High Court of KeralaSingle JudgeAppeal disposed of; the plaintiff shall deposit...

Mary Antony and Others v. Roy Joseph

Case / Petition Number:RFA No. 98 of 2013

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court of Kerala
Hon'ble Judges
  • P. Somarajan
Judgment Date
2022-01-11
Court Decision / Holding
The appeal is disposed of with directions that the plaintiff deposit an additional Rs.15,00,000 within five months; failure to do so will set aside the trial court’s decree for specific performance and decree the suit in part returning the advance amount with interest. This balances delay, financial capability, and the evident intent to perform, applying Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act.
Final Disposition
Appeal disposed of; the plaintiff shall deposit an additional Rs.15,00,000 within five months; failure to deposit will set aside the decree of specific performance and the suit will be decreed in part for return of the advance amount with interest, thereby finalizing the dispute in part.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Mary Antony
  • Jancy
  • Applonia
  • Annamma
  • Matilda
  • Antony

Respondents

  • Roy Joseph

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Sri.K.S.Hariharaputhran
  • • Sri.Dipu James
  • • Sri.George Mathew
  • • Sri.P.M.Ismail
  • • Sri.M.D.Sasikumar

Counsels for Respondents

  • • Sri.Mathew John (K)
  • • Sri.Mathew Devassi
  • • Sri.ABY J Augustine

Case Synopsis & Summary

This Regular First Appeal (RFA No. 98 of 2013) arises from a suit for specific performance brought by Roy Joseph against six defendants, including Mary Antony and her children, in respect of 11.250 cents of land with a residential building. The trial court granted specific performance, accepting Ext.A2 agreement dated 20.06.2009 for Rs.12,50,000 with an advance of Rs.2,25,000 and considering the defendants’ obligation to perform. Before expiry of the contract period the plaintiff contends readiness and willingness to perform, but the defendants dispute the plaintiff’s readiness and willingness, arguing lack of direct evidence as required under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. The plaintiff’s evidence was largely through a power of attorney holder, PW1, and Ext.A7 (a bank certificate) and Ext.A5 response. The High Court discusses the differentiation between readiness (financial capacity to pay) and willingness (intent to perform) and cites Susheela (died) v. T.M.Muhammedkunhi to emphasize that direct evidence is not always essential where other evidence suffices, while noting inconsistencies in Ext.A7 and the bank loan details. It ultimately considers discretion under Section 20 of the Act, referencing Vasudevakurup v. Haridasan and other authorities, and holds that the plaintiff must deposit Rs.15,00,000 within five months, failing which the decree will be set aside and the suit decreed in part for return of the advance amount with interest, thereby disposing of the appeal.

Provisions of Law Cited

Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief ActSection 20 of the Specific Relief Act

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • A distinction may be drawn between readiness to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract.
  • Readiness means the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract and includes the financial ability to raise the money to pay the purchase price.
  • Even if the plaintiff has the financial capacity to pay the purchase price and thereby shows readiness to perform, that need not necessarily mean that he is willing to perform his part of the contract; willingness is separately required.
  • Direct evidence is not always necessary to prove readiness and willingness if other evidence suffices to establish the statutory requirement under Section 16(c).
  • The mental element and intention to perform the essential terms of the contract are crucial for readiness and willingness.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellants contended that the plaintiff failed to prove readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) since the evidence was primarily through a power of attorney holder and not direct testimony; Ext.A7 bank certificate and Ext.A5 reply were fraught with inconsistencies, including missing loan account numbers and dubious timing of the demand draft; therefore, there was a lack of positive, cross-examined evidence of the plaintiff’s readiness and willingness. They urged that the court should not rely on mere financial capacity without clear intent to perform; the exercise of discretion under Section 20 should not compel deposit of a large sum given the delays and the circumstances surrounding the Ext.A2 agreement.

Contentions of Respondents

The respondents argued that readiness includes financial capacity and the evidence, though partly through PW1, plus Ext.A7 and other records, demonstrated the plaintiff’s ability and intention to perform. They contended that cross-examination is not indispensable if the surrounding evidence, credibility, and circumstances establish readiness and willingness; the documentary evidence, investment in the property, and legal precedents on Section 20 support the trial court’s decision. They urged the court to grant discretion to ensure finality and prevent undue delay.

