High Court of KeralaSingle JudgeAppeal dismissed; acquittal maintained.

M.C. George v. K.C. Joseph and State of Kerala

Case / Petition Number:CRL.A. No. 2345 of 2009

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • C. T. Ravikumar
Judgment Date
2013-01-16
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal dismissed; the judgment of acquittal by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alappuzha, is upheld; the respondent is not convicted under Section 138 NI Act; the appellant’s challenge to the acquittal fails.
Final Disposition
Appeal dismissed; acquittal maintained.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • M.C. George

Respondents

  • K.C. Joseph
  • State of Kerala

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Sri K.S. Hariharaputhran
  • • Sri M.D. Sasikumar
  • • Sri George Mathew

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Public Prosecutor
  • • Smt. S. Hima-R2

Case Synopsis & Summary

This is a criminal appeal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, preferred by the complainant M.C. George (the appellant) against the judgment of acquittal in CC No. 209 of 2009 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alappuzha, on 13 August 2008. The appellant alleged that the first respondent, K.C. Joseph, borrowed Rs. 98,000 and issued a post-dated cheque (Ext. P1) drawn on Federal Bank, Alappuzha, in discharge of the debt; the cheque bounced for insufficiency of funds. After the complainant’s evidence (PW1) and documentary Exts. P1–P5, the accused was examined under Section 313 CrPC, and DW1 testified for the defence. The trial court acquitted the accused under Section 255(1) CrPC, finding the prosecution failed to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt and regarding the execution of Ext. P1. The appellant contends that the trial court blindly accepted the accused’s version, ignored the presumption under Section 139 NI Act, and did not properly consider the evidence of the loan and execution of Ext. P1; he relies on Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde to emphasize that the prosecution must prove execution and that the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt, with applied preponderance of probabilities for the accused. The High Court, after reviewing the evidence and the trial court’s reasoning, dismisses the appeal and sustains the acquittal. The final disposition is that the appeal fails and the acquittal stands.

Provisions of Law Cited

Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Section 67 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Beyond reasonable doubt (prosecution standard)
  • Preponderance of probabilities (standard for the accused)
  • No presumption of execution under Section 139 NI Act; presumption relates to consideration/amount if due execution is proved (Krishna Janardhan Bhat)

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant contends that the trial court relied on DW1’s testimony without proper corroboration and did not accord due weight to Ext. P1 and the evidence of loan (Exts. P1–P5). He argues that Section 139 NI Act creates a presumption in favor of liability upon due execution and that the prosecution need only establish the loan and the cheque; the failure to prove execution should not lead to acquittal if the circumstances demonstrate a probable loan transaction. He relies on Krishna Janardhan Bhat to underline the standard of proof and the need to prove execution; the balance of probabilities suggests the original loan transaction and execution of Ext. P1 were established.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents submit that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the execution of Ext. P1 and the loan transaction; the accused denied execution; DW1’s testimony is credible and consistent with the defence; the trial court’s assessment of evidence was proper, and the acquittal is warranted under CrPC 255(1). The court is urged to uphold the acquittal and reject the appeal.

