MAHARAJ SINGH v. UTTAR PRADESH

/ 1072 MAHARAJ SINGH _v._ STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & OTHERS _November_ 2, 1976 [H. R. KHANNA AND V. R. KRISHNA !YER, JJ.] _U.P._ _Zamindari Abolition_ & _Land Reforms Act,_ _1950-Section_ _117-Scope_ _of-State_ _vests lands in Gaon_ _Sabha-Suit_ _for_ _ejectment-Gaon_ _Sabha did_ ••~t _appeal-State-If_ _had_ locus standi. _Words_ & _phrases-Vest-Person_ _aggrie1·ed-Appurte11a11ce-Mea11i11g_ _'fl_ By virtue of s. 4 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950, the right, title and interest of all the intermediaries in every estate including _hats,_ bazars and _me/as_ stood terminated and vested absolutely in the State. Section 9 provides that all wells, trees in _abadi_ and all buildings situate within the limits of an Estate, belonging to an intermediary, shall continue to belong to or be held by such intermediary and the site of the buildings which is appurtenant thereto, shall be deemed to be settled with him by the State Government. Section 117 ( 1) empowers the State Government to vest lands in Gaon Sabhas or other local authorities. Under s. 117(6) the State Government has power to resume from a Gaon Sabha the lands vested in it. By a notification under s. 117(1) the State Government vested the land in the village in the Gaon Sabha. On the estate in dispute, the defendant who was the quondam zamindar, had been conducting a cattle fair. The estate had on it, among others, a few structures. The plaintiffs' (the State and the Gaon Sabha) suit for ejectment of the defendant from the estate was dismissed by the trial court. Th~ Gaon Sabha, however, did not appeal; but the State went in appeal to the High Court as 'a person aggrieved'. The Rish Court negatived the defendant's contentions that as a result of the notification under s. 117 ( 1) the land having vested in the Gaon Sabha, the State Government had no _locus standi_ and that it was not a person aggrieved, but allowed the defendant to keep all the structures and a space of 5 yards running round each building. Dismissing the appeal, HELD : (1) The State has title to sustain the action in ejectment. The Government, despite vesting the estates in Gaon Sabhas has, and continues to have, a constant hold on these estates, when it chooses, to ta\ce away what it had given possession of to a Gaon Sabha. This is plainly 'present legal interest' in the Government and a sort of _precarium_ _te11a11s_ in the Sabha. [1082 D; 1079 F-G] (a) The Act contemplates taking over of all zamindari rights as part of land reform. Instead of centralising management of all estates ~t State level, the Act gives an enabling power to make over these states to Gaon Sabhas. Apart from management, no power is expressly vested in the Sabhas to dispose of the estates absolntely. If the State thinks fit to amend or cancel the earlier vesting declaration or notification it can totally deprive the Sabha of, and resume from it, any estate. The vesting in the State was absolute but the vesting in the Sabha was limited to possession and management subject to divestiture by Government. Such a construction of vesting in two different senses in the· same section is sound because the word 'vest' has many meanings. The sense of the situation suggests that in s. 117 ( 1) 'vested in the State' carries a plenary connotation, while 'shall vest in the Gaon Sabha' imports a qualified disposition confined to the right to full possession and enjoyment so long as it lasts. To postulate vesting of absolute title in the Gaon Sabha by virtue of the declaration under s. 117(1) is to stultify s. 117(6). [1081 A-C; F-G] A B c D E F G H _)_ '; ' .. MAHARAJ SINGH _v._ UTTAR **PRADESH** _**(Krishna**_ _**Iyer,**_ _**1.)**_ **1073** (b) The State is 'a person aggrieved'. He, who has a proprietary rii;ht, A which has beei or is threatened by violation, is an 'aggrieved person'. The nght to a remedy apart, a larger circle of persons can move the court for the protection of defence or enforcement of a civil right or to ward off or claim compensation for a civil wrong, even if they are not proprietarily or pcrsonall v Jinked with the cause of ·action. The nexus between the _/is_ and the plaintiff need not necessarily be personal. A person aggrieved is an expression which has expanded with the larger urgencies and felt necessities of our time. [1082 E-F] (c) The amplitude of 'legal grievance' has broadened with social compulsions. The State undertakes today activities whose beneficiaries may be the genernl community even though the legal right to the undertaking may not vest in the community. The State starts welfare projects whose effective irnplemen tatio~ may call for collective action from the protected group or any member of thei!t. Test suits, class actions and representative litigation are the beginning and the horizon is expanding with persons' and organisations not personally injured but vicariously concernecf oeing entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the court for.-edressal of actual or imminent wrongs . .