Mohammed Haneefa v. The State of Kerala

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** **PRESENT:** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.BHAVADASAN** ## **TUESDAY, THE 9TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2012/17TH ASWINA 1934** ## **Bail Appl..No. 6961 of 2012 ()** **-----------------------------CRIME NO.549/2011 OF VARAPUZHA POLICE STATION, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT** **--------------------------------** **PETITIONER/ACCUSED: -------------------------------------** **MOHAMMED HANEEFA,AGED 33 YEARS, S/O LATE K.M. MOIDU, RESIDING AT ''RAHATH'', KOTTIKULAM, P.O. BEKAL, KASARAGOD DISTRICT** **BY SRI.M.K.DAMODARAN,SENIOR ADVOCATE ADV.SRI.JAWAHAR JOSE** **RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT: -----------------------------------------------** **THE STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM -682 031** **BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SMT.KOCHUMOL KODUVATH** **THIS BAIL APPLICATION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 25-09-2012, THE COURT ON 09-10-2012 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:** **sts** ## **P. BHAVADASAN, J.** - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - B.A. No. 6961 of 2012 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Dated this the 9[th] day of October, 2012. ## **ORDER** Undaunted by the dismissal of the three earlier applications, the petitioner has moved this court for the fourth time seeking anticipatory bail. First among them was B.A. 9108 of 2011 which was dismissed by order dated 22.11.2011, wherein a direction was issued to the petitioner to surrender before the Investigating Officer, who after interrogation was directed to produce the petitioner before the Magistrate concerned, so as to enable the petitioner to apply for regular bail, which the learned Magistrate was directed to dispose of as far as possible on the same date with due notice given to the Assistant Public Prosecutor. The petitioner did not comply with the said order. He thereafter filed B.A.10844 of 2011 which was dismissed by order dated 24.1.2012, wherein, after noticing the facts and B.A.6961/2012. 2 contentions raised by the learned Public Prosecutor, this court found that for several reasons made mention of in the order, it will not be appropriate to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner. It was also observed that the petitioner was at liberty to surrender before the Investigating Officer or the Magistrate concerned and move for bail. Observing so, the petition was dismissed. He did not comply with that order also. Instead, he filed B.A. 3869 of 2012 which this court, by an elaborate order, after referring to the entire contentions raised by the petitioner and the objections raised by the learned Public Prosecutor, dismissed the same by taking note of the gravity of the offence, the possibility of the accused fleeing from justice and the likelihood of the petitioner indulging in similar offences and also the possibility of the petitioner threatening the witnesses and tampering with the evidence. 2. The facts of the case and the involvement of the petitioner have been very succinctly referred to in the B.A.6961/2012. 3 order dated 15.6.2012, while dismissing B.A. 3869 of 2012. It is therefore unnecessary to tread that path again. This court. while disposing of the said application, took note of the allegations in the earlier applications and found that the allegations in B.A.3869 of 2012 were substantially the same, and the fact that there was no change of circumstance pointed out weighed among the several other reasons with this court to dismiss the application. 3. However, while disposing of B.A. 3869 of 2012, this court observed that one of the contentions raised by the petitioner was that the car, in which the girl is said to have been transported to Kanhangad, was at the relevant time in the garage and if so, the petitioner could have produced some documents in support of the same and in the absence of any document to that effect, the said contention cannot be countenanced. Drawing inspiration from the said observation, the petitioner has now sought to produce Annexures D and E documents, which, according to him, B.A.6961/2012. 4 would sufficiently show that the vehicle was garaged at the relevant time and that would be sufficient to expose the falsity of the prosecution claim as against the petitioner. The petitioner has, in addition to the contentions raised in the earlier applications, also sought to produce Annexure F document, which, according to the petitioner, shows that the victim in this case had attended college from 28[th] June, 2011 to 3[rd] August, 2011, and that is sufficient to show that as on the date of the alleged incident, she was attending the college and therefore, that also makes the prosecution version as against the petitioner extremely vulnerable. 4. To understand the above contentions, a few facts are necessary. The victim in this case was initially arrested along with two other persons and was booked for the offences under the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act. As investigation progressed, shocking informations came to light and thereafter, various other offences were added and several persons were arrayed as accused persons. The B.A.6961/2012. 