Meethal Saseendran v. Tharayil Peedikayil Abdurahiman Haji and Others

# **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.R.ANITHA** **TUESDAY, THE 28[TH] DAY OF JUNE 2022 / 7TH ASHADHA, 1944** **RSA NO. 351 OF 2020** **AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT IN OS 207/2013 OF PRINCIPAL MUNSIFF** ## **COURT ,KANNUR** **AS 84/2016 OF SUB COURT, KANNUR** ## **APPELLANT/1st DEFENDANT:** MEETHAL SASEENDRAN AGED 57 YEARS S/O.GOPALAN, VISHAK NIVAS, MAKRERI AMSOM, MUNDALORE DESOM, P.O.MUNDALORE, KANNUR DISTRICT, PIN-670 622. BY ADVS. T.KRISHNANUNNI (SR.) SRI.VINOD RAVINDRANATH SMT.MEENA.A. SRI.K.C.KIRAN SMT.M.R.MINI SHRI.ANISH ANTONY ANATHAZHATH ## **RESPONDENTS/PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANTS 2 AND 3:** 1 THARAYIL PEEDIKAYIL ABDURAHIMAN HAJI, AGED 76 YEARS S/O.KUNHAMMED, BUSINESS, RESIDING AT ROSHINI MANZIL, CHIRAKKALKULAM WARD, KANNUR-670 003. 2 K.P.JYITHISH, AGED 52 YEARS S/O.BHASKARAN, BUSINESS, RESIDING AT KRISHNA KRIPA, SOUTH BAZAR, KANNUR, PIN-670 001. 3 P.P.VENU, FATHER'S NAME AND AGE NOT KNOWN TO THE APPELLANT, ADVOCATE, YOGASALA ROAD, KANNUR, PIN-670 001. BY ADVS. SRI.K.BABU SMT.C.LEENA SRI.SHAJI THOMAS THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 14.06.2022, THE COURT ON 28.06.2022 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: R.S.A.No.351/2020 2 ## **M.R.ANITHA, J** ****************** R.S.A.No.351 of 2020 ------------------------------------------Dated this the 28[th] day of June, 2022 ## **JUDGMENT** This Regular Second Appeal has been directed against the judgment and decree in A.S.No.84/2016 on the file of Subordinate Judges' Court, Kannur, which concurred with the judgment and decree in O.S.No.207/2013 on the file of Munsiff's Court, Kannur. O.S.No.207/2013 has been filed for declaration and recovery possession and permanent prohibitory injunction. Parties would be referred hereinafter as per the status before the trial court. 2. O.S.No.207/2013 was tried along with O.S.No.358/2013, a suit for injunction, which was filed by the R.S.A.No.351/2020 3 plaintiff against the Kannur Municipality and its Secretary and the appellant herein as defendants 1, 2 and 3. 3. Plaint schedule property absolutely belongs to the plaintiff and it was let out to the second defendant on a monthly rent of Rs.2,500/- as per the rent deed dated 02.04.2005. When the second defendant committed default in payment of rent, R.C.P.No.14/2011 was filed before the Additional Rent Control Court, Kannur. The petition was allowed and the building was delivered to the plaintiff as per order dated 06.03.2013 in E.P.No.26/2013. In 2011, second defendant had filed O.S.No.138/2011 before Sub Court, Thalassery making the plaintiff and defendant No.1 as defendants for declaring the sale deed No.4519/2006 as void. That suit was subsequently transferred to Sub Court, Kannur and was re-numbered as O.S.No.230/2012, which ultimately ended in dismissal for default on 07.07.2012. In O.S.No.138/2011 second defendant had specifically pleaded that he had not executed any document in favour of first defendant and had not obtained any power of attorney from the plaintiff. In that suit, plaintiff filed written R.S.A.No.351/2020 4 statement denying the execution of power of attorney. On 19.05.2013, when plaintiff was conducting some repair works in the shop room, first defendant tried to obstruct him in carrying out the repairs claiming title over the schedule property. Existence of document No.4519/2006 creates cloud upon the title of the plaintiff over the plaint schedule property. Hence suit has been filed seeking for a declaration that document No.4519/2006 is void and for perpetual injunction. On 08.01.2014 first defendant broke open the door of the building situated in the plaint schedule property and trespassed into the building and took possession of the building. So recovery of plaint schedule building on the strength of title was further sought. Against defendants 2 and 3, no relief has been sought. 4. First defendant filed written statement contending that the suit is not maintainable. O.S.No.138/2011 was a collusive suit between the plaintiff and the second defendant. After the dismissal of O.S.No.138/2011 the plaintiff did not opt to transpose him as plaintiff in that case. Only after a lapse of ten months, this suit has been filed with the same cause of action. R.S.A.No.351/2020 5 Hence the suit is barred by Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short 'the Code') as well as by the principles of estoppal by judgment. Plaintiff assigned the plaint schedule property in favour of this defendant through his power of attorney holder, the second defendant. After execution of document No.4519/2006, 2[nd] defendant is the absolute title holder in possession of the property. 