Cited Precedents (12)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
Susheela (died) and Others v. T.M.Muhammedkunhi2012 (1) KHC 508 (DB)PositiveUsed to illustrate the distinction between readiness and willingness and to support the need for direct evidence in certain contexts.
Raj Rani Bhasin (Smt.) v. S. Kartar Singh MehtaAIR 1975 Delhi 137PositiveCited to show that readiness alone without willingness may be insufficient for specific performance.
Vasudevakurup v. Haridasan2021 (6) KLT 782PositiveUsed to discuss discretion under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act.
Her Highness Maharani Shantidevi P.Gaikwad v. Savjibhai Haribhai Patel and OthersAIR 2001 SC 1462PositiveThree-judge SC decision cited in the context of Section 20 discretion.
A.C.Arulappan v. Smt.Ahalya NaikAIR 2001 SC 2783PositiveReferenced among apex court authorities relevant to Specific Relief Act.
Tejram v. PatirambhauAIR 1997 SC 2702PositiveCited as part of the apex court precedents considered.
Kanshi Ram v. Om Prakash Jawan and OthersAIR 1996 SC 2150PositiveCited as authority in the surrounding discussion on relief.
S.Rangaraju Naidu v. S.ThiruvarakkarasuAIR 1995 SC 1769PositiveCited within the authority discussion for Specific Relief Act.
Azhar Sultana v.B.Rajamani and OrsAIR 2009 SC 2157PositiveCited for the apex court perspectives on readiness/willingness.
Gobind Ram v. Gian ChandAIR 2000 SC 3106PositiveCited as supportive precedent in relief matters.
Damacherla Anjaneyulu and Another v. Damacheria Venkata Seshaiah and AnotherAIR 1987 SC 1641PositiveCited among apex court authorities in the context of discretion and readiness.
Antony K.O and Another v. M.K.Krishnankutty Menoki and Others2017 (1) KHC 479 = 2017 (1) KLJ 357Mentioned OnlyMentioned as part of the Division Bench authorities referenced without direct application in the ruling.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