Cited Precedents (1)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde(2008) 2 SCC (CrL.) 166PositiveCited to explain that there is no presumption of execution under Sec. 139 NI Act; the presumption pertains to consideration and requires proof of due execution; the prosecution must prove execution, and standard of proof evolves from the Supreme Court’s ratio.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.T.RAVIKUMAR WEDNESDAY, THE 16TH DAY OF JANUARY 2013/26TH POUSHA 1934 CRL.A.No. 2345 of 2009 ( ) -------------------------- AGAINST THE JUDGMENT IN CC.209/2009 DATED 13-08-2009 OF THE COURT OF CHIEF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE, ALAPPUZHA ------------------------------------------ PETITIONER/COMPLAINANT ----------------------- M.C.GEORGE, S/O.CHACKO, "SRUTHY",KALARKODU WARD,AMBALAPUZHA TALUK ALAPPUZHA DISTRICT. BY ADVS.SRI.K.S.HARIHARAPUTHRAN SRI.M.D.SASIKUMAR SRI.GEORGE MATHEW RESPONDENT(S)/ACCUSED AND STATE: ------------------------------- 1. K.C.JOSEPH, S/O.CHACKO, AGED 73,KALATHIL VEEDU,OPP. THE HOUSE OF THAIPARAMBIL THOMAS,CHETHIPUZHA,KURISUMUKKU P.O. CHANGANACHERY. 2. STATE OF KERALA, REP. BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,HIGH COURT OF KERALA ERNAKULAM. BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SMT.S.HIMA-R2 THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 16-01-2013, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ## **C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J. ========================== CRL.APPEAL. No.2345 OF 2009 ==========================** Dated this the 16[th ] day of January, 2013 ## **JUDGMENT** This appeal is directed against the judgment of acquittal dated 13.8.2008 in C.C.No.209 of 2009 passed by the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alappuzha on the complainant filed by the appellant against the first respondent herein alleging commission of offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The trial court found that the appellant had failed to prove the offence against the accused and consequently held him not guilty and acquitted him under section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. The case of the appellant/complainant is as follows:The first respondent/accused borrowed an amount of **Crl.A.2345/09** 2 Rs.98,000/- from him and in discharge of the said legally enforceable debt, Ext.P1 cheque drawn on the Federal Bank Limited, Alappuzha was issued by the first respondent. On its presentation for encashment, the same got dishonoured on the ground of insufficiency of funds. A demand notice was issued to the first respondent within the statutorily prescribed period. However, the first respondent failed to pay the amount covered by the said cheque within the prescribed period. 3. the the first Obviously, to prove charge against respondent, the appellant got examined as PW1 and Exts.P1 to P5 were marked. On closing the complainant's evidence, the accused was examined under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He denied all the incriminating circumstances put to him. Finding that it is not a fit case for acquittal, the appellant was called upon to enter his evidence and thereupon he examined one Ouseph as DW1 and got marked Ext.D1. After careful evaluation of the evidence on record, the **Crl.A.2345/09** 3 trial court found that the appellant had failed to prove conclusively the offence alleged against the first respondent/accused. Consequently, the first respondent was found not guilty and he was acquitted under section 255(1) Cr.P.C. 4. The contentions of the appellant is that the court below had blindly believed the version of the accused without any corroboration and that there was no reason to hold that the petitioner is not entitled to the presumption available under section 139 of the Act. The evidence of DW1 ought not to have been believed as he is an interesting witness besides being inimical to the appellant. It is also contended that the findings of the court below that the appellant herein had failed to prove the original transaction is not true to facts. The appellant who was examined as PW1 deposed that on 4.5.2007, the first respondent/accused borrowed Rs.98,000/- from him and Ext.P1 post dated cheque drawn on Federal Bank Limited, Alappuzha for the said amount was issued. He deposed in tune with the averments made in **Crl.A.2345/09** 4 the complaint. Evidently, the first respondent/accused denied the execution of Ext.P1 cheque. With respect to the source of fund, the case of the appellant revealed from his evidence, is that he had withdrawn an amount of Rs.50,000/- from his account on 31.8.2006. Admittedly, the said amount was withdrawn 9 months prior to the alleged date of lending. It cannot be presumed that in anticipation of a future requirement of the accused he had withdrawn an amount of Rs.50,000/- from his account and kept it with him. There is absolutely no explanation as to how the balance amount was raised. That apart, more importantly, the appellant did not have a case that he had actually seen the execution of Ext.P1 cheque. In such a case, the appellant had to prove the execution of Ext.P1 cheque by resorting to the recognized methods as provided under law in view of the denial of execution by the first respondent/accused. In the said circumstances, evidently, he attempted to let in evidence regarding the original transaction. **Crl.A.2345/09** 5 5. In the decision reported in **Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde [(2008) 2 SCC (Crl.) 166]** , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that there can be no presumption as to execution of a cheque under section 139 of the NI Act and the presumption which is possible is only with respect to the consideration and that presumption could be raised only when due execution of the cheque is proved. As already held, the appellant had no case that he had seen the execution of Ext.P1 cheque. He had not examined any person who witnessed such execution and also had failed to bring in an expert opinion, in terms of the provisions under section 67 of the Evidence Act, to prove the execution. In such circumstances, the appellant had to let in evidence regarding the original transaction. I have already adverted to the case of the appellant regarding the transaction. The case of the appellant is that he had withdrawn an amount of Rs.50,000/- nine months prior to the date of alleged lending and kept it with him. The standard of proof required on the part of the accused and that of the prosecution have also been dealt with by the **Crl.A.2345/09** 6 Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Krishna Janardhan Bhat's** case (supra). It was held that prosecution must prove the guilt of an accused beyond all reasonable doubt and the standard of proof required on the part of an accused is “preponderance of probabilities”. Going by the said decision, inference of preponderance of probabilities could be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by referring to the circumstances upon which the accused relies. In regard to the aforesaid factual details elaborately discussed in the judgment of the court below, no dispute has been raised. In this case, considering the case put forth by the accused and the appellant and on a careful evaluation of the evidence on record, the court below found that the first respondent had made out a probable case and the appellant had failed to prove the original transaction as stated in the complaint as also the execution of Ext.P1 cheque. In view of the facts and circumstances and the indisputable and undisputed evidence obtained as above, the said finding of the court below cannot be said to be palpably wrong. The appellant has failed to make out a case so **Crl.A.2345/09** 7 as to invite an appellate interference. In the circumstances expatiated above, it cannot be said that the judgment of the trial court is perverse or against the weight of evidence. In such circumstances, it can only be held that the appellant has failed to make out a prima facie case for appellate interference. This appeal is, therefore, liable to fail and accordingly, it is dismissed. **Sd/C.T. RAVIKUMAR (JUDGE)** **spc/** **Crl.A.2345/09** 8 **C.T. RAVIKUMAR, J.** **JUDGMENT September, 2010** # **Crl.A.2345/09** 9