High CourtDivision BenchAppeal allowed; eviction order set aside; parti...

Mohan Lal v. Jai Bhagwan

Case / Petition Number:Civil Appeal No. 50 of 1988
Neutral Citation:1988 SCR 345

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • Sabyasachi Mukharji
  • S. Rangnathan
Judgment Date
1988-03-23
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal allowed. Eviction order set aside. Parties to bear their own costs.
Final Disposition
Appeal allowed; eviction order set aside; parties to bear their own costs.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Mohan Lal

Respondents

  • Jai Bhagwan

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Dr. Meera Aggarwal

Counsels for Respondents

  • • A.B. Rohtagi
  • • Mukul Rohtagi
  • • Atul Tewari
  • • Ms. Bina A Gupta

Case Synopsis & Summary

The appellant, Mohan Lal,tenant, rented premises from the respondent, Jai Bhagwan, in 1975 for Rs.120 per month and executed a rent note providing that the tenant would run the business of English Liquor Vend and sale of liquor in the shop. In March 1979, the liquor licence was not renewed, forcing the tenant to discontinue liquor vending and to run a general merchandise business instead. The landlord filed a petition under section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973, alleging arrears of rent for 1 April 1979 to 31 August 1979 and a change of user from liquor vend to general merchandise. The Rent Controller held that the tenant had changed the user and was liable for eviction. The Appellate Authority and the Punjab & Haryana High Court dismissed the Civil Revision, upholding eviction. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the “business purposes” must be judged in light of the Act’s aim to control eviction; given the expanding concept of business (including departmental stores), the shift from liquor vend to general merchandise did not amount to a change of user under section 13(2)(ii)(b). The Court distinguished Sikander Lal but read it with reservation and found Maharaj Kishan Kesar not applicable here, while invoking Duport Steels to emphasize purposive interpretation. Consequently, the eviction order was set aside and the appeal allowed.

Provisions of Law Cited

Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973, Section 13(2)(ii)(b)East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, Section 13(2)(ii)(b) (as cited in Sikander Lal v. Amrit Lal)

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Meaning must be found in the felt necessities of time (purposive/statutory interpretation)
  • Separation of powers (Parliamentary supremacy and judiciary)
  • Parliament legislates to remedy lacunae; judiciary interprets accordingly (textual interpretation guided by legislative intent)

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The tenant contended that after March 1979 the liquor licence was not renewed, forcing discontinuance of liquor-vend and commencement of general merchandise business. There is no clause in the rent note prohibiting a change of business, and the purpose of user remained commercial; the change did not constitute a ‘change of user’ under Section 13(2)(ii)(b). The licence non-renewal and continued business use do not impair utility or cause nuisance; the expanded concept of retail business does not fit mischief of the statute.

Contentions of Respondents

The landlord submitted that the change from liquor vending to general merchandise was a change of user and thus attracts eviction under Section 13(2)(ii)(b). The Rent Controller and courts below rejected this; the Tenant’s switch to a different business was not allied to the original purpose and would cause mischief under the Act; reliance on earlier Full Bench opinions was appropriate.

Cited Precedents (3)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Sikander Lal v. Amrit Lal[1984] Punjab Law Reporter 1Partly Overruled / LimitedThe Court notes the Punjab & Haryana High Court’s reliance on this Full Bench decision but states it must be read with reservation and is not controlling for the present case.
Maharaj Kishan Kesar v. Milkha Singh and othersCivil Appeal No. 1086 of 1964DistinguishedThe Court indicates that there is nothing in this decision which would assist the respondent in the present case and rejects its applicability to the facts.
Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs and others[1980] 1 All E.R. 529PositiveCited to emphasize purposive interpretation and the duty of judiciary to interpret legislation in light of the felt necessities of time.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

