High Court of KeralaSingle JudgeWrit petition dismissed

M.K. Ashraf v. State Bank of India and Others

Case / Petition Number:WP(C).No.4186 OF 2020(W)
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Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • Amit Rawal, J.
Judgment Date
2020-02-14
Court Decision / Holding
The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.
Final Disposition
Writ petition dismissed

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • M.K. Ashraf

Respondents

  • State Bank of India
  • Branch Manager, State Bank of India, Kannanalloor, Kollam
  • Binu Kalpakam, Advocate Commissioner, Kodiyattu Building, OPP.A.M.Hospital, Karunagapally, Kollam

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Sri R. Kishore (Kallumthazham)

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Adv. Jawahar Jose, SC

Case Synopsis & Summary

The petitioner, M.K. Ashraf, is an Ex-NRI, promoter and a personal guarantor to the principal borrower, who has challenged the actions of the State Bank of India under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, in the wake of an insolvency moratorium imposed by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). The core issue is whether the Section 14 moratorium can bar proceedings against a personal guarantor, given that Section 60 of the Code contemplates insolvency resolution for both corporate debtors and guarantors, and the moratorium’s scope appears to refer primarily to the corporate debtor. The petitioner contends that the moratorium operates to suspend recoveries against the guarantor’s personal property, and thus the SARFAESI action against him is without jurisdiction and violative of the moratorium and Article 226. The respondent-bank relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in State Bank of India v. V. Ramakrishnan (2018) 17 SCC 394, arguing that the moratorium under Section 14 does not prevent SARFAESI action against guarantors. The High Court, however, distinguishes that line of reasoning, noting that paragraphs 20–24 of the Ramakrishnan judgment do not clinch the case here. After analysis, the court concludes that the petitioner’s arguments do not fall within Article 226 and that there is no ground to interfere. The writ petition is dismissed, permitting SARFAESI action against the guarantor’s property to proceed under applicable law.

Provisions of Law Cited

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act, 2002)Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC)Section 14 (IBC)Section 60 (IBC)Section 60(1) (IBC)Section 60(2) and (3) (IBC)Part III (IBC)Section 243 (IBC)Section 2(e) (IBC)Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The petitioner contends that the insolvency moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, particularly Section 14, encompasses actions against personal guarantors once a moratorium is in place against the principal borrower. He asserts that such moratorium renders continuing or initiating recovery actions against his personal assets impermissible and seeks relief under Article 226 to restrain the bank from enforcing SARFAESI against him. He also relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in State Bank of India v. V. Ramakrishnan (2018) to argue that personal guarantors cannot be pursued during moratorium.

Contentions of Respondents

The petitioner-bank argues that Section 14 moratorium is limited to corporate debtors and does not automatically shield personal guarantors from SARFAESI actions. It submits that Section 60 contemplates insolvency resolution for guarantors and corporate debtors and that personal guarantors remain subject to SARFAESI proceedings until otherwise directed by competent tribunals. It relies on the Ramakrishnan decision to support its stance that the moratorium cannot be read to bar SARFAESI against guarantors, and maintains that the proper forum for such issues, if any, would be the NCLT rather than Article 226 writ jurisdiction.

