High CourtDivision BenchAppeal dismissed; conviction and sentence confi...

Mahesh Prasad Gupta v. State of Rajasthan

Case / Petition Number:Criminal Appeal No. 130 of 1970
Neutral Citation:/

Case Details & Bench

Court
High Court
Hon'ble Judges
  • M. H. Beg
  • Y. Chandrachud
Judgment Date
1973-12-01
Court Decision / Holding
Appeal dismissed; conviction and sentence confirmed.
Final Disposition
Appeal dismissed; conviction and sentence confirmed; appellant to surrender to bail forthwith.

Parties to the Case

Appellants / Petitioners

  • Mahesh Prasad Gupta

Respondents

  • State of Rajasthan

Legal Representation & Advocates

Counsels for Petitioners

  • • Nuruddin Ahmad
  • • Sobhagmal Jain

Case Synopsis & Summary

Mahesh Prasad Gupta v. State of Rajasthan is a Supreme Court decision delivered by Chandrachud, J., with M. H. Beg, J., in a Criminal Appeal arising from a conviction under sections 5(1)(d) read with 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and section 161 IPC. The appellant, a clerk in the office of the Loco Foreman, Western Railway, Kotah, faced allegations of accepting a gratification of Rs. 15 from a complainant, Umashanker, while processing an application for an advance from the Provident Fund. The case traverses the trial court’s conviction and the Rajasthan High Court’s affirmation of that conviction. The central legal issue concerns the burden and interpretation of Section 4(1) PCA, which creates a presumption that accepted gratification is a motive or reward for an official act unless the contrary is proven, and whether this presumption can be invoked without initially proving that payment was made for other than legal remuneration. The prosecution contends the evidence establishes acceptance of a bribe; the defense contends the Rs. 15 was part of an earlier loan. The Supreme Court analyzes the evidence, the presumption under Section 4(1), and the standard of proof—preponderance of probabilities—ultimately upholding the appellate and high court findings. The Court affirms the conviction and sentence, emphasizing the lack of genuine corroboration for the loan theory and the appellant’s failure to rebut the presumption. The appeal is dismissed.

Provisions of Law Cited

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, s.5(1)(d) read with s.5(2)Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, s.4(1)Indian Penal Code, s.161

Legal Doctrines & Maxims

  • Presumption under s.4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 that accepted gratification is a motive or reward for an official act unless the contrary is proved.
  • Preponderance of probabilities as the standard of proof in criminal matters (as recognized in V. D. Jhingan v. State of Uttar Pradesh).
  • Burden of proof shifting in presumption provisions; need for prosecution to establish acceptance and not merely legal remuneration.

Submissions & Arguments

Contentions of Appellants / Petitioners

The appellant argued that the Rs. 15 received from the complainant was not a bribe but part payment of a prior loan of Rs. 30 advanced by the appellant to the complainant in November 1965. He contended there was no evidence of any official act performed in exchange for the money and that there was no close relationship, secrecy, or inducement from any other person. He asserted that the need to prove bribery could not be satisfied by broad presumptions and that Section 4(1) only creates a presumption of motive if the payment is not for legal remuneration, which the defense claims the Rs. 15 represented. He urged that the prosecution must establish that the payment was not a legitimate loan payoff and that the evidence did not negate the loan explanation. The appellant thus contended that the presumption should not automatically conclude bribery and that the defense should be permitted to rebut by a preponderance of probabilities.

Contentions of Respondents

Prosecution contended that the receipt of Rs. 15 by the appellant, admitted by him, clearly indicated a gratuity for an official act—processing the complainant’s loan application. The evidence, including testimonies of PW-4, PW-5, and PW-6, was described as clear and convincing that the money was accepted as a bribe rather than as legal remuneration. The prosecution invoked Section 4(1) PCA to create a presumption that the acceptance of gratification was for a motive or reward described in Section 161 IPC, and argued that the onus then lay on the appellant to prove the contrary. It was further argued that the loan theory was an afterthought, unsupported by corroboration, and that the appellant’s financial distress did not undermine the inference of bribery given the context of the money’s acceptance and the attempted concealment.

Cited Precedents (1)

Case NameCitationTreatmentExplanation
V. D. Jhingan v. State of Uttar PradeshAIR 1966 SC 1762PositiveUsed to support the standard that a defendant may prove his case by a preponderance of probabilities rather than beyond reasonable doubt, thereby informing the burden of proof in the presence of a Section 4(1) presumption.