MOHAN LAL _v._ JAI BHAGWAN MARCH 23, 1988 [SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND S. RANGANA1HAN, JJ.] _Haryana_ _Urban_ _(Control_ _of Rent_ _&_ _Eviction) Act,_ _1973_ _Section_ _13(2)(ii)(b)-Tenant-Eviction of-Use of building for purpose other_ _than for which leased._ _Landlord-Renting out shop-Tenant-To run business of Eng-_ _lish Liquor_ _Vend-Do_ _sale_ _of liquor-Liquor licence not renewed-_ _Tenant doing business_ _of general merchandise-Whether change in_ _user._ _A_ B c _Statutory Interpretation: Statutes-Words and expressions-_ _Meaning must be found in ·the felt necessities of the time._ D The appeUant-tenant took on rent the suit premises from the respondent-landlord on a monthly rent of Rs.120 and executed a rent note in bis favour on 19th April, 1975. Clause 4 of the rent note provided that the tenant was to run the 'business of English Liquor Vend, and do sale of liquor in the shop.' The respondent filed a petition for eviction under section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973 against the appellant on the ground of arrears of rent from 1st April, 1979 to 3 Ist August, 1979 and change of user from liquor vend business to that of general merchandise. The appellant tendered the entire arrears of rent at the first date of hearing, and contested the eviction petition by filing a written statement contending that after March, 1979 the licence of liquor-vend in_ his favour was not renewed, and he had to dtscontinue that business at the suit premises, and had to start the business of general merchandise. It was, further, contended that the purpose of user still . remained commercial and that there was no clause in the· rent note prohibiting the appellant to change to any other business. . E F G The Rent Controller held that the appeUant had changed the user of the shop iii dispute and that be was liable for eviction under the Act. H 345 A B c D t. 346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 3 S.C.R. The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal. The High Court also dismissed the Civil Revision and upheld the order of eviction. Allowing the Appeal, this Court, HELD: 1. The business purposes must be adjudged in the light of the purposes of the Rent Act in question which is to control the eviction of tenants therefrom. [349C] 2. In the expanding concept of business now-a-days and the growing concept of departmental stores, it cannot be said that there was any change of user in the instant case, when the tenant converted the use of the building from liquor vend business to that of general merchandise. The building was rented for the purpose of carrying on a busin!!SS. It was used for another business which would not in any way impair the utility or damage to the building, and the business could be conveniently carried on in the said preinises. No nuisance was also created. The case would, therefore, not attract the mischief of s. 13(2)(ii)(b). [3490, 350E] 3. So far as the High Court of Punjab and Haryana held in the Full Bench decision in _Sikander Lal_ v. _Amrit Lal,_ (1984 Punjab Law Reporter 1) that allied business would not amount to change of user but for a business which is not allied for the business for which it was let }-· E out would amount to change of user come within the mischief of clause (b) of section 13(2)(ii) of the Act, the same must be .read with reserva· lion. [348H, 349A] F 4. When Parliament legislates to remedy a defect or a lacuna in the existing law, and the judiciary interprets them, it has to be borne in mind that the meaning of an expression must be found in the felt neces· sities of time. [349G-H, 350C·DI _Duport Steels Ltd._ & _others_ v. _Sirs and others,_ [1980) 1 AII.E.R. 529 at 541, referred to. G CIVIL APPELLA1E JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 50 of 1988. ~ From the Judgment and Order dated 14.8.87 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Civil Revision No. 2836 of 1982. H Dr. Meera Aggarwal for the Petitioner. MOHAN LAL _v._ JAi BHAGWAN IMUKHARJI, J.] 347 A.B. Rohtagi, Mukul Rohtagi, Atul Tewari and Ms. Bina A Gupta for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and B Haryana dated 14th August, 1987. The appellant took on rent the premises in dispute from the respondent at a monthly rent of Rs.120 and executed a rent note in his favour on 19th April, 1975. Clause 4 of the said rent note proVided, _inter alia,_ as follows: "That the tenant will run the business of English Liquor Vend in the shop-will do sale ofLiquor." C The landlord, respondent herein filed a petition under section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & EViction) Act, 1973 (hereinafter called 'the Act') against the appellant on the ground of arrears of rent from 1.4.1979 to 31.8.1979 and change of user from Liquor Vend business to that of general merchandise at the shop iu dispute by the appellant. The appellant tendered the entire arrears of rent at the first date of hearing and thereafter he contested by filing written statement. The appellant submitted that after March, 1979, the licence of liquor-vend E in his favour was not renewed and he had to discontinue thatbusine.ss of liq nor-vend at the shop in dispute and had to start the business of general merchandise. According to the appellant the purpose of the user still remains commercial and that in the rent note there was no clause prohibiting the appellant to change any other business in the shop in dispute. F The Rent Controller held that the appellant had changed the user of the shop in dispute and he was liable for eViction under the Act. There was an appeal to the Appellate Authority and the Appellate Authority dismissed the said appeal. The appellant went in ciVil reVision to the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The High Court dis- G __J._ missed the ciVil revision and upheld the eViction. Hence this appeal. The question is, whether a ground for eViction was made out under clause (b) of section 13(2)(ii) of the Act. The said Act was passed _to control_ the increase of rent of certain buildings and rented land situated within the limits of urban areas, and the eViction of the H 348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 3 S.C.R. A tenants therefrom. Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act reads as follows: "13(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller, for direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application is satisfied: B (i) xx xx xx (ii) that the tenant has after commencement of 1949 Act, without the written consent of the landlord c D E F G H (a) XX xx xx (b) used the building or rented land for a purpose other than that for which it was leased." The High Court of Punjab and Haryana has relied on a Full Bench decision of the said High Court in _Sikander Lal_ v. _Amrit Lal,_ [1984] Punjab Law Reporter 1. That was a case under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act of 1949. The Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the facts and circumstances of that case held that it was a common ground that the premises was originally leased for the business of handlooms. Thereafter it was used for small carding machine not occupying a space of more than 4 feet x 4 feet which converted cloth into thread. It was held that there was no change of user. The Full Bench, however, observed that it emerged from the long line of authorities that where the subsequent use of the premises is merely ancillary to the specific original purpose then it would imply no change of user within the meaning of the statute. If by custom or convention or on the finding of the Court it could be held that the added use of the premises was apcillary to the main original purpose then in the eye of law it would be deemed to have been within the terms of the original lease. It was further held that both on principle and on binding precedent it emerged that the specified original purpose could not be, according to the Full Bench, extended by adding to it any and every purpose thereto, and the same must be confined within the limitation of being either a part or parcel of, or ancillary to, the original purpose. There the Court was concerned with section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act which is an identical provision as the present one. So far as the High Court held in that case that allied business would not amount to change of user but for a business which is not allied for the business for which it was let out would amount to change ).- I( I I ~ ##### __l~ ~ ## ###### # MOHAN LAL _v._ JAi BHAGWAN [MUKHARJI. J.] 349 of user come within the mischief of clause (b) of sectiion 13(2)(ii) of the Act, the same must be read with reservation. Our attention was drawn to a decision of this Court in _Maharaj_ _Kishan Kesar_ v. _Milkha Singh and others,_ (Civil Appeal No. 1086 of 1964 decided on 10th of November, 1965. That was a decision under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. There on the facts the Court found that selling petrol was an allied business of the workshop and as such it is a part of the business. The Court held that there is no evidence to show that in the trade a petrol pump is not regarded as a part of motor workshop business. The sale of petrol is an allied business and would not amount to conversion to a different business or change of user. There is nothing in the said decision which would give any assistance to the respondent in this case. The business purposes must be adjudged in the light of the purposes of the Rent Act in question which is to control the eviction of tenants therefrom. In the expanding concept of business now-a-days and the growing concept of departmental stores, we are of the opinion that it cannot be said that there was any change· of user in the facts of this case which would attract.the mischief of the provisions of section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act. The building was rented for purpose of carrying .on a business, using it for another business, it will not in any way impair the utility or damage the building and this business can tie conveniently carried on in the said premises. There was no nuisance created. Our attention was drawn to the observations of Lord Diplock in _Duport Steels Ltd. and others_ v. _Sirs and others,_ [1980) 1 All.E.R. 529 at 541. That was a decision in respect of the Trade Disputes Act 1906. Lord Diplock said: "My Lords, at a time when more and more cases involving F the application of legislation which gives effect to policies that are the subject of bitter public and parliamentary controversy, it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the . British Constitution, though largely unwritten, is firmly · based on the separation of powers.: Parliament makes the laws, the judiciary interpret them."·Wben Parliament legis- G !ates to remedy what the majority of its members at the time perceive to be a defect or a lacuna in the existing law (whether it be the written law enacted by existing statutes or the unwritten common law as it-has been expounded by the judges in decided cases), the 'role of the judiciary is confined to ascertaining from the words that Parliament H A B c D E 350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 3 S.C.R. has approved as expressing its intention what that intention was, and to giving effect to it. Where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is not for the judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect to its plain meaning because they themselves consider that the consequences of doing so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral. In controversial matters such as are involved in industrial relations there is room for differences of opinion as to what is expedient, what is just and what is morally justifiable. Under our constitution it is Parliament's opinion on these matters that is **paramount."** A B c While respectfully agreeing with the said observations of Lord Diplock, that the Parliament legislates to remedy and the judiciary interpret them, it has to be borne in mind that the meaning of the expression must be found in the felt necessities of time. In the backD ground of the purpose of rent legislation and inasmuch as in the instant case the change of the user would not cause any mischief or detriment or impairment of the shop in question and in one sense could be called an allied business in the expanding concept of departmental stores, in· our opinion, in this case there was no change of user which attract the mischief of section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act. The High Court, therefore, was in error. E In that view of the matter this appeal is allowed· and the order of eviction is set aside. The parties will pay and bear their own costs. N.V.K. Appeal allowed. ### • ####