Cited Precedents (1)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
State Bank of India v. V. Ramakrishnan and Another[(2018) 17 SCC 394]DistinguishedThe Kerala High Court references Ramakrishnan but distinguishes its applicability here, holding that the Ramakrishnan proposition cannot be extended to bar SARFAESI actions against personal guarantors and that moratorium provisions do not automatically apply to guarantors in the manner argued.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT RAWAL** **FRIDAY, THE 14TH DAY OF FEBRUARY 2020 / 25TH MAGHA, 1941** ## **WP(C).No.4186 OF 2020(W)** ## **PETITIONER/S:** **M.K.ASHRAF, AGED 65 YEARS S/O.MUHAMMED KUNJU, ADHILS HOUSE, KANNANALLOOR P.O., KOLLAM-691 586.** **BY ADV. SRI.R.KISHORE (KALLUMTHAZHAM)** ## **RESPONDENT/S:** **1 STATE BANK OF INDIA, SARB, 1ST FLOOR, LMS COMPOUND, NEAR MUSEUM WEST GATE, VIKAS BHAVAN P.O., THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695 033. 2 BRANCH MANAGER, STATE BANK OF INDIA, KANNANALOOR, KOLLAM-691 586. 3 BINU KALPAKAM, ADVOCATE COMMISSIONER, KODIYATTU BUILDING, OPP.A.M.HOSPITAL, KARUNAGAPALLY, KOLLAM-690 518.** ## **OTHER PRESENT:** ## **ADV. JAWAHAR JOSE,SC** **THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 14.02.2020, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** **WP(C).No.4186 OF 2020(W)** **2** ## **AMIT RAWAL, J. ================== W.P.(C) No. 4186 of 2020 ================== Dated this the 14[th] day of February, 2020** ## **JUDGMENT** The petitioner an Ex NRI, promoter and a guarantor to the principal borrower, has approached this court challenging the action of the Bank under Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act), in view of the fact that order under section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 has been issued fixing a time line moratorium. Section 60 of the aforementioned Code prohibits the Bank to initiate the proceedings against the personal debt. Since, the bank cannot initiate the steps to recover the amount under SARFAESI Act, in view of the moratorium issued under Section 14 of the Code against the principal borrower, impugned action has been taken against the property belonging to the petitioner being personal guarantor. In view of provision **WP(C).No.4186 OF 2020(W)** **3** of Section 60(1) of the Code of 2016, if any action initiated under SARFAESI Act is without jurisdiction, the remedy is to approach the National Company Law Tribunal. 2. The learned Counsel for the bank submits that the proposition as scouted out is already covered by the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in **State Bank of India v. V. Ramakrishnan and Another** **[(2018) 17 SCC 394],** holding that Bank is not prevented from initiating the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act against the personal guarantor, de hors moratorium under Section 14. 3. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the proposition as attempted to be build up during the course of hearing is not able to cut ice to bring the case within the realm of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. It would be relevant to mention paragraphs 20, 21, 22, 24 of the judgment referred in **State Bank of India** (supra). **WP(C).No.4186 OF 2020(W)** **4** 20. Section 14 refers to four matters that may be prohibited once the moratorium comes into effect. In each of the matters referred to, be it institution or continuation of proceedings, the transferring, encumbering or alienating of assets, action to recover security interest, or recovery of property by an owner which is in possession of the corporate debtor, what is conspicuous by its absence is any mention of the personal guarantor. Indeed, the corporate debtor and the corporate debtor alone is referred to in the said section. A plain reading of the said section, therefore, leads to the conclusion that the moratorium referred to in Section 14 can have no manner of application to Personal guarantors of a corporate debtor 21. However, Section 2(e) and Section 60 are strongly relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents as, according to them, the Code will apply personal guarantors of corporate debtors, and by Section 60, proceedings against such personal guarantors will show that such moratorium extends to the guarantor as well. 22. We are afraid that such arguments have to be turned down on a careful reading of the sections relied upon. Section 60 of the Code, in sub-section (1) thereof, refers to insolvency resolution and liquidation for both corporate debtors and personal guarantors, the adjudicating authority for which shall be the **WP(C).No.4186 OF 2020(W)** **5** National Company Law Tribunal, having territorial jurisdiction over the place where the registered office of the corporate person is located. This sub-section is only important in that it locates the Tribunal which has territorial jurisdiction in insolvency resolution processes against corporate debtors. So far as personal guarantors are concerned, we have seen that Part III has not been brought into force, and neither has Section 243, which repeals the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 and the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920. The net result of this is that so far as individual personal guarantors are concerned, they will continue to be proceeded against under the aforesaid two Insolvency Acts and not under the Code. Indeed, by a Press Release dated 28-8-2017, the Government of India, through the Ministry of Finance, cautioned that Section 243 of the Code, which provides for the repeal of the said enactments, has not been notified till date, and further, that the provisions relating to insolvency resolution and bankruptcy for individuals and partnerships as contained in Part III of the Code are yet to be notified. Hence, it was advised that stakeholders who intend to pursue their insolvency cases may approach the appropriate authority/court under the existing enactments, instead of approaching the Debts Recovery Tribunals. 24. The scheme of Sections 60(2) and (3) is **WP(C).No.4186 OF 2020(W)** **6** thus clear - the moment there is a proceeding against the corporate debtor pending under the 2016 Code, any bankruptcy proceeding against the individual personal guarantor will, if already initiated before the proceeding against the corporate debtor, be transferred to the National Company Law Tribunal or, if initiated after such proceedings had been commenced against the corporate debtor, be filed only in the National Company Law Tribunal. However, the Tribunal is to decide such proceedings only in accordance with the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909 or the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, as the case may be. It is clear that sub-section (4), which states that the Tribunal shall be vested with all the powers of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, as contemplated under Part III of this Code, for the purposes of sub-section (2), would not take effect, as the Debts Recovery Tribunal has not yet been empowered to hear bankruptcy proceedings against individuals under Section 179 of the Code, as the said Section has not yet been brought into force. Also, we have seen that Section 249, dealing with the consequential amendment of the Recovery of Debts Act to empower Debts Recovery Tribunals to try such proceedings, has also not been brought into force. It is thus clear that Section 2(e), which was brought into force on 23-11-2017 would, when it refers to the application of the Code to a personal **WP(C).No.4186 OF 2020(W)** **7** guarantor of a corporate debtor, apply only for the limited purpose contained in Sections 60(2) and (3), as stated hereinabove. This is what is meant by strengthening the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process in the Statement of Objects of the Amendment Act, 2018. On perusal of the aforementioned findings, it is axiomatic that the Bank is not denuded of its powers to initiate the recovery proceedings under the SARFAESI Act against the petitioner. No ground of interference is made out. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. **Sd/-** **AMIT RAWAL** **Judge** MIN **WP(C).No.4186 OF 2020(W)** **8** ## **APPENDIX** ## **PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS:** **EXHIBIT P1** **THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF THE NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL DATED 28TH NOVEMBER 2019 NUMBERED AS IBA/45/KOB/19.** **EXHIBIT P2 THE TRUE COPY OF THE NOTICE ISSUED BY THE DRT DATED 16TH OCTOBER 2019 NUMBERED AS OA561/2019.** **EXHIBIT P3 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ADVOCATE NOTICE ISSUED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT DATED 30.01.2020 IN MC NO.875/2019.**