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Extracted Judgment Text

Exact text extracted from official judgment records.

MAHESH PRASAD GUPTA 1'. STATE OF RAJASTHAN . _December_ J, 1973 [M. H. BEG AND Y. v. C tiANDRACIIUD, JJ.] _pm•mt/allofCom•ptioll Act,_ 194_7-S. _5(1)_ _((/)and s._ 5(2) _rtad with s._ _16ll.P.C.-_ _Apptl/ant ltnd acrtpted_ _Rs._ 15/· _w/uclt_ ~m _no_ _pori of_ _hislt/IOI_ _r<twtnuution-Th'_ _pmumprion Is that the apptllmrl acuptrd_ _!Itt_ _nmormt as a rCM·ard for clniug an officitd_ - _«t-Tire brrrtlrtt of proving tfrt_ _cmrtrnr)' usts on tire_ _opf'l/lonr._ The•pp:l!>nt had been convi<lcd unucr s . 5(1) (d) read with • 5(2) of the Pre..:ntion of Corruption _Act,_ 1947, _as_ also under s. 161 of the Pen~ I Code and " " ' sc•tenc:d to one _ytor_ R.I. and a fine. The question for con,idcrntion in this case was "hcthcr the coneurw1t findir.g or,uilr recorded by the trial court and the High Court was in accordance with I•" and the evidence in the c:lsc, B _0_ The app:llant was a clerk in the offiec o r the Loco-Foreman, Western R•il"'al: Kotah, and he had 10 process nppli~:ltions for advances from the Provtdent FcnJ Ae<:ount. _It_ is alleged that the appellant while processing the complainant's arplication, ac_x:cpted a bribe or Rs. _IS/·_ rrom the complaina nt in a hotel. The •F p:ll~nt adm1tted the receipt or the amount but contended that the amount was pa,d to him by the complainant in part paym~nt or a loan or Rs. 30/- which b"d been ~d vanc:d by him to the complainant earlier. Both the trial Coun and tl1e H•:h Court h:ld the •ccu•ed guilty, Dismissina the appeal, ' HELD: (I) S0<.1ion 4(1) or the Preve ntio n or Corruption Act, 1947 provide~ to lh<utent nutenal, thrlt where in any trial or an olfcnce pun,>hable under S«t1cn 16lofthe P.:nal Code, or under s. S(2)oflhe Act it is proved that nn ae<:used person h:ls ~CC.::pted ••any &ratification (other than legal remuneration)", it shall be p~e: uun:d,unte•s the contrary is proved that he acccpte<l that gratificauo.n as a momd •r:eward s.uch as !s mentioned in Section (161), Penal Codo. !'he mollve or reffiwa! . m:nlloned act. (mq ID Sectton 161 is - _/JIItr olio_ - ror doing or [or-bcanna tO do any [0 ] .,a - 1 8.J'\.~D establish }J a reasonable d oubt. [581 cj ~ _D lhu_ - _1_ _1°11_ v. _The StttU of Utrnr l'radulr_ AJ.R. 1966 · • s _c_ 176~ -· rcrcrred to. lolhepr h d ~ nceoftheappdWttwas r.,..lllt1••·C'ieJltcase hoththe courtsluweheldth311 e er\ . wthattheamount IU In lh: P~es:nt ca•e. the prosecution had prol'c <l thai the a ppellant h•d accqt~d u,; _ISJ._ wh.ch clearly wns no part or his lcllal remuneration. The presumPIIO. • .ttfort, ""'• tbat thcUJ>pellant oeccpteu the amount as a motive or rewafd for do,na **tn off-.::1** **-iJ** **act •** - "~~i'<~ .~~dc0ut s. 4(1) of the appellant the Act, t he urged burden thot of the pro-.·presumPtion ur. inathc c.ontra• ~ er m•· us~mt:r~ nt w•s t ~ld 01b; [1] Y_.if the pro;ecution estobli;hes in the first insta r.c~ that th en~~~~ to the cbr "'"e than as legal remuneration. This contcn!lo~ is co . r . cu In< s,..,io~rms or'· 4(1) and would render illusory, the prcsun,pt• [00 ] ~"s'~ ~~~nt " 3' ~C<:·pt<d To east on the prosecution the burden of provtna that then ·s ·to t •k tt< >I"'o;.. thiI s Oted ~" 1~. belru~ by 0 to the provo DD~ceuseu ture thOf ~t otherwise the the burden amount th~n restlna was by p3id way on the of and lea~ ~ros<eultOO, ao:ePted I rcotuncrn!IO by woy [0] - [0 ] p~~·;o~d [1 ] ~ r 111 br1' [\] ~ [cn] ha, [' ot ] If ·c _to_ bribe Pro•e It tlu~ [0] t c m~\cd, onbc~usenport ey was accepted from by the the prea~.J suu1pt1<'D anu t_~et ta 1 [p~s~~!~ ] 'r a.r.ount by the [acctpud ][as ][a ] ##### ~d Is plain that irttteprosecution provcstheacceptance o the n form or ### ••lllotive • t • accused &111 kio ~ndb the amount must docs estanot blish reprethat sent the legal amo remunt uneration ;:s not . !n 8.J'\.~D a P~<d establish by him lti.~sc by or rewurdsuch as is mentioned ins. 161 t .P.C. he ~~~~cd nut prove his c:a,. beyonS'cponucrance of pro babilities. thai ls to saY, t at c ~ .. P<cponu~runce ofprobabllit!es ..