5. R.C.P.No.14/2011 has been filed in collusion between the plaintiff and defendant No.2. Defendant No.1 is using the ground-floor of the building for real estate business and upstair room and stair case are in possession of tenants by name Abdul Shukkoor and K.P. Sumanth. Amin has not delivered physical possession of the building as per the order in R.C.P. The second defendant is a business partner of the plaintiff and power of attorney was executed before Advocate P.P. Venu who is a notary. No incident as alleged occurred on 19.05.2013. During 2010, the original title deed as well as power of attorney were lost while defendant was travelling from Thalasseri to Kannur. R.S.A.No.351/2020 6 6. Second defendant remained ex parte. Third defendant filed written statement contending that he was not a party in O.S.No.138/2011. As per the Notarial Register maintained by him, power of attorney has been executed by Abdul Rahiman Haji on 07.11.2005 appointing one K.P.Jyothish as the power of attorney for the sale of property of Abdul Rahiman Haji in Kannur village. Third defendant attested the execution of the power of attorney. So plaintiff has no cause of action as against 3[rd] defendant. 7. PWs 1 and 2 were examined and Exts.A1 to A25 series and Ext.C1 marked from the side of the plaintiff. Exts.B1 to B12 marked, DWs 1 and 2 examined from the side of first defendant. Exts.B4, B6 and B11 are said to have been rejected. 2[nd] defendant remained ex parte. 8. After hearing both sides, the learned Munsiff found that first defendant failed to establish the execution of power of attorney by the plaintiff in favour of the second defendant and hence the Sale Deed alleged to have been executed by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant is held to be R.S.A.No.351/2020 7 void ab initio. Since the first defendant was found to be in possession of the plaint schedule property, recovery of possession was ordered on the strength of title and consequently prohibitory injunction also granted against the first defendant. 9. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsiff, A.S.No.84/2016 was filed before the Subordinate Judge's Court, Kannur. Appeal was dismissed confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsiff. 10. Having lost the case in both the forums, the appellant approaches this Court in this Regular Second Appeal contending that the trial court as well as the first appellate court have not correctly understood the contentions of the parties and it ought to have been found that the appellant/first defendant has discharged the burden with respect to the proof of the power of attorney executed by the plaintiff in favour of the second defendant. R.C.P.No.14/2011 was filed in collusion between the plaintiff and the second defendant. O.S.No.138/2011 was also a collusive suit. It ought to have been found that the Sale Deed No.4519/2006 of S.R.O Kannur is a true and valid document. R.S.A.No.351/2020 8 First defendant discharged the burden with respect to proof of execution of power of attorney. 11. Notice was issued to the respondents and all the respondents were duly served. 12. Heard Smt.Meena A., learned counsel for the appellant and Adv.Shaji Thomas, learned counsel for the first respondent and Adv.C.Leena for the third respondent. For 2[nd] respondent/2[nd] defendant, there was no appearance. Lower court records were called for and perused. Heard both sides. 13. Plaintiff is the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property and he acquired right over the same as per Partition Deed No.1026/1958 of Sub Registrar's office, Kannur certified copy of which is marked as Ext.A1. He let out the building attached to the plaint schedule property to the 2[nd] defendant. When 2[nd] defendant kept rent in arrears, R.C.P.No.14/2011 was filed before the Rent Control Court, Kannur. That petition was allowed, Ext.A2 is the certified copy of order of the Rent Control Court in R.C.P.No.14/2011 and Ext.A3 is the delivery warrant in E.P.No.26/2013 in R.C.P.No.14/2011; Ext.A4 is the delivery R.S.A.No.351/2020 9 report; Ext.A5 is the certified copy of delivery receipt executed by the plaintiff. 14. The second defendant filed O.S.No.138/2011 against the first defendant and plaintiff for declaring sale deed No.4519/06 as void abinitio and consequential reliefs. The plaintiff filed written statement, copy of which is produced as Ext.A8, wherein he stoutly denied execution of any power of attorney in favour of the second defendant for the purpose of selling the plaint schedule property and also contended that the alleged power of attorney as well as Document No.4519/06 of Kannur S.R.O are liable to be set aside and the second defendant as well as the first defendant has to be dealt with in accordance with law for fabricating documents. He also vehemently contended that the property is well in his possession and is not parted with the possession to the first defendant. Subsequently, that suit happened to be dismissed for default on 07.07.2012. Thereafter, the present suit has been filed by the plaintiff. 