5 allegation against the petitioner is that he, in the last week of July, 2011, had sexually assaulted the victim and thereby he was also liable to be arrayed as an accused. In fact, his rank is shown as the 52[nd] accused in the case. 5. The attempt of the petitioner, in this proceedings, is to show that the car, in which he is said to have travelled at the relevant date, i.e., in the last week of July, was actually garaged for repair work and therefore, the allegation against him of having made use of the car to take the girl cannot be accepted. It is significant to notice here that the wife of the petitioner had moved for release of the vehicle from the court concerned. Infact, the vehicle belonged to the wife of the petitioner. The other attempt, as already mentioned, is to show that the girl was attending college during the period from 28.3.2011 to 3.8.2011 and therefore, the allegation that the petitioner had sexually assaulted the girl in the last week of July, 2011 cannot be true. B.A.6961/2012. 6 6. Several other contentions are also taken by the petitioner. All those contentions had been raised on the earlier occasions and found to be unacceptable by this court. Contentions like, if as a matter of fact the allegations against the petitioner are true, that would have found a place in the first statement taken from the victim on 4.8.2011, the statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. later and also the subsequent statements to police, and the absence of mention about the petitioner in any of those statements, except the one taken long after the confession statement made by accused No.35, wherein, for the first time, the involvement of the petitioner was revealed, were considered in detail by this court in various bail applications filed by the petitioner for the very same purpose and were rejected. Those contentions, therefore, do not merit re-consideration at all. 7. In support of his contention that even if earlier applications for the same relief have been rejected, this B.A.6961/2012. 7 court is competent and is infact duty bound to consider the latter application on merits, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner relied on the following decisions: (i) The unreported decision dated 20.1.2004 of this court in **B.A.154 of 2004** where even after three earlier applications for anticipatory bail were rejected, this court, on the fourth occasion, taking note of the circumstances, granted anticipatory bail. (ii) The decision reported in **Laxman Irappa Hatti v. State of Mahrashtra** (2004 Cri.L.J. 3802), wherein an earlier application for bail was rejected. But a subsequent application for bail, after charge sheet has been filed, was found entertainable, but the High Court concerned relegated the party to the court where trial was to take place for bail. (iii) The decision reported in **Babu Singh v. State of U.P.** ((1978) 1 SCC 579), wherein the Apex Court held that the second application, after the former has been B.A.6961/2012. 8 rejected on the basis that more materials become later available, and that entitles the accused to prefer a second application. (iv) The decision reported **Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra** ((2011) 1 SCC 694) has been relied on for the proposition that the application for anticipatory bail will have to be considered in the light of Articles 19, 21 and 22 of the Constitution and also for the proposition that arrest is not a matter of course, but an act to be exercised after evaluating materials available. Emphasis was laid on the observation by the Apex Court about the scope and ambit of the provision for anticipatory bail and the duty of the courts which are conferred with such extraordinary power in considering such applications. (v) The decision reported in **Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab** ((1980) 2 SCC 565) for the proposition that freedom of the individual is of B.A.6961/2012. 9 paramount consideration and also that a person is willing to submit to restraints on his freedom by acceptance of conditions which the court may think it fit to impose in consideration of the assurance that if he is arrested, he shall be enlarged on bail. 8. Learned Public Prosecutor very vehemently opposed the anticipatory bail application. It was pointed out that the two documents now produced by the petitioner cannot be relied on for the purpose of considering whether the petitioner is entitled to anticipatory bail. These documents and these facts were within the knowledge of the petitioner even when the earlier applications were filed, and taking aid of the observations made by this court on the last occasion, the documents have been procured for the purpose of this case. At this point of time, according to the learned Public Prosecutor, the question of considering the defence documents do not arise for consideration at all. Referring to the order dated 15.6.2012 in B.A. 3869 of 2012, B.A.6961/2012. 10 learned Public Prosecutor contended that this court had considered the entire matter in considerable detail, and was apprehensive of the availability of the petitioner for investigation, the chance of the petitioner fleeing from justice and the likelihood of the petitioner involving in similar offences, the possibility of influencing the witnesses weighed with this court, and it was under those circumstances, the petition was rejected on the last occasion. None of those circumstances, which weighed with this court to decline pre-arrest bail to the petitioner, has ceased to exist and it is significant to notice, according to the learned Public Prosecutor, that inspite of repeated directions by this court to surrender before the Investigating Officer or the JFCM concerned, the petitioner has shown little regard for those directions indicating his disinclination to obey the law and in such circumstances, the petitioner does not deserve any sympathy and the petition is only to be dismissed. B.A.6961/2012. 