(1083 A-CJ _Dhabolkar_ [1976J 1 S.C.R. 306 followed. _'Locus standi'_ has a larger ambit in current legal semantics than the accepted, individualistic jmisprudence of old. Therefore, the State, in the present case. is entitled to appeal under s. 96 of the Ccxle of Civil Procedure. [I 084 DJ (2) Where a wrong against community interest is done, 'no _locus standi'_ will not always be a plea to non-suit an interested public body chasing the wrongdoer in court. In the instant case the Government is the 'aggrieved person'. Its right of resumption from the Gaon Sabha, meant to be exercised in public interest will be seriously jeopardised if the estate slips into the hands of a trespasser. The estate belonged to the State, is vested in the Gaon Sabha for community benefit, is controlled by the State through directions to the Land Management Committee and is liable to be divested. The wholesome object of the legislature of cautiously decentralised vesting of estates in loc~·l 5elf-governing units will be frustrated, if the State is to be a helpless spectator of its purposeful bounty being wasted or lost. [1083 H; 1084 A-BJ (3 )(a) The touchstone of 'appurtenance' is dependence of the building on what appertains to it for its use as a building. Obviously the _hat,_ bazar, or _me/a_ is not an appurtenance to the building. Even if the buildings were used and enjoyed in the past with the whole stretch of vacant space for a _hat_ or _mela,_ the land is not aopurtenant to the principal subject granted by s. 9, namely, buildings. [1085 GJ (b) The larger objective of s. 9 is to settle with the former intermediary only such land as is strictly appurtenant to buildings, all the rest going to the State for implementation of the agrarian reform policy. [1084 G] (c) The large open spaces cannot be regarded as appurtenant to the terraces, stands and structures. What a integral is not necessarily appurtrnant. A position of subprdination, sometlting incidental or ancillary or dependent is Implied in appurtenance. Th3' much of space required for the use of the structures _as such_ has been excluded by the High Court itself. Bevond that may or may not be gecessary for the _hat_ or _mela_ but not for the enjoyment of the _chabutras_ as such. [1085 B-Cl _(_ d) 'Appurtenance' in relation to a dwelling, includes all land occupied therewith and used for the purroses thereof. The word 'appurtenances' has a distinct and definite meaning. _Prima facie_ it imports nothing more than what is strictly appertaining to the subject-matter of the devise or grant. What is necessary for the enjoyment and has been used for the purpose of the building, such as easement, alone will be appurtenant. The word 'appurtenance<' include' all the incorporeal hereditaments attached to the land granted or demised .. such as rights of wav, but does not include lands in addition to that granted. [1086 D-EJ - (e) What the High Court has granted viz., _5_ yards of surrounding space is sound in law. [I 086 HJ **B** c **D** E **F** **G** **H** 1074 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1977] 1 s.c.R. A CIVIL APPELLAT& JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1 of 1976 . • Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 23-5-1975 of the Allahabad High Court in First Appeal No. 392/ 64. _Shanti Bhushan, V._ _P._ _Goel_ and _Subodh Markendeya,_ for the Appellant. _L._ _N._ _Sinha, Solicitor-General_ _of_ _India_ and 0. _P._ _Rana,_ for the Respondent No. 1. _Bal Kishan Gaur_ and _Amlan Ghosh,_ for Respondent No. 2. - • _Yogeshwar Prasad_ and _Rani Arora,_ for Respondent No. 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J.-Two principal submissions, whose implications perhaps are of profound moment and have public impact, have been, at wide-ranging length, urged in this appeal by certificate, by Shri Shanti Bhushan, for the appellant/defendant and, with effective brevity, controverted by the Solicitor General, for respondent/1st plaintiff. The two focal points of the controversy are : (a) Is the appeal to the High Court by the State/1st plaintiff at all competent, entitlement as a 'party aggrieved' being absent, having regard to the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P. Act 1 of 1951) (for short, the Act) ?; and (b) Is it sound to conceptualise 'area appurtenant to buildings' in s. 9 of the Act so narrowly as has been done by the High Court ? There were two plaintiffs-the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Gaon Sabha of Bedpura claiming common put alternative reliefs. The suit was for injunction or ejectment, on title, of the sole defendant who was the quondam zamindar of the 'estate' which is the ·subject matter of the suit. The trial Court dismissed the suit whereupon the 2nd plaintiff dropped out of the litigation, as it were, and the State alone pursued the matter by way of appeal against the decree. The High Court partially allowed the appeal and the aggrieved defendant is the appellant before us. An _expose_ of the facts may now be given· to the extent necessary for explaining the setting of the contention between the parties. 'J;he State of Uttar Pradesh extinguished all zamindari estates by the Act and implemented a scheme of settlement or lands with intermediaries, tenants and others by first vesting all estates in the siate and empowering it to vest, divest and re-vest from time to time according to flexible needs and _ad hoc_ requirements, the same estate's in Gaon Sabhas or other local authorities. Settlement of trees, buildings and other specified items in the intermediaries was also part of the agrarian reform. A skeletal picture of the legislation may now be projected. But, before that, a short sketch of the actual dispute may illumine the further discussion. The suit lands were part of an estate owned and possessed by the defendant-zamindarini. The statutory consequence of the abolition of all zamindaris by force of s. 4 is spelt out in s. 6, to wit, the ( #### - _(_ i • ## I B c D E F G H ### • l\IAHARAJ SINGH _v._ UTTAR PRADESH _(Krishna Iyer,_ _J.)