15. So, the first question is with regard to the bar under Order II Rule 2 of the Code. R.S.A.No.351/2020 10 16. Bar under Order II Rule 2 was raised in view of dismissal of O.S.No.138/2011 on 07.07.2012 which was filed by the second defendant, the tenant of the plaintiff. It would be apposite in this context to quote Order II Rule 2 which reads thus : _“Suits to include the whole claim: (1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court .”_ _(2)Relinquishment of part of claim.- Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished._ _(3)Omission to sue for one of several reliefs.- A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs; but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted._ 17. On going through the above it could be seen that the bar under Order II Rule 2 is mandatory and plaintiff is bound to R.S.A.No.351/2020 11 claim the entire relief so as to afford ground for final decisions upon the subjects in dispute and to prevent further litigation between the parties. Sub Rule 2 further provides that where the plaintiff omits to sue in respect of or intentionally relinquishes any portion of his claim he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. So, on a bare reading of the provision, it would be clear that the express bar of Order II Rule 2 is against the plaintiff in filing a subsequent suit in respect of the portions omitted or relinquished. Here, admittedly, the suit O.S.No.138/2011 has been filed by the 2[nd] defendant who is the tenant of the plaintiff against the first defendant and the plaintiff as 2[nd] defendant. 18. It is relevant in this context to quote **P. Rama Aiyar v. T. Bagavathimuthu Pillai and Ors MANU/TN/0202/1935** **AIR 1936 Madras 473** wherein a Division Bench of Madras High Court held that warrant of Order II Rule 2 will not preclude a defendant from relying upon his rights in a subsequent proceeding when he was only a defendant in the earlier suit. The plaintiff in this case was the defendant in the earlier suit. R.S.A.No.351/2020 12 19. So, relinquishment of the claim by the second defendant in the earlier suit will not in any way operate as a bar under Order II Rule 2 as against the plaintiff who had filed written statement stoutly denying the execution of the power of attorney and the transfer of property by him to the first defendant. 20. In the appeal memorandum, bar of res judicata also raised due to non-filing of the appeal against the decree in O.S.No.358/2013. **Raghavan Nambiar v. Sumathi Amma : 1991 (1) KLJ 61** was placed before the first appellate court in this regard wherein it has been held that where two or more suits are jointly heard and disposed of by a common judgment entering findings on issues in them, all the findings will bind the parties separately and they will operate as res judicata, if not challenged and corrected in appeal. But, in the present case, O.S.No.358/2013 has been filed by the plaintiff against the Municipality and Secretary as well as the first defendant against grant of licence to the first defendant herein for conducting the business and to restrain the first defendant herein from getting R.S.A.No.351/2020 13 the licence. That suit was dismissed by the learned Munsiff on the ground of bar of jurisdiction of civil court by special procedures established by special statute with respect to the grant of licence. So, the issue in O.S.No.358/2013 and the present case are not similar or substantially the same. It has also been found by the learned Munsiff that if the plaintiff is entitled for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property in O.S.No.207/2013 by declaring Ext.D3 title deed as void, relief in O.S.No.358/2013 will become infructuous also. Hence dismissal of O.S.No.358/2013 will not operate as res judicata against the plaintiff in contesting the appeal against the judgment in O.S.No.207/2013 (A.S.No.84/2016) since issues decided in both suits are not similar or substantially the same. 21. Next question is with regard to power of attorney alleged to have been executed by the plaintiff. Execution of power of attorney has been stoutly denied by the plaintiff. The first defendant claims right over the property covered by Ext.B3 document alleged to have been executed by 2[nd] defendant under the authority of power of attorney executed by the plaintiff in R.S.A.No.351/2020 14 favour of the 2[nd] defendant. It has come out that the second defendant had already filed O.S.No.138/2011 for setting aside the document as well as