High Court of KeralaSingle JudgeStatutory bail granted; Annexure-A2 set aside; ...

Mohammed Haneefa v. State of Kerala

Case / Petition Number:CRL.MC NO. 8637 OF 2022

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • A. Badharudeen
Judgment Date
2022-12-06
Court Decision / Holding
Annexure-A2 order set aside; statutory bail granted to the petitioner with conditions: bond Rs.1,00,000 with two solvent sureties, surrender of passport (or affidavit if none), cooperation with investigation, not leaving India without permission, and maintaining good conduct; the petitioner to be released on statutory bail.
Final Disposition
Statutory bail granted; Annexure-A2 set aside; the accused to be released on statutory bail with specified conditions.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Mohammed Haneefa

Respondents

  • State of Kerala

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • K.R. Vinod
  • • M.S. Letha
  • • Nabil Khader
  • • Chithra C. Edadan George Roy

Counsels for Respondents

  • • G. Sudheer (Public Prosecutor)

Case Synopsis & Summary

Mohammed Haneefa, accused no.4 in Crime No.238/2022 of Vadakkancherry Police Station, challenged the Special Court for SC/ST (POA) Act & NDPS Act Cases, Manjeri’s Annexure-A2 order (dated 16.11.2022) extending detention beyond 180 days under NDPS Act Section 36-A(4). The petition, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., contends that the prosecution failed to file its Final Report within the statutory period and that Annexure-A1 did not disclose progress of investigation, nor provide concrete reasons for prolonged detention; thus the extension and consequent denial of statutory bail were vitiated. The High Court of Kerala, led by Justice A. Badharudeen, examined the statutory framework: NDPS Act Section 36-A(4) redefines the reference to 180 days to 180 days, with a possible extension up to one year on a Public Prosecutor’s report indicating progress and the specific reasons for detention beyond 180 days; this is parallell to the TADA framework under Section 20(4) (bb). The court reviewed decisions (Hitendra Vishnu Thakur, Sanjay Kumar Kedia, Appukuttan, Nayantara Gupta, Sanjay Dutt, Jigar) to underscore that the Public Prosecutor must independently assess and narrate progress and justification, and that failure to do so vitiates the extension. Ultimately, Annexure-A2 was set aside, and statutory bail was granted with imposed conditions, thereby reaffirming the centrality of timely reporting and the accused’s liberty in default bail scenarios.

Provisions of Law Cited

Cr.P.C., 1973, Section 482NDPS Act, 1985, Sections 19, 24, 27ANDPS Act, 1985, Section 36-ANDPS Act, 1985, Section 36-A(4)Cr.P.C., 1973, Section 167(2)TADA Act, Section 20(4)TADA Act, Section 20(4)(bb)

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Public Prosecutor must independently apply mind to the request for extension and report to the court; not a mere forwarding agency (Hitendra Vishnu Thakur)
  • Extension beyond 180 days allowed only with progress of investigation and justification for detention (twin conditions)
  • Indefeasible right to statutory bail if extension is not properly granted (as emphasized in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and subsequent rulings)
  • 36-A(4) is parimateria with 20(4) of TADA in governing extension of time for NDPS investigations
  • Notice and presence of the accused during extension proceedings is mandatory (as per Sanjay Dutt, Jigar)
  • Public Prosecutor’s report is not a mere formality; it must disclose progress and the mind of the prosecutor

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The petitioner contends that extension beyond 180 days under Section 36-A(4) NDPS Act requires a progress report and specific reasons for detention; Annexure-A1 lacks progress and shows no independentmind by the Public Prosecutor; therefore Annexure-A2 extending detention and the denial of statutory bail are illegal. The petitioner invokes Hitendra Vishnu Thakur, Sanjay Kumar Kedia, Appukuttan, Nayantara Gupta, and recent Jigar decisions to urge that failure to satisfy the twin conditions and notice invalidates the extension, entitling default bail.

Contentions of Respondents

The Public Prosecutor argues that Annexure-A1 demonstrates compliance with Section 36-A(4)’s proviso, showing progress in investigation and reasons for continued detention; the Special Court had jurisdiction to extend time; the court’s interpretation aligns with Hitendra Vishnu Thakur, Sanjay Kumar Kedia, Appukuttan, Nayantara Gupta, and related precedents; the extension was legally permissible and the bail denial was appropriate given the circumstances.