_ 1075 cesser of the ownership of the zamindar and vesting of title and possession in ihe State. By a notification under s. 11 7 (1) of the Act the area of lands was vested by the State in the 2nd plaintiff Gaon Sabha. The legislative nullification notwithstanding, the defendant who had been conducting a lucrative bi-weekly cattle fair, the best in the district, persisted in this profitable adventure strengthened by s. 9 of the Act which settles in the intermediary all building's and area appurtenant thereto. This resulted in possessory disputes between the Gaon Sabha and the defendant-proceedings under s. 145 upholding the latter's possession and the present suit for declaration of title· and con·sequential injunction or ejectment. ••• Tfie estate, which is the· site of the rural cattle market, has a large nullJ.ber of trees on it, a temple in one plot, a (veterinary ) clinic in another and quite a number of cattle stands and other auxilliary structures which are facilities for the bovine display and transaction of business. Taking advantage of the provisions of the Act, the defendant successfully claimed before the High Court that the trees and the two plots with the shrine and the _oushadhalaya_ should be deemed to have been settled with her. Her ambitious demand, based on some provisions which we will presently Xcray more carefully, was that the entire estate with all the buildings thereon wa·s enjoyed as a _unum quid_ and the vacant lands were as much necessary for the meaningful running of the cattle fair as the structures themselves. To dissect and detach the buildings from the vacant spaces was to destroy the func. tional wholeness of the service rendered. In short, the large intervening areas surrounding the _ohabutras_ and other edifices were essential adjuncts or appurtenant lands which, together in thejr original entirety, should be settled under s. 9 of the Act with the erstwhile intermediary _viz.,_ the defendant. The High Court declined to go the whole hog with the defendant but granted the plea to the limited degree of giving all the structures and a space of 5 yards running round each 'building'. In the view of the Court _hats,_ bazars, and _me/as_ could not be held by a private owner under the scheme of the Act and reliance on the conduct of the cattle market as an indicator of 'appurtenant' area was, therefore, impermissible. The suit was decreed _pro tanto._ The Gaon Sabha, when defeated in the trial Court, discreetly stepped out of the risks•of an appeai but the Government, first plaintiff,. claiming to. be gravely aggrieved, challenged the dismissal of the suit ahd was faced with the plea that the land having vested in the Gaon Sabha, on the issue of the notification under s. 11 7 ( l) of the Act, the State had no surviving interest in the property and', therefore, forfeited the position of a 'person aggrieved', who alone could competently appeal against a decree. This contention, negatived by the High Court, has been reiterated before us with resourceful embellishments and that, logically, is the first question of law falling for our decision and is the _piece de resistance,_ if we may say so, in this appeal. If the 1st plaintiff's entire interests, by subsequent plenary vesting in the 2nd plaintiff, have perished, the former cannot, as of right, appeal under s. 96 C.P.C. Survival after death is unknown to A B c D E F G H 1076 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1977] 1 s.c.R. real property law and suits, without at \east apprehended miury, are beyond the ken of the procedural law. To put it in a nutsl!el;, has the State current intere·st in the estate, sufficient to sustain an appeal ? (2) It shall be lawful for the State Government, if it so considers necessary, to issue, from time to time, the notification referred to in sub-section ( 1) in respect only of such area or areas as may be specified and all the provisions of sub-section ( 1), shall be applicable to and in the case of every such notification." Section 6 sets out the legal consequences of such vesting more specifically. We may extract the provision : ''6. _Consequences of the vesting of an estate in the_ _State.-_ When the notification under section 4 has been published · in the Gazet_te then, notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or document or in any other law for the time being in force and save as otherwise provided in this Act, the consequences as hereinafter set forth shall, from the begining of the date of vesting, ensue in the" area to which the notification relates, namely- (a) all rights, title and interest of all the intermediaries (i) in every estate in such area including land ( cultivable or barren), grove-land, forests whether within or outside village boundaries, trees (other than trees in village _abadi,_ holding or grove), fisheries, tanks, ponds, water-channels, ferries, pathways, _abadi_ sites, _hats,_ bazars and _melas_ other than _hats,_ bazars and _melas_ held upon land to which Clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 18 apply, and The anatomy of the Act, so far as this dispute is concerned, needs to be· set out and alongside thereof, the exercises in statutory construction necessary to resolve the two legal dispute·s. The Act had for its primary object, as testified by its Preamble, the extinction of intermediary rights _viz.,_ zamindaris and the like. The goal of the legislation must make its presence felt while the judicial choice of meanings of words of ambiguous import or plurality of significations is made. Section 4 is the foundational provision, the very title deed of the Sta~~ and it runs, to read : "s. 4. _Vesting of estates_ _in_ _the_ _State.