 of the Act. Therefore, we find no reason to interfere with the order of eviction concurrently passed by the authorities below. 69. The learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant would submit that the tenant is aged 69 years. Considering the situation prevailing in the country on account of Covid-19 pandemic, the tenant may be given at least 6 months time to give vacant possession of the petition schedule building. 70. On the above request made by the learned counsel for the tenant, the learned counsel for the respondentslandlords would submit that a reasonable period of six months can be granted to the tenant for giving vacant possession of the petition schedule building, on condition that the tenant shall clear the entire dues towards arrears of rent and continue to pay the monthly rent for the remaining period, without any R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 54 default. 71. The learned counsel for the tenant would submit that the tenant is prepared to clear the entire dues towards arrears of rent, within a time limit that may be fixed by this Court and he shall continue to pay the monthly rent for the remaining period, without any default, till he gives vacant possession of the petition schedule building to the landlords. In such circumstances, this Rent Control Revision Petition is dismissed declining interference on the impugned order of the Rent Control Court and the impugned judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority; however by granting six months time to the petitioner-tenant, to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule building to the respondents-landlords, considering the situation prevailing in the Country on account of COVID-19 pandemic, subject to the following conditions: - (i) The respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition shall file an affidavit before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, expressing an unconditional undertaking that he will surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule building to the R.C.R.No.208 of 2013 55 petitioners-landlords within six months from the date of this order and that, he shall not induct third parties into possession of the petition schedule rooms; - (ii) The respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition shall deposit the entire arrears of rent as on date, if any, before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within four weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, and shall continue to pay rent for every succeeding month, without any default; - (iii) Needless to say that, in the event of the respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition failing to comply with any one of the conditions stated above, the time limit granted by this order to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule building will stand cancelled automatically and the petitioners-landlords will be at liberty to proceed with the execution of the order of eviction. **Sd/ANIL K. NARENDRAN JUDGE** **Sd/M.R. ANITHA JUDGE** yd