Cited Precedents (8)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra1994 SCC (4) 602PositiveEstablished the need for a prosecutor’s independent mind and the twin conditions for extending 180-day timelines under 20(4) of TADA; parallels drawn for 36-A(4) NDPS.
Sanjay Kumar Kedia v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotics Control Bureau & Another(2009) 17 SCC 631PositiveHeld 36-A(4) is parimeteria with 20(4) of TADA; extension beyond 180 days permitted with proper prosecutor’s report and progress disclosure.
Appukuttan v. State of Kerala2013 KHC 3669PositiveFollowed Hitendra Vishnu Thakur; reinforced the prosecutor’s independent assessment and reporting requirements.
Nayantara Gupta v. State of Maharashtra2020 SCC Online Bom 873PositiveSupportive authority for stringent interpretation of prosecution reporting requirements.
Sanjay Dutt v. State through CBI, Bombay(1994) 5 SCC 410PositiveNoted necessity of notice and proper consideration in extension proceedings under related provisions.
Jigar @ Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya v. State of GujaratLiveLaw SC 794 (2022)PositiveAffirmed that accused must be produced and informed when extension is being considered.
Unreported Crl.M.C.No.5412/2022Crl.M.C.No.5412/2022Mentioned OnlyUnreported decision cited in support of legal position; not binding precedents.
Unreported B.A.No.3850/2021BA No.3850/2021Mentioned OnlyUnreported decision referenced in the discussion.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