-_ ( 1) As soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, the State Government may, by notification, declare that, as from a date to be specified, all estate situate in the Uttar Pradesh shall vest in the State and as from the beginning of the date so specified (herinafter called the date of vesting), all such estates shall stand transferred to and vest except as hereinafter provided, in the State free from all encumbrances. A B c D E F G H MAHARAJ SINGH _v._ UTTAR PRADESH· _(Krishna Iyer,_ .T.) 1077 (i~) in all sub-soil in such estate's including rights, if any A in mines and minerals, whether being worked or not; shall cease and be vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh free from all ~ncumbrances; .j: Reading the two sister sections together, certain clear conclusions emerge. Emphatically, three things happened on the coming into force of the Act. By virtue of ·s. 4 the right, title and interest of all in~ime<liaries in every estate, including _lwts,_ bazars and _me/as,_ stood terminated. Secondly, this whole bundle of interests came to be vested in the State, free from all encumbrances, the quality of the vesting being •absolute. Thirdly, one and only one species of property in _lzats,_ bazars and _me/as_ was expressly exclu<led from the total vesting of estates in the State, _viz.,_ such as had been held on lands to which s. 18 (1) la) to ( c) applied. Section 9, at this stage, needs to be read since it is geared to the nationalisation of zamindaris by providing for settlement, under the State, of some kinds of landed interests in existing owners or occupiers. Section 9 states : _"Private wells, trees in abadi and buildings_ _to_ _be_ _settled_ _with the existing owners or occupiers_ _thereof.-_ All wells, trees in _abadi,_ and all buildings situate within the limits of an estate, belonging to or held by an intermediary or tenant or other person, whether residing in the village or not, shall continue to belong to or be held by such intermediary, tenant or persons, as the case may be, and the site· of the wells or the buildings which are appurtenant thereto shall be deemed to be settled with him by the State Government on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed " A close-up of this section is called for since the basic plank of the defendant'& case is the claim to the whole set of plots as building and appurtenant area of land statutorily settled ~ith her. If she is such a settlee, the substantive nierit of the plaintiff's title fails. We will examine this aspect after tt survey of the sections relevant to the _locus_ _standi_ of the State is done . B c D E F .. So we shift to Chapter VII which relates to Gaon Sabhas vesting G by the State of resumed estates in them and the limitations and other conditions to which it is subject. Attributed legal personality by s.3, the Gaon Sabhas are bodies corporate which, under th~ various provisions of Chapter VII, have been invested with legal viability right to own and hold property, to transfer and otherwise deal with movables and immovables and manage their landed assets through the executive agency of Land Management Committees. This H comprehensive proprietary personality of the Sabha is indisputable but unhelpful for our purpose. A 8 1078 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1977] 1 s.c.R. The controversy before us comes into focus when we read s. 11 7 ( 1), (2) and (6), all the limbs being taken as belonging to•a legally living corporate body. Section 117, els. (1) and (2), provide: "117. _Vesting of certain_ _land:;_ _etc.,_ _in_ _Gaon Shabhas_ _and other local_ _authorities.-_ ( 1) At any time after the publication of the notification· referred to in Section 4, the State Government may, by general or special order to be published in. the manner prescribed, declare that as from a date to be specified in th:is behalf, all or any of the following things, namely- • • - - C (v) hats, bazafS! and melas except hats, bazars, and • (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or · in any other law for the time being in force, the State Government may, by general or special order to be published in the manner prescribed in the Gazette, declare that as from a date to be specified in this behalf, all or any of the thmgs specified in clauses (i) to (vi) 0f mh-F.ection (1) which alter their vesting in the State under this Act had been vested in a Gaon Sabha or any ilther local authority, either under this Act or under section 126 of the Uttar Pradesh Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam 1959 \(J.P. Act II of 1959) shall vest in any other ·local authority (including a Gaon Sabha) established for the whnle or part of the village in which the said things are situated." - · · Section 117 ( 6) injects a precarious does into the system of estates vested in Gaon Sabhas by sub-s. ( 1) and goes on to state: "117(6). The State Government may, at any time, by general or special order to be. published in the manner prescribed, amend or cancel any declaration or notification made in respect of any of the things aforesaid, whether melas held on land to which the provisions of clauses (a} to (c) of sub-section (1) of ~ectirn1 18 apply or on sites and areas referred to in section 9, and which had v~sted in the State under this Act shall vest in the Gaon Sabhas or and other local authoritv established tor the whole or part of the village in which the said things are situate, or partly in one such local authority (including a Gaon Sabha) and partly in another: Provided that it shall be lawful for the State Gov•.wnment to ;nake the declaration aforesaid subject to such exceptions and conditions as may be specified in the notification. D E F G H ... J MAHARAJ SINGH _v._ UTT AR PRADESH _(Krishna Iyer,_ _J.)