Merin Mathew v. Union of India and Air India SATS Airport Services Private Limited and Others

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** ## **THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.NAGARESH** **WEDNESDAY, THE 21[ST] DAY OF FEBRUARY 2024 / 2ND PHALGUNA, 1945** **WP(C) NO. 20163 OF 2022** ## **PETITIONER:** **MERIN MATHEW AGED 37 YEARS D/O T M SHEEBA MATHEW FORMER ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER (L & D DIVISION) AIR INDIA SATS LIMITED (AI- SATS) 1ST FLOOR PANACHAMOOTTIL SQUARE, AIRPORT RD, VALLAKKADAVU, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695008 (RESIDING AT THEKKE KAITHAVANA TC 19/1973, DECENT JN, POOJAPURA PO., THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695012)** **BY ADVS. MAITREYI SACHIDANANDA HEGDE ANJALI ANIL A.** ## **RESPONDENTS:** - **1 UNION OF INDIA, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF CIVIL AVIATION, RAJIV GANDHI BHAVAN, SAFDARJANG AIRPORT, NEW DELHI-, PIN – 110003** - **2 [AIR INDIA SINGAPORE AIRPORT TERMINAL SERVICES LTD.] REPRESENTED BY THE VICE PRESIDENT 1ST FLOOR PANACHAMOOTTIL SQUARE, AIRPORT RD, VALLAKKADAVU, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM PIN – 695008.** **[NAME OF R2 IS CORRECTED AS 'AIR INDIA SATS AIRPORT SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED' INSTEAD OF 'AIR INDIA SINGAPORE AIRPORT TERMINAL SERVICES LTD.' AS PER ORDER DATED 29/11/2022 IN I.A NO.2/22 IN WP(C) 20163/22].** W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 2 : **3 BINOY JACOB (FORMER VICE PRESIDENT) AIR INDIA SINGAPORE AIRPORT TERMINAL SERVICES LTD. (AI-SATS) 1ST FLOOR PANACHAMOOTTIL SQUARE, AIRPORT RD, VALLAKKADAVU, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695008. RESIDING AT 5-B, JUPITER, TRINITY WORLD, CHITTETUKARA, THRIKKAKARA TALUK, KAKKANAD, ERNAKULUM, PIN – 682037** **4 INTERNAL COMMITTEE AIR INDIA SINGAPORE AIRPORT TERMINAL SERVICES PRIVATE LTD., REPRESENTED BY THE CHAIRPERSON (SENIOR MANAGER HR(DEL), AIR INDIA AIRLINES HOUSE IB, GURUDWARA, RAKABGUNJ ROAD, NEW DELHI, PIN – 110001** **5 DEPUTY LABOUR COMMISSIONER (CENTRAL), KOLLAM, PIN – 691013** **6 REGIONAL JOINT LABOUR COMMISSIONER, KOLLAM KAANKATHU MUKKU, KOLLAM, KERALA, PIN – 691013** **BY ADVS. SRI.PREMSANKAR R SRI.M.P.SHAMEEM AHAMED SRI.SASTHAMANGALAM S.AJITHKUMAR SRI.AKHIL PHILIP MANITHOTTIYIL SMT.DEVISREE.R-GOVERNMENT PLEADER** **THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 21.02.2024, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:** W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 3 : ## **N. NAGARESH, J.** ````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` ## W.P.(C) No.20163 of 2022 ````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` _Dated this the 21[st] day of February, 2023_ ## **J U D G M E N T** ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ The petitioner, who was working with the 2[nd] respondent-Air India SATS Airport Services Private Limited as an Administrative Officer, has filed this writ petition challenging Ext.P4 Report on sexual harassment complaint filed by the petitioner. By Ext.P4 report, the Internal Complaints Committee found that a fit case of sexual harassment is not made out. The Committee observed that there need to be a harmonious work environment to work towards achieving Company goals and not in groups against each other. 2. According to the petitioner, while she was working as Administrative Officer, the 3[rd] respondent-Former Vice W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 4 : President of the 2[nd] respondent-Company invited the petitioner for a business dinner at a Hotel in Thiruvananthapuram. The petitioner would allege that the 3[rd] respondent made unwelcome invitations to spend time with him alone and made lewd and personal comments about the physique of the petitioner. The petitioner would further allege that in the month of April, 2016, when the petitioner came to the office cabin of the 3[rd] respondent with certain office files, the 3[rd] respondent tried to touch her body inappropriately, with lustful intention and the petitioner was subjected to molestation. 3. The petitioner submitted a complaint to the CMD of the 2[nd] respondent-Company. A Committee was constituted in Mumbai and an enquiry was made. The petitioner would state that the Committee conducted the enquiry violating the principles of natural justice and the provisions of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013. The Internal Complaints Committee was one-sided W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 5 : and completely biased, contended the petitioner. 