-3s ;n favouro t e•·•e 580 SUPP.BMB COURT REPORTS [1974] 2 s.c.R. was acc~pted by the app:llant by way of bribe. Further, there was no particular A B ## c D E F G H intimlcy b3tween the appellant and the complainant and it was not likely that the appellant would give a loan to complainant without a receipt and without interest. Further, the complainant bore no enmity with the appellant and there is no evidence to hold that the complainant was inftucnced by anybody into lodging a false case against the appellant. As the appellant had failed to discharge his burden, the order of conviction and sentence must be confirmed. CRIMINAL .APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 130 of 1970. Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 6th July, 1970 of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur in S. B. Criminal Appeal No. 342 of 1967. _Nuruddin_ _Ahmad_ and _Sobhagma/ Jain,_ for the appellant _Maya_ _Rao,_ for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD, J. In this appeal by special leave the question for consideration is whether the concurrent finding of guilt recorded by the learned Special Judge, Jaipur and the High Court of Rajasthan is in accordance with law and the evidence in the case. The appellant has been convicted under section 5(1) (d) read with section s (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 as also under section 161 of the Penal Code. He has been sentenced the undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- on each count. The complainant Umashanker is a cleaner in the Loco Shed, Kotah. The appellant was working at· the material time, as a clerk in the office of the Loco Foreman, Western Railway, Kotah, on.:: of his duties being to process applications made by a certain class of employees for advances from the Provident Fund Account. On April 8, 1966, the complainant presented an application to the appellant asking for an advance of Rs. 150/- from his Provident Fund Account. It is alleged that the appellant refused to accept the application unless the complainant agreed to pay to him a gratification of Rs. 15/-. On April 10, the complainant approached a Vigilance Officer Srinath Sharan Srivastava, and lodged a complaint before him that the appellant was demanding a bribe. On the 12th the Vigilance Officer took the complainant to the office of the Special Police Establishment, Jaipur where Inspector Ajmera asked the complainant to make one more attempt to present the application to the appellant. Accordingly, the complainant resubmitted his application on the 13th when the appellant is alleged to have renewed his demand for a bribe. A trap was thereafter laid and it is alleged that the appellant accepted from the complainant a sum of Rs. 15/- on the evening of the 13th at 'Meghraj Hotel'. The two currency notes of Rs. 10/- and _Sf·_ were treated with sodium carbonate powder and the payment is alleged to have been witnessed by the _motbirs_ Jagdish Prasad Tiwari and Bhagwandas Makhija. The appellant admitted the receipt of the amount but contended that the amount was paid to him by the complainant ill part payment of a loan of Rs. 30/- which had been advanced by him to the complainant on November I, 1965. He stated that the complainant had not presented to him any application at all on April 8 and on the 13th the application was presented not to him but to the Head-clerk. According to 8 ### c 0 F H M. P, GUPTA _V,_ RA.f.ASTHAN _(Chandrachud,_ /,) 581 him the application of the 13th was processed by him in the ordinary courSe and on the loan being recommended by the Loco Forman, the application was duly forwllrded to the despatch clerk for obtaining the sanction of the Divisional Superintendent's Office. On the central issue whether the sum of Rs. 15/· had passed hands from the complainant to the appellant, we have the admission of the appellant himself but quite apart from that admission, there is clear and convincing evidence to show that the appellant had· accepted the money from the complainant. The evidence of the complain.'lnt Uma· #### shanker (P. W. 4), Jagdish Prasad (P. w. 5) andBhagwandas Makhija (P. W. 6) leave.s no doubt on this point. Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, provides to the extent material, that where in any trial of au offence punishable under section 161 of the Penal Code or under section 5(2) of the Act, it is proved that an accused person has accepted "any gratification (other than legal remuneration)", it shall be presumed unless the contrary is proved that he accepted that ratification as n motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 161, Penal Code. The motive or. reward mentioned in section 161 is _inter alia,_ for doing or forbearing to do any - fticial act. The prosecution having proved that the appellant had accepted the sum of Rs. 1 _S/·,_ which clearly is tto part of his legal remuneration, the presumption must be raised under section 4(1) of the Act that the appellant accepted the amount as a motive or reward for doing an official act. The official act in the instant case was the processing of the appellant's application for a loan from his Provident Fund Account. Under section 4(1) of the Act, the burden of proving the contrary must rest on the appellant. But learned counsel appearing on his he· half urges that the presumption under section 4(1) can be raised ouly if the prosecution establishes in the first instance that the amount was paid otherwise than as legal remuneration. This. contention is contrary to the clear terms of section 4(1) and would render illusory the presump tion arising under the section. To ·cast on the prosecution the burden of proving that the amount was accepted by the accused otherwise than by way of legal remuneration is to ask the prosecution to prove that the amount was paid and accepted by way of bribe. If this be the true nature of the burden resting on the prosecution, no presumption at all need be raised because aj)art from the presumption the prose· cution would have to prove that the money was accepted by the accused and that it was accepted as a bribe. It is plaitl that if the prosecution proves the acceptance of the amount by the accused a11d the amo~mt does not represent legal remuneration in any form or of any kind, the accused must establish that the amount was not accepted by him as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 161, Penal Code. As held in _V. D. Jhingan_ _1•s._ _The State_ _of Uttar Prades!J(l),_ the accused can establish his case by preponderance of probabilities, that is to say, he need not prove his case beyond a reasonable do~1bt . (.1) A.l.ll. 1966 S.C. 1762, 582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1974] 2 S.C.R. Both the courts have held that the defence of the appellant is false and the preponderance of probabilities is in favour of the view that the amount was accepted by the appellant by way of bribe. The learned Special Judge described the loan theory propounded by the appellant as false, while the High Court observed that the conclusion is irresistible that the theory is an after-thought. We are in agreement with this fir1ding. There was no particular intimacy between the appellant and the complainant and it is not likely that the appellant would give a loan to the complainant, without a receipt and without interest. A copy of his monthly account (Ex. D-11) produced by the appellant shows that on November _1,_ 1965, when the loan is alleged to have been given, the appellant was himself. in indigent circumstances. In September, 1965, his expenses exceeded his income for which he had to sell some silver lying in the house ; in October, he overstepped his income by more than Rs. 100/- and in the crucial month of November he had to take a loan of Rs. 80/- from the Railway Fund and to sell some wheat lying in the house in order to meet his expenses. The debit entry of Rs. 30/- in the name oft he complainant wa~, as held by the High Court, evidently inserted after scoring off a writing against a sum of Rs. 30/-. When Inspector Ajmera disclosed his identity to the appellant and asked him to produce the money, he became nervous and begged for mercy. He could not have forgotten that he was a creditor of the complainant in the sum of Rs. 30/- and that the amount was received by him in part payment of that Joan. The complainant bore no enmity with the appellant and assuming, as contended on behalf of the appellant, that there was some hostility between the appellant and the Head-clerk, Chandra Prakash Saxena, we ~e no_ foundation for the argument that Saxena influenced the complaHlant mto lodging a false case against the appellant. As the appellant has failed to discharge his burden, the order of conviction and sentence must b~ confirmed. Appellant will surrender to his bail forthwith. A. B ## c