_ . I 0 79 generally or in the case of any Gaon Sabha or other local auth~ity, and resume such thing and whenever the State Government so resumes any such thing, the Gaon Sabha or other· local authority, as the case may be, shall be entitled to receive and be paid compensation on account only of the development, if any, effected by it in or over that thing: Provided that the State Government may, after such resumption, make a fresh declaration under sub-section ( 1) or sub-section (2) vesting the thing resumed in the same or any other local authority (including a Gaon Sabha) ••and the provisions of sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) as the case may be, shall _mutatis mutandis,_ apply to such decljration. - - - Before moving further, we may glance at a group of sections which have more than peripheral impact on the legal equation between Government and Sabha _vis a vis_ estates vested in the latter by A B c the former. Section 119 carves out a power for the State Government to take away _hats,_ bazars and melas vested in a Gaon Sabha D and transfer them to a zilla parishad or other authority. Sections 122A and 122B create and regulate the Land Management Committee which is to administer the estates vested in the Sabha and s. 126, quite importantly, gives the power to the State Government to issue orders and directions to the Management Committee. Pausing here for an instant, let us look back on the status of the State which, through its Executive branch, vests a resumed estate in a Gaon Sabha, retaining power, at any time, and without conditions or even compensation (save for actual developmental work done), to divest the land so vested and make it over to another like local authority., In such a situation where the State remains the legal master with absolute powers' of disposition over the land vested _pro tempore_ in a particular Gaon Sabha, can it be postulated that it has no legal interest in the preservation of that over which it has continuous power of operation, creation and deprivation? Government, despite vesting estates in Gaon Sabhas on the wholesome political principle of decentralisation and local self-government, has and continues to have a constant hold on these estates, may be like a brooding: omnipotence descending, when it chooses, to take away what it had giveb. possession of to a Sabha. This is plainly present legal interest in Government and a sort of _precarium tenans_ in the Sabha, notwithstanding the illusory expression 'vesting' which may mislead one· into the impression that an absolute and permanent ownership has been created. An overview of these legal prescriptions makes one sceptical about the statutory ideology of autonomous village self-government since, so far as estates are concerned, these Sabhas have been handcuffed and thrown at the mercy or mood of the State Government. The pragmatics of the Act has reduced Gaon Sabhas to obedient E F G H A B c D E F H 1 oso. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1977] 1 S.C.R. holders, for the nonce, of .the limited bounty of estates vested in them -a formal, fickle, homage to Art. 40 of the Constitution !. Shri Shanti Bhushan did draw our attention to certain cousin statutes and other remotely related provisions but the soul of his submission does not suffer by their omission in the discussion. We pass on to the spinal issues agitated before us. _Locus standi_ The .estates first vest in the State. The fulfilment of th-: purpose of the Act, the setting in which the corner-stone for the statutory edifice is laid and the categorical language used, especially 'free fro!lf •an encumbrances', leave no doubt in our minds, nor was it disputed before us, that this initial vesting is absolute and inaugurates the scheme of abolition. The consequence of vesting articulated iry s. 6 only underscore this conclusion. What next ensues, when the State Government, · acting under s.117(1), notifies a further vesting in a Gaon Sabha is the cardinal question. Does the State retain a residuary legal interest, sufficient to make it a 'person aggrieved', competent to challenge in appeal an adverse decree? And can the State canvas fpr the po'>ition that a proprietary right persists in it _albeit_ its act of vesting the same estate earlier in a local authority? Does the key word 'vest' connote and denote divergent t11ings in ilie same section and Act _vis a vis_ Government and the Gaon Sabha? Had drafting skills been better, ·this unlovely ambiguity could have been avoided. But courts have no choice but to take the text as it is. Zeroing in on the relevant provisions, we are inclined to concur with the High Court. With certitude one may assert that the State has that minimal interest to follow the proprietary fortunes of the estate so as to entitle it to take legal action to interdict its getting into alien hands. The legislative project and the legal engineering visualised by the Act are clear and ilie semantics of the words used in the provisions must bend, if iliey can, to subserve tllem. To