4. The Committee submitted Ext.P4 Report observing that no case of sexual harassment was made out and the allegations raised by the petitioner against the 3[rd] respondent were not sufficient to conclude that there was sexual harassment. The petitioner thereafter filed W.P.(C) No.20939 of 2017 challenging Ext.P4 Report. The writ petition was dismissed by this Court as per Ext.P8 judgment granting liberty to the petitioner to approach the appropriate forum filing appeal. 5. Pursuant to the said Ext.P8 judgment, the petitioner filed an appeal before the 5[th] respondent-Deputy Labour Commissioner (Central). The 5[th] respondent held that he is not competent to deal with the appeal and the petitioner has to approach the appropriate appellate authority. In Ext.P9 order, the 5[th] respondent held that the appropriate government for M/s. Air India SATS Airport Services Private Limited is not the Central Government, but it is the State Government. W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 6 : 6. The petitioner thereupon filed appeal before the 6[th] respondent-Regional Joint Labour Commissioner, Kollam. The 6[th] respondent rejected the appeal as per Ext.P10 order, holding that the appeal is not maintainable before him as the 2[nd] respondent-Company does not operate under the jurisdiction of the State of Kerala. 7. The counsel for the petitioner argued that Ext.P4 Report is illegal and unsustainable as the Report has been drafted in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. Instead of conducting enquiry by an Internal Complaints Committee at the petitioner’s workplace, the 2[nd] respondentCompany constituted another Committee consisting of Members from Mumbai and Delhi, to influence the outcome. 8. The petitioner was not given opportunity to cross examine the witnesses produced by the 3[rd] respondent. The Committee did not give the petitioner a copy of their findings and was not afforded with opportunity to make representation against the findings, urged the counsel for the petitioner. The petitioner submitted an appeal against the Report to the W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 7 : ## Managing Director. The said appeal was not considered. 9. As regards the petitioner’s appeal addressed to the 5[th] respondent, the counsel for the petitioner argued that Exts.P9 and P10 orders are contrary to each other. In Ext.P9, the Deputy Labour Commissioner has held that the appropriate Government for M/s. Air India SATS Airport Services Private Limited is not the Central Government, but is the State Government. In Ext.P10, the Regional Joint Labour Commissioner held that the 2[nd] respondent-Company comes under the ambit of the Central Government. In effect, the petitioner has been denied appellate remedy. The orders impugned by the petitioner in the writ petition are therefore liable to be quashed. 10. The 2[nd] respondent resisted the writ petition. The 2[nd] respondent submitted that an appeal has to be filed within a period of 90 days from the date of the recommendations. The appellate authority cannot condone delay and admit an appeal subsequent to 90 days. The petitioner had approached this Court earlier and this Court held that if the W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 8 : petitioner is aggrieved by the report, she has to prefer appeal. 11. As per Section 18(2) of the Act, 2013, the appeal has to be filed before the appellate authority notified under Section 2(a) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. The 2[nd] respondent is a Private Limited Company and is not an establishment under the control of the Central Government. Therefore, as per Section 2(b), the appropriate government is the State Government. The 6[th] respondent being the competent officer under the State Government considered the appeal filed by the petitioner and found that the appeal has been filed beyond the 90 days period. Therefore, the appellate authority rightly rejected the appeal on the ground of delay. 12. The counsel for the 2[nd] respondent further urged that the mere fact that this Court had given liberty to the petitioner to move the appropriate forum, cannot be a reason to condone the delay in filing appeal. The appellate authority is not empowered to condone the delay beyond the W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 9 : permissible limit and the fact that liberty was given in the first round cannot have the potential of nullifying a statutory mandate as to limitation. The writ petition filed by the petitioner is therefore liable to be dismissed, contended the counsel for the 2[nd] respondent. 