## **`IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM`** ## **`PRESENT`** ## **`THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.SOMARAJAN`** ``` TUESDAY, THE 11[TH] DAY OF JANUARY 2022 / 21ST POUSHA, 1943 ``` ## **`RFA NO. 98 OF 2013`** ``` AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 29.09.2012 IN OS 478/2009 OF SUB COURT, ALAPPUZHA ``` ## **`APPELLANTS/ DEFENDANTS:`** - **`1 MARY ANTONY AGED 66 YEARS W/O.ANTONY, BAVAKKAD HOUSE, THUMPOLY WARD, ARYAD SOUTH VILLAGE, ALAPPUZHA-8.`** - **`2 JANCY AGED 43 YEARS`** ``` D/O.MARY ANTONY, BAVAKKAD HOUSE, THUMPOLY WARD, ARYAD SOUTH VILLAGE, ALAPPUZHA-8. ``` ``` 3APPLONIA AGED 37 YEARS D/O.MARY ANTONY, BAVAKKAD HOUSE, THUMPOLY WARD, ARYAD SOUTH VILLAGE, ALAPPUZHA-8. ``` - **`4 ANNAMMA AGED 34 YEARS D/O.MARY ANTONY, BAVAKKAD HOUSE, THUMPOLY WARD, ARYAD SOUTH VILLAGE, ALAPPUZHA-8.`** - **`5 MATILDA AGED 33 YEARS D/O.MARY ANTONY, BAVAKKAD HOUSE, THUMPOLY WARD, ARYAD SOUTH VILLAGE, ALAPPUZHA-8.`** ``` 6ANTONY AGED 32 YEARS S/O.MARY ANTONY, BAVAKKAD HOUSE, THUMPOLY WARD, ARYAD SOUTH VILLAGE, ALAPPUZHA-8. ``` ``` BY ADVS. SRI.K.S.HARIHARAPUTHRAN SRI.DIPU JAMES SRI.GEORGE MATHEW SRI.P.M.ISMAIL SRI.M.D.SASIKUMAR ``` ``` RFA NO. 98 OF 2013 ``` ``` 2 ``` ## **`RESPONDENT/PLAINTIFF:`** ``` ROY JOSEPH AGED 40 YEARS S/O.M.F.JOSEPH, KANJIRAMCHIRA, ARYADU SOUTH VILLAGE, ALAPPUZHA-7, NOW EMPLOYED AT KUWAIT, REP. BY HIS POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER & WIFE, JEE MARY ROY, AGED 30, KANJIRAMCHIRA, ARYADU SOUTH VILLAGE, ALAPPUZHA-7. ``` ``` BY ADVS. SRI.MATHEW JOHN (K) SRI.MATHEW DEVASSI SRI.ABY J AUGUSTINE ``` ``` THIS REGULAR FIRST APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR HEARING ON 11.01.2022, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ``` ``` RFA NO. 98 OF 2013 ``` ``` 3 ``` ## **`JUDGMENT`** ``` A suit for specific performance granted by the trial court is under challenge. It is pertaining to 11.250 cents of property with a residential building therein. The defendants have agreed to sell the same for a total consideration of Rs.12,50,000/- by executing Ext.A2 agreement dated 20.06.2009, by which, an advance amount of Rs.2,25,000/- was received by stipulating a period of six months. Just before the expiry of the period agreed into, Ext.A3 notice was issued on 08.12.2009 demanding performance of part of contract to the defendants, to which, Ext.A5 reply was issued disputing the alleged subsequent payment of Rs.50,000/- and also disputing the readiness and willingness alleged. The trial court on consideration of the evidence and after hearing both the parties, decreed the suit by granting ``` ``` RFA NO. 98 OF 2013 ``` ``` 4 ``` ``` specific performance, against which the defendants came up. ``` ``` 2. The property agreed to be sold admittedly is the only place of abode of the first defendant and her children. But she decided to sell the property for the purpose of meeting the marriage expenses of her two unmarried daughters, the defendants 4 and 5 and also for meeting the treatment expenses of the sixth defendant, a crippled son. ``` ``` 3. The suit was instituted through a power of attorney holder. Oral evidence was also tendered through the said power holder. The plaintiff did not mount on the box to give direct evidence. It was taken up as a ground to reject the readiness and willingness deposed through the power holder. It was submitted that the statutory requirement under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act would constitute some ``` ``` RFA NO. 98 OF 2013 ``` ``` 5 ``` ``` mental element coupled with intention to perform the essential terms of contract to be performed by the plaintiff, for which, there should be direct evidence amenable to cross examination. Hence, it was argued that the non-examination of the plaintiff would be fatal as against the requirement to be established under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. But, in order to prove the readiness and willingness to perform the essential terms of contract by the plaintiff, it is not at all necessary to insist direct evidence when other evidences are sufficient enough to discharge the statutory requirement. A mere oral evidence tendered through the witnesses cannot be substituted in the place of direct evidence to be given by the plaintiff so as to discharge the statutory requirement under Section 16(c) of the Act, unless there is evidence to show any positive and affirmative action disclosing the mental ``` ``` RFA NO. 98 OF 2013 ``` ``` 6 ``` ``` element and intention regarding the readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract. In other words, the availability of amount either in cash or otherwise with the plaintiff sufficient to meet the requirement, though constitutes a relevant factor, may not by itself discharge the burden to prove readiness and willingness unless spoken to directly by him by mounting on the box and tested its credibility by cross examination. Paragraph 15 of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Susheela (died) and Others v. T.M.Muhammedkunhi (2012 (1) KHC 508 (DB)) is extracted below for reference: ``` ``` “15. A distinction may be drawn between readiness to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract. Readiness means the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract and it includes his financial ability to raise the money to pay ``` ``` RFA NO. 98 OF 2013 ``` ``` 7 ``` _`the purchase price. Even if the plaintiff has the financial capacity to pay the purchase price and he thereby shows readiness to perform the contract, that need not necessarily mean that he is willing to perform his part of the contract. Unless he is also willing to perform his part of the contract, mere readiness to do so cannot be of no avail to him. He may, nevertheless be disqualified from seeking specific performance of the contract if he is really unwilling to buy the property although he may be ready to do so. (See`_ Raj Rani Bhasin (Smt.) v. S. Kartar Singh Mehta _`- AIR 1975 Delhi 137).