# **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN** **TUESDAY, THE 6[TH] DAY OF DECEMBER 2022 / 15TH AGRAHAYANA,** **1944** **CRL.MC NO. 8637 OF 2022** **AGAINST THE ORDER IN CRL.M.P.NO.1694/2022 DATED 16.11.2022 IN CRIME NO.238/2022 OF VALANCHERRY POLICE STATION, MALAPPURAM IN THE FILES OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SC/ST(POA) ACT & NDPS ACT CASES, MANJERI)** **PETITIONER/ACCUSED NO.4 :** **MOHAMMED HANEEFA AGED 29 YEARS S/O.MAMMU, PALLIYALIL HOUSE, VALANCHERRY P.O, TIRUR, MALAPPURAM, PIN: 676 552 BY ADVS. K.R.VINOD M.S.LETHA NABIL KHADER CHITHRA C.EDADAN GEORGE ROY** ## **RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT :** **STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA, KOCHI - 682031** **BY SRI.G.SUDHEER, PUBLIC PROSECUTOR** **THIS CRIMINAL MISC. CASE HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 06.12.2022, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY PASSED THE FOLLOWING:** Crl.M.C.No.8637 of 2022 2 **A.BADHARUDEEN, J. -------------------------------------------------------Crl.M.C.No.8637 of 2022** **--------------------------------------------------------** **Dated this the 6[th] day of December, 2022** ## **O R D E R** This is a petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred as ‘Cr.P.C.’ for convenience) and the prayer in this petition are as under: (a) Call for the records pertaining to Annexure-A2 order of the Special Court for SC/ST (PoA) Act & NDPS Act Cases, Manjeri dated 16.11.2022 and set aside the same. (b) Grant default bail to the petitioner in view of the failure of the Investigating Officer to file the Final Report within the statutory time and thus Crl.M.C.No.8637 of 2022 3 order the release of the petitioner by imposing necessary conditions in the interest of justice. (c) To issue any other order appropriate in the circumstances of this case. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Public Prosecutor. 3. The prosecution allegation is that, the petitioner herein who is arrayed as accused No.4 in Crime No.238 of 2022 of the Vadakkancherry Police Station along with the other accused committed offences punishable under Sections 22(c) and 29(i) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, on 01.05.2022 at about 4.00 p.m., accused Nos.1 to 3 were found in a car possessing 163 grams of MDMA for sale and they were intercepted and contraband taken into custody. Subsequently, they were arrested. The allegation against the petitioner is that he had sent money into the account of the first accused by Google Pay transaction to deal with Crl.M.C.No.8637 of 2022 4 the contraband. The petitioner was arrested on 13.05.2022 and he has been in custody thereafter. 4. The petitioner was nabbed red handedly and has been detained in custody. Since the prosecution failed to file Final Report within 180 days, the Prosecutor filed Annexure-A2 petition (Crl.M.P.No.1694 of 2022) for extension of time. At the same time, the petitioner filed statutory bail application. 5. The learned Special Judge under the NDPS Act, Manjeri allowed Annexure-A2 order and thereby extended the period of detention for a period beyond 180 days. Similarly, it is submitted that the statutory bail application moved by the petitioner was dismissed in view of the extension granted as per Annexure-A2. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out two anomalies while pressing for reversal of the said orders. Crl.M.C.No.8637 of 2022 5 7. While assailing these orders, the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that in order to get extension of the period of investigation beyond 180 days, by resorting to Section 36-A(4), it is necessary, for the learned Public Prosecutor, to indicate the progress of investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of 180 days. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the petition filed by the learned Public Prosecutor, copy of which produced as Annexure.A1 herein, does not contain the progress of investigation, though there are reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of 180 days. Accordingly, it is argued that the Special court went wrong in allowing Annexure.A1 and dismissing the statutory bail plea of the petitioner, which is an indefeasible right of the petitioner, guaranteed by the Constitution. He has given emphasis to the decisions reported in **Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and others v.** Crl.M.C.No.8637 of 2022 6 **State of Maharashtra** [1994 SCC (4) 602], **Sanjay Kumar Kedia @ Sanjay Kedia Vs.Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau & Another** [(2009) 17 SCC 631], Unreported Crl.M.C.No. 5412/2022, **Appukuttan vs. State of Kerala** (2013 KHC 3669), Unreported B.A.No.3850/2021 and **Nayantara Gupta V. State of Maharashtra** [2020 SCC Online Bom 873] in support of his contention. 8. Whereas, the learned Public Prosecutor, who supported the orders impugned, submitted that, going by the recitals in Annexure.A1 petition dated 20.05.2022 filed by the learned Public Prosecutor, compliance of the mandate of Section 36-A(4) could be gathered and therefore, the orders impugned does not require any interference. 9. Having heard as argued, it is necessary to refer the statutory wordings, and then to the decisions highlighted by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Crl.M.C.No.8637 of 2022 7 ## 10. Section 36-A provides as under: “ **36-A.Offences triable by Special Courts** .-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). 2. xxxx ## 3. xxxx 4. In respect of persons accused of an offence punishable under section 19 or section 24 or section 27-A or for offences involving commercial quantity the references in subsection (2) of section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) thereof to “ninety days”, where they occur, shall be construed as reference to “one hundred and eighty days”: Provided that, if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of one hundred and eighty days, the Special Court may extend the said period up to one year on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the Crl.M.C.No.8637 of 2022 8 progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of one hundred and eighty days.” 11. In **Hitendra Vishnu Thakur’s** case (supra), paragraph No.23 dealt with Section 20(4)(bb) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, (hereinafter referred as ‘TADA’ for convenience) and it was held as follows: “23. ………………. on a plain reading of clause (bb) of sub-section (4) of Section 20, point out that the Legislature has provided for seeking extension of time for completion of