13. The counsel for the 3[rd] respondent submitted that Ext.P4 report was challenged in W.P.(C) No.20939 of 2017 and the said writ petition was dismissed. Therefore, the present writ petition is barred by the principles of _res judicata._ Ext.P4 report does not contain any error of law. Natural justice is not violated. The petitioner participated in the enquiry. Adequate opportunity was given to the petitioner. The counsel for the 3[rd] respondent asserted that as the period prescribed for filing appeal is 90 days, the appeal preferred by the petitioner beyond the period of 90 days cannot be entertained by the appellate authority. The Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the 6[th] respondent. 14. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the respective learned counsel appearing for the 2[nd] W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 10 : respondent and the 3[rd] respondent. I have also heard the learned Government Pleader representing the 6[th] respondent and the learned Deputy Solicitor General representing respondents 1 and 5. 15. In the writ petition, the petitioner has challenged Ext.P4 Report of the Internal Complaints Committee and Ext.P10 order passed by the 6[th] respondent as appellate authority. Ext.P4 Report was earlier challenged by the petitioner filing W.P.(C) No.20939 of 2017. This Court dismissed the said writ petition, granting liberty to the petitioner to move the appropriate forum. 16. Though the counsel for the petitioner urged various legal grounds and relied on a number of judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court and of this Court for impugning Ext.P4 report, I find that Ext.P4 was once subjected to challenge in W.P.(C) No.20939 of 2017 and this Court dismissed the writ petition granting liberty to the petitioner to move appropriate forum. Therefore, it is not open now for the petitioner to impugn the same Ext.P4 Report again in this writ W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 11 : petition. 17. The question then arises as to whether any interference is called for against Ext.P9 order passed by the 5[th] respondent or Ext.P10 order passed by the 6[th] respondent. In Ext.P9 order, the 5[th] respondent has held that the 5[th] respondent has no power or jurisdiction to consider an appeal relating to the 2[nd] respondent-Company. The petitioner thereafter approached the 6[th] respondent filing appeal. The 6[th] respondent, by Ext.P10 order, rejected the appeal filed by the petitioner on two grounds. Firstly, the 6[th] respondent held that the 2[nd] respondent-Company is not under the jurisdiction of the State Labour Department. The 6[th] respondent further held that the appeal has been filed beyond the period of 90 days and for that reason also the appeal is not maintainable. 18. In such circumstances, it becomes necessary to decide who is the competent authority in the matter of appeals arising out of the reports/orders made by the Internal Complaints Committee of the 2[nd] respondent-Company. For W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 12 : the said purpose, it is necessary to decide which is the ‘appropriate government’. 19. Section 2(b) of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 defines 'appropriate government' to mean (i) in relation to a workplace which is established, owned, controlled or wholly or substantially financed by funds provided directly or indirectly (A) by the Central Government or the Union Territory Administration, the Central Government; (B) by the State Government, the State Government; (ii) in relation to any workplace not covered under sub-clause (i) and falling within its territory, the State Government. 20. Section 18 of the Act, 2013 which provides for appeal, is as follows: ## **18. Appeal** (1) Any person aggrieved from the recommendations made under sub-section (2) of section 13 or under clause (i) or clause (ii) of subsection (3) of section 13 or sub-section (1) or subsection (2) of section 14 or section 17 or nonimplementation of such recommendations may prefer an appeal to the court or tribunal in accordance with the provisions of the service rules applicable to the said person or where no such service rules exist then, without prejudice to W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 13 : provisions contained in any other law for the time being in force, the person aggrieved may prefer an appeal in such manner as may be prescribed. (2) The appeal under sub-section (1) shall be preferred within a period of ninety days of the recommendations. 