denying the execution of such power of attorney by the plaintiff in favour of him, though the suit was ultimately dismissed for default. It is after about ten months of the dismissal of that suit, the present suit has been filed by the plaintiff. Though the learned counsel for the appellant contends about the delay in filing the suit inspite of the dismissal of O.S.No.138/2011 on 07.07.2012, since it is within the period of limitation the fact that the suit has been filed after about ten months of the dismissal of O.S.No.138/2011 is of no avail to the appellant. Since the execution of power of attorney has been emphatically denied by the plaintiff and the first defendant asserts to have the existence of such a power of attorney as per Section 101 Illustration (b) of the Indian Evidence Act, the burden is upon him to prove the existence of such a power of attorney. First defendant relies upon the written statement filed by the 3[rd] defendant the Notary Public before whom the power of attorney alleged to have been executed. Third defendant R.S.A.No.351/2020 15 contended in the written statement that the power of attorney has been executed by Abdul Rahiman Haji on 07.11.2005 appointing one K.P.Jyothish as the power of attorney for the sale of property of Abdul Rahiman Haji in Kannur village and the execution of the power of attorney has been attested by him. But the 3[rd] defendant has not been examined and it is not proved that the Abdul Rahiman Haji referred to in the written statement of third defendant is the plaintiff herein. No attempt was also made at the instance of the first defendant to get the register concerned produced from the custody of the third defendant. The pleadings in the written statement of 3[rd] defendant will not constitute evidence. So, the written statement filed by the third defendant cannot be relied on by the first defendant as proof of execution of power of attorney by the plaintiff in favour of the second defendant. 22. It is also pertinent to note that either the sale deed alleged to have been executed by the plaintiff in original or the power of attorney could be produced before the court by the first defendant. The first defendant has got a specific contention that R.S.A.No.351/2020 16 the sale deed as well as the power of attorney has been lost in transit. To substantiate that contention he produced Ext.B12 newspaper advertisement regarding the loss of power of attorney as well as the sale deed. But, in Ext.B12 there is reference only with regard to the sale deed and there is no mention regarding the power of attorney. Ext.B13 is copy of the original petition filed by the first defendant before this Court against an order in I.A.No.689/2014 filed in the suit for calling documents from the Municipality. That application was dismissed by the trial court and in that the contention of the first defendant was that documents are to be called from the Municipality to compare the signature in the power of attorney with the admitted signatures. So, it was concluded by the learned Munsiff as well as the first appellate court that it would lead to an inference that the first defendant was in possession of the power of attorney even during 2014. That was also taken as a circumstance to conclude that the contention of the first defendant that the power of attorney was lost during 2010 in transit is a false story. That may be the reason why there is no reference in Ext.B12 about the loss of R.S.A.No.351/2020 17 power of attorney and only the loss of sale deed has been referred there. Apart from the oral evidence of first defendant there is no evidence with regard to the existence of power of attorney. Section 63(5) of the Indian Evidence At, 1872 says that Oral accounts of the contents of a document given by some person who has himself seen it is a secondary evidence. But none of the contingencies stipulated in Section 65 of the Evidence Act is satisfied to permit the plaintiff to give secondary evidence relating to power of attorney. Learned counsel for the plaintiff in this context placed reliance on **Abraham K.J and Another v. Mariamma Itty and Others : 2016 (3) KHC 718.** 23. Admittedly, the power of attorney could not be produced before the court and in the previous paragraphs it has been found that the contention of the first defendant that the power of attorney has been lost in transit is not believable and it has also been found that the facts and circumstances would only leads to a conclusion that the alleged power of attorney was with the first defendant which is probabilised by Ext.A13, the O.P. filed by the first defendant before this Court. R.S.A.No.351/2020 18 24. In **Abraham K.J. And Anr. v. Mariamma Itty and Ors. :2016 (3) KHC 718 (D.B.)