11 9. After having gone through the petition, and hearing the petitioner's counsel and the learned Public Prosecutor, this court finds considerable force in the submission made by the learned Public Prosecutor. Almost all the contentions now raised were considered on earlier occasions and they did not find favour with this court and this court found it to be a case inappropriate to grant pre-arrest bail to the petitioner. Several factors which have been referred to by the learned Public Prosecutor and which are referred to in the earlier paragraphs weighed with this court in declining anticipatory bail to the petitioner. 10. True, the petitioner has produced Annexures D, E and F in support of his contentions with regard to pre-arrest bail in this petition. The claim that the vehicle involved was garaged at the relevant time was a plea taken in B.A. 3869 of 2012, and it did not find favour with the court then. Of course, the court observed that, if as a matter of fact it was so, some documents could have been B.A.6961/2012. 12 produced. It was the said fact, which made the petitioner to obtain documents in respect of the said fact, and seek pre-arrest bail. Annexure F, of course, has been produced for the first time before this court. But, as rightly pointed out by the learned Public Prosecutor, the authenticity etc. of Annexures D, E and F do not arise for consideration now. It has been held that even at the time of framing the charge, the court need not necessarily look into the documents produced by defence for, even at that time the courts are to be primarily governed by the materials collected by the prosecution against the accused. Moreover, all these documents could have been produced by the petitioner on the earlier occasions and the piecemeal production of documents to claim pre-arrest bail cannot be appreciated. 11. Much was argued about the age of the victim. According to the petitioner, the date of birth of the girl is 25.5.2005, if so as on the date of assault, i.e. 4.8.2011, the victim is above 16 years, and is not a minor. Any act on the B.A.6961/2012. 13 victim after she attained 16 years must be treated to be voluntary and if that be so, even if the allegations against the petitioner are taken as true, i.e., he sexually assaulted the victim in the last week of July, 2011, no offence of rape can be attributed to the petitioner. 12. The arguments may look attractive. But the word 'consent' contained in Section 90 has been considered in a number of decisions of both High Courts and Apex Court. The consent must be free, i.e., it must not be consent obtained by coercion, threat, fraud or misrepresentation. In case of rape, one has to appreciate the position in which the victim is placed. In the case on hand, the victim was thrown into sex trade while she was 15 years of age and she was forced to subjected to torments by none other than her mother and her own sister. Later, another lady purchased her and utilized her. The victim had little choice and the consequences of resistance would have been disastrous. In such a situation, she might have B.A.6961/2012. 14 submitted meekly or was passive does not mean there was consent. 13. As already noticed, his claim with regard to the absence of mentioning the name the petitioner in the FIS and the various earlier statements given by the victim etc., do not merit consideration in view of the fact that those aspects have already been considered by this court while considering the earlier bail applications. 14. What is significant is the order dated 15.6.2012 in B.A. No.3869 of 2012, while this court, after taking note of the entire facts and circumstances of the case, refused to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner observing that the case was of grave and serious nature. This court found several reasons to decline relief to the petitioner. 15. As rightly pointed out by the learned Public Prosecutor, the petitioner has shown little regard to the directions issued by this court, and has chosen to keep away B.A.6961/2012. 15 from justice and law. On the first occasion, the petitioner was directed to surrender before the Investigating Officer, which he did not do. While disposing of the second bail application, this court observed that the petitioner may either surrender before the Investigating Officer or before the JFCM court concerned, and that also was not complied with. On the third occasion, though no direction was given, this court had observed that the act of the petitioner in keeping away from law is a fact to be taken note of while considering whether the petitioner is entitled to pre-arrest bail. 16. The involvement of the petitioner, it appears from the records, was revealed for the first time in the statement given by accused No.35, who was arrested on 10.10.2011. The learned Public Prosecutor also pointed out that subsequently when the statement of the victim was taken, the involvement of the petitioner was clearly revealed. It is therefore clear that only after 10.10.2011, 16 B.A.6961/2012. after accused No.35 was apprehended, petitioner's involvement had come to light. One may recall here that the first of the pre-arrest bail applications filed by the petitioner was dismissed by order dated 22.11.2011. Almost one year has elapsed since then. It is surprising to note that the Investigating Officer has not taken any steps to have the petitioner arrested even after he had flouted the directions of this court. As rightly noticed by this court while disposing of B.A. 3869 of 2012 on 15.6.2012, it shows the clout and influence possessed by the petitioner and his ability to keep the law at bay. 17. Coming to the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, one can have no quarrel with the propositions laid down in those cases. It is well settled that dismissal of a bail application neither precludes the petitioner from filing a subsequent application for the very same purpose, nor is it a ground to summarily reject the latter application. B.A.6961/2012. 