21. In the case of the 2[nd] respondent-Establishment, their service rules do not provide for appeal to any Court or Tribunal. Therefore, a person aggrieved can prefer an appeal in such manner as may be prescribed. Rule 11 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Rules, 2013 provides that subject to the provisions of Section 18, any person aggrieved from the recommendations made under sub-section (2) of Section 13 or under clause (i) or clause (ii) of sub-section (3) of Section 13 or sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 14 or Section 17 or non-implementation of such recommendations, may prefer an appeal to the appellate authority notified under clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. Therefore, going by Rule 11, the petitioner can prefer an W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 14 : appeal as provided under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. 22. Section 2(b) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 defines 'appropriate government' to mean, in respect of industrial establishment under the control of the Central Government or a Railway Administration or in a major port, mine or oil field, the Central Government, and in all other cases the State Government. Section 6 of the Act, 1946 provides that any employer, workman, trade union or other prescribed representatives of the workmen aggrieved by the order of the Certifying Officer under sub-section (2) of Section 5 may, within thirty days from the date on which copies are sent under sub-section (3) of that Section, appeal to the appellate authority and the appellate authority, whose decision shall be final, shall by order in writing confirm the standing orders either in the form certified by the certifying officer or after amending the said standing orders by making such modifications thereof or additions thereto as it thinks necessary to render the draft W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 15 : standing orders certifiable under this Act. Section 6 is the only provision in the Act, 1946 providing for appeal. The appellate authority therefore should be one appointed by the appropriate government. 23. Going by Section 2(b) of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, the 2[nd] respondent-Company is not established, owned, controlled or wholly or substantially financed by funds provided directly or indirectly by the Central Government. Therefore, the State Government is the appropriate government in the matter, going by the Act, 2013. If that be so, the 6[th] respondent is the competent appellate authority. 24. Section 2(a) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 defines “appellate authority” to mean an authority appointed by the appropriate government by notification in the official gazette to exercise in such area as may be specified in the notification the functions of an appellate authority under this Act. As per Section 2(b) of the W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 16 : Act, 1946, “appropriate government” in respect of industrial establishments under the control of the Central Government or a Railway Administration or in a major port, mine or oil field, the Central Government is the appropriate government and in all other cases, State Government is the appropriate government. 25. The 2[nd] respondent-Establishment cannot be said to be under the control of the Central Government as the Central Government does not have any share holdings in the 2[nd] respondent-company. In fact, the 2[nd] respondentcompany is a private limited company. Therefore, the appropriate government, even under the Act, 1946 will be the State Government. 26. The Government of Kerala has published Ext.P20 notification whereunder Regional Joint Labour Commissioner is designated as the appellate authority for revenue districts of Thiruvananthapuram, Kollam, Pathanamthitta and Alappuzha. Therefore, the 6[th] respondent is the competent appellate authority. W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 17 : 27. The petitioner initially approached the 5[th] respondent, who is the appellate authority appointed by the Central Government, challenging the proceedings of the Internal Complaints Committee. The 5[th] respondent noted that the 2[nd] respondent-Establishment is neither established, owned, controlled or wholly or substantially financed by funds provided directly or indirectly by the Central Government or the Union Territory Administration. The 5[th] respondent therefore rightly found that the application filed by the petitioner is not maintainable before the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), Cochin and consequently, dismissed the appeal. The 5[th] respondent observed that the appellant may move the appropriate forum for redressal of her grievance in this regard, as the matter is not examined on merits. 