he literal or be blinkered by some rigid canon of construction may be to miss the life of the law itself. Strengili may be derived for this interpretative stand from the observation in a recent jud~ent of this Court(l) "A word can have many meanings. To find J}ut the exact connotation of a word in a, statute, we must look to the context in which it is used. The context would quite often provide the key to meaning of the word and the sense it should carry. Its setting would give colour to it and provide a cue to the int<"ntion of the lecisfature in using it. A word, as said by Holmes, is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary !!featlv in colour an<l content acconling to the circumstances and ilie time in which it is used." (I) _Thiru Manickaru_ & _Co._ v. _The State of,Tamil Nadu._ [1977] l S.C.R. 950, MAHARAJ SINGH _v._ UTTAR PRADESH _(Krishna Iyer,_ J.) 1081 _)_ \_ _J_ In the instant case the Act contemplates taking over of all zamindari rights ~s part of land reform. However, instead of centralising management of all estates at State level, to stimulate local self-government, _the_ Act gives an enabling power-not obligatory duty-to make over these estates to Gaon Sabhas which, so long as they are in their hands will look after them· through management committees which will be under the statutory control of Gove~mnent tinder s.126. Apart from management, no power is expressly vested in the Sabhas It is reasonable to harmonii<:e the statutory provisions to reach a solution which will be least incongruous with legal rights we are cognisant of in current jurisprudence. Novelty is not a favoured child of the law. So it 1s right to fix the estate created by s. 117 into familiar moulds if any. Such an approach lends to the position that the veJSting in the State was absolute but the vesting in the Sabha was limited to possession and management subject to divestiture by Government Is sueh a construction of 'vesting' in two differ~nt senses in the ~ame section, sound ? Yes. It is, because 'vesting' is a word of slippery import and has many meanings. The context controls the text and the purpose and scheme Project the particular -semantic shade or nuance of meaning. That is why even definition clauses allow themselves to be modified by contextual compulsions. ·so the sense of the situation suggests that in s.117 ( 1) of the Act 'vested in the State' carries a plenary connotation, while 'shall vest jn the Gaon Sabha' imports a qualified disposition ·confined to the right to full possession and enjoyment so long as it lasts. Lexicographic support is forthcoming, for this meaning. Black's Law Die to dispo~e of the estates absolutely. The fact that as a _bcdy'_ cor - • porate it can own and sell property does not mean that the estates vested in a Sabha can be finally sold away, iw the teeth of the provi:llons striking a contrary note. For, unde~ s.117(6), if, for any ·reasons of better management or other, the State (Government is but the operational arm of the State and cannot, as contended. be delinked as a separate entity, in this context)-the State thinks fit to :amend or cancel the earlier vesting declaration or notificatiq11, it c::m totally deprive the Sabha of, and resume from it, any estate. This plenary power to emasculate or extinguish the Sabha's right to the estate is tell-tale. True, this cut-back on the amplitude of the vest:ing is not an incident of the estate created but is provided for by the Act itself. Even so, we; have to envision, in terms of realty law, what are the nature and incidents of the interest vested in the Sabha:full ownership divestible under no circumstances or partial estate with the paramount interest stiU surviving in _praesenti_ in the State? A B c D E F G H 1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1977] 1 s.c.R. tionary gives as the sense of 'to vest' as 'to give an imrnedi~te fixed right of present or future enjoyment, to clothe with possession, to deliver full possession of land or of an estate, to give seisin'. Webster's III International Dictionary gives the meaning as 'to give to a person a legally fixed immediate right of present or furture enjoyment'. The High Court has sought some Engilsh judicial backing(!) for taking liberties with strict and pedantic construction. A ruling of this Court(2) has been aptly pressed into service. There is thus authority for the position that the expression 've~~ is of fluid or flexible content and can if the context so dictates, bear the limited sense of being in possession and enjoyment. Indeed, to postulate vesting of absolute title in the G:j.on Sabha by virtuee of the declaration under s.117 (1) of the Act is to stultify s.117 ( 6). Not that the legislature cannot create a right to divest what has been completely vested but that an explanation of the term 'vesting' which will rationalise and integrate the initial vesting and the subsequent resumption is preferable, more plausible and better fulfils the purpose of the Act. We hold that the State has title to sustain he acion in ejectment. Aside from this stand, it is easy to take the view that the 1st plaintiff is a person. aggrieved and has the competence to carry an appeal against the dismissal of the suit. Of course, he who has a proprietary right, which has been or is threatened to be violated, is surely an 'aggrieved person'. A legal injury creates a remedial right in the injured person. But the right to a remedy apart, a larger circle of persons can move the court for the protection of defence or enforcement of a civil right or to ward off or claim compensation for a civil wrong, even if they are .not proprietarily or personally linked with the cause of action. The nexus between the _Us_ and the plaintiff need not necessarily be personal although it has to be more than a wayfarer's allergy to an unpalatable episo<le. 