17 18. In **P. Kumaran's case** (supra) this court considered an application after three earlier applications were dismissed. This court highlighted the circumstances under which the fourth application was entertained and also observed that the right of the accused to have a fair and just investigation and right to speed and early trial. This court in that case had occasion to take note of the fact that inspite of the dismissal of the earlier bail applications, the investigating agency did not do anything to arrest the petitioner, the accused in that case. 19. In **Laxman Irappa Hatti's case** (supra), it was held as follows: _“The powers conferred upon the Sessions Judge or the High Court under Section 439 Cr.P.C. are wide enough to grant bail. There is no hard and fast rule and no inflexible principle governing the exercise of the discretion conferred by Section 439 and that the only principle which was established was that the discretion should be exercised judiciously. The dominant criteria is_ B.A.6961/2012. 18 _whether there is any change of circumstance and the change should be substantial and not merely cosmetic........”_ 20. In **Babu Singh's case** (supra), it was held as follows: _“.... But an order refusing an application for bail does not necessarily preclude another, on a later occasion, giving more materials, further developments and different considerations. While we surely must set store by this circumstance, we cannot accede to the faint plea that we are barred from second consideration at a later stage. An interim direction is not a conclusive adjudication, and updated reconsideration is not over-turning an earlier negation. In this view, we entert_ ain the application and evaluate the merits pro and con.” In the said decision, it was also held as follows: _“9. The doctrine of Police Power, constitutionally validates punitive processes for the maintenance of public order, security of the State, national integrity and the interest of the public generally. Even so, having regard to the_ B.A.6961/2012. 19 _solemn issue involved, deprivation of personal freedom, ephemeral or enduring, must be founded on the most serious considerations relevant to the welfare objectives of society specified in the Constitution._ _10. What, then, is 'judicial discretion' in this bail context? In the elegant words of Benjamin Cardozo,_ _"The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to 'the primordial necessity of order in the social life'. Wide enough in all conscience is the field of discretion that remains."_ _Even so it is useful to notice the tart terms of Lord Camden that_ _"the discretion of a judge is the law of tyrants: it is_ B.A.6961/2012. 20 _always unknown, it is different in different men; it is casual, and depends upon constitution, temper and passion. In the best it is oftentimes caprice; in the worst it is every vice folly and passion to which human nature is liable . . . . ."_ _11. Some jurists have regarded the term 'judicial discretion' as a misnomer. Nevertheless, the vesting of discretion is the unspoken but inescapable silent command of our judicial system, and those who exercise it will remember that:_ _"discretion, when applied to a court of justice, means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humor; it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular."_ _"An appeal to a judge's discretion is an appeal to his judicial conscience. The discretion must be exercised, not in opposition to, but in accordance with, established principles of law."_ _(Judicial discretion, (ibid) p. 33)_ _12. Having grasped the core concept of judicial discretion and the constitutional perspective in which the court must operate public_ B.A.6961/2012. 21 _policy by a restraint on liberty, we have to proceed to see what are the relevant criteria for grant or refusal of bail in the case of a person who has either been convicted and has appealed or one whose conviction has been set aside but leave has been granted by this Court to appeal against the acquittal. What is often forgotten, and therefore warrants reminder, is the object to keep a person in judicial custody pending trial or disposal of an appeal Lord Russel, C. J. said :_ _"I observe that in this case bail was refused for the prisoner. It cannot be too strongly impressed on the magistracy of the country that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment, but that the requirements as to bail are merely to secure the attendance of the prisoner at trial."_ _This theme was developed by Lord Russel of Killowen C. J., when he charged the grand jury at Salisbury Assizes, 1899;_ _"... it was the duty of magistrates to admit accused persons to bail, wherever practicable, unless there were strong grounds for supposing that such persons would not appear to take their trial. It was not the poorer classes who did not_ B.A.6961/2012. 