28. Thereafter, the petitioner moved the 6[th] respondent challenging the report dated 05.10.2016 of the Internal Complaints Committee. The 6[th] respondent concluded that as per Section 18 of the Sexual Harassment W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 18 : of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, an appeal against the report of the Internal Complaints Committee has to be filed within 90 days. There is no provision to condone delay. The report of the Internal Complaints Committee is dated 05.10.2016. The appeal was filed only on 28.11.2019, that is after much delay and beyond the time limit of 90 days to submit appeal. The 6[th] respondent also found that since 50% of shares of the 2[nd] respondent-company are owned by Air India Limited, a Central Government Company and the remaining 50% shares are owned by SATS Limited of Singapore Airlines, the 2[nd] respondent-Company is not under the jurisdiction of Kerala State Government. The 6[th] respondent further noted that the Internal Complaints Committee of the 2[nd] respondent is at New Delhi and the company has Branches in several States in India, which shows that the company is not under the jurisdiction of Kerala State Government. On these premises, the 6[th] respondent held that the appeal is not maintainable and consequently dismissed the appeal, as per W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 19 : Ext.P10 order dated 30.11.2021. 29. As stated earlier, as per Section 2(a) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, 'appellate authority' means an authority appointed by the appropriate government. As per Section 2(b), the Central Government will be the appropriate government with respect to “industrial establishments under the control of the Central Government or a Railway or major port, oil field, mine and in all other cases, the State Government”. There is nothing on record to come to a conclusion that the 2[nd] respondentPrivate Limited Company is under the control of the Central Government. The 2[nd] respondent-Company is not a Railway or major port, oil field or mine. Therefore, State Government will be the appropriate government. 30. Going by the Industrial Relations Code, 2020, the Industrial Employment Act will remain in force until it is repealed by a subsequent notification. Anything done or any action taken under the Act shall deemed to have been taken under the Code and shall be in force unless it is contrary to W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 20 : the provisions of the Code. As the 2[nd] respondent does not come under the definition of Central Government, the appropriate government will be the State Government. The 6[th] respondent will be the competent appellate authority on that score also. 31. When the petitioner filed an appeal before the 5[th] respondent, who is Deputy Labour Commissioner (Central), the 5[th] respondent as per Ext.P9 held that the application is not maintainable before the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), Cochin and the appeal filed under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 stands dismissed. 32. Thereafter, the petitioner moved the 6[th] respondent-Regional Joint Labour Commissioner, Kollam, who is the appellate authority under the State Government by filing appeal. The 6[th] respondent, after verifying the arguments of the parties, held that an appeal against the report of the Internal Complaints Committee has to be filed within 90 days from the date of receipt of the report and there W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 21 : is no provision to condone the delay. The 6[th] respondent noted that the report of the Internal Complaints Committee is dated 05.10.2016 and the appeal was submitted only on 28.11.2019 i.e., much delay after the time limit of 90 days to submit appeal. 33. The 6[th] respondent further held that the 2[nd] respondent-Company is a joint venture of which 50% shares are owned by Air India Limited, a Central Government Company, and therefore the 2[nd] respondent is not under the jurisdiction of the Kerala Government. For that reason also, appeal is not maintainable. The 6[th] respondent on those grounds dismissed appeal as per Ext.P10 order. 