'A person aggrieved' is an expression which has expanded with the larger urgencies and felt necessities of our times. Processual jurisprudence is not too jejune to respond to societal changes and challenges: "Law necessarily has to carry within it the impress of the past traditions, the capacity to respond _tt>_ the needs of the present and enough resilience to cope with the d;mands of . the future. A code of law, especially in the social fields, is not a document for fastidious dialectics; properly drafted and rightly implemented it can be the means of the ordering of the life of a people."( [3] ) (I) _Richardson_ ~~,v.~~ _Robertson_ (1862) 6 LR 75; & _.Hiride_ v. _Chorlton_ (1866) 2 CP 104, 116. (2) _Fruit_ & _Vegetable Merchant's_ _Union_ v. _The Delhi Improvement Trust,_ AIR 1957 SC 344. (3) Address by-Khanna J. at the Birth Centenary of Sir Tei Bahaclur _Sapru_ d/16-10-76 at Allahabad. / _{_ # _r_ A B c D E F G q MAHARAJ SINGH _v._ UTT AR PRADESH _(Krishna Iyer,_ _!.)_ I 0 83 The.classical concept of a 'person aggrieved' is delineated in Re : _Sidebotham ex_ _p._ _Sidebotham_ (1880 14 Ch.D. 258). But the amplitude of 'legal grievance' has broadened with social compulsions. The State undertakes today activities whose benefioiaries may bci the general community even though the legal right to the undertaking may not vest in the community. The State starts welfare projects whose effective implementation may call for collective action from the protected group or any member of them. New movements like consumerism, new people's organs like harijan or mahila samajams or labour unions, new protective institutions like !~~al aid societies operate on the socio-legal plane, not to beat 'their golden wings in the void' but to intervene on behalf of the weaker classis. Such burgeoning of collective social action has, in turn, generated gradual processual adaptations. Test ~uits, class actions and representative ~itigation · are the beginning 1nd the horizon is expending, with persons and organisations not personally injured but vicariously concerned being entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the court for redressal of actual or imminent wrongs. In this wider perspective, who is a 'person aggrieved"? _Dhabolkar_ ( 1974 1 SCR 306) gives the updated answer : "The test is whether the words 'perso_n aggrieved' include 'a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests'." (p. 315) "American · jurisprudence has recognised, fqr instance, the expanding importance of consumer protection in the economic system and permitted consumer organisations to initiate or intervene in actions, although by the narrow rule of 'locu~ _standi',_ such a course could not have been justified (see p. 807-New York University Law Review, Vol. 46, 1971). In fact, citizen organisations have recently been compaigning for using legal actions for protection of community interest, broadening the scope of 'standing' in legal proceedings (see p. 403-Boston University Law Review, Vol.51, 1971). In the well-known c~se of _Attorney-General_ _of the Gambia_ v. _Peirra Sarr_ _N._ _'lie_ 1961 A.C. 617), Lord Denning observed about th~ Attorney-General's standing thus : " .... The words 'person aggrieved' are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation. They do not include, ofl course, a 11).ere busy body who is interfering in things which do not concern him; but they do include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order) has been made which prejudicially affects his interests." (p. 324-325) Where a wrong against community interest is done 'no _locus_ _standi'_ will not always be a plea to non-suit an interested' public body chasing the wrong-doer in court. In the case before us, Govern A B c D E F G H placed. Its right of resumption from the Gaon Sabha, mea9nt to be exercised in public interest, will be seriously jeopardised if the estate slips into the hands o~ a trespasser. 1'he estate belonged to the State, is vested in the Gaon Sabha for community benefit, is controlled by the State through directions to the Land Management Committee and is liable to be divested without ado any time. The wholesome object of the legislature of cautiously decentralised Yesting of estates in local self-governing units will be frustrated, if the State, the watchdog of the whole project, is to be a helpless. spectator of its purposeful bounty being wasted or lost. It must _act,_ out _d_ fidelity to the goal of the statute and the continuing duty to salvage public property for public use. Long argument is otiose to make out a legal grievance in such a situation of peril and, after all, • the star of processual actions _pro bona publico_ has to be on the ascen dant in a society where supineness must be substituted by activism if the dynamic rule of law is to fulfil itself. _'Locus standi'_ has a larger ambit in current legal semantics than the accepted, individualistic jurisprudence of old. The legal dogmas of the quiet past are no longer' adequate to assail the social injustices of the stormy present. Therefore, the State, in the present case, is entitled to appeal under s. 