** relied on by the counsel a Division Bench of this Court had made a detailed probe into the validity of the power of attorney and non-production of the same before the court etc. That was a case in which plaintiffs alleged that first plaintiff executed a power of attorney in favour of the 5[th] defendant only for the purpose of facilitating building construction and he never authorised the 5[th] defendant to sell any portion of his property. Second plaintiff had executed another power of attorney in favour of the 5[th] defendant even before purchase of the property intending to enable him to develop the property and none has a case that the 2[nd] plaintiff's property had been sold by the 5[th] defendant using the power of attorney executed by her. The case of the plaintiffs is that 5[th] defendant has no authority to deal with the 2[nd] plaintiff's property and it has been contended by either side that the other side has the responsibility to produce materials to show that the 5[th] defendant had no power to execute either Ext.A2 or Ext. A5 so as to bind the respective plaintiffs. The suit was filed when plaintiffs found R.S.A.No.351/2020 19 on enquiry that 5[th] defendant executed Ext.A2 Sale Deed in favour of 4[th] defendant in respect of a portion of plaint B Schedule property using the power of attorney and the suit has been filed for declaring the Sale Deed _ab initio_ void and not binding on the plaintiffs or their right in the properties or for recovery of possession. Defendant contended that the property was sold to him by a registered Sale Deed. In that context it was held that mere registration of the document will not amount to conclusive proof and the fact that the executant had valid power and authority for executing the Sale Deed through the power of attorney will have to be proved by adducing cogent evidence. It is also held that it is incumbent as per Section 101 of the Evidence Act on the purchaser of property to prove that the 5 th defendant had the requisite authority to execute the Sale Deed by using the power of attorney. It is also held that when the purchaser of property fails to produce the power of attorney in court an adverse inference can be drawn against the purchaser. In that case the recitals in the document showed that a copy of the challenged power of attorney had been given to the assignee R.S.A.No.351/2020 20 (4[th] defendant). Fourth defendant has no valid reason for not producing the copy of the impugned power of attorney which is handed over to him at the time of sale. So in the absence of production of the copy of the said power of attorney by the 4[th] defendant an adverse inference has been drawn that he intentionally withheld power of attorney in the name of 5[th] defendant as it was unfavourable to him. 25. In the present case, the situation is more dangerous. The first defendant had got a specific case that the power of attorney as well as the original sale deed alleged to have been executed in his favour has been lost in transit. According to him, he had made an advertisement in the newspaper also about the missing of document i.e. power of attorney as well as the original sale deed. But the paper publication, Ext.B12, only speaks about the sale deed. It is also to be noted that though the first defendant has got a specific case that the said documents were lost in the year 2010, Ext.B12 paper publication was effected only in the year 2011 after the filing of O.S.No.138/2011 by the second defendant. So all those factors would speak in volumes R.S.A.No.351/2020 21 that first defendant wilfully suppressed the power of attorney from the court. It may only be due to the fact that it would not have given any such authorisation to the second defendant by the plaintiff. So non-production of the power of attorney cuts the roots of the defence of the first defendant regarding the authority of the second defendant who is only a tenant of the plaintiff to execute a sale deed with respect to the tenanted premises in favour of him. 26. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would also bring to my attention the fact that inspite of the alleged execution of sale deed in favour of the first defendant the plaintiff had been paying tax, both land tax and building tax, with respect to the plaint schedule building and property and Ext.24 series are the tax receipts issued by the Village Officer relating to the period 2009-2011 as well as building tax receipts Ext.A25 series relating to the period 2007-2013. First defendant also produced the building tax receipts relating to the period 2011-2013, possession certificate and property tax receipts issued by Village Officer relating to the period 2009-2012 (Exts.B6 to B7 series). But, it is R.S.A.No.351/2020 22 well settled that entry in revenue records will not confer any title (See **Suraj Bhan and Others v. Financial Commissioner and Others : (2007) 6 SCC 186** ). 