34. The said conclusion of the 6[th] respondent is not sustainable. Firstly, the Central Government does not hold any share holdings in the 2[nd] respondent-Company. Even if Air India Limited, which was then a Central Government Company, holds 50% of shares, it cannot be said that the Air India Limited is holding majority shares because the holder of the remaining 50% shares is owned by SATS Limited of W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 22 : Singapore Airlines. Therefore, even the Air India Limited does not hold majority share in the 2[nd] respondent-Company. Furthermore, there is nothing on record to conclude that the Central Government is exercising any powers over the affairs of the 2[nd] respondent-Company. The fact that Company has several Branches in several States in India, is not a reason to conclude that the Central Government is the appropriate government, in view of the definition of the “appropriate government” contained in Section 2(b) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. 35. The further reason extended by the 6[th] respondent to dismiss the appeal filed by the petitioner is that there is delay in filing the appeal. It is true that the report of the Internal Complaints Committee was dated 05.10.2016. But, after the said report, the petitioner had appealed to the Managing Director of the 2[nd] respondent-Company. After long wait, the petitioner was informed by the HR Department that the petitioner was free to go to court as permitted under the Act. W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 23 : 36. The petitioner then filed a complaint before the Human Rights Commission and another complaint to the Special Secretary to the Social Justice Department dated 03.06.2017 as evidenced by Ext.P5. It was when the authorities did not respond that the petitioner approached this Court filing W.P.(C) No.20939/2017. This Court, as per Ext.P8 judgment, granted liberty to the petitioner to move the appropriate forum. Ext.P8 judgment was delivered on 23.10.2019. 37. In the meanwhile, the petitioner had filed her appeal before the 5[th] respondent on 27.12.2018 on the _bona fide_ belief that the 5[th] respondent is the competent authority. The 5[th] respondent dismissed the appeal as per Ext.P9 order only on 29.05.2019. It was thereafter that the petitioner filed appeal before the 6[th] respondent. The 6[th] respondent rejected the appeal as per Ext.P10 order dated 30.11.2021 holding _inter alia_ that the 6[th] respondent is not the appellate authority. W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 24 : 38. It is to be noted that the petitioner has been pursuing her complaint before various authorities ever since the report of the Internal Complaints Committee. There was confusion and doubts regarding the competent appellate authority in view of the fact that the appeal provision is contained in the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, but, the appellate authorities are those prescribed under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. The lack of clarity is clear from the fact that the 5[th] respondent Central Authority has held that he is not the appellate authority whereas the 6[th] respondent State Authority has held that he is not the competent authority. 39. Taking into consideration the fact that the petitioner is pursuing a complaint regarding sexual harassment at workplace which is violation of women's right of equality, life and liberty and taking into consideration the strict protective measures envisaged by the Act, 2013 and the judgment of the Apex Court in _**Vishaka and others v.**_ W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 25 : _**State of Rajasthan** [(1997) 7 SCC 23]_ , I am of the view that the petitioner should be granted an opportunity to prosecute her appeal before the competent appellate authority, on merits, in spite of the delay. 40. Ext.P10 order passed by the 6[th] respondent is therefore set aside. The matter is remitted back to the 6[th] respondent. The 6[th] respondent is directed to reconsider the appeal filed by the petitioner and pass orders afresh on merits after giving notice of hearing to affected parties. Writ petition is disposed of with the afore direction. Sd/- **N. NAGARESH, JUDGE** aks W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 26 : ## **APPENDIX OF WP(C) 20163/2022** ## **PETITIONER’S EXHIBITS** **EXHIBIT P1 A COPY OF THE FIR AND FIS IN CRIME NO. 1411/2016 DATED 10.09.2016 OF MUSEUM POLICE STATION, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM DISTRICT EXHIBIT P2 A COPY OF SECTION 164 STATEMENT GIVEN BY THE PETITIONER EXHIBIT P3 A COPY OF THE FINAL REPORT IN CRIME NO. 1411/2016 OF MUSEUM POLICE STATION, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM DISTRICT, PENDING AS C.C. NO. 131/2017 ON THE FILE OF JFCM-III, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM EXHIBIT P4 A COPY OF THE REPORT DATED 05.10.2016 EXHIBIT P5 A COPY OF THE LETTER BEARING NO. 1126854/B3/2017/SJD DATED 03.06.2017 ISSUED BY THE UNDER SECRETARY ADDRESSED TO THE H.R. OF THE 2ND RESPONDENT EXHIBIT P6 A COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 23.06.2017 ISSUED BY THE HEAD OF DEPARTMENT, HUMAN RESOURCES, AIR INDIA SATS EXHIBIT P7 A COPY OF THE RELIEVING LETTER DATED 13.11.2017 ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER EXHIBIT P8 A COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 23.10.2019 IN WPC NO. 20939/2017 PASSED BY THIS HON'BLE COURT EXHIBIT P9 A COPY OF THE ORDER OF THE DEPUTY LABOUR COMMISSIONER DATED 29.05.2019 EXHIBIT P10 A COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 30.11.2021 IN APPEAL NO. SOA G:N2415/19(A) PASSED BY THE 6TH RESPONDENT EXHIBIT P11 A COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 04.05.2019 IN CMP NO.832/2019 PASSED BY THE COURT OF THE JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE OF THE FIRST CLASS - III, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM EXHIBIT P12 A COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 12.10.2020 IN CRL.R.P NO.20/2020 PASSED BY THE HON'BLE ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE** W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 27 : - **EXHIBIT P13 A COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 25.03.2020 IN CMP NO. 474/2020 IN C.C. NO. 131/2017 PASSED BY THE HON'BLE JUDICIAL FIRST-CLASS MAGISTRATE-III, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM** - **EXHIBIT P14 A COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 27.10.2021 IN CRL.M.C NO. 2092/2021 PASSED BY THIS HON'BLE COURT** - **EXHIBIT P15 A COPY OF THE REPORT IN DECCAN HERALD NEWSPAPER DATED 11.02.2022** - **EXHIBIT P16 A COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGES OF THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN AT WORKPLACE (PREVENTION PROHIBITION AND REDRESSAL)ACT 2013** - **EXHIBIT P17 A COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGES OF THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN AT WORKPLACE (PREVENTION PROHIBITION AND REDRESSAL)ACT 2013** - **EXHIBIT P18 A COPY OF THE RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT STANDING ORDERS ACT 1946** - **EXHIBIT P19 A COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGES WITH INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CODE 2020** - **EXHIBIT P20 A COPY OF THE S.R.O.NO.327/2016 IN PART II OF G.O (MS)NO.66/2016/LBR DATED 07.04.2016** - **EXHIBIT P21 A COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 01.11.2022 IN CRL.M.C. 847/2022 PASSED BY THIS HON'BLE COURT** - **EXHIBIT P22 A COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 30.09.2022 IN CRL.M.C. NO. 6797/2022 PASSED BY THIS HONBLE COURT** **RESPONDENT’S EXHIBITS** - **EXHIBIT R2(A) A COPY OF THE EMAIL DATED 18.10.2016 SENT BY THE HEAD-HR AND ADMINISTRATION TO THE PETITIONER** - **EXHIBIT R2(B) A COPY OF THE SHOW CAUSE NOTICE DATED 29.05.2017** - **EXHIBIT R2(C) A COPY OF THE CHARGE SHEET DATED 05.06.2017** - **EXHIBIT R2(D) A COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 12.06.2017** W.P.(C) No.20163/2022 : 28 : **EXHIBIT R2(E) A COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER DATED 17/08/2017 IN WP 20939/2017 EXHIBIT R2(F) A COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 17.07.2018 IN WA.NO.544/2018 EXHIBIT R2(G) A COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 21.11.2018 IN RP.NO.849/2018 IN WPC 20939/2017 EXHIBIT R2(H) A COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 23.10.2019 IN WP 20939/2017 EXHIBIT R3 (A) THE TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER IN WP(C) 20939/2017 DATED 17/08/2017 EXHIBIT R3(B) A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 17.07.2018 IN W.A.NO.544/2018 OF THIS HON BLE COURT EXHIBIT R3 (C) THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 21/11/2018 IN R.P. NO.849/2018 OF THIS HON'BLE COURT EXHIBIT R3 (D) THE TRUE COPY OF THE COUNTER IN APPEANO.G2415/2019 BEFORE THE HON'BLE REGIONAL LABOUR COMMISSIONER AT KOLLAM EXHIBIT R3 (E) THE TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM ORDER IN CRL.M.C NO.847/2022 BEFORE THIS HON'BLE COURT DATED 23/08/2022** **EXHIBIT R3(F) THE TRUE COPY OF RELEVANT PORTION OF CRL.M.C. NO.847/2022 OF THIS HON BLE COURT EXHIBIT R3 (G) THE TRUE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT PENDING BEFORE THE JFCM-1, KAKKANAD C.C. NO. 316 /2022**