22 _appear, for their circumstances were such as to tie them to the place where they carried on their work. They had not the golden wings with which to fly from justice."_ _In Archbold it is stated that:_ _"The proper test of whether bail should be granted or refused is whether it is probable that the defendant will appear to take his trial ....._ _The test should be applied by reference to the following considerations :_ _(1) The nature of the accusation ....._ _(2) The nature of the evidence in support of the accusation ...._ _(3) The severity of the punishment which conviction will entail....._ _(4) Whether the sureties are independent, or indemnified by the accused person ...._ _Perhaps, this is an overly simplistic statement and we must remember the constitutional focus in Arts. 21 and 19 before following diffuse observations and practices the English system. Even in England there is a growing awareness that the working of the bail system requires a second look from the point of view of correct legal criteria_ B.A.6961/2012. 23 _and sound principles, as has been pointed out by Dr. Bottomley.”_ ## 21. In **Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre's cas** e (supra) the Apex Court traced the history, object, purpose and the reason for introduction of the provision for anticipatory bail in Cr.P.C. In that decision, in paragraphs 86, 88, 89 of the said decision the report of the National Police Commission, the power of arrest which was being grossly misused, the need to thoroughly examine the complaint filed against the accused, the gravity of the charge and the exact role of the accused and the need to record valid reasons which led to the arrest of the accused in the case diary and the duty of the courts to carefully and meticulously evaluate the facts of the case and also the exercise of the discretionary power have been discussed. In paragraphs 118 and 119 of the said decision, it was held as follows: B.A.6961/2012. 24 _“118. In case the arrest is imperative, according to the facts of the case, in that event, the arresting officer must clearly record the reasons for the arrest of the accused before the arrest in the case diary, but in exceptional cases where it becomes imperative to arrest the accused immediately, the reasons be recorded in the case diary immediately after the arrest is made without loss of any time so that the court has an opportunity to properly consider the case for grant or refusal of bail in the light of reasons recorded by the arresting officer._ _119. Exercise of jurisdiction under section 438 of Cr.P.C. is extremely important judicial function of a Judge and must be entrusted to judicial officers with some experience and good track record. Both individual and society have vital interest in orders passed by the courts in anticipatory bail applications.”_ A word of caution was struck by the Apex Court in paragraph 126 of the decision which reads as follows: _“126. We deem it appropriate to reiterate and assert that discretion vested in the court in all_ B.A.6961/2012. 25 _matters should be exercised with care and circumspection depending upon the facts and circumstances justifying its exercise. Similarly, the discretion vested with the court under section 438, Cr.P.C. should also be exercised with caution and prudence. It is unnecessary to travel beyond it and subject to the wide power and discretion conferred by the legislature to a rigorous code of selfimposed limitations.”_ ## 22. In **Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia's case** (supra), it ## was held as follows: _“33. We would, therefore, prefer to leave the High Court and the Court of Session to exercise their jurisdiction under S. 438 by a wise and careful use of their discretion which by their long training and experience they are ideally suited to do. The ends of justice will be better served by trusting these courts to act objectively and in consonance with principles governing the grant of bail which are recognised over the years, than by divesting, them of their discretion which the legislature has conferred upon them, by laying down inflexible rules of general application. It is_ B.A.6961/2012. 26 _customary, almost chronic, to take a statute as one finds it on the ground that, after all. "the legislature in its wisdom" has thought it fit to use a particular expression. A convention may usefully grow whereby the High Court and the Court of Session may be trusted to exercise their discretionary powers in their wisdom, especially when the discretion is entrusted in their care by the legislature in its wisdom. if they err, they are liable to be corrected.”_ In paragraphs 35, 36, 37 and 38, the Apex Court discussed the various aspects that need to be considered while considering the application for anticipatory bail. 23. On a careful reading of the above decisions, the following propositions emerge: (i) Right to life and liberty guaranteed by the Constitution are unalienable and are sacrosanct and need to be protected. (ii) Mere fact that the earlier application or applications for anticipatory bail or regular bail have B.A.6961/2012. 27 been rejected is not a ground to reject the subsequent application, if change of circumstances are shown. (iii) The power under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is very wide and discretionary, that discretion should be exercised on sound judicial principle and on justifiable reasons. (iv) Arrest is not a matter of course. Several factors like the nature of the offence, the gravity of the offence, role of the accused, the materials available against the accused, the necessity for custodial interrogation, chances of accused fleeing from law, the possibility of impeding investigation will have to be considered. 