27. It is also brought out that along with the filing of this case, Commissioner visited the property and Ext.C1 commission report was filed and plaintiff is found in possession of the building at the time of inspection on 28.05.2013. So also, the delivery receipt in R.C.P which is produced as Ext.A3 delivery report in E.P 26/13 and A4 certified copy of Amin's account in E.P. 26/2013 and Ext.A5, certified copy of the receipt in E.P.No.26/2013, would conclusively prove that at the time of delivery in execution of the order in RCP 14/2011 first defendant was not in possession of the building and the building was actually lying locked and the Amin break opened the key and effected delivery and the plaintiff was given actual delivery of possession of the building. It is pending the proceedings in this suit that first defendant took forceful possession of the building and the plaintiff has got a specific contention that first defendant was a convict in a murder case and fearing him actually his unlawful acts were not resisted by R.S.A.No.351/2020 23 him. Whatever it be the documents produced from the side of the plaintiff would conclusively establish that he got delivery of the property through the court as per Order in RCP 14/2011 (Ext.A2 order). Ext.A1 is the certified copy of partition deed by which the plaintiff obtained the plaint schedule property. It would conclusively establish the plaintiff's right and title over the plaint schedule property. Ext.A24 (series) and A25 (series) prove his possession of the property even after the execution of Ext.B3 sale deed (Ext.A9). 28. It is true that the learned counsel for the appellant/ first defendant, would also contend that actually this is a case of collusion between the 2[nd] defendant and the plaintiff and first defendant actually lost the amount by purchasing the property and now he has been left without any remedy. Collusion between plaintiff and second defendant is not so explicit. It is true that he had filed O.S.No.138/2011 for declaring the sale deed and power of attorney as null and void and that suit was subsequently dismissed for default. He did not contest the suit also. If at all he was actually sailing with plaintiff nothing prevented him from R.S.A.No.351/2020 24 contesting this case supporting the plaint allegations. But that has not been done. 29. As per Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short 'the Code'), the High Court on satisfaction of involvement of a substantial question of law can entertain an appeal from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to it. In **Govinda Raju v. Mariamman : AIR 2005 SC 1008** it has been held that the existing substantial question of law is a sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code. In **K.N.Nagarajappa vs H.Narasimha Reddy** : **(2021 (5) KLT Online 1137 (SC)** the circumstances under which High Court can interfere with findings of lower court on concurrent findings of facts has been explained. Paragraph 14 of the said decision is relevant to be extracted which reads thus: _“Undoubtedly, the jurisdiction which a High Court derives under Section 100 is based upon its framing of a substantial question of law. As a matter of law, it is axiomatic that the findings of the first appellate court are final. However, the rule that sans a substantial question of law, the High Courts cannot interfere with findings of the_ R.S.A.No.351/2020 25 _lower Court or concurrent findings of fact, is subject to two important caveats. The first is that, if the findings of fact are palpably perverse or outrage the conscience of the court; in other words, it flies on the face of logic that given the facts on the record, interference would be justified. The other is where the findings of fact may call for examination and be upset, in the limited circumstances spelt out in Section 103 CPC."_ 30. So, this Court can interfere with the concurrent findings of facts of the courts below only on satisfaction of existence of a substantial question of law. 31. In the present case, the plaintiff could establish as has been found by the trial court as well as the first appellant court that the sale deed No.4519/2006 of Sub Registry office, Kannur is null and void and is not binding on the plaintiff and the plaint schedule property. Recovery of possession was also ordered along with consequential prohibitory order of injunction. The concurrent findings so entered into by the courts below are perfectly legal and proper and I do not find any substantive question of law for enabling this Court to make any interference R.S.A.No.351/2020 26 in this R.S.A and accordingly it is dismissed. (sd/-) **M.R.ANITHA, JUDGE** jsr/shg True Copy P.S to Judge