“`_ ``` 4. Even going by the oral evidence tendered by PW1, the power holder, she was having an amount of Rs.8,50,000/- in cash and availed a loan of Rs.5,50,000/- out of which a demand draft for Rs.5,00,000/- was drawn as on the date of expiry of period of contract, for which she relied on Ext.A7 certificate issued by the then ``` ``` RFA NO. 98 OF 2013 ``` ``` 8 ``` ``` Manager of South Indian Bank, Convent Road. PW2 is the Bank Manager of the said Bank at the time when he was examined and he pleaded ignorance with the details of Ext.A7. It seems to be so strange that the certificate issued by the then Manager did not contain even the number of the loan account. On the other hand, the Demand Draft was returned on the same day to the bank. It causes reasonable doubt as to the genuineness of Ext.A7 certificate especially when it did not contain the bank details or even the account number under which the loan facility was extended and it would lend support to the case advanced by the defendants regarding the alleged foul play in creating a record in collusion with the then Manager. Even going by Ext.A7, though the loan amount is stated to be Rs.5,50,000/-, the DD drawn which was submitted back on the same day comes to Rs.5,00,000/- without specifying the loan account or its details. ``` ``` RFA NO. 98 OF 2013 ``` ``` 9 ``` ``` Prima facie, it appears that the certificate is seen issued without disclosing the account number or loan account number maintained with the said bank in the name of the plaintiff or the power holder. Only general answers were given pertaining to issuance of Ext.A7 by PW2 without touching into its genuineness and no records were called for or summoned so as to prove its genuineness. Hence, Ext.A7 certificate will not render any assistance to the plaintiff. The fact that the alleged DD was drawn on the date of expiry of the alleged agreement i..e on 20/06/2009 and the same was returned on the same day would itself show something fishy behind it. Hence, there is failure on the part of the plaintiff to prove the readiness and willingness to perform the essential terms of contract. ``` ``` 5. The various aspects regarding the exercise of discretion under Section 20 of the ``` ``` RFA NO. 98 OF 2013 ``` ``` 10 ``` ``` Specific Relief Act has been dealt with by this Court inVasudevakurup v. Haridasan (2021 (6) KLT 782), after referring a three Judge Bench decision of the Apex Court inHer Highness Maharani Shantidevi P.Gaikwad v. Savjibhai Haribhai Patel and Others (AIR 2001 SC 1462) and also the decisions of the Apex Court in A.C.Arulappan v. Smt.Ahalya Naik (AIR 2001 SC 2783) Tejram v. Patirambhau (AIR 1997 SC 2702)and in Kanshi Ram v. Om Prakash Jawan and Others (AIR 1996 SC 2150),S.Rangaraju Naidu v. S.Thiruvarakkarasu (AIR 1995 SC 1769),Azhar Sultana v.B.Rajamani and Ors (AIR 2009 SC 2157),Gobind Ram v. Gian Chand (AIR 2000 SC 3106), Damacherla Anjaneyulu and Another v. Damacheria Venkata Seshaiah and Another (AIR 1987 SC 1641),besides the the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Antony K.O and Another v. M.K.Krishnankutty Menoki and Others (2017 (1) KHC 479 = 2017 (1) KLJ 357). ``` ``` RFA NO. 98 OF 2013 ``` ``` 11 ``` ``` 6. The learned counsel for the respondent/ plaintiff at the fag end of the argument expressed his willingness to pay an additional amount of Rs.7.5 lakhs. It is submitted that the property is situated in the prime centre of the Alappuzha district. According to the defendants, it would worth more than Rs.30 lakhs. While taking into consideration the undue delay of more than 13 years and the circumstances under which Ext.A2 agreement for sale was executed and also taking into consideration the extent of advance amount paid which is less than 1/5[th] of the agreed sale consideration, it is fit and proper to apply the ratio laid down in the abovesaid decisions by striking a balance. Hence, it is hereby ordered that the plaintiff shall pay or deposit an additional amount of Rs.15,00,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Lakhs) without the liability of interest in addition to the sale consideration (including ``` ``` RFA NO. 98 OF 2013 ``` **==> picture [15 x 10] intentionally omitted <==** ``` the amount deposited), within a time schedule of five months from today for the grant of decree of specific performance, failing which, the decree of the trial court granting specific performance will stand set aside and the suit will stand decreed in part granting a decree of return of advance amount of Rs.2,25,000/- (Rupees Two lakhs Twenty Five Thousand) with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of suit till realization from the defendants and charged upon the plaint schedule property. ``` ``` The appeal is disposed of as above. ``` ``` Sd/- ``` ``` P.SOMARAJAN ``` ``` JUDGE ``` ``` SPV ```