24. Certain other propositions are also well established. They are: - (a) The power under Section 438 Cr.P.C. being an - extraordinary remedy, it will be resorted to only in exceptional and special circumstances. B.A.6961/2012. 28 (b) When the offence attributed is punishable with life imprisonment or death, and is of grave and serious nature, unless the court is satisfied at the time investigation itself that the charges or allegations are groundless or are made with oblique motive. (c) The court should remember that granting of anticipatory bail can have considerable impact on the smooth and impartial investigation. (d) Mere delay in collecting materials or some of the materials collected are not convincing enough by themselves are not grounds to grant anticipatory bail. (e) The position of the person cannot be better before arrest than after arrest. (f) Several factors which have an impact or bearing on the issue including the social impact, interest of the public, the possible consequences of granting anticipatory bail and the possibility of the accused fleeing from justice are all significant and B.A.6961/2012. **==> picture [13 x 9] intentionally omitted <==** important considerations while dealing with an application for anticipatory bail. (g) The tendency of fleeing from justice, the conduct of showing little respect for the order of the court and the possibility of the accused thwarting investigation etc. are also relevant factors. 25. The Apex Court has also deprecated the practice of repeated filing of anticipatory bail applications one after another on the same allegations and contentions without any demur. In the case on hand also, the petitioner has gone on filing petition after petition raising substantially the same contentions and inspite of the orders of this court to surrender, he chose to simply ignore the same. 26. One is constrained to refer to certain unhealthy practices followed in the investigation of cases. In the present case, even after this court repeatedly rejected, in fact even ordered to surrender, even though the petitioner ignored those directions, it is distressing to note that there B.A.6961/2012. 30 has been no sincere and conscious effort from the side of the investigating agency to arrest the petitioner. Almost an year has passed since the first order of this court directing the petitioner to surrender. If this court is compelled to believe that even after dismissal of three applications for anticipatory bail, the fact that investigating agency does not do anything in the matter, the investigating agency is being influenced or pressurized or is in hand and glow with the petitioner, this court could not be found fault with. This case is a typical instance of either incompetency or inefficiency of the investigating agency or is a glaring example of the investigating agency being influenced or acting on extraneous considerations. Either way, it brings little credit to the investigating agency. 27. The act of the investigating agency in filing piecemeal charge also causes considerable difficulties. Whether that has the sanction of law need not be considered herein. But the practice seen to be quite an B.A.6961/2012. 31 unhealthy one for, it considerably delays the commencement of trial apart from inherent defects it may generate. 28. It is true that the petitioner has produced some materials in addition to what has been produced by him on the earlier occasions and raised certain contentions based on those documents. The difficulty in accepting any of those documents as of now have already been discussed. 29. Apart from this fact, there are no new factors revealed during investigation to show that petitioner's involvement is doubtful. Change of circumstance contemplates that subsequent materials collected by the investigating agency make the allegation against the petitioner weak or open to serious doubt. It does not mean that different approach to same circumstances or different interpretation of materials which were already considered can be treated as change of circumstance. B.A.6961/2012. 32 30. One cannot at this juncture omit to note the callous and indifferent attitude of the petitioner to the orders of this court. Inspite of specific directions to surrender, he paid little heed and chose to ignore the same. It could not be said that there are no materials against the petitioner as of now to show his involvement in the crime. May be that there was delay in recording the statement of the victim as far as the involvement of the petitioner is concerned. But, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is wholly insignificant. 31. The conduct of the petitioner in flouting the directions of this court and his ability to keep the investigating agency at bay speaks volumes about the influence he could wield. While disposing of B.A.3869 of 2012, by order dated 15.6.2012, this court had elaborately considered the various circumstances which persuaded the court to dismiss the anticipatory bail application repeatedly. B.A.6961/2012. 33 The court had also observed about the influence the petitioner could muster to keep away from law. In the light of the above facts and circumstances, it is felt that it will not be appropriate for this court to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner. This application is without merits, and it is accordingly dismissed. P. BHAVADASAN, JUDGE sb.