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Th~ second, and from a practical point of view equally potent ground of defence, is that 'appurtenant' space envelops the whole area around the buildings and the suit for recovery of possession deserves to be dismised _in toto._ Let us examine this submission. Section 9 of the Act obligates the State to settle (indeed, it _is_ deemed to be settled) with the intermediary certain items in the estate. That provision has been set out earlier. The short enquiry is whether the entire land is 'appurtenant' to the buildings. The contention of the defendant flows along these lines. The structures accepted by the High Court as 'buildings' within the scope of s. 9 were part of a cattle fair complex. Even the mandir and the _oushadalya_ fitted in to the _hat_ total and the integrity of the whole could not be broken up without violating the long years of common enjoyment. It would also be, a double injury: (a) to the defendant; and (b) to the community. The _hat_ or _me/p_ could not be held by the defendan~ if the land were snatched away and the Government could do nothing on a land without the buildings Jielonging to the defendant. Maybe there is some sociological substance in the ]Jresentation but the broader purpose of the section cannot be sacrificed to the marginal cases like the present. The larger objective is to settle with the former intermediary only such land as is strictly appurtenant to buildings, all the rest going to the State for implementation of the agrarian reform policy. The key to the solution of the dispute lies in ascertaining whether land on which the cattle fair was being held was appurtenant to the buildings or not on the strength of its use for the _hat._ The Solicitor General made a two-pronged attack on the defendant's proposition. A B c D E F G H MAHARAJ SINGH _v._ UTTAR PRADESH _(Krishna Iyer,_ J.) 1085 Firstly, he argued that _hats,_ bazars and _melas_ were a distinct interest **A** in the seheme of Indian agrestic life and agrarian law. This right had been virtually nationalised by the Act and only the State or the Gaon Sabha, save where s. 18(a) to (c) otherwise provided, could hold a fair. A ruling by this Court on an ·analogous subject lends support to this contention (See _State_ _of_ _Bihar_ v. _Dulhin Shanti Devi_ : AIR 1967 SC 427 relating to Bihar Land Reforms Act). The heated debate at the bar on this and allied aspects need not detain us further also because of our concurrence with the second eontention of the Solicitor General that the large open spaces cannot ~regarded as appurtenant to the terraces, stands and structureJS. What is integral is not necesarily appurtenant. A position of sub-0rdination, something incidental or ancillary or dependant is implied in a1'rmrtenance. Can we say that the large spaces are subsidiary or ancillary to or inevitably implied in the enjoyment of the buildingis qua buildings? that much of space required for the use of the structures _as_ _such_ has been excluded by the High Court itself. Beyond that may or may not be necessary for the _hat_ or _mela_ but not for the enjoyment of the _chabutras_ as such. A hundred acres may spread out in front of a club house for various games like golf. But all these abundant acres are unnecessary for nor incidental to the enjoyment of the house in any reasonable manner. It is confusion to miss the distinction, fine but real. **B** "Appurtenance', in relation to a dwelling, or to a school, college ... .includes all land occupied therewith and used for _the purpose_ _.thereof_ (Words and Phrases Legally Defined-Butterworths, 2nd edn). "The word 'appurtenances' has a distinct and definite meaning .... _Prima_ _facie_ it imports nothing more than what is strictly _appertaining_ _to_ _the subject-matter_ _of_ _the devise or grant,_ and which would, in truth, pass without being specially mentioned : Ordinarily, what is necessary for the enjoyment and has been used for the purpose of the building, such as easements, alone will be appurtenant. Therefore, what is necessary for the enjoyment of the building is alone covered by the expression 'appurtenance'. If some other purpose was being fulfilled by the building and the lands, it is not possible to contend that those lands are covered by the expression 'appurtenances'. Indeed 'it is settled by the earliest authority, repeated without contradiction to the latest, that fand cannot be appurtenant to land. The word 'appurtenances' rncludes all the incorpore~ hereditaments attached to the land granted or demised, such as rights of way, of common ... but it does not include lands in ad~ition to that granted'. (Words and Phrase, supra). **c** **E** **F** G **H** In short, the touchstone of 'appurtenance' is dependence of the - building on what appertainJS to it for its use as a building. Obviously, the _hat,_ bazar or _mela_ is not an appurtenance to the building. The law thus leads to the clear conclusion that even if the buildings were used and enjoyed in the past with the whole stretch of vacant space for a _hat_ or _mela,_ the land is not appurtenant to the principal subject granted by s. 9, _viz.,_ buildings. #### ..1, ' This conclustion is inevitable, although the contrary argumrnt may be ingenious. What the High Court has granted, _viz., 5_ yar&; of A 1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1977] 2 S.C.R. surrounding space, is sound in law although based on guess-work in fact The appeal fails and is dismissed but, in the circu~stances, without costs. **P.B.R.** _Appeal dismissed._ •• ##### • #### ' l 338SCI/76-GIPF.