investigation on a report of the public prosecutor. The Legislature did not purposely leave it to an investigating officer to make an application for seeking extension of time from the court. This provision is in tune with the legislative intent to have the investigations completed expeditiously and not to allow an accused to be kept in continued detention during unnecessary prolonged investigation at the whims of the police. The Legislature expects that the Crl.M.C.No.8637 of 2022 9 investigation must be completed with utmost promptitude but where it becomes necessary to seek some more time for completion of the investigation, the investigating agency must submit itself to the scrutiny of the public prosecutor in the first instance and satisfy him about the progress of the investigation and furnish reasons for seeking further custody of an accused. A public prosecutor is an important officer of the State Government and is appointed by the State under the Code of Criminal Procedure. He is not a part of the investigating agency. He is an independent statutory authority. The public prosecutor is expected to independently apply his mind to the request of the investigating agency before submitting a report to the court for extension of time with a view to enable the investigating agency to complete the investigation. He is not merely a post office or a forwarding agency. A public prosecutor may or may not agree with the reasons given by the investigating officer for seeking extension of time and may find that the investigation had not progressed in the proper manner or that there has been unnecessary, Crl.M.C.No.8637 of 2022 10 deliberate or avoidable delay in completing the investigation. In that event, he may not submit any report to the court under clause (bb) to seek extension of time. Thus, for seeking extension of time under clause (bb), the public prosecutor after an independent application of his mind to the request of the investigating agency is required to make a report to the Designated Court indicating therein the progress of the investigation and disclosing justification for keeping the accused in further custody to enable the investigating agency to complete the investigation. The public prosecutor may attach the request of the investigating officer along with his request or application and report, but his report, as envisaged under clause (bb), must disclose on the face of it that he has applied his mind and was satisfied with the progress of the investigation and considered grant of further time to complete the investigation necessary. The use of the expression "on the report of the public prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period” as occurring in clause (bb) in Subsection (2) of Crl.M.C.No.8637 of 2022 11 Section 167 as amended by Section 20(4) are important and indicative of the legislative intent not to keep an accused in custody unreasonably and to grant extension only on the report of the public prosecutor. The report of the public prosecutor, therefore, is not merely a formality but a very vital report, because the consequence of its acceptance affects the liberty of an accused and it must, therefore, strictly comply with the requirements as contained in clause (bb). The request of an investigating officer for extension of time is no substitute for the report of the public prosecutor. Where either no report as is envisaged by clause (bb) is filed or the report filed by the public prosecutor is not accepted by the Designated Court, since the grant of extension of time under clause (bb) is neither a formality nor automatic, the necessary corollary would be that an accused would be entitled to seek bail and the court ‘shall’ release him on bail if he furnishes bail as required by the Designated Court.” 12. Again, it was held that, “The courts are expected to zealously Crl.M.C.No.8637 of 2022 12 safeguard his liberty. Clause (bb) has to be read and interpreted on its plain language without addition or substitution of any expression in it. We have already dealt with the importance of the report of the public prosecutor and emphasised that he is neither a ‘post office’ of the investigating agency nor its ‘forwarding agency’ but is charged with a statutory duty. He must apply his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and his report must disclose on the face of it that he had applied his mind to the twin conditions contained in clause (bb) of sub-section (4) of Section 20.” 13. Again, it was held that, “even the mere reproduction of the application or request of the investigating officer by the public prosecutor in his report, without demonstration of the application of his mind and recording his own satisfaction, would not render his report as the one envisaged by clause (bb) and it would not be a proper report to seek extension of time. In the absence of an appropriate report the Designated Court would have no jurisdiction to deny to an accused his Crl.M.C.No.8637 of 2022 13 Indefeasible right to be released on bail on account of the default of the prosecution to file the challan within the prescribed time if an accused seeks and is prepared to furnish the bail bonds as directed by the court.” 14. In **Sanjay Kumar Kedia’s** case (supra), the Apex court considered the scope and ambit of Section 36-A(4) of the NDPS Act read with Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. In this decision, the Apex Court considered the decision in **Hitendra Vishnu Thakur’s** case (supra), and held that Section 36-A(4) of the NDPS Act is parimeteria with Section 20(4) of the TADA. In paragraph 10, it has been observed as under: “10. The question to be noticed at this stage is as to whether the two applications for extension that had been filed by the public prosecutor seeking an extension beyond 180 days met the necessary conditions. We find that the matter need not detain us as it is no longer res integra and is completely covered by the judgment of this Court in Hitendra Vishnu’s case Crl.M.C.No.8637 of 2022 14 (supra). In this case, the Bench was dealing with the proviso inserted as clause (bb) in Subsection (4) of Section 20 of TADA, which is parimeteria with the proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 36A of the Act. This Court accepted the argument of the accused that an extension beyond 180 days could be granted but laid a rider that it could be so after certain conditions were satisfied.” 15. In the said decision also, the duty of the Public Prosecutor has been extensively discussed while holding that proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 36-A has to be construed in relation to the subject matter covered by the said section. In an unreported decision of this Court in Crl.M.C.No.5412/2022, this Court granted default bail, on the finding that the learned Public Prosecutor did not seem to have applied his mind to the report of the Investigating Officer. In **Appukuttan’s** case (supra), this Court while dealing with impact of Section 36-A(4) of the NDPS Act, followed the ratio in **Hitendra Vishnu Thakur’s** case Crl.M.C.No.8637 of 2022 15 (supra) and **Sanjay Kumar Kedia’s** case (supra) by reiterating the principles. In the other decisions pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner also, the same legal position has been reiterated. 16. Thus, the law emerges is that, as per Section 36- A(4) of the NDPS Act, in respect of persons accused of an offence punishable under Sections 19 or section 24 or section 27-A or for offences involving commercial quantity the references in sub-section (2) of section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) thereof to “ninety days”, where they occur, shall be construed as reference to “one hundred and eighty days”. If it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of one hundred and eighty days, the Special Court may extend the said period up to one year acting on the report of the Public Prosecutor. The proviso to Section 36-A(4) categorically states that the Public Prosecutor, while making an Crl.M.C.No.8637 of 2022 16 application for extension of time, shall indicate two aspects on applying his mind, viz., (a) the progress of the investigation and (b) the specific reason for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of 180 days and failure to narrate either of the twin aspects, that is, both aspects together would make the said application outside the ambit of the proviso to Section 36-A(4) of the NDPS Act and in such an application, extension of time cannot be granted. 17. The 2[nd] point argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, non issuance of notice with opportunity of hearing to the petitioner at the time when the petition filed under Section 36-A(4) was considered. It is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that, as early in the year 1994, the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in a decision reported in **Sanjay Dutt Vs. State through CBI, Bombay** [1994 (5) SCC 410], [AIR (SCW) 3857], Crl.M.C.No.8637 of 2022 17 considered the necessity of notice while hearing a petition filed under Section 20(4)(b)(b) of the TADA Act and in paragraph No.47, it has been observed in the said case, referring to **Hitendra Vishnu Thakur Vs. State of Maharashtra** [1994 (4) SCC 602], the Apex Court considered the requirement of notice to the accused before grant of extension of time under Section 20(4)(b)(b) of the TADA Act, and held that, notice is the requirement of law. 18. In a latest decision of the Apex Court reported in **Jigar @ Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya Vs. State of Gujarat** [2022 LiveLaw (SC) 794], it is held that, following the ratio in **Sunjay Dutt's** and **Hitendra Vishnu Thakur's** case (supra), it is mandatory to produce the accused at the time when the court considers the application for extension and the accused must be informed that, the question of extension of period of investigation is being considered Crl.M.C.No.8637 of 2022 18 by the court. 19. On perusal of the orders impugned or otherwise the said procedure also not seen to have been complied. In this case, the learned Public Prosecutor filed Annexure-A1 application, runs into six paragraphs. Even on meticulous reading of AnnexureA1 petition, compliance of the first condition, i.e., indication of progress of the investigation could not be gathered, though it has been stated therein that the 2[nd] accused could not be arrested so far. Thus, it has to be held that the application as Annexure.A1 put by the prosecutor is not in terms of the mandate of proviso to Section 36-A(4) of the NDPS Act and therefore, the same cannot be allowed. Further, the accused also not produced before hearing the extention petition with notice of the said fact. the Thus, it is held that the learned Special Judge went wrong in allowing Annexure.A1 application and denying the statutory bail Crl.M.C.No.8637 of 2022 19 plea of the petitioner herein/the accused. 20. To the contrary, it is held that the statutory bail, an indefeasible right of the petitioner, is liable to be granted since the petition for extension is not in accordance with the statutory mandate. 21. Accordingly, Annexure-A2 order stands set aside and consequently, the statutory bail plea of the petitioner stands allowed. The accused shall be released on statutory bail, on the following conditions: 1) The petitioner/accused shall be released on bail, on executing bond for Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) each by himself and by two solvent sureties to the satisfaction of the Special Judge. 2) The petitioner/accused shall surrender his passport, if any, before the Special Court on the date of execution of bond, or within a period of three days thereafter, after getting exemption in this regard from the Special Court. If he has no passport, he shall file an affidavit stating so, on the date of execution of bond or within three days’ Crl.M.C.No.8637 of 2022 20 thereafter. 3) The petitioner/accused shall co-operate with the investigation and he shall be made available for interrogation by the Investigating Officer, as and when directed, till the investigation is complete. 4) The petitioner/accused shall not leave India without prior permission of the Special Court. 5) The petitioner/accused shall not commit any offence during the currency of this bail and any such involvement is a reason to cancel the bail hereby granted. Sd/- ## **A. BADHARUDEEN** ## **JUDGE** rkj Crl.M.C.No.8637 of 2022 21 ## **APPENDIX OF CRL.MC 8637/2022** |**PETITIONER ANNEXURES**|| |---|---| |**ANNEXURE A1**|**THE COPY OF THE REPORT DATED 09.11.2022**| ||**FILED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR U/S.36A(4) OF**| ||**THE NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC**| ||**SUBSTANCES ACT, 1985 BEFORE THE SPECIAL**| ||**COURT FOR SC/ST (POA) ACT & NDPS ACT CASES,**| ||**MANJERI**| |**ANNEXURE A2**|**THE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 16.11.2022 OF**| ||**THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SC/ST (POA) ACT &**| ||**NDPS ACT CASES, MANJERI, BY WHICH THE**| ||**EXTENSION OF TIME IS GRANTED**| |**ANNEXURE A3**|**THE COPY OF THE ORDER IN**| ||**